ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. This second appeal arises out of a suit fur ejectment on the ground contained in Section 4 (g) of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 23 of 1955. The trial Judge dismissed the suit and that has been confirmed by the Addl. District Judge (Shri P. V. Muzumdar). Apart from anything else, there is an insuperable difficulty in the way of the Appellant who, as conceded by the Learned Counsel, resides in a house of which he is the owner. That house is situated in the city of Lashkar and the house from which the Defendant is sought to be ejected is also situated in the same city. Clause (g) of Section 4 runs thus: in the case of residential accommodation that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence or that of any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and there is no other accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned for such residence. Two things are required to be established before a decree for ejectment can be passed under this section: (1) A landlord must genuinely require: accommodation (a) for his own residence, or (b) for that of any person of his family. (2) There is no accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned for such residence. On a plain reading of this section it is clear that if a landlord has another accommodation in the same city in which he is residing, he cannot claim ejectment of a tenant on the ground that he requires it for his own residence; likewise if the person of his family for whom he requires ejectment of his tenant is residing in the same city in a house belonging to the Plaintiff, then also the suit is not maintainable. Shri Sapre maintains that(the word 'such' indicates that if the residence in the occupation of the landlord is not sufficient for his needs he is entitled to get a tenant ejected although he may be residing in another house of his own. If this construction was accepted it would render the protection, which the law aims to provide, nugatory. I would demonstrate it in this way. If this construction was accepted it would render the protection, which the law aims to provide, nugatory. I would demonstrate it in this way. Supposing a landlord has four houses A B G D. He is residing in house A and brings a suit against the tenant occupying house B on the ground that he requires it for his own need. He gets ejectment on the interpretation put by Shri Supre. Then he seeks ejectment of the tenant occupying house C and then again of the tenant in occupation of D. In this way, he can get all his houses vacated, and every time his plea would be that the accommodation was not sufficient for his needs and that he is the sole arbiter of his requirement. In my opinion such a construction would put the section out of harmony with the Act as a whole. Shri Sapre relies on two reported decisions. (1954 M.B.L.J. 274 and 1306). Neither of these two decisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court is applicable to this case. In each of those cases the landlord was residing in a rented house and the question was whether he could be compelled to stay there on the plea that it was sufficient for his residence. The point involved here was not under consideration in any of those eases. It may also be mentioned in passing that Section 4 (g) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Act No. 15 of 1950 was slightly different from Section 4 (g) of the Madhya Bharat Accommndation Control Act No. 23 of 1955 which governs the case in hand. In the former Act the words 'of his own' did not exist. Then Shri Sapre has relied on an unreported decision of this Court in Second Appeal No. 6 of 1959 Shyamji Bhai v. Nand Kishore (which the learned Judge did not mark as approved for reporting). It is not clear from that judgment that the question now before me was agitated there. It seems to me that what was urged in that case was that the decision in Motilal v. Badrilal 1954 M.B.L.J. 274 deserved a reconsideration. But the learned Judge did not agree. It is not clear from that judgment that the question now before me was agitated there. It seems to me that what was urged in that case was that the decision in Motilal v. Badrilal 1954 M.B.L.J. 274 deserved a reconsideration. But the learned Judge did not agree. The following observations of Kristin an J. After all once there is personal requirement it should be for the landlord to decide for himself, whether he should sqeoze himself in one room or 2 rooms, or should stretch himself in more confortable accommodation. I do not see why the landlord should be compelled to live in discomfort and cramped just to oblige an unwilling tenant cannot be read as referring also to a case where the landlord is residing in a house of bis own. At the request of Shri Sapre I have perused the judgment of the first appellate Court in that case. Instead of supporting Shri Sapre's presumption, it is now quite clear that in that case also the Plaintiff was residing in a rented bouse. Repelling the argument that the Plaintiff had not averred in the plaint that he had no accommodation of bis own in that city, the Addl. District Judge, Vidisha observed: Mere mat men is tark men koi sar nahin hai kyonki pakshkaron ke bich is sambandh men koi bhra nahin hai ki vadi ke pas vidisha men is vad grasta makan ke atrikt anya kot(sic) makan niji nahin hai. Pratwadi gan sweyam ne jawab notis dinsnkit 18-9-55 tatha apni mujbat appeal ke para, 2 aa men likha hai ki vadi ke pas is makan ke alawa kiraya ka makan hai. In this situation I do not see any force in Shri Sapre's persuasion that I should refer the matter to a larger Bench. It is all the more so because I am fortified in my view by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Khubchand and Anr. v. Badri Pd. and others in Letters Patent Appeal No. 28 of 1957 (decided at Jabalpur by Bbutt and Shrivastava JJ.) where it is laid down: In a case where a landlord is occupying "any other house" in the same city or town the question of the sufficiency of the accommodation does not arise for consideration. Therefore, the fact that Respondents Nos. and others in Letters Patent Appeal No. 28 of 1957 (decided at Jabalpur by Bbutt and Shrivastava JJ.) where it is laid down: In a case where a landlord is occupying "any other house" in the same city or town the question of the sufficiency of the accommodation does not arise for consideration. Therefore, the fact that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 found the premises in their possession to be insufficient for their needs did not entitle them to the grant of permission to terminate the tenancy. For these reasons this appeal is dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed