JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J 1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiff Smt. Premanbai who has lost her suit in both the Courts below. 2. The appellant (plaintiff) was married of the age of (sic) to the respondent (defendant) Chhanholal. They did not get on well together, and the appellant is now residing with her father She applied under Section 488, Criminal productive Case, for maintenance, but her application was dismissed on the respondent raising a plea that she had been velidly divorced. Accordingly, she filed the present suit for a declaration that the marriage between the paries subsists. She also claimed restitution of conjugal rights and maintenance at the rate of Is. 15 per month. 3. The respondent (defendant) pleaded that he had divorced the appellant (plaintiff) in accordance with the caste custom on 5-1-1942 in the presence of the Panchas. The appellant had agreed to the divorce personally as also through her father and a document about the divorce (Ex 0-1) was also execrated: Accordingly, it was pleaded that the appellant was not entitled to the declaration sought or to maintenance (sic) 4. The Courts below have held that there is a custom amongst Patwas the case to which the parties belong according to which divorce can take place by mutual constant They held that such divorce did take place, as alleged by the respondent. The suit was, therefore dismissed. 5. Shri R.K. Pandey for the appellant does not dispute the finding regarding the custom. He also does not dispute the finding of the Courts below that in fact there was a caste Panchayat and the respondent on the one hand and the appellant along with her father on the rather agreed to the divorce. His contention, however, is that such a divorce could not take place as the father could not give any consent on behalf of the minor to the divorce, and the minor herself was incompetent to give any such consent. 6. It is pertinent to observe that the custom pleaded by the respondent was that divorce was possible with mutual consent of the spouses. The defendant did not plead that according to the custom of the caste, the father or the guardian of the minor could give consent on her behalf. 6. It is pertinent to observe that the custom pleaded by the respondent was that divorce was possible with mutual consent of the spouses. The defendant did not plead that according to the custom of the caste, the father or the guardian of the minor could give consent on her behalf. As the father had given away the girl in marriage to the respondent he ceased to be her guardian from the date of marriage and the husband became the guardian of the. appellant under; Hindu Law, The father, therefore, could not give, any consent op behalf of the minor as he was not in law her guardian. There is no provision existing in Hindu law according to which the father can act on behalf of the minor in matter of divorce. 7. In this view, the divorce can be supported only, on the ground that the appellant herself had consented to it. The Courts below have found that the plaintiff had given such consent. The only question to be decided now is the validity of her consent. Before I take up the question of the personal law relating to minority governing the parties, it is necessary to find out the age of the appellant-plaintiff on the date on which the divorce between the parties took place. The appellant Premanbai as P. W. 1. has stated that her age was 12 years at the time of her marriage. She further states that she went off and on to the house of her husband during the three years following marriage. After three ears she went and actually resided with her husband for 15 days, but the respondent refused to maintain her and she had, therefore, to make a complaint to the caste panchas. Although he has denied the knowledge of any panchayat, the finding of the Courts below is that it was in the caste panchayat that she had agreed to the divorce proposed by her husband. The respondent Chhannoolal as D. W. 1. states that the appellant was 11 or 12 years old when she married him. He further states that she lived with him for three years after which the panchayat in which the divorce was agreed to by the parties took place. The respondent Chhannoolal as D. W. 1. states that the appellant was 11 or 12 years old when she married him. He further states that she lived with him for three years after which the panchayat in which the divorce was agreed to by the parties took place. In paragraph 9 he states that the appellant was 15 years old at that time, on the evidence of both the parties it is apparent that the age of the appellant was between 14 and 15 years at the time of the panchayat. 8. Shri R.K. Pandey has referred to section 11 of the Contract Act and has contended that as the consent amounts to a contract, her consent would be invalid unless she was major. Section 2 of the Indian Majority Act is as follows; Nothing here in contained shall affect- The capacity of any person to act in the following matters, viz., marrige, dower, divorce and adoption. It is clear from this provision that the provisions in the Indian Majority Act do not apply to the acts of a person on specified matters. It would be sufficient if under the personal law applicable to the party she could act in those matters. It has been argued for the appellant that the accepted age under Hindu Law for majority is 15 years; and as the appellant was. admittedly below 15 years on the date of the divorce, her consent is invalid 9. Shri A.P. Sen for the respondent relies upon Mt. Futtma Khatun Vs. Fazlal Karim Mea AIR 1928 Cal. 303 & Naksetan Bibi Vs. Habiber Rohaman, AIR 1948 Cal 66, in support of his contention that a minor is capable of granting consent in matters relating to marriage and divorce. In the first case, it has been held that a minor husband can validly delegate to his wife authority to divorce herself from her husband in accordance with the provisions of Mahomedan Law, as, though a mi or he has the capacity to act in matters of divorce. In the second case, it has been held that the expression "capacity to, act" used in section 2 of the Indian Majority Act is wider that the expression "capacity to enter into a contract". In the second case, it has been held that the expression "capacity to, act" used in section 2 of the Indian Majority Act is wider that the expression "capacity to enter into a contract". It was held that such a suit by a minor girl for dissolution of marriage was tenable and could be maintained even without a next friend after she had attained puberty. 10. As I have said, in matters of adoption, marriage and divorce the Indian Majority Act does not apply and the competency of a party in these matters has to be judged by the special provisions in their personal law. Under Hindu law minority terminates at the completion of the 15th year according to the view taken in Bengal and at the completion of the 16th year according to the view taken in other parts of India: [ See paragraph 516 of Mula's Principles of Hindu Law (12th Edition)] No case was cited at the Bar directly on the question, regarding the age of majority in the context of divorce under Hindu Law. However; in relation to adoption the question came up for consideration in Kashinath Balkrishna Vs. Anant Murlidhar, ILR 1942 Bom. 782. After reviewing several decisions on the point. Broom field J; arrived at the following conclusion; I think it is clear from these cases, that, according to the view taken by, this High Court, there is no hard and fast rule that an adoption by a youth or girl who has not completed the age of fifteen years is necessarily invalid. On the contrary, this Court has regarded the question of the possession of the necessary understanding and discretion as a question of fact to be determined on the. evidence, in the particular case. In that case, a person aged 14 yearns and a half had taken a son in adoption and it was held that the adoption was valid. 11. What applies in the context of adoption should, in my opinion, apply equally to the case of divorce. The age of 15 years under Hindu Law has not to be rigidly adhered to; but the real test is whether the person concerned had sufficient maturity of understanding to comprehend the nature of the act which he was doing. 11. What applies in the context of adoption should, in my opinion, apply equally to the case of divorce. The age of 15 years under Hindu Law has not to be rigidly adhered to; but the real test is whether the person concerned had sufficient maturity of understanding to comprehend the nature of the act which he was doing. In the instant case, the appellant was over 14 years of age and it appears from her statement in the witness box that she could comprehend the legal effect and the consequences of a divorce. She has admitted that she was being ill-treated by her husband and had occasion to complain to the caste Panchas about the treatment that was given to her. Under these circumstances she was quite able to understand the consequences of her consent to the divorce proposed by her husband. This is especially so as she had received proper advice from her father. Accordingly, I hold that her consent was valid under Hindu Law and the divorce is binding on her. 12. The Courts below have rightly held that she was not entitled to the declaration sought by her nor was she entitled to restitution of conjugal rights or maintenance. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.