JUDGMENT : Barman, J. - The sole Defendant is the Appellant form a decision of the learned District Judge, Sambalpur-Sundargarh, affirming a decision of the learned Munsif, Sundargarh. 2. The matter arises in these circumstances: The Plaintiffs filed a suit against the Defendant for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the properties mentioned in Schedule A to the plaint. The Plaintiffs case is that one Padman Pande was the original owner of the suit land. He had two sons Saita Pande and Parma Pande and two daughters Plaintiffs Sabitri and Subas. On the death of Padman Pande, his two sons Saita and Parma inherited the suit land by right of survivorship. Parma and Saita died leaving them surviving their widows Ulasa and Kajala respectively. It is alleged that on February 14, 1946 Ulasa and Kajala, gave a lease of the suit land to the Defendant for five Purugs of paddy per annum. Kajala died same time in 1948. After her death, Ulasa mortgaged the B schedule property to one Kartika Patel on December 18, 1948 and since then he is in possession of the said property. Ulasa died on October 21, 1950. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs, the two surviving daughters of Padman Pande, requested the Defendant to give up possession of the suit land but to no effect. Thereupon, the Plaintiffs filed the suit on July 22, 1954. 3. In the written statement the Defendant took the defence that the two widows Ulasa and Kajala had surrendered the suit and to the Gountia of the village and that the Gountia settled the same with him. He further denied that the Plaintiffs were the daughters of Padman Pande and as such they had no right to sue to dispossess him from the suit land. 4. Both the Courts below found that there was no surrender of the suit land by the two widows Ulasa and Kajala to the Gountia and that there was no resettlement in respect of the suit land with the Defendant as alleged. Both the Courts further found that the Plaintiffs were the daughters of Padman Pande and as such they got title to the suit land as the 'next reversioners of Saila and Par am a after the death of the two widows and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit. 5. Mr. Both the Courts further found that the Plaintiffs were the daughters of Padman Pande and as such they got title to the suit land as the 'next reversioners of Saila and Par am a after the death of the two widows and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit. 5. Mr. S. Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing for the Defendant raised a point of jurisdiction for the first time in this second appeal. He contended that on the Plaintiffs' own evidence the Defendant was a Bhag tenant in respect of the suit laud and as such the Defendant could not be evicted from the same. The learned Counsel further contended that as appears from paragraph 3 of the plaint there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the Defendant and the two widows Ulasa and Rajala and hence the Defendant was protected by Section 3 of the Orissa Tenants Relief Act, 1955 or alternatively by Section 10 of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948. Mr. Mohanty's point of jurisdiction was based on the following grounds: (i) Having regard to the nature of the claim, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine the suit. (ii) The order, having been made without jurisdiction, was a nullity. In support of his contentions Mr. Mohanty cited before me a-decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mahabir Singh Vs. Narain Tewari and Others . In that case the question was as to whether the parties were estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction against a statute. The High Court held that there can be no estoppel against a statute. If a question of estoppel were dependent on the determination of some facts, a party may certainly be estopped from pleading it. But if it is patent and apparent on the record, then even if there were estoppel against a party, a Court would not be estopped from considering the point. Indeed, if it involves a question of jurisdiction, it would be the duty of the Court to take it into account. The principle of estoppel can not be allowed to defeat the provisions of a statutory enactment which affects the jurisdiction of a Court, as a party cannot by its admission or previous conduct confer jurisdiction on a Court where none exists. On the broad proposition there is no dispute that this is the position in law. Mr. The principle of estoppel can not be allowed to defeat the provisions of a statutory enactment which affects the jurisdiction of a Court, as a party cannot by its admission or previous conduct confer jurisdiction on a Court where none exists. On the broad proposition there is no dispute that this is the position in law. Mr. Mohanty then cited before me a decision of the Bombay High Court in Alfred Wilkinson v. Grace Emily Noran Vilkinson and Anr. ILR 47 Bom 843. That was a case on Indian Divorce Act. There, the question was whether the Court had jurisdiction in respect of parties who were domiciled in England. In this case, although no issues were raised with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the divorce petition, it appears that the question of jurisdiction was argued on the basis that the parties were domiciled in England. This decision, in my view, was in a different context and does not directly touch the point at issue in the present case. 6. Mr. G.K. Misra, learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiffs Respondents, took me through various paragraphs in the plaint and the Defendant's own pleadings in his written statement and contended that the suit against the Defendant was on the basis of evicting a trespasser and not a tenant. In Pandab Bissoyi and Ors. v. Magiri Sasamal ILR 1956 Cutt 677 Narasimham C.J. observed in paragraph 12 of the judgment that it is too fundamental that in considering the question of jurisdiction not only the plaint but also the written statement must be looked into and the real nature of the dispute between the parties ascertained. Any other construction will lead to impossible situations. Suppose on a particular date the landlord files a civil suit in the Munsif's Court as against the tenants alleging that they were mere trespassers and on the very same date the tenants also file an application before the Collector, under the provisions of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, alleging that they were tenants entitled to protection under that Act. In the Civil Court the tenants would naturally file their written statements supporting the allegations made in their application before the Collector. In the Civil Court the tenants would naturally file their written statements supporting the allegations made in their application before the Collector. Similarly, in the Tenants Protection Act case the landlord would file a counter application denying that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the Applicants, and saying that it was a purely civil dispute outside the jurisdiction of the Collector. It cannot be said that in the Civil Court the allegations in the plaint alone should be looked into or else that in the Revenue Court, the allegation contained in the application of the tenants alone should be looked into, and both the Courts should completely ignore the written statement and the counter-application filed by the other side, and proceed to dispose of the plaint of the application, as the case may be according to law. Such a view would lead to two Courts of original jurisdiction hearing the same dispute and perhaps giving contradictory decisions. Such a situation would, however, be avoided if the Court before whom the pleadings are filed examines them in their entirety, ascertains the real nature of the dispute and then decides which Court has jurisdiction, bearing in mind the statutory provisions regarding the tribunal which is required to decide that dispute. This in my view is a clear authority in support of Mr. Misra's contention that on the pleadings this Court has jurisdiction. It appears that the suit was filed as early as 1954 and the Orissa Tenants Relief Act came in to force in 1955. The Defendant ought to have taken the point of jurisdiction, if any, before the trial Court. In fact no issue as framed. The Defendant's point of jurisdiction now raised in this second appeal fails. 7. On merits, Mr. G.K. Misra contended that the suit was filed against the Defendant as trespasser and not as tenant. According to the Defendant he was a tenant of the Gountia of the village. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. The Defendant however wrongfully claimed that he was a tenant under the Plaintiffs. By October 21, 1950 the last widow Ulasa had died and thereupon the Plaintiff's title accrued. There is an evidence of payment of rent by the Defendant after the death of the last widow in 1950. The Defendant however wrongfully claimed that he was a tenant under the Plaintiffs. By October 21, 1950 the last widow Ulasa had died and thereupon the Plaintiff's title accrued. There is an evidence of payment of rent by the Defendant after the death of the last widow in 1950. The evidence of the Defendant as d.w. 2 of the Plaintiff No. 2 as p.w. 7 is to be noticed. There is no case that the Defendant became a tenant of the Plaintiffs. It appears that the Gountia of the village settled the suit lands with the Defendant. That does not create a relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. Both the Courts below accepted the Plaintiffs' version regarding the Plaintiffs' title after the death of the widow and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to possession. Mr. G.K. Misra cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad Singh and Anr. v. Deonarain Prasad and Ors. AIR 1956 S.C. 305 where a similar point arose under the Bihar Tenancy Act. The Plaintiffs attempted to take khas or actual possession of the suit lands. They were obstructed by the Defendants who claimed occupancy rights therein. Thereupon the Plaintiffs filed the suit. The Plaintiffs alleged that the lands were 'Kamat Khudkasht' which originally belonged to the original owners and thereafter to the mortgagees by virtue of certain deeds; that the Defendants claimed rights as occupancy raiyats under a settlement with mortgagees; that the settlement was not binding on mortgagors. The Defendants denied the allegations and pleaded that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to possession. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. The High Court in appeal reversed the finding and dismissed the suit. Thereupon the Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court who held that the Defendants had failed to establish that they had any rights of occupancy over the suit lands and that the Plaintiffs were accordingly entitled to a decree in ejectment. Their Lordships observed that before a person can claim occupancy rights u/s 21 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, he must establish that he is a raiyat as defined in Sections 5(2) and 5(3) and as the Defendants acquired the right to hold the lands from the Mortgagees and not under mortgagors, they are not rajyats and can claim no right u/s 21. In the judgment their Lordships discussed the principles on which such question has to be determined. This decision of the Supreme Court supports the Plaintiffs' contentions on merits. 8. In this view of the matter I cannot accept the contentions made on behalf of the Defendant. The decision of the Courts below is therefore upheld. This appeal is dismissed. The Respondents would get costs throughout. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed