ORDER Shivdayal Shrivastava, J 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment on the ground contained in S. 4 (g) of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act 23 of 1956. The trial Judge dismissed the suit and that has been confirmed by the Addl. District Judge (Shri P. V. Muzumdar). 2. Apart from anything else, there is an (sic) difficulty in the way of the appellant who, as conceded by the learned counsel, resides in a house of which he is the owner. That house is situated in the city of Lashkar and the house from which the defendant is sought to be ejected is also situated in the same city. Clause (g) of section 4 runs thus: In the case of residential accommodation that the land-lord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence or that of any person of his family bona-fide residing or to reside with him and there is no other accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned for such residence. 3. Two things are required to be established before a decree for ejectment can be passed under this section: (1) A land-lord must genuinely require accommodation (a) for his own residence, or (b) for that of any person of his family. (2) There is no accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned for such residence. On a plain reading of this section it is clear that; if a land-lord has another accommodation in the same city in which he is residing he cannot claim ejectment of a tenant on the ground that he requires it for his own residence; likewise if the person of his family for whom he requires ejectment of his tenant, is residing in the same city in a house belonging to the plaintiff, then also the suit is not maintainable. 4. Shri Sapre maintains that the word 'such' indicates that if the residence in the occupation of the landlord is not sufficient for his needs, he is entitled to get a tenant ejected although he may be residing in another house of his own. If this construction was accepted it would render the protection, which the law aims to provide, negatory I would demonstrate it in this way. If this construction was accepted it would render the protection, which the law aims to provide, negatory I would demonstrate it in this way. Supposing land-lord has four houses A B C D: He is residing in house A And brings a suit against the tenant occupying house B on the ground that he requires it for his own need. He gets ejectment on the interpretation put by Shri Sapre. Then he seeks ejectment of the tenant occupying house C and then again of the tenant in occupation of D. In this way, he can get all his houses vacated, and every time his plea would be that the accommodation was not sufficient for his needs and that he is the sole arbiter of his requirement. In my opinion such a construction would put the section out of harmony with the Act as a whole. 5. Shri Sapre relies on two reported decisions (1954 M. B. L. J. 274 and 1106). Neither of these two decisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court is applicable to this case. In each of those cases the land-lord was residing in a rented house and the question was whether he could be compelled to stay there of the plea that it was sufficient for his residence. The point Involved here was not under consideration in any of those cases. It may also be mentioned in passing that S. 4 (g) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Act No.15 of 1950 was slightly different from S. 4 (g) of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act No. 23 of 1955 which governs the case In hand. In the former Act the words of his own' did not exist, 6. Then Shri Sapre has relied on an unreported decision of this Court in second appeal No.6 of 1959 Shyamji Bhai vs. Nand Kishore (which the learned Judge did not mark as approved for reporting.) It is not clear from that judgment that the question now before me was agitated there. It seems to me that what was urged in that case was that the decision. In Motilal vs. Badrilal 1954 M.B.L.J. 274 deserved a reconsideration. But the learned Judge did not agree. It seems to me that what was urged in that case was that the decision. In Motilal vs. Badrilal 1954 M.B.L.J. 274 deserved a reconsideration. But the learned Judge did not agree. The following observations of Krishnan J. After all once there is personal requirement it should be for the land-lord to decide for himself, whether he should squeeze himself in one room or 2 rooms, or should stretch himself in more comfortable accommodation. I do not see why the land-lord should be compelled to live in discomfort and cramped just to oblige an unwilling tenant. Cannot be read as referring also to a case where the land-lord is residing in a house of his own. At the request of Shri Sapre I have perused the judgment of the first appellate Court in that case. Instead of supporting Shri Sapre's presumption, it is now quite clear that in that case also the plaintiff was residing in a rented house. Repelling the argument that the plaintiff had not averred in the plaint that he had no accommodation of his own in that city, the Addl- District Judge Vidisha observed:- Mere mat men is tark men koi sar nahin hai kyonki pakshkaron ke bich is sambandh men koi bhra nahin hai ki Vadi ke pas Vidisha men is vad-grastha makan ke atirikt anya koi makan niji na-bin bai. Pratiwadi-gan swayam ne jawab notis dinankit 18-9-1955 tatha apni muj-bat appeal ke para (2) (aa) men likha hai ki vadi ke pas is makan ke alawa Kiraya ka makan hai. In this situation I do not see any force in Shri Sapre's persuasion that I should refer the matter to a larger Bench, It is all the more so because I am fortified in my view by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Khubchind and mother vs. Badsi Pd. and others in Letters Patent appeal No.28 of 1957 (decided at Jabalpur by Bhutt and Shrivastava. JJ.) where it is laid down: In a case where a land-ford is occupying any other house in the Same city or town the question of the sufficiency of the accommodation does not arise for consideration. Therefore, the fact that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 found the premises in their possession to be insufficient for their needs did not entitle them to the grant of permission to terminate the tenancy. 7. Therefore, the fact that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 found the premises in their possession to be insufficient for their needs did not entitle them to the grant of permission to terminate the tenancy. 7. For these reasons this appeal is dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed.