Judgment :- 1. This is a revision, by the plaintiff in O. S.312 of 1957 on the file of the District Munsiff, Kanjirappaly, allowing an application C.M.P No. 5791 of 1958 filed by the 1st defendant, the State of Kerala. 2. The point that is at present, raised in this revision by Mr. Subramonia Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner is only as to whether the lower court has jurisdiction to set aside the ex-parte decree as against the State 3. After the institution of the suit on 19-12-1957, it is seen that summons were issued to the State, viz., the 1st defendant on 21-12-1957 and it is also stated that the summons was actually served on the Chief Secretary of the State on 28-12-1957. The suit was posted for trial on 24-2-1958 and it transpires that there was no appearance on behalf of the State, the 1st defendant, and an exparte decree was passed on 24-2-1958 itself by the learned District Munsiff. 4. The 1st defendant, State after coming to know about the ex parte decree and the allegation by them is that they came to know about the lower Court decree only on 16-8-1958, filed C. M. P. No. 5791 of 1958 for setting aside the ex parte decree passed against the State. 5. The main ground urged in respect of the application on behalf of the State was that the trial court erred in fixing a date for appearance within 90 days of the date of issue of summons as is required under R.67 of the Civil Rules of Practice of Travancore-Cochin. There was also a second ground taken that the State came to know about the decree only on 16-8-1958. In these circumstances, the State requested the court to set aside the ex parte decree. 6. This was opposed by the plaintiff on the ground that actually the Government had knowledge of the institution of the suit as early as in 1957 and that the State is guilty of serious laches in not entering appearance on the date fixed for bearing and therefore the Court was perfectly in order and even justified in passing an exparte decree on 24-2-1958. It was also contended that R.67 of the Civil Rules of Practice, T-C is only directory and not mandatory and therefore though a court commits breach of that rule, it cannot be said that the decree itself is void. Alternatively it was also contended by the plaintiff that the question of the knowledge of the decree does not at all come in these circumstances, because there has been a proper service of summons on the Chief Secretary of the State as early as on 28-12-1957. On these grounds, it was contended that the application filed by the State on 4-9-1958 to set aside the ex parte decree is hopelessly barred by Limitation also. The trial court has overruled all the objections raised on behalf of the plaintiff and accepted the explanation given by the State in the affidavit filed. One of the grounds is that they were not aware of the decree passed on 24-2-1958 till 16-8-1958 and that the State has given explanation as to the circumstances under which there was no representation on 24-2-1958. In this view the District Munsiff set aside the exparte decree and has posted the suit for trial after giving an opportunity to the 1st defendant to file necessary defence. 7. It is against this order that this Civil Revision Petition is filed. 8. More or less the same contentions that were urged before the trial court have been repeated before me also by Mr. Subramonia Iyer learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner. The learned counsel contended that R.67 of the Civil Rules of Practice is not mandatory and is only directory and therefore the Court acted perfectly within its jurisdiction when it passed the original ex-parte decree against the 1st defendant. The learned counsel also contended, as it was contended in the lower Court, that the question of 0.9 R.13 does not at all come into play in this matter. On the other hand, the learned Govt. Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, has supported the reasons given by the trial court and he has also submitted that the provisions of R.67 of the T-C. Civil Rules of Practice are mandatory and that the learned Munsiff acted beyond his jurisdiction in decreeing the suit within the time mentioned therein. On the other hand, the learned Govt. Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, has supported the reasons given by the trial court and he has also submitted that the provisions of R.67 of the T-C. Civil Rules of Practice are mandatory and that the learned Munsiff acted beyond his jurisdiction in decreeing the suit within the time mentioned therein. The learned counsel also contended that once the court comes to the conclusion that the decree passed was without jurisdiction, it follows that a proper service in the manner and in compliance of the provisions of law has not been effected in this case. Therefore the only alternative ground on which the State could rely is the date of the knowledge regarding the ex parte decree passed as against the State. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to the allegations in the affidavit, which have been accepted by the trial court and as such the learned Government Pleader contends that when the court realised the mistake and set aside the ex-parte decree passed against the State, it acted quite legally and within its jurisdiction in setting aside the exparte decree. I am in entire agreement within the contentions of the Learned Government Pleader. R.67 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Travancore-Cochin reads as follows: "The date for appearance of parties shall be so fixed by the Court as to allow a reasonable time between the date of service and the date of hearing. In the Munsiff 's Court it shall be not less than 21 days in the case of an Original Suit or Original Petition, and 14 days in the case of Small Cause Suits and 3 clear days in other cases. In the District Court ana Sub Court it shall be not less than 30 days in the case of an original suit, 21 days in the case of an appeal, original petition or small cause suit and 3 clear days in other cases: provided that in the case of suits in which the State is a defendant, the time allowed shall be not less than 90 days". The last portion of the rule is, almost analogous with the Note to Clause.6 of R.49 A, of the Rules framed in the Civil Rules of Practice in Madras State. There is no difference in substance between the wording of these rules regarding the State. According to Mr. The last portion of the rule is, almost analogous with the Note to Clause.6 of R.49 A, of the Rules framed in the Civil Rules of Practice in Madras State. There is no difference in substance between the wording of these rules regarding the State. According to Mr. Subramonia Iyer, the Rule obtaining in Travancore area, and corresponding to R.67 (T.C.) Art.482 of the Civil Courts Guide (T) has come up for consideration, before a Full Bench of the T.C. High Court reported in 1954 K. L.T. 609 (Varkey Thomas v. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd.). The learned counsel attempted to find some support for his contention on a decree passed by a court in the circumstances and this cannot be considered to be void. In my opinion the question as to whether the decree is void or not is not the matter before me. The main point, I have to deal with in this case is the question as to whether the court acted properly and in accordance with both the spirit and letter of R.67 when it posted the case as against the State on 24-2-1958 and disposed it of. The summons itself has been issued only on 21-12-1957. Even the Full Bench Decision of the T-C. High Court referred to above is to the effect that the corresponding rule viz , Art.482 is peremptory and that it gives no discretion to the court. In this respect the learned judges have differed from the decision in C. M. A. 223 of 1953 and agreed with the view expressed in the decision reported in 1952 K. L T. 665 (Ahmed Ummal Sulaiha Ummal v. Abdul Khanni Lebba Noohookannu Lebba). In the Full Bench case the Hon'ble Chief Justice has observed at page 612 as follows: "We are pronouncedly of the opinion that the decision in 1952 K.L.T. 665 construes Art.482 of the Civil Court's Guide correctly and that the decision in C.M.A. 223 of 1953 and the cases followed there do not give a true construction to the said Article". From this it follows that the court had absolutely no jurisdiction to adopt a course contrary to the mandatory provision of R.67 of the T. C. Civil Rules of Practice. In the view that I take of this matter, it is really unnecessary for me to consider the alternative contention of Mr. Subramonia Iyer based upon 0.9 R.13. From this it follows that the court had absolutely no jurisdiction to adopt a course contrary to the mandatory provision of R.67 of the T. C. Civil Rules of Practice. In the view that I take of this matter, it is really unnecessary for me to consider the alternative contention of Mr. Subramonia Iyer based upon 0.9 R.13. In my opinion this contention of his has no substance, because acceptance of that contention requires that courts must come to the conclusion that service of summons has been effected in the manner and in accordance with the provisions relating to them. That is, it must be a proper service in all respects giving the party not only sufficient opportunity but also the necessary time which is enjoined upon by the rules. In the absence of compliance of this mandatory provision it cannot be said that there has been a proper service of summons in this case in accordance with R.67. Therefore the State was perfectly right in relying upon knowledge of the decree for filing the application. The date of knowledge as mentioned in the petition in the lower Court as 16-8-1958, has been accepted by the lower Court; and the application has been filed within 20 days of the date of knowledge. 9. The order under revision does not call for any interference and is dismissed with costs of the State, 1st respondent.