JUDGMENT B. Upadhya, J. - These revisions arise out of proceedings started on objections being Sled Under Order 21 Rule 58, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. One Ram Narain Sahu had five sons, one of whom died issueless and the other four were Bhairo Dayal, Kanhaiya Lal, Ganesh Prasad and Ram Rup. Bhairo Dayal's son, Sri Lakshmi Sevak Sahu was the judgment debtor against whom the decree was sought to be executed and the objectors are the sons of Sri Lakshmi Sevak Sahu. The decree holder is Kanhaiya Lal's son Rang Nath who had brought a suit for accounts against; Lakshmi Sevak Sahu as manager of the family estate. Lakshmi Sevak Sahu had not rendered proper accounts to Rang; Nath and Rang Nath claimed that he was entitled to his share of the income of the family properties. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit filed by Rang Nath on 15-8-1944. This was followed by a final decree, which is now in execution, on 13-12-1949, for Rs. 4451 odd. This suit had been filed by Rang Nath in the year 1930, Two years earlier another suit No. 48 of 1928 had been filed by Ram Rup the youngest son of Ram Narain Sahu against Lakshmi Sevak Sahu with similar allegations. In that case a preliminary decree was passed but there were appeals and the matter was fought U.P. to the Privy Council. When the decree ultimately passed was executed there was a compromise between Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and Balmukand son of Ram Rup, who had since died. Though the matter is now not before the court these two cases do indicate that members of the erstwhile Hindu family, whose affairs were being managed by Sri Lakshmi Sevak Sahu, were evidently dissatisfied with the management and this dissatisfaction took the concrete shape of litigation as far back as 1928 and 1930. The course of litigation appears to be much prolonged and the sons of Lakshmi Sevak Sahu appear to have felt the necessity of safeguarding their own interests by separating their shares in the ancestral property. It is alleged that in 1938 there was a partition between Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and his sons and possession was separately taken by the parties, but there was no document in writing to evidence that partition. It is alleged that in 1938 there was a partition between Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and his sons and possession was separately taken by the parties, but there was no document in writing to evidence that partition. On 29 3-1944 a regular partition deed was drawn up, executed and got registered and the two properties which were attached by the decree holder on 20-5-1950 are said to be the properties which came by allotment to the share of the sons of Lakshmi Sevak Sahu. It appears that the court closed soon after the attachment for the summer vacations and when reopened early in July objections were filed by the sons of Lakshmi Sevak Sahu Under Order 21 Rule 58 Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Civil Judge disposed of the objections along with another objection in another execution case which was heard along with this case by another order dated 5-4-1952, He dismissed the objections. 3. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge is rather a very long order in which he has attempted to deal in detail with matters which he thought called for a decision in the case. The learned Judge after setting out the pedigree referred to the prolonged litigation from 1928 and then set out some of the facts relating to the partition between Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and his sons and proceeded to formulate the points which according to him arose for decision, almost issues, in a regular suit. The learned Judge posed four questions: (1) Whether a separation and partition had taken place between Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and his sons in 1938 and 1940? (2) Whether the partition set U.P. was a sham and collusive transaction? (3) Whether the decree in question amounted to Avyavaharik debt? (4) Whether any arrangements had been made by Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and his sons for payment of the debts of the creditor and if not its effect? 4. (2) Whether the partition set U.P. was a sham and collusive transaction? (3) Whether the decree in question amounted to Avyavaharik debt? (4) Whether any arrangements had been made by Lakshmi Sevak Sahu and his sons for payment of the debts of the creditor and if not its effect? 4. One cannot help noticing that in posing these questions the learned Judge evidently forgot the exact scope of an enquiry Under Order 21, Rule 58 and felt as if he was dealing with a regular suit, yet the enquiry was and must be considered by the parties to be of a summary character, with the result that a solitary person was examined as a witness on behalf of the objectors and only the son of the decree holder appeared on the other side. Detailed evidence relating to the nature of the transaction, the partition itself and the earlier oral partition in 1938 was not produced. Nor does it appear to have been found necessary by the parties to enter into the question of the change of possession which took place at the above partition, the fact as to who paid the revenue for the Zamindari properties mentioned in the partition deed after the partition or any change in the revenue papers or as to who repaired the house and got the usufruct thereof. All these were matters which in a regular suit might have been the subjects of considerable dispute. On these points it is very likely that the parties would have produced such oral and documentary evidence as they found necessary. But, with the scanty evidence before him, the learned Judge thought it proper to draw inferences and conclusions about the nature of the transactions and liabilities of the objectors the invalidity of the partition and other complicated matters both of fact and law. He found that the partition was only a sham and collusive transaction entered into with an intention to defeat and delay the decrees in question and not made with an intention to separate or partition the joint family properties. He further observed that the decree in question was not an Avyavaharik debt and the sons were, therefore, liable to pay the amount. Relating to the arrangement, which he thought should have been made for the payment of those decrees, the learned Judge observed that no arrangement was made. On these findings he based his decision. He further observed that the decree in question was not an Avyavaharik debt and the sons were, therefore, liable to pay the amount. Relating to the arrangement, which he thought should have been made for the payment of those decrees, the learned Judge observed that no arrangement was made. On these findings he based his decision. 5. An objection in the nature of a preliminary objection was raised by learned Counsel for the opposite party that this revision was not maintainable. It was urged that the law provided for a suit Under Order 21, Rule 63 after an objection filed under Order 21, Rule 58 had been disposed of and the order passed by the court on such an objection must be deemed to be final. Learned Counsel contended that the existence of this alternative remedy by way of a suit indicated that further proceedings relating to the objection itself by way of an appeal or revision were not called for. It was also urged that the case did not fall within the ambit of Section 115, CPC as no question of jurisdiction was involved. The findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge are stated to be the findings of fact which disposed of the matter and this Court, learned Counsel contended, was not competent to examine those findings in its revisional jurisdiction even if they were wrong and they were binding on this Court. 6. The first contention raised by learned Counsel for the Respondent is answered by a Full Bench of this Court in Lila Vs. Mahange and Others . That was a case where an objection u/s 195 of the Succession Act had been dismissed by the District Judge of Shahjahanpur and a preliminary objection was raised that no revision lay inasmuch as another remedy was open to the Applicant by way of regular proceedings. Sulaiman, Acting C.J. observed that it could not be laid down as a general proposition that the High Court has no power of Intel, leeched at all or should not interfere where there is another remedy by way of a suit open to the Applicant. This view has before accepted and followed in several cases thereafter and the controversy which to some extent existed prior to this decision was set at rest. This view has before accepted and followed in several cases thereafter and the controversy which to some extent existed prior to this decision was set at rest. The provision that a regular suit may be filed under Order 21 Rule 63 debt not therefore bar the consideration of the propriety of the decision by the court below u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure. This preliminary objection is untenable. 7. The dispute relating to the applicability of Section 115, CPC is however one that deserve consideration. Learned Counsel for this opposite party has referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Fahmida Begam and Others Vs. Chobey Sambho Nath and Others, AIR 1953 All 632 . In that case earlier decisions of the Privy Council were recalled and after stating the rules laid down by the Privy Council in this connection the Supreme Court observed that interference in revision by a High Court is not permissible even if there be an aeronaut is decision on facts or law but in a case where the order sought to be revised was passed in a manner not warranted by the ambit of the court's jurisdiction if there had been any material irregularity or breach of procedure the court could exercise its revisional powers. The Judicial Committee in Balkrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar 41 IA 261 : AIR 1917 PC 71 laid down as follows: It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. With this enunciation of the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court it becomes necessary to ascertain how far the learned Civil Judge acted within or outside the scope of his jurisdiction in the proceedings before him. The objections before him Under Order 21, Rule 58 had to be considered according to the Code of Civil Procedure. With this enunciation of the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court it becomes necessary to ascertain how far the learned Civil Judge acted within or outside the scope of his jurisdiction in the proceedings before him. The objections before him Under Order 21, Rule 58 had to be considered according to the Code of Civil Procedure. Where a claimant or objector is require to adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he "had some interest in or was possessed of the property attached." This is stated in Rule 59 and the following rule says that if upon the said investigation the Court is satisfied that for the reasons stated in the claim or objection such property was not, when attached, in the possession of the judgment debtor or of some person in trust for him...the court shall make an order releasing the property wholly or to such an extent as it thinks fit for attachment. Reading the two rules which set out what an objector has to show by producing relevant evidence and what the court after necessary investigation has to find it is clear that the objection Under Order 21, Rule 58 is to be disposed of on the basis of possession. This is the view expressed in several cases though it is laid down that the question of title may have to be enquired into and determined as an, incidental matter. This determination of title is not to be after any thorough or full enquiry but such title as would prima facie indicate the nature of possession alone has to be ascertained. In the case of the Daccan Commercial Bank Ltd. AIR 1946 Mad. 174 a learned Judge of the Madras High Court laid down that the investigation of the claim made under Order 21, Rule 58 had to be made with reference to what an objector was required to prove and where it was found that the objector was in possession the apparent title on which such possession was alleged to be based alone had to be enquired into and that detailed enquiry relating to the validity or genuineness of that title which could afford the subject matter of a regular suit under the provisions of Rule 63 was out of place in the enquiries to be made Under Rule 58 as these enquiries were of a summary nature. The learned Judge observed that in such proceedings the executing court is concerned only with the question of possession of the property and should not and cannot embark upon enquiries involving a decision as to the title, as opposed to the apparent title to the property. This dictum was based on an earlier case of this Court and a decision of the Calcutta High Court. The same view has been taken by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Saha and Another, AIR 1957 Cal 72 . The genuineness and validity of an assignment was questioned in that case and the learned Judges remarked that Rules 59 and 60 of Order 21 provide for a summary investigation of the claim preferred under Rule 58. They quoted with approval an earlier decision of that Court which laid down that the question of title was required to be gone into such proceedings only so far as it may be necessary to determine whether the person in possession holds such possession as agent or as trustee for another. The learned Judges observed: If it be found that the judgment debtor is in possession of the attached property the further issue whether his apparent possession is his real possession will not be gone into. The Court will not go into the question of benami. 8. Later they again observed "'the apparent possession' therefore follows the 'apparent title'. In these proceedings the Court cannot enquire into the question if Makkhan Lal is a mere benamidar and that the possession of Makkhan Lal is really the possession of Laxmi Narayan. If there is any apparent possession tacked on any apparent title the court must give effect to it in a summary proceeding." The Bench therefore considered it to be a proper case where the High Court could interfere in revison. The same view has been expressed by the Bombay High Court in Nalinkant Bhanushanker Dave Vs. If there is any apparent possession tacked on any apparent title the court must give effect to it in a summary proceeding." The Bench therefore considered it to be a proper case where the High Court could interfere in revison. The same view has been expressed by the Bombay High Court in Nalinkant Bhanushanker Dave Vs. Hiralal Amratlal Parekh and Others, AIR 1959 Bom 87 , The Court observed: The claimant objecting to the attachment has to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in the property or was possessed thereof and the words 'some interest' occurring in R.59 have been interpreted as meaning such interest as would make the possession of the judgment debtor not on his own account but on account of or in trust for the claimant or the claimant may prove his own possession. It is only in such cases that a claim for removal of attachment can succeed. These cases clearly indicate the scope of the enquiry required to be made in the proceedings started by objections under Order 21, Rule 58 Code of Civil Procedure. It has to be considered as to whether the learned Civil Judge kept in view the restricted nature of the enquiries which he was called upon to make. It appears from the order passed by the learned Civil Judge that though at the hearing, the parties appeared to have been alive to the fact that the proceedings were of a summary character and they did exercise, considerable restraint in the production of evidence, Only one witness was produced on either side and the other evidence also was considerably less than what it might have been in a regular suit, the learned Judge appears to have ignored the nature of the proceedings before him and on the scanty material before him he thought it proper to indulge in inferences and conclusions which cannot be held to be justified. His duty was to see, in the first place, whether such possession of the objectors could be attributed to any title professed by them. Curiously enough there is not a word in the whole order, lengthy as it is, on the question of possession. His duty was to see, in the first place, whether such possession of the objectors could be attributed to any title professed by them. Curiously enough there is not a word in the whole order, lengthy as it is, on the question of possession. The principal thing which the law required him to decide he has obviously ignored in exercising his jurisdiction by embarking upon a decision, which appeal to be an ultimate decision about the title of the objector and in the second place he has failed to exercise his jurisdiction by not giving any decision on the question of possession which in the express terms of Rule 59 it was his duty to do. I am of opinion that this is a case where an interference u/s 115 CPC is not only amply justified but really required. The learned Judge in his order has observed that the separation and partition pleaded by the objectors was fictitious. The decree which was in execution had been passed in 1949. The partition deed is dated 29-3-1944, five years before the decree in execution and five months even before the preliminary decree was passed. The document is a registered document. The property which fell to the lot of the judgment debtor is also mentioned in that document. It is not denied that mutation of names was effected in accordance with this document. If this document was given effect to and had been in force for more than five years prior to the passing of the decree and if there was some property allotted to the judgment debtor himself at the partition set up by the objectors, it is seriously open to question as to whether it was at all necessary for the learned Civil Judge in these summary proceedings to embark upon a detailed enquiry as to the validity or bona fides of this transaction. The sons of the judgment debtor, Sri Laxmi Sevak Sahu, were in law entitled to a partition. Sri Laxmi Sevak Sahu was a person whose conduct appears to have driven his own brothers and nephews against him and prolonged litigation had to be gone through between them. The sons of the judgment debtor, Sri Laxmi Sevak Sahu, were in law entitled to a partition. Sri Laxmi Sevak Sahu was a person whose conduct appears to have driven his own brothers and nephews against him and prolonged litigation had to be gone through between them. In the circumstances, if the sons of Sri Laxmi Sevak Sahu considered it prudent to have their interests severed, so as to avoid liabilities because of the actions of their father, it is difficult to say that they did something which was patently illegal or could be disapproved of even on moral grounds. 9. A somewhat complicated question as to a sons, liability under the Hindu Law to pay a father's debt even after partition was considered by the Supreme Court in Lila Vs. Mahange and Others . Referring to various authorities Mukerji, J., as he then was, observed: As regards debts contracted by the father after partition, there is no dispute that the sons are not liable for such debts. The share which the father receives on partition and which after his death comes to his sons, may certainly at the hands of his lather be available to the creditors of the father but the shares allotted on partition to sons can never be made liable for post partition debts of the father. 10. The decree in this case was evidently passed after the partition. Whether the debts had been incurred prior to the partition or not and whether they were of such a character as to create any liability on the sons to pay them is a matter which the learned Civil Judge ought to have found obviously beyond the scope of a summary enquiry which he was required to make in these proceedings. The scanty evidence, which the learned Judge had before him, did not in my opinion justify the general observations which he has made relating to the genuineness or otherwise of the partition and the legal liability of the objectors to pay the decretal amount. The scanty evidence, which the learned Judge had before him, did not in my opinion justify the general observations which he has made relating to the genuineness or otherwise of the partition and the legal liability of the objectors to pay the decretal amount. In the circumstances of the case, where the partition had been made several years before the decree now sought to be executed and where the names of the objectors are entered in the Municipal Register in respect of these properties and the objectors are in possession there was no course open to the learned civil Judge but to exempt the properties from attachment and leave the decree holder if he so desired, to establish his claim to recover the decretal amount from those properties by filing a regular suit Under Order 21 Rule 63 Code of Civil Procedure. 11. In the light of the above observations, the order passed by the court below is set aside and this revision is allowed with costs. The two properties which were attached will be released from attachment.