Munna Lal Goel v. Kishan Pehalwan — 1959 DIGILAW 250 (ALL)

JUDGMENT R. Dayal, J. - This is a special appeal by Munnalal Goel and Smt. Ram Katori Goel against the order of Mr. Justice Mehrotra allowing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Sri Sri Krishna and Sri Puran Chand Mehrotra, respondents 1 and 2 respectively. 2. The appellants are the owners of certain premises occupied by the aforesaid respondents. They applied to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for permission to sue these respondents for ejectment under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act - hereinafter called the Act - on the allegation that they wanted those premises for Munnalal Goel's occupation in order that he might carry on his business there. The respondents contended that Munnalal Goel did not require the shop for the purpose alleged. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer after making enquiries rejected that application on the 31st January 1956. 3. The appellants did not then file a revision before the Commissioner under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the Act which they could do within thirty days from the communication of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to them. Instead Smt. Ram Katori, appellant No. 2, presented an application dated the 13th February 1956 to the District Magistrate Kanpur stating therein the circumstances of the family, denying that any request for enhancement of rent was made to the respondents and just stating that Munnalal Goel, her son, had applied to the Rent Control Officer but that application was decided in favour of the respondents on account of their wrong statement and ignorance of Munna Lal Goel. She prayed that her shop be got vacated and that thus justice be done and promised that she would not let it out on rent and that her son would carry on business in the shop. The District Magistrate sent this application to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer with the direction. "Please reconsider the matter after hearing the parties." 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accordingly gave a further hearing to the parties and on the Ist October 1956 granted the appellants permission to sue the respondents for ejectment. 5. The respondents then went to the Commissioner in revision. The Additional Commissioner dismissed the revision. "Please reconsider the matter after hearing the parties." 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accordingly gave a further hearing to the parties and on the Ist October 1956 granted the appellants permission to sue the respondents for ejectment. 5. The respondents then went to the Commissioner in revision. The Additional Commissioner dismissed the revision. They then filed the writ petition which was allowed by the learned Judge by an order which is the subject matter of this appeal. 6. The learned Judge held that the District Magistrate's direction forwarding the application of appellant No. 2 to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer amounted to his cancelling the order dated the 31st January 1956 of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer refusing permission to sue for the ejectment of respondents and that this the District Magistrate could not do. He further held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in his subsequent order granting the permission had not considered the point of view of the tenants at all. He also held that in these circumstances it could not be said that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had independently applied his mind to all the relevant considerations under Sec. 3 of the Act. He made it clear in his order that it was open to the landlord to make a fresh application for permission to file a suit which would be dealt with by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in accordance with law. The appellants do not appear to have taken advantage of this alternative open to them and filed the special appeal presumably knowing full well that it would take considerable time for disposal. 7. The main contention for the appellants is that the direction of the District Magistrate has been misconstrued by the learned Judge and that it did not amount to the District Magistrate's cancelling the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated the 31st January 1956. Further, it is contended that the District Magistrate could legally give such a direction as he had given in his case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. We do not agree with these contentions. 8. It is necessary to determine the nature of the District Magistrate's direction on the application presented by Smt. Ram Katori on the 13th February 1956. The direction was to reconsider the matter after hearing the parties. We do not agree with these contentions. 8. It is necessary to determine the nature of the District Magistrate's direction on the application presented by Smt. Ram Katori on the 13th February 1956. The direction was to reconsider the matter after hearing the parties. It is true that the District Magistrate did not specifically say that he was cancelling the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and that he did not order the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to cancel his previous order. The District Magistrate simply asked that officer to reconsider the matter after hearing the parties. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had finished with the matter. He had decided it finally holding that the appellants had no genuine need for the premises. The aggrieved party could go to the Commissioner against the order within thirty days of the order. We doubt whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the absence of any provision could have reviewed the order, even if he had been approached direct. No question of reconsideration therefore could possibly arise. Reconsideration can take place only when the previous order be cancelled or be deemed to have been cancelled. We are therefore of opinion that the District Magistrate's direction did amount to the implied cancellation of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer refusing to give permission for suing the respondents for ejectment. The District Magistrate's order, in the alternative, would amount to a direction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to cancel his previous order, to rehear the parties and then to decide the matter afresh. Whichever of the two interpretations be given to the District Magistrate's order, the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. There is ample authority to support this view. 9. The earliest case is that of R. N. Seth v. Girja Shanker, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 819 There the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow granted permission on the 28th April 1947 to institute the suit for ejectment. That permission was revoked by the District Magistrate Lucknow on the 24th July 1947. 9. The earliest case is that of R. N. Seth v. Girja Shanker, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 819 There the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow granted permission on the 28th April 1947 to institute the suit for ejectment. That permission was revoked by the District Magistrate Lucknow on the 24th July 1947. It was observed in this case at page 822 : "The power exercised by the District Magistrate in cancelling the order previously passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was in the nature of an appellate or revisional power which cannot be exercised in the absence of an express statutory enactment. No power is given under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act to any authority to sit in appeal or revision against an order passed by the 'District Magistrate' under Sec. 3 of the Act and the District Magistrate could not, therefore, revise the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed on 28th April 1947." 10. It may just be mentioned that in 1947 there was no provision for filing a revision before the Commissioner against the order of the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3. Such a provision was made in 1952 by the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act (XXIV of 1952) which came in force on the 1st October 1952. 11. In Jang Bahadur v. District Magistrate, Banaras, 1954 A.L.J. 225 the Additional District Magistrate set aside the order of allotment made by the Assistant Rent Control Officer. On merits the order of the Additional District Magistrate was considered to be correct and therefore the petition was rejected. V. Bhargava, J. considered this case, distinguished it and left the question open remarking at page 227 : "It is obvious that if two officers exercise the same power one cannot revise the order of another. But if the jurisdiction is concurrent, it may be possible for one to review the order of another." 12. V. Bhargava, J. considered this case, distinguished it and left the question open remarking at page 227 : "It is obvious that if two officers exercise the same power one cannot revise the order of another. But if the jurisdiction is concurrent, it may be possible for one to review the order of another." 12. Similar view is implied in the observations of Malik, C.J. in Sri Syed Abdul Hamid v. Smt. Fattma Begam, 1955 A.L.J. 132 He said at page 138 : "If the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been acting independently and had passed final orders which are now revisable by the Commissioner and then by the Local Government the District Magistrate who has neither appellate nor revisional powers may not be entitled to interfere, but where, as in this case, the District Magistrate has all along been functioning through the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and bearing in mind that the orders passed were administrative or executive orders, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Magistrate on the 6th of April, 1949, was without jurisdiction as by that order he was merely recalling a permission which had been granted at his instance." 13. In Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur and others, 1955 A.L.J. 252 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an allotment order in favour of Mahabir Prasad on the 14th June 1951. The unauthorised occupant, Bansidhar, failed in his various attempts to get that order set aside and after an order for his eviction under Sec. 7 A of the Act had been issued he approached the District Magistrate on the 12th May 1953 and prayed that a fresh enquiry might be held and further proceedings for his eviction might be stayed. The District Magistrate by his order dated the 18th September 1953 directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to cancel the allotment made by him in Mahabir Prasad's favour and to allot the shop to Bansidhar. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on the 26th September 1953 allotting the shop to Bansidhar "as demanded by the District Magistrate." Brij Mohan Lall J. said at page 255: "The mere fact that another officer has also been empowered under the Act does not take away the District Magistrate's own power. Both of them can exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Both of them can exercise concurrent jurisdiction. If a petitioner instead of applying to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer approaches the District Magistrate the latter has certainly jurisdiction to pass a suitable order thereon. But a power under concurrent jurisdiction can be exercised so long as it has not been exercised in respect of the same matter by another coordinate authority. To hold that the District Magistrate can interfere with an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer even after that officer has passed an order will mean converting an authority of concurrent jurisdiction into a superior authority. Moreover anomalous results will follow from such a proposition. If the District Magistrate exercising a concurrent jurisdiction is held entitled to upset the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the latter can, for similar reason, again upset the order of the District Magistrate. This will lead to utter confusion. This could never have been the intention of law." 14. He further held that the District Magistrate as a superior authority could not up-set the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and observed at page 256: "Where a power is exercised by a public servant under statutory sanction, that power can be exercised by him alone and not by any superior authority........... But the higher authority cannot by its own order set aside the order of the inferior authority and assume to itself an appellate or revisional power which has not been conferred upon it by the statute. If it were possible to hold that the District Magistrate by reason of being a superior authority can upset the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's order it will follow from the same process of reasoning, that the Commissioner can also by reason of being a higher authority upset the District Magistrate's order and the State Government can upset the Commissioner's order." 15. Brij Mohan Lai, J. further held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not lawfully cancel his own order when that cancellation was not the result of the exercise of his own discretion but was brought about in pursuance of an order of a superior authority and that, as such, it was really the order of the superior authority and that authority could not be permitted to do, through the agency of its subordinates, what it could not do itself. 16. 16. Mootham, C.J. agreed that the District Magistrate could not cancel the allotment order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 17. In Civil Misc. Writ No. 830 of 1953 Sri Ram Chandra v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur, and others D/d. on the 16th March 1955, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer fixed the rent of the accommodation in suit at Rs. 40/- per month. The landlady instead of filing a suit in the Civil Court under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 3 A of the Act approached the District Magistrate who called for a report from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and later directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reopen the proceedings and to submit another report to him. Brij Mohan Lall, J. held that the District Magistrate had no power to issue such an order to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and observed: "The District Magistrate had no power to issue any order to him. If the District Magistrate had contented himself with suggesting to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to rehear the petitioner and had left the said officer free to accept that suggestion or not, the position would have been different. What the District Magistrate has done is to call for a report and after the receipt of that report to direct further enquiry. He has also said that after that enquiry he will pass the order himself. He had no jurisdiction whatsoever to do so." 18. The case fully supports the contention for the respondents that the District Magistrate could not order the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reconsider his previous order. It may be mentioned, however, that Brij Mohan Lall, J. had said in Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur and others, 1955 A.L.J. 252 decided a fortnight earlier, that the superior authority may even ask the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to re-consider his decision leaving to him the freedom to change its mind or not. 19. Similar view was expressed by Mehrotra, J. in Sri K. G. Nene v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and others, 1955 A.L.J. 778 where the facts were practically similar to those of Mahabir Prasad's case'. Mehrotra, J. observed at page 782. 19. Similar view was expressed by Mehrotra, J. in Sri K. G. Nene v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and others, 1955 A.L.J. 778 where the facts were practically similar to those of Mahabir Prasad's case'. Mehrotra, J. observed at page 782. "No power of revision or appeal against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been given to the District Magistrate under the Act and if the District Magistrate cancels an order passed by a subordinate officer or issues specific direction to him, it would be in effect exercising powers of an appellate and revisional Court". 20. In Sri Bishambhar Nath Saxena v. District Magistrate Jalaun, 1956 A.L.J. 272 a similar view was expressed. In that case the District Magistrate cancelled the order of allotment passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and directed him to make a re-allotment of the premises after due publicity. It was held that the District Magistrate had no power to set aside or cancel the order of the Rent Control and Eviction officer. Agarwala, J. said at page 274. "In other words, when once an order has been made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer-it is beyond the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to set aside or to revise it unless the Act empowers him to do so." 21. In Civil Misc. Writ No. 33 of 1956 Mohammad Yunus and another v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur and others D/d. 4.12.1956, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on the 15th January 1955 granting permission to the landlords to file the suit for ejectment. The tenant then presented two applications. one before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for a reconsideration of his order and another before the District Magistrate with the same prayer. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application presented to him on the 2nd February 1955. The District Magistrate however directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated the 21st February 1955 to hear the parties and to report to him and to ask the landlords not to file the suit for ejectment in the civil court. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer complied with these directions and his final report to the District Magistrate suggested that the permission already granted be cancelled. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer complied with these directions and his final report to the District Magistrate suggested that the permission already granted be cancelled. The District Magistrate then ordered on the 13th June 1955; "Please cancel permission to evict, given to the land lord." On receipt of this order the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cancelled his previous order. It was held that the rehearing started at the instance of the District Magistrate, that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer throughout acted under the directions of the District Magistrate and that the cancellation of the permission was under the directions of the District Magistrate and not due to any independent volition of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself. The cancellation order was therefore held to be bad and was quashed. 22. It is therefore well settled that the District Magistrate cannot cancel or direct the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to cancel his previous order passed in the exercise of the statutory powers conferred on him under the Act. 23. Even if it be assumed that the District Magistrate's order did neither amount to cancelling the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer impliedly nor to directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to cancel his previous order and that it was simply an order by a superior officer to a subordinate officer suggesting to him a reconsideration of the matter after hearing the parties, we are of opinion that such a suggestion cannot be made by the District Magistrate to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It is open to question whether the District Magistrate is really a superior officer of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer when the latter exercises certain powers of the District Magistrate under the Act. The Act does not contemplate any officer subordinate to, or inferior to, the District Magistrate. It does not, of course, contemplate by the expression 'District Magistrate' just the District Magistrate who is the head of the district administration. 24. By the expression 'District Magistrate' the Act means not only the District Magistrate who is the head of the district administration but also an officer who is authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act such an officer is usually called the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 24. By the expression 'District Magistrate' the Act means not only the District Magistrate who is the head of the district administration but also an officer who is authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act such an officer is usually called the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The moment the District Magistrate has authorised some other person to perform such functions, that officer for the purpose of the Act is as good a District Magistrate as the District Magistrate conferring the power is. The Act makes no distinction between their respective powers and has not given any particular power to the District Magistrate which he could exercise with reference to the orders passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or with reference to the proceedings pending before him. The District Magistrate should not in the interest of proper discharge of his duties by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer make any particular suggestion to the latter in connection with a matter pending before him. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to exercise his own mind with respect to the matter for determination before him. The mere fact that the District Magistrate authorises such an officer to perform certain of his functions under the Act does not by itself make him, in the absence of any such provision in the Act, a superior of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. So the very first premise for the contention that the District Magistrate can make a suggestion for reconsideration to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer falls to the ground and there remains no question of such suggestions being considered to be valid due to the general power of a superior to guide a subordinate in the exercise of his executive or administrative powers. 25. The first reference to such a power in the District Magistrate as a superior officer is found in Mannu Lal v. Chakradhar Hans, 1952 A.L.J. 278 in that case the Rent Control and Eviction Officer gave permission for suing the tenant for ejectment on the 28th December 1948 but later on, i.e. on the 12th February 1949, withdrew it. 25. The first reference to such a power in the District Magistrate as a superior officer is found in Mannu Lal v. Chakradhar Hans, 1952 A.L.J. 278 in that case the Rent Control and Eviction Officer gave permission for suing the tenant for ejectment on the 28th December 1948 but later on, i.e. on the 12th February 1949, withdrew it. The landlord however ignored the revocation of the permission and instituted a suit contending that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not revoke his previous order and that in fact the revocation order was passed by him under the dictation of the District Magistrate. The courts agreed and decreed the suit for ejectment. On second appeal the suit was dismissed in view of the finding that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had inherent jurisdiction to revoke the sanction. A special appeal was then filed. It was held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer exercised administrative or executive power and not a judicial or quasi-judicial power in considering an application for permission to sue under Sec. 3 of the Act, that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on further consideration could revise his previous order if he considered it proper and that no opportunity need be given to the landlord to show cause before the previous order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could be cancelled. It is in connection with the objection about the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passing the subsequent order under the dictation of the District Magistrate which was disallow? ed, that Malik C.J. said: "An administrative or executive power has to be exercised always subject to the control of the superior officers and we see no objection to the second order having been passed at the directions of the District Magistrate." 26. It does not appear from this judgment what was the actual order of the District Magistrate. The file of the special appeal, however, shows that the District Magistrate's order contained the direction: "Previous order passed on this subject will be revised in the light of this order." Consequently the Rent Control and Eviction Officer withdrew the permission previously granted. 27. It does not appear from this judgment what was the actual order of the District Magistrate. The file of the special appeal, however, shows that the District Magistrate's order contained the direction: "Previous order passed on this subject will be revised in the light of this order." Consequently the Rent Control and Eviction Officer withdrew the permission previously granted. 27. Agarwala J., who was a member of the Bench delivering this judgment, himself held differently in Sri Bishambhar Nath Saxena v. District Magistrate, Jalaun, 1956 A.L.J. 272 He held that the District Magistrate could control and guide the Rent Control and Eviction Officer before he passed any order but could not do so after the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had exercised his power, and made an order, and explained the import of the above mentioned observation of Malik C.J. He said at page 274: "In the exercise of administrative functions there is scope for the officer exercising them being controlled by superior officer unless the exercise of the discretion is vested in the particular officer by a statutory provision. As already stated the Act authorises the District Magistrate to perform the function mentioned therein. It also authorises an officer authorised by him to act on his behalf to do the same so far as his authority will extend. It follows therefore that in administrative matters the agent of the District Magistrate may be guided by the latter as to the manner in which he will exercise the functions entrusted to him, see Mannu Lal v. Chakradhar Hans, 1952 A.L.J. 278. Before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has exercised any of the powers vested in the District Magistrate under the Act he may be controlled and guided by the District Magistrate, his principal. Once he has so exercised his powers his order is an order under the Act and it can be interfered with only as provided under the Act and not otherwise." 28. In Sri Syed Abdul Hamid v. Smt. Fatima Begum, 1955 A.L.J. 132 even Malik C. J. was not prepared to go to the length these observations ostensibly go due to amendment in law. In that case the landlord applied to the District Magistrate for permission to sue the tenant for ejectment. In Sri Syed Abdul Hamid v. Smt. Fatima Begum, 1955 A.L.J. 132 even Malik C. J. was not prepared to go to the length these observations ostensibly go due to amendment in law. In that case the landlord applied to the District Magistrate for permission to sue the tenant for ejectment. The district Magistrate forwarded the application to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer saying that the landlord be permitted to file a suit after two months. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accordingly gave the necessary permission without even issuing notice to the tenant. When the tenant filed an objection before the District Magistrate the latter cancelled the permission granted to the landlord by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and directed that notice be issued to the tenant and that both the parties be heard in the case before final orders were to be passed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer thereafter heard the parties and recommended to the District Magistrate that the original permission be maintained. The District Magistrate however was of a different opinion and wrote back that it would be unfair to turn out a tenant of long-standing without giving him alternative accommodation, the house suggested being too small for his family. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer thereafter refused the permission. Malik C.J. reiterated what he had said in Mannu Lars Casel about the exercise of administrative or executive power subject to the Control and guidance of the superior officer but said, what is already quoted before, at page 138. "If the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been acting independently and had passed final orders which are now revisable by the Commissioner and then by the Local Government the District Magistrate who has neither appellate nor revisional powers may not be entitled to interfere, but where, as in this case, the District Magistrate has all along been functioning through the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and bearing in mind that the orders passed were administrative or executive orders, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Magistrate on the 6th of April, 1949, was without jurisdiction as by that order he was merely recalling a permission which had been granted at his instance." 29. In Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur and others, 1955 A.L.J. 252 Brij Mohan Lall J. said at page 256 : "Where a power is exercised by a public servant under statutory sanction, that power can be exercised by him alone and not by any superior authority. The superior authority may give him suggestion and may even ask him to reconsider his decision leaving to him the freedom to change its mind or not. If in such circumstances the officer who originally pass-ed the order changes his mind and arrives at a contrary conclusion, the order will be perfectly valid because it would be the order of the original authority and not of the higher authority." He explained the observations in Mannu Lal's case thus at page 257 : "What the learned Chief Justice meant by the above quoted remark was that the District Magistrate could suggest new facts and new aspects of the case to the Rent. Control and Eviction Officer and could ask him to reconsider the matter in the light of those suggestions. Had it been his Lordship's intention to say that the District Magistrate could substitute his own discretion for the discretion of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer a more explicit language would have been used. It may again be pointed out that in the Full Bench case cited above the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has remarked that where the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been acting independently different considerations arise and it is not possible for the District Magistrate to interfere. His remarks relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite party are to be interpreted in the light of his observations in the Full Bench case. Obviously his Lordship meant that the District Magistrate could ask the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reconsider the matter. He did not mean to hold that the District Magistrate could overrule the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer." 30. With respect, we do not agree with this interpretation of the remarks as in that case it had been found that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed the cancellation order at the dictation of the District Magistrate. 31. With respect, we do not agree with this interpretation of the remarks as in that case it had been found that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed the cancellation order at the dictation of the District Magistrate. 31. It is clear from the above discussion that the view expressed in Mannu Lal's case about the exercise of administrative or executive power by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer under the control and guidance of the District Magistrate, the superior officer, has not been fully accepted in later cases which clearly lay down that an order once passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot be cancelled, varied or amended by the District Magistrate or by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under his directions even if the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself can do so on his own initiative and as the result of his exercising his own mind independently and that such guidance can be given prior to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's passing an order and not later. 32. Just as it has been considered in the Full Bench case of Sri Syed Abdul Hamid v. Smt. Fatima Begum, 1955 A.L.J. 132 that the subordinate Magistrate will not think of interfering with the order of his superior, the District Magistrate, it can be said that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer will not think of not acting according to the recommendation or suggestion of the District Magistrate and that therefore any suggestion or recommendation by the District Magistrate in connection with an order already passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer must have the result of depriving that officer of the exercise of his own independent mind. When the District Magistrate asked the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the present case to reconsider the matter after hearing the parties, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no option but to reconsider the matter which as already mentioned, implied setting aside his original order and replacing it by a subsequent order which may be of the same nature but certainly would be a new order. It may be said that the District Magistrate by his recommendation had allowed the application for review though he had left the actual review of the previous order to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It may be said that the District Magistrate by his recommendation had allowed the application for review though he had left the actual review of the previous order to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Both the acts, i.e., the act of considering the question whether a review appellants should be granted or not and, if granted, the act of finally deciding the matter, are to be performed by the same officer just as they are done in Court. Here, the District Magistrate undoubtedly did the first act, i.e., allowed the review application to the extent that the the case be reheard. He did not pass the final order nor did he give any direction about it. It was left to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to pass a suitable order after hearing the parties. The District Magistrate's order therefore undoubtedly trespassed over the jurisdiction. It cannot be said what the reaction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself would have been to the application of Smt. Ram Katori if it had been presented to him with the District Magistrate's recommendation. 33. It has been urged for the respondents that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer becomes final after thirty days if no revision is filed and that therefore even the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot revoke his previous order. It is not necessary to consider this question as we have held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not review the order at his own instance and had done so under the direction of the District Magistrate. 34. It may be open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to entertain a fresh application for permission to sue after he has rejected a previous one, but such a successive application will be entertained ordinarily only on the basis of fresh material which was not available at the consideration of the previous application. The application of Srimati Ram Katori to the District Magistrate in the present case was not a fresh application for permission. It was an application allegation that the order on the earlier application had been wrong and praying for justice being done by having the other party vacate the permises. Paragraph 12 of the Counter affidavit sworn to by Munnalal Goel States. It was an application allegation that the order on the earlier application had been wrong and praying for justice being done by having the other party vacate the permises. Paragraph 12 of the Counter affidavit sworn to by Munnalal Goel States. "The only object of approaching the District Magistrate was that that the deponents application under Sec. 3 may be property Considered on merits and disposed of according to law." 35. In the circumstances it is not open to the appellants to urge that this was a fresh application for permission. It was clearly an application to the District Magistrate for setting aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 36. It has been Strenuously urged for the appellants that there being no error apparent on the face of the record this Court could not interfere when the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner have followed the procedure laid down in the Act. We have already indicated that what took place in the present case was not in conformity with what is provided in the Act. The Act does not provide for the District Magistrate interference with the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself. The error committed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in reviewing his previous order in the circumstances of this case is fairly well apparent. The Commissioner took a wrong view of the law as interpreted by this Court and his order also therefore suffers from an apparent error of law. This Court can interfere with such an order. 37. It has also been contended for the appellants that the respondents did not avail of the right to go to the State Government in view of its powers under Sec. 7-F of the Act. It was held in Brij Kishore v. The Rent Control Officer, Kanpur, 1954 A.L.J. 172 that this section gives no right to a party to approach the Government. It was observed at page 176. "We are of opinion that this section does not afford any alternative remedy to the applicants. The applicants have not been given any right to approach the State Government to revise the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. This section just empowers the State Government to call for the record and make suitable order. "We are of opinion that this section does not afford any alternative remedy to the applicants. The applicants have not been given any right to approach the State Government to revise the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. This section just empowers the State Government to call for the record and make suitable order. The applicants, therefore, cannot approach the State Government by way of appeal or revision against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer." 38. We are therefore of opinion that the District Magistrate had no power to pass the order he did directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to reconsider the matter after hearing the parties and that that order and the subsequent order of the. Rent Control and Eviction Officer were bad in law and had been rightly set aside by the learned Judge. 39. In view of the above, we dismiss this appeal with costs.