ORDER P.V. Dixit, C.J. In this case the controversy centres round the correctness of an order made by the Additional Tahsildar, Gopad Banas, under section 22(1) of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and upheld in appeal by the Collector, Sidhi, allotting certain lands to the respondents Nos. 1 to 4. The material facts are that two villages, namely, Amaba Tola and Bagarhkhas, situated in district Sidhi of the former Vindhya Pradesh State were pawai Jagir villages of one Raghobhansingh. After his death the villages were held by his two widowed daughters-in-law, the petitioner Jayaram Kumari and a co-widow known as Kathahwali (deceased). In 1943, Sampatsingh, father of respondent No. 1; Pratipalsingh, father of respondent No. 3; and Yogendra Bahadursingh, respondent No. 4 instituted a suit against the two widows claiming a declaration that the two widows were entitled to hold the villages only for maintenance during their life-time and that they were lawfully entitled to succeed to the villages. This suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs were only reversioners and had no claim whatsoever on the villages during the life-time of the widows. Thereafter, in certain revenue proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner, Sidhi, an order was made on 10th September 1948 by which the pawai villages were mutated in favour of Sampatsingh, Pratipalsingh and Yogendra Bahadursingh with the reservation that the widows would retain the possession of the villages for their maintenance during their life-time. Thus Jayaram Kumari and Kathahwali continued to remain in possession of the villages. In 1951 when Kathahwali died disputes again arose between the parties as to the possession of the villages and proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started. In those proceedings Jayaram Kumari's possession of the villages was maintained and Sampatsingh was directed to institute a civil suit for establishing his right to the possession of the villages. Thereafter, Jayaram Kumari granted a tenancy patta of the entire sir lands in the two villages to her nephew Ranbahadursingh who is other petitioner in the present case. In the annual khasra papers for the year 1952-53 Ranbahadursingh was shown as in possession of the said sir lands. A similar entry was repeated for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55. On 19th January 1956 respondents Nos. In the annual khasra papers for the year 1952-53 Ranbahadursingh was shown as in possession of the said sir lands. A similar entry was repeated for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55. On 19th January 1956 respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 complained to the Tahsildar, Gopad Banas, that Ranbahadursingh's name had been wrongly entered as the person in possession of the sir lands and that in fact the possession was with Jayaram Kumari, and that, therefore, her name be entered as the person in possession of the sir lands. After the coming into force of the Act on 30th June 1953, the respondents made an application under section 20 of the Act for allotment to them of the land which was in Raghobhansingh's possession as sir land. It was on this application that the Additional Tahsildar made an order under section 22(1) of the Act allotting the lands to respondents Nos. 1 to 4. The question that arises for determination turns on sections 22(1) and 24 of the Act. Section 22(1) is as follows: 22. Allotment of air or khudkasht land:- (1) A Jagirdar shall be allotted all air and khudkasht land which he was cultivating personally for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption. Section 24 provides: 24. Sir or khudkasht land in lieu of maintenance allowance, - Any air or khudkasht land granted by a Jagirdar to a person in lieu of maintenance allowance payable from the Jagir-lands which is under the personal cultivation of such person on the date immediately preceding the date of resumption, shall be deemed to be settled on such person as a patttdar tenant. The Additional Tahsildar took the view that Raghobhansingh's name as the person in possession of the sir land was entered in the annual village papers up to the year 1952, that according to the order of mutation passed by the Deputy Commissioner in 1948, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 would be deemed to be sirdars, that even if Jayaram Kumari was in actual possession of the land, her possession was as a representative of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 would be deemed to be sirdars, that even if Jayaram Kumari was in actual possession of the land, her possession was as a representative of respondents Nos. 1 to 4, that her possession was only for her maintenance, that as Jayaram Kumari was not the Jagirdar she could not create any tenancy in favour of Ranbahadursingh; and that, therefore, even if Ranbahadursingh was in possession of the land the possession would be regarded as of Jayaram Kumari. The Additional Tahsildar also found that Jayaram Kumari had been granted 2/3 of the compensation payable under the Act for her maintenance by an order dated 31st March 1956 of the Land Reforms Commissioner. In appeal, the Collector also took the view that the effect of the order passed in mutation proceedings of 1948 was that in law the possession of the lands was of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 though Jayaram Kumari and the co-widow Kathahwali (deceased) were in actual possession of the lands for their maintenance. Section 22(1) is plain enough to show that under that provision a Jagirdar can be allotted all sir and khudkasht land which he was cultivating personally for a continuous period of three years immediately before the resumption of the estate under the Act. Now here, the decision in the suit filed by Sampatsingh and others in 1943, the order made in the mutation proceedings of 1948, the order made in proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the application made by respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 themselves in 1956 leave no doubt that until the date of resumption at least the actual possession of the sir lands was with Jayaram Kumari and that she was holding those lands in lieu of maintenance allowance. The view taken by the Additional Tahsildar and the Collector that the possession of Jayaram Kumari was as representative of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 is clearly opposed to the facts on record and to the plain provisions of section 22(1). For the applicability of section 22(1) it is essential that the land of which allotment is sought must have been in personal cultivation of the Jagirdar for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption. According to the definition given of the expression "land cultivated personally", the view taken by the revenue authorities is clearly untenable. For the applicability of section 22(1) it is essential that the land of which allotment is sought must have been in personal cultivation of the Jagirdar for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption. According to the definition given of the expression "land cultivated personally", the view taken by the revenue authorities is clearly untenable. Section 24 clinches altogether the question of possession arising in the present case. It distinctly provides that sir or khudkasht land granted by a Jagirdar in lieu of maintenance allowance which is under the personal cultivation of the grantee shall be deemed to be settled on such person as a pattedar tenant. This provision shows that for the purposes of sections 22 and 24 the cultivation of the land by the petitioner No. 1 could not be regarded as the personal cultivation of the Jagirdar. In coming to the conclusion that they did, both the Additional Tahsildar and the Collector overlooked the fact that what was material for section 22(1) was the actual possession of the land and not constructive possession. The actual possession of the land immediately preceding the date of resumption being with the petitioner Jayaram Kumari, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 could not clearly be allotted the sir land under section 22(1). The order of the revenue authorities thus being in utter contravention of section 22(1) must be quashed. There was some argument at the Bar as regards the person who was in possession of the land today and as regards the question whether that person was entitled to retain possession of the land. This question does not really arise n these proceedings initiated on respondents Nos. 1 to 4's application for the allotment of the land under section 22(1). In these proceedings the question that arises is about the allotment of the land to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and not whether the petitioners are entitled to continue to hold the land that may be in their possession today. Petitioner No. 2's claim that be is in possession of the land today has been disputed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 who say that in fact they are in possession of the property. The revenue authorities have not given any finding as to the person or persons in actual possession of the land today. Petitioner No. 2's claim that be is in possession of the land today has been disputed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 who say that in fact they are in possession of the property. The revenue authorities have not given any finding as to the person or persons in actual possession of the land today. The Collector determined the question of possession as evidenced by entries in revenue papers. He did not give any consideration to the question of actual possession. Be that as it may, the person in actual possession, if be thinks that he has a legal right to continue to remain in possession, is at liberty to take appropriate steps for the retention of his possession or for protection against dispossession. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 27th March 1968 of the Additional Tahsildar, Gopad Banas, which was upheld in appeal by the Collector, Sidhi, allotting the lands in dispute to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Appeal allowed.