Judgment S.C.Misra, J. 1. The two petitioners, Ramsaroop Dhanuk and America Dhanuk, were being tried in the Gram Cutcherry of Kharthua Gram Panchayat, within police-station Bukhtiarpur, on the complaint filed against them by the Opposite Party Ishwar Sao. The charge against them was that on the night of the 9th of May, 1958, they along with some other persons stealthily entered the room of the complainant and committed theft o£ a number of articles and the two petitioners were identified among the culprits. Cognizance was taken of the case and they were summoned for trial before the Gram Panchayat. The petitioners thereafter filed an application before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Barh under Sections 70 and 73 of the Bihar Gram Panchayat Raj Act, challenging the jurisdiction of that Court to try them. They alleged that there was deep-seated enmity between the petitioners and the members of the Gram Panchayat as also that the complainants case made out an offence under Sec. 457, Indian Penal Code, which was not triable by the Gram Panchayat Court. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate sent for the records of the case and rejected the prayer for taking the case out of the jurisdiction of the Panchayat Court. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, however, indicated in the order rejecting the prayer that the question of jurisdiction could arise clearly only after the evidence in the case was recorded, but that he was not satisfied that there was any substance in the allegation of enmity contained in the petition. On 1-7-1958, the petitioners again approached the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, after some evidence was recorded, for transfer of the case to the Court of a Magistrate, but the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate called for a report from the Gram Panchayat and perusing the same rejected the petition for a transfer. The petitioners have accordingly moved this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 or the Constitution of India for quashing the trial and directing transfer of the case pending before the Gram Panchayat to a competent Magistrate. 2. Learned counsel has pressed the only question now left open to him which is that the facts stated in the petition of complaint disclose an offence under Section 457, Indian Penal Code, which is not triable by the Gram Panchayat Court, and, as such, their trial under Sec.380, Indian Penal Code, was beyond jurisdiction. 2. Learned counsel has pressed the only question now left open to him which is that the facts stated in the petition of complaint disclose an offence under Section 457, Indian Penal Code, which is not triable by the Gram Panchayat Court, and, as such, their trial under Sec.380, Indian Penal Code, was beyond jurisdiction. Learned counsel has referred to the case of Kailash Singh V/s. The State, 1958 BLJR 780, which judgment was delivered by me sitting with U. N. Sinha J. The particular passage on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Court trying the case is in seizin of the case on the allegations on behalf of the prosecution. That decision, however, is no authority for the proposition put forward by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners. That was a case in which charge was under Sec.325, Indian Penal Code, which was tried by the learned Magistrate but he convicted the accused under Sec.323, Indian Penal Code. The argument advanced in that case was that the offence under Sec.323, Indian Penal Code, being triable by the Gram Cutcherry it was incumbent on the trial Magistrate suo motu to transfer the case to the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who should have ordered the case to be tried by the Gram Cutcherry. That argument was negatived: The question raised by the learned Counsel in the present petition did not arise for consideration in the above case. The next case relied upon by the learned Counsel was the decision of this Court reported in Shyamlal Jagnani V/s. State, AIR 1954 Pat 247 . That was a case in which the accused were tried under Sec.353, Indian Penal Code, by a Magistrate of the Second Class and was acquitted. He was again prosecuted on the same facts by a first class Magistrate for an offence under Clauses (a) and (h) of Sec.26 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the second trial was barred. The Division Bench of this Court, however, rejected the contention on the ground that the second trial was expressly permissible under Sec. 403 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the Magistrate in the previous trial was not competent to try the offences in subsequent trial in view of Sec.26 (2) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. The Division Bench of this Court, however, rejected the contention on the ground that the second trial was expressly permissible under Sec. 403 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the Magistrate in the previous trial was not competent to try the offences in subsequent trial in view of Sec.26 (2) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. They were distinct offences. The following observation was made in that judgment with regard to this argument: "It appears to me that this argument cannot possibly have any application to the petitioners trial for the offence under Sec.26 (1) (a) because that offence is constituted not by any act done by them on 22-4-1952 but by their general act of not having got themselves registered as dealers under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, though they were required to get themselves registered under the provision of Section 9 (1) of that Act. The mere fact that Vishnu Swaroop learnt of this default on the aforesaid date cannot make it an act done or an offence committed by the petitioners on that particular date." The facts of the case were, therefore, entirely different from those which are found in the present case. In the case of Idris V/s. Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat 349, it was held that according to Sec.35, Code o£ Criminal procedure, as it now stands, there is nothing to prevent the Court to pass separate sentences for offences under Sections 457 and 380, Indian Penal Code. The question, however, is not of much practical importance as in an overwhelmingly large number of cases the punishment provided for any one of these two offences will be sufficient and if the Court of appeal finds that the trial Court has wrongly passed two separate sentences, but the sentences taken together are not excessive, they can be consolidated. In the case of Mt. Champa Pasin V/s. Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 326, which is referred to in that judgment, it has been held that two separate sentences for offences under Sections 457 and 380 were not justified. In the case of Mt. Champa Pasin V/s. Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 326, which is referred to in that judgment, it has been held that two separate sentences for offences under Sections 457 and 380 were not justified. It is clear from this that although in a particular case a person may be convicted both under Sections 457 and 380, Indian Penal Code, if the evidence in the case fulfils the requirement of both the sections yet it may well be that, where the facts are of a doubtful nature, an accused person may with equal propriety be convicted only under Sec.380, Indian Penal Code, although on meticulous examination of the facts the offence might also be triable on the additional charge framed under Section 457, Indian Penal Code. The decision in the case of Mohd. Abdullah V/s. Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 243, only lays down the well-known principle that a Magistrate acts without jurisdiction if he reduces a grave offence to a minor one with a view to give himself jurisdiction to by the case summarily. Where the facts of a case clearly make out an offence of a grave character but the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction wrongly applying a section for a minor offence, the argument may well be advanced that it amounts to an act of reducing a grave offence to a minor one with a view to clutch jurisdiction. In those cases, however, where the facts are of a doubtful nature no such consideration can arise. In my opinion, although an offence under Sec. 457 may be independent of an offences under S, 380 yet in a good many cases it is very difficult to distinguish them, and where the trial is one under Section 380, Indian Penal Code, where theft has been committed in a house by the accused person, it cannot necessarily be asserted that it is not a case under Section 380 but under Sec. 457 and Sec.380 taken together. In the case of Makund Moiri V/s. State of Bihar, Criminal Misc. In the case of Makund Moiri V/s. State of Bihar, Criminal Misc. Case No. 282 of 1954, (Pat), which is my own judgment sitting with Banerji J. decided on 14-1-1955, the following observation was made: "The facts made out in the petition of complaint at the most, as I have said, might make the offence of a doubtful nature, as was the view of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, as to whether two distinct offences under Sections 379 and 323, Indian Penal Code, were committed or a graver offence under Sec.392 of the Code was committed. In the result, we would be reluctant to exercise our power of superintendence in setting aside a judgment of this character particularly when the petitioners made no grievance of it at an early stage." Learned Counsel for the petitioners has, however, contended that that observation was made because the petitioners in that case moved this Court only after their conviction by the Gram Cutcharry, In the present case, however, the petitioners have moved this Court earlier, before the trial has been held. Therefore, the above case is distinguishable. In my opinion, the contention is unacceptable. It is true, no doubt, that in Makund Koers case the petitioners had come to this Court at a late stage but the principle of law laid down therein remains that this High Court will not compel the trial Court necessarily to divest itself of jurisdiction on the view that the facts make out an offence of a graver nature not triable by the Court in seizin of the case, unless the offence disclosed is necessarily a distinct one. Where, however, as I have mentioned above, the facts on behalf of the prosecution are such that the offence may fall under a section triable by the Court on a reasonable view of the matter, this Court will not order that Court to be divested of jurisdiction. In my opinion, therefore, the observation in Makund Koeris case to which reference has been made by Mr. Sanyal for the opposite party, must be taken to be applicable to this case as well and the application must be dismissed. It is not necessary in this view of the matter to take into account what has happened in the case in the Grams Cutcharry after the institution of this application in this Court. 3. This application accordingly fails and is dismissed.