Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge of Anjikaimal, reversing the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsiff of Vaikom in O. S.774/1121. 2. The present suit was for terminating the lease hold right of the defendants under a lease in their favour, of 1086 namely, Ext. B, in these proceedings and also for an injunction restraining them from taking delivery of the property in execution of the decree in O.S. 1277/1104, District Munsiff's Court, Vaikom, evidenced by the judgment, Ext. 2. 3. According to the plaintiff, the suit properties Sy. No. 10/7 of an extent of about 53 cents of garden land, belongs to the Thripunithura Devaswom. There was a lease executed by the Devaswom on 18-6-1086 under Ext. B, in favour of one Ayyappan Krishnan. This Ayyappan Krishnan assigned the lease-hold rights, obtained by him under Ext. B, in favour of the first plaintiff in these proceedings, on 2-7-1094. There was a suit filed by the present defendants 1 and 2, to which the present plaintiff was also a party, as also the assignor in favour of the present plaintiff.- That suit was O.S. 1277/1104, District Munsiff's Court, Vaikom, for setting aside the assignment in favour of the present plaintiff by Ayyappan Krishnan on the ground that the lease-hold rights obtained by Ayyappan Krishnan was not his exclusive property, but it was a lease taken by him as Karnavan for and on behalf of the members of the tarwad, of which the present defendants 1 to 6 are parties. There was also an allegation that the assignment itself, in favour of the present plaintiff of 2-7-1094, is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs in O.S. 1277/1104. 4. That suit was contested by the present plaintiff on several grounds which will be mentioned later in this judgment. But ultimately, the present defendants 1 and 2 who are the plaintiffs in O.S. 1277/1104 obtained a decree for possession of the properties as prayed for. There was also a declaration that the lease evidenced by Ext. B enured to the members of the tarwad of which Ayyappan Krishnan was Karnavan and that the assignment in favour of the present plaintiff was not assigned on the members of the tarwad. 5. There was also a declaration that the lease evidenced by Ext. B enured to the members of the tarwad of which Ayyappan Krishnan was Karnavan and that the assignment in favour of the present plaintiff was not assigned on the members of the tarwad. 5. Pending the proceedings in O.S. 1277/1104, the first plaintiff, who was the first defendant in O. S.1277/1104, obtained directly from the Tripunithura Devaswom itself a lease in his favour evidenced by Ext. H dated 18-2-110. According to the plaintiff, the lease in his favour by the Devaswom evidenced by Ext. H gives a right to terminate the leasehold interest of the defendants on the basis of the lease taken by Ayyappan Krishnan under Ext. B. 6. The suit was contested by the defendants on several grounds. (1) The most important point of attack raised as against the plaintiff's claim was that the proceedings covered by O.S. 1277/1104, which resulted in the judgment Ext. 2, operates as res judicata in these proceedings; (2) the lease taken by the first plaintiff and evidenced by Ext. H is hit by lis pendens under the provision of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, inasmuch as it was taken during the pendency of 0. S.1277/1104; and (3) in any event, the present first plaintiff, when he took Ext. H, which is practically a renewal of the lease in favour of Ayyappan Krishnan, was occupying a fiduciary position in possession of the properties. Having obtained a renewal under Ext. H, the said renewal operates as a resulting Trust in favour of these parties-defendants, by virtue of the application by S.90 of the Trusts Act. 7. Both the learned District Munsiff as also the learned District Judge have rejected the attack on the ground that the present proceedings are barred by res judicata by virtue of the decision evidenced by Ext. 2. On the other substantial contentions raised by the defendants namely of lis pendens and also the resulting Trust, here again, the learned District Munsiff did not accept those pleas raised on behalf of the contesting defendants. According to the trial court, there is no bar of lis pendens nor was the first plaintiff occupying a position of Trust or confidence or a fiduciary capacity when he obtained the lease, Ext. H, in his favour. According to the trial court, there is no bar of lis pendens nor was the first plaintiff occupying a position of Trust or confidence or a fiduciary capacity when he obtained the lease, Ext. H, in his favour. In this view, the trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit as prayed for, subject to his paying the value of improvements to the contesting defendants, fixed by that court. 8. This decree was taken on appeal by the defendants to the learned District Judge of Anjikaimal. Here again, the learned judge, as mentioned earlier, did not accept the plea of the defendants that the present proceedings are hit by the plea of res judicata. But on the question of lis pendens, the learned judge was at considerable pains to record a finding in favour of the defendants. The entire reasoning of the learned judge on this aspect of the matter is contained in Para.4 of his judgment and it is seen that the learned judge himself felt considerable doubt about the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to this transaction, Ext. H. But nevertheless, the learned judge did come to a conclusion that the transaction evidenced by Ext. H is hit by S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Dealing with the question as to whether S.90 of the Trusts Act is attracted to the transaction evidenced by Ext. H on which the first plaintiff very strongly relies upon in this litigation, the learned judge was of the view that but for the assignment in his favour and also his possession by virtue of that assignment, the present first plaintiff would not have got a renewal from the Tripunithura Devaswom. On this reasoning, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff, by virtue of his possession under the document dated 2-7-1094, has utilised that possession for obtaining additional advantage or benefit in his favour namely renewal under Ext. H. In consequence, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the renewal so obtained by the first plaintiff under Ext. H, must enure for the real owners namely, the present defendants 1 and 2. In this view, the learned judge disagreed with the conclusions arrived at on these points by the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 9. H. In consequence, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the renewal so obtained by the first plaintiff under Ext. H, must enure for the real owners namely, the present defendants 1 and 2. In this view, the learned judge disagreed with the conclusions arrived at on these points by the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 9. It is against this judgment of the learned District Judge that the legal representatives of the plaintiff have come up in appeal. Mr. Subramonia Iyer, learned counsel for the appellants, very strenuously attacked the reasoning of the learned judge on the question of the applicability of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act and also S.90 of the Trusts Act. Mr. P.H. Sankaranarayana Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting defendants-respondents supported the reasoning of the learned judge on both these points, and in fact Mr. Sankaranarayana Iyer has referred me also to some case law which may have a bearing on a consideration of the question of lis pendens and also the applicability of S.90 of the Trusts Act. In the view that I take on the question of res judicata which really has been held in favour of the plaintiff-appellant by both the courts, and which has been canvassed before me by Mr. Sankaranarayana Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, I think it unnecessary to consider whether the views expressed by the learned District Judge on the question of lis pendens and the applicability of S.90 of the Trusts Act are correct or not. In my view, the contentions of Mr. Sankaranarayana Iyer that this litigation is barred by res judicata, by virtue of the proceedings in O.S. 1277/1104, which resulted in the judgment of Ext. 2, has to be accepted. Though Mr. S. Subramonia Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, has attempted to support the conclusions arrived at by both the courts on this point, I am not able to accept his contentions in this regard. 10. In order to appreciate whether the present proceeding is hit by the proceedings in 0. S.1277/1104, District Munsiff's Court, Vaikom it is desirable to consider what exactly was the scope of that litigation. That was a suit filed by the present defendants 1 and 2 for recovery of possession of the suit properties from the present first plaintiff, who was the first defendant therein. S.1277/1104, District Munsiff's Court, Vaikom it is desirable to consider what exactly was the scope of that litigation. That was a suit filed by the present defendants 1 and 2 for recovery of possession of the suit properties from the present first plaintiff, who was the first defendant therein. Their case was that the lease obtained by Ayyappan Krishnan on 18-6-1086, evidenced by Ext. B, was a transaction entered into by him not in his individual capacity or for his sole benefit, but as Karanavan of the tarwad of which the present defendants 1 to 6 are members. They also contended that the assignment made by Ayyappan Krishnan of this leasehold right in favour of the present first plaintiff who was the first defendant therein, on 2-7-1094, is not valid and binding as against the tarwad. They also took the contention that the assignment itself is not supported by consideration and there were also several minor points of attack regarding the same. 11. The present first plaintiff, who was the first defendant that suit, filed a written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiffs therein to get possession of the properties on the basis of the original lease in favour of Ayyappan Krishnan namely, Ext. B. The defence of the present first plaintiff, as will be seen from a narration of the contentions of the parties set out in the judgment of, the learned District Munsiff, evidenced by Ext. 2, was to the effect that the plaintiffs therein have no right to get possession of the properties from the 1st defendant therein. He took up the position that the leasehold right taken by Ayyappan Krishnan and subsequently transferred in his favour was really a transaction taken by Ayyappan Krishnan for his exclusive benefit and that he was entitled in law to transfer the same to whomsoever he likes without regard for the wishes of the other members of the tarwad. On this ground, he supported the assignment in his favour dated 2-7-1094. Apart from this attack made on the right of the plaintiffs therein to get possession of the property, he also took pointedly another attack upon their right to get possession and placed considerable reliance upon the present transaction in his favour, namely, Ext. H dated 18-2-1105. He stated that he has obtained a direct lease from the Tripunithura Devaswom on 18-2-1105 evidenced by Ext. H dated 18-2-1105. He stated that he has obtained a direct lease from the Tripunithura Devaswom on 18-2-1105 evidenced by Ext. H in these proceedings, and as such, the right of the Karnavan on the basis of the lease. Ext. B, has also been extinguished and in consequence, the suit filed by the plaintiffs therein on the basis of the lease, even assuming that it was a lease in favour of the Karnavan namely, Ext. B, cannot avail them in those proceedings. 12. No doubt, there is no issue framed as regards Ext. H in those proceedings. But the point is that that was also relied upon as an alternative point of attack for non-suiting the plaintiffs therein and the parties' joined issue on this matter also. In these circumstances, there cannot be any dispute that even an alternative point of attack taken in a particular litigation by a party and decided against him by the court, will operate as res judicata as regards both the main points and also that alternative point in subsequent proceedings. The right of the present first plaintiff, who was the first defendant in those proceedings to non-suit the plaintiffs therein, namely, defendants 1 & 2 in this suit, on those points, was considered by that court in Para.8 of the judgment evidenced by Ext. 2. After considering the plea raised by the present first plaintiff on the basis of Ext. H, the learned District Munsiff came to the conclusion that the present first plaintiff would not have got possession of the properties of the leasehold right but for the fact, that possession was transferred by Ayyappan Krishnan under the assignment dated 2-7-1094. No doubt, the trial court, there, had to consider also the right of the plaintiffs if any, to get value of improvements. But the more important point is that the trial court recorded a specific finding on this point based upon Ext. H to this effect: "In the circumstances, the execution of another lease-deed by Devaswom does not extinguish the rights of the original lessees. This contention of the first defendant is not sustainable." After considering the other point in controversy between the parties, ultimately, the trial court there gave a decree as prayed for in favour of the plaintiffs, ignoring the rights claimed by the present first plaintiff on the basis of Ext. H also. 13. No doubt, Mr. This contention of the first defendant is not sustainable." After considering the other point in controversy between the parties, ultimately, the trial court there gave a decree as prayed for in favour of the plaintiffs, ignoring the rights claimed by the present first plaintiff on the basis of Ext. H also. 13. No doubt, Mr. S. Subramonia Iyer was at considerable pains to convince me that the reasoning of the learned judge in that case in Para.8 of his judgment regarding Ext H, was not really necessary for a decision in that case and at the most, that was considered only to find out whether the landlord has got a right to grant a lease to another tenant, without satisfying the claims of the existing tenant regarding the value of improvements. I am not able to accept this contention of the learned counsel on the interpretation that he places on the reasoning contained in Para.8 of that judgment. As stated earlier, this was an alternative basis of attack made by the present first plaintiff to non-suit the plaintiffs in O.S. 1277/1104. There, it was specifically found that the execution of this lease-deed in favour of the present first plaintiff by the Devaswom will not extinguish the rights of the original lessees. In this litigation, this is exactly what he wants to achieve by having a declaration for extinguishing the rights of the present defendants on the original lease, Ext. B. Ext. II may be a right decision or wrong decision. I am not concerned with that aspect of the matter, when the point is whether that decision operates as res judicata in the present proceedings. 14. Mr. S. Subramonia Iyer finally contended that the exact pleading raised by his client in that litigation was not made available in these proceedings. It is not really necessary because sufficient extracts from the written statement of the present first plaintiff have been made in the judgment. Further, the first plaintiff knows full well that this question of res judicata has been raised in the present proceedings even at the earliest stage of the written statement, and if the first plaintiff has not placed any material to controvert the statement contained in Ext. 2, he will have to take the consequences therefor. 15. Further, the first plaintiff knows full well that this question of res judicata has been raised in the present proceedings even at the earliest stage of the written statement, and if the first plaintiff has not placed any material to controvert the statement contained in Ext. 2, he will have to take the consequences therefor. 15. In the result, the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge are confirmed, but for different reasons given by me in this judgment. The plaintiff will pay the costs of the respondents. No leave.