Judgment :- 1. In both these Second Appeals, the substantial question that arises for decision, and which has been held against the appellants, is as to whether a Kana Kychit executed by the appellants on 10 81944 is valid and binding as against the appellants. 2. In S. A.347/56, the question has been concurrently found against the appellants and that decision is that it is binding, so far as the appellants are concerned. Again in S. A. 348/56, the lower appellate court has held that the said document of 10 - 81944, Kana Kychit is binding so far as the appellants are concerned. The document in question is Ex. Al in the proceedings connected with.8. A. 348/56, and Ex. A4 in proceedings connected with S. A. 347/56. In this Second Appeal on behalf of the appellants, who are same in both the Second Appeals, Mr. Mohammed Naha, learned counsel appearing for them, has attacked the reasoning and conclusions of the lower courts regarding the binding nature of the respective Kana Kychit dated 10- 8-1944. 3. Before Mr. Naha could proceed with his contentions based upon the merits, the learned counsel, Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, appearing for the contesting respondents in both these appeals, brought to my notice that there is the decision of the learned District Munsiff of Kozhikode in O S.240/51 and according to the learned counsel, the said decision will operate as res judicata in these proceedings and that if this court accepts his contentions regarding that aspect of the matter, a consideration on the merits will become unnecessary. 4. In order to consider as to whether the said decision relied upon by Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar will operate as res judicata or not, an adjournment was granted on his request and he has now filed an application C. M. P. 3715/59 for adducing the decree and judgment in the said 0. S.240/51 as additional evidence in these proceedings. The reasons given in the said application are that the judgment of the learned District Munsiff in this suit was given after the judgment in the suits in question were delivered by the trial court and that it was also tendered before the lower appellate court. S.240/51 as additional evidence in these proceedings. The reasons given in the said application are that the judgment of the learned District Munsiff in this suit was given after the judgment in the suits in question were delivered by the trial court and that it was also tendered before the lower appellate court. The learned counsel also drew my attention to the fact that in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in A. S.98/55, out of which S. A. 347/56 has been filed, there is a statement to the effect that the learned judge has considered it unnecessary to rely upon the decree in O. S.240/51 filed by the defendants 1 & 2 who are the appellants in this court and in which they have lost. He has also drawn my attention to the fact that Exts.-B6 to B-8 namely, the plaint and other connected proceedings in the suit, which resulted in the judgment which is now sought to be marked as additional evidence, have been filed by the appellants themselves as exhibits. The learned counsel also invited my attention to the statement of facts contained in the judgment of the trial court in O. S.387/51 to the effect that defendants 1 & 2, who are the appellants in this Second Appeal, have them, selves mentioned about the suit filed by them in the District Munsiff's Court Kozhikode for a declaration that the renewed Kanam demise is not valid and binding. 5. According to the learned counsel, the reference in the contentions of the defendants 1 & 2 is to the proceedings which has resulted in the judgment in O. S.240/51, District Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode. Therefore, under these circumstances, he has filed an application, as mentioned earlier, for receiving this judgment and decree as additional evidence in these appeals. 6. Naturally, this application is very vehemently opposed in both the Second Appeals by the learned counsel Mr. Naha. The fact that the decree or the judgment was tendered before the lower appellate court has been controverted. Objection has also been taken that there is no scope for admitting these two documents namely, the decree and judgment as additional evidence under 0.41 R.27 C. P. C. The learned counsel Mr. Naha. The fact that the decree or the judgment was tendered before the lower appellate court has been controverted. Objection has also been taken that there is no scope for admitting these two documents namely, the decree and judgment as additional evidence under 0.41 R.27 C. P. C. The learned counsel Mr. Naha, alternatively contended that even if these documents are admitted as additional evidence, there is no question of the decision operating as resjudicata in these proceedings, because the point is being pursued by his clients, in this court and is now pending final decision in these two second appeals. 7. The learned counsel Mr. Naha has also placed some reliance upon certain decisions in support of both his contentions regarding this application now filed for admitting this judgment and decree as additional evidence namely, G. M. P. 3715/59. The application C. M. P. 3715/59 is my judgment, has to be ordered and the decree and judgment in 0 S.240/51 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode have to be marked as additional evidence in these proceedings. As in my opinion, that decision will operate as res judicata in these two Second Appeals, I did not trouble Mr. Naha to argue his two appeals on the merits. 8. The contention that is raised by Mr. Naha appearing for the appellants regarding the admissibility of the present judgment and decree as per the application C. M. P. 3715/59 are two fold: (a) that this is not a matter coming under 0.41 R.27 C.P.C., and (b) that in any event, the said judgment will not operate as res judicata in these proceedings. 9. I will consider these two contentions presently. Regarding the first contention that it does not come under 0.41 R.27 of the C P. C., the contention of Mr. Naha is to the effect that there is nothing on record to show that this has been tendered in evidence before the lower appellate court and therefore, it will not come under 0.41 R.27 (1) (a). Regarding the first contention that it does not come under 0.41 R.27 of the C P. C., the contention of Mr. Naha is to the effect that there is nothing on record to show that this has been tendered in evidence before the lower appellate court and therefore, it will not come under 0.41 R.27 (1) (a). Prima facie this argument may sound plausible, but it is not possible for me to accept this contention in the face of the statement in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in A. B. 98/1955, out of which 8 A 347/56 arises to the effect: "It is unnecessary to rely upon the decree in O. S.240/51 filed by defendants 1 & 2 and which they have lost". This gives an indication that the final judgment in these proceedings must have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge. No doubt, it would have been proper and better for the respondents to have formally filed an application to receive this document in evidence. In fact, Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, under instructions from his client, states that an attempt was made to tender this decree and judgment in 0. S.240/51 as additional evidence before the learned Judge. This is controverted by Mr. Naha on the other side. Some such attempt, as contended by Mr. Gopalan Nambiar, must have been made is clear from the passage which I have just extracted from the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. Even otherwise, in my opinion, this is a matter where I should exercise my powers under 0.41, R.27 C.P.C., I do not think the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by Mr. Naha and reported in Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh (A. I. R.1951 S. C. 193) or Chunilal v. Adhyaru (A. I. R.1956 S. C. 655), or State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal (A. I. R.1957 S. C. 912) stand in the way of my admitting this document as additional evidence. Apart from that, there is the significant fact that the appellants themselves have taken a plea in the written-staternents that they have filed the suit 0. S.240/51 in which the question about the binding nature of the Kana Kychit which is also in question in these two suits, is directly involved. They have also filed, as mentioned earlier, Exts. B-6 to B-8 connected with the proceedings in O. S.240/51. S.240/51 in which the question about the binding nature of the Kana Kychit which is also in question in these two suits, is directly involved. They have also filed, as mentioned earlier, Exts. B-6 to B-8 connected with the proceedings in O. S.240/51. Infact, Ex. B-6 is the plaint in the said suit filed by the present appellants in these Second Appeals. 10. In view of these circumstances, it is perfectly legitimate for this court to find out as to what happened to the proceedings evidenced by the plaint and other connected matters namely, Exs. B-6 to B-8. This judgment could not have been filed in the trial court, because the judgment of the trial court in these proceedings was given earlier than the judgment in 0. S.240/51. There is also, as mentioned by me earlier, a reference to this judgment by the learned Subordinate Judge. But he did not think it necessary to invoke the aid of this judgment for putting the appellants out of court. In fact, he says in so many words that he has got other sufficient materials on which he could dismiss the appeals filed before him by the present appellants. In view of these circumstances, in my opinion, this is a fit case to exercise my powers under 0.41 R.27 C. P. C., and I accordingly admit the certified copies of the decree and the judgment in O. S.240/51, District Munsiff's -Court, Kozhikode as additional evidence on behalf of the contesting respondents in both the appeals. The Registrar of this High Court, is directed to give suitable exhibit numbers to these two documents in chronological order. 11. Now that I have admitted this decree and judgment as additional evidence, I have to consider the second contention raised by Mr. Naha. The second contention is that this judgment will not operate as resjudicata in these proceedings. In order to appreciate this contention it is desirable to know what exactly is the scope of controversy in the present 2 appeals and also the nature of the controversy in O. S.240/51. As mentioned by me in this judg-rrent, the main point in controversy in these two appeals is as to whether the Kana Kychit dated 10 81944 executed by these appellants in these two appeals is valid and binding on them. As mentioned by me in this judg-rrent, the main point in controversy in these two appeals is as to whether the Kana Kychit dated 10 81944 executed by these appellants in these two appeals is valid and binding on them. This is exactly the point that they have mentioned in the written-statement that the said Kana Kychit executed by them is not binding on them also. The suit O. S 240/51 has been filed by the present appellants, who are defendants 1 and 2, as plaintiffs, for a declaration that the renewal of the Kanam demise dated 10 81944 Is not valid and binding on them. They have set out several grounds of attack on this document of 10 81944. This document of 10 81944 is Ex. A2 in 0. S.240/51. After a consideration of their case, the trial court namely, the learned District Munsiff, Kozhikode in 0. S.240/51, has come to the conclusion, that the plain tiff s therein are not entitled to any reliefs whatsoever and has also come to the conclusion that the Kana Kychit of 10 81944 is valid and binding on them. Those plaintiffs, are defendants 1 and 2 in these two proceedings and the appellants in these Second Appeals. There is also no dispute that the parties are substantially the same in all these proceedings. 12. According to Mr. Naha, this judgment which has come into existence no doubt later, and which almost decides the rights as against his clients, cannot constitute as res judicata in these proceedings because the identical question is the subject-matter of appeals and further Second Appeals in this court. It is really the final judgment of this court in these two Second Appeals that will conclude the rights of parties. 13. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar,has referred me to the decision of the Madras High Court of Leach C. J., and Mr. Justice Kuppuswami lyyar reported in Chockalinga Thevar Firm v. Sankarappa Naikar (A. I.R. 1942 Mad. 421). That decision is to the effect that the rule of res judicata applies equally to appeals and miscellaneous proceedings, as it does to original suits and therefore where during the pendency of an appeal, a final judgment on the same issue is pronounced by a competent court of jurisdiction in another case, it operates as res judicata. 421). That decision is to the effect that the rule of res judicata applies equally to appeals and miscellaneous proceedings, as it does to original suits and therefore where during the pendency of an appeal, a final judgment on the same issue is pronounced by a competent court of jurisdiction in another case, it operates as res judicata. The learned Chief Justice, who spoke for the court, has considered the earlier Single Bench decisions of Mr. Justice Varadachariar reported in Bangachariar v. Bangaswami Ayyangar (I. L R.59 Mad, 777 and also of Mr. Justice Venkataramana Rao reported in Krishnan Nair v. Kambi (A.I.R.1937 Mad. 544) to the effect that in such circumstances, the judgment which has come into existence and which has become final pending an appeal in another matter, nevertheless operates as resjudicata. 14. Mr. Naha contended that in this decision there was no serious'contest on behalf of the respondents. I cannot accept this contention, because the learned judges refer to this aspect as to why there could not have been a contest in the matter before them. Mr. Naha also placed considerable reliance upon the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Panchanada Velan v. Vaithianatha Sastrial (I. L. R.29 Mad. 333 at 335). That was a case of a suit and a cross-suit disposed of by a common judgment and an appeal being filed against the decision only in one suit. The passage relied upon by Mr. Naha is at page 335 to the following effect: "It would lead to startling results if we were to hold that an Appellate Tribunal is precluded from dealing with a question which comes before it on appeal because an inferior Court, upon the same facts, but in a case other than the case under appeal, had given a decision which had not been appealed against, at the same time as the decision in the case under appeal." In that judgment it will be seen that the learned judges start by saying that technically, no doubt, the tenant's appeal ought to have been in both suits and the proper course for the District Judge to have taken would have been to require the appellant therein to amend his memorandum of appeal so as to make it an appeal in both the suits. But in the particular circumstances of that case, the learned judges were of the view that "the tenant's appeal in his suit, if successful would have the effect of superseding the adjudication in the landlord's suit". This decision has been considered by Mr. Justice Varadachariar in the decision reported in Rangachariar v. Rangaswami Ayyangar (I. L. R.59 Mad. 777) and also in the Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Chockalinga Thevar Firm v. Sankarappa Naiker (A. I. R.1942 Mad. 421) and in my opinion if I may say so with great respect, the distinction made by the learned judges is perfectly correct and acceptable to me. In my view, the decision in Panchanada Velan v. Vaithianatha Sastrial (I. L. R.22 Mad. 333 at 335) and especially the particular passage relied upon by Mr. Naha will not support his contention that in circumstances like the one before me, the judgment will not operate as res judicata in these appeals. 15. The decision in Appa v. KachaiBayyan Kutti (A. I. R.1932 Mad. 689) which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Narhari v. Shanker (A. I. R.1953 S. C. 419), in my opinion, again does not touch the matter in question before me. They only deal with the procedure namely, when different defendants file different appeals against the same decree, and the plaintiff's suit is ultimately dismissed by the decision in those appeals, the plaintiff need file only a single appeal and not several appeals against the various appellate judgments. None of these decision are helpful in this particular matter. 16. Therefore, in my opinion, acting on the basis of the principles laid down by Mr. Justice Varadachariar in the decision reported in Rangachariar v. Rangaswami Ayyangar (I.L. R.59 Mad. 777); by Mr. Justice Vankataramana Rao in Krishnan Nair v. Kambi(A. I. R.1937 Mad. 544) and later approved by the Division Bench ruling in Chockalinga Thavar Firm v. Sankarappa Naikar (A. I. R 1942 Mad. 421), it follows that the present document, which has been marked as additional evidence in this case namely, the judgment in O. S 240/51, operates as resjudicata in both these Second Appeals. Therefore, it follows that both the Second Appeals will have to be dismissed. As mentioned earlier, in the view that I have taken on the question of this judgment operating as res judicata in these proceedings, I have not heard Mr. Therefore, it follows that both the Second Appeals will have to be dismissed. As mentioned earlier, in the view that I have taken on the question of this judgment operating as res judicata in these proceedings, I have not heard Mr. Naha on the merits of the case. 17. In the result, both the Second Appeals are dismissed and the contesting respondents will have costs only in Second Appeal 347/56. No leave in both.