Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, who was a Revenue Inspector in the service of the Corporation of Trivandrum in 1953, was placed under suspension by the Commissioner of the Corporation on suspicion of irregularities in the collection of advertisement taxes. Ext. P1 dated 22-5-1953 is the order of suspension. This order was cancelled on 1-7-1953 pending final disposal of the enquiry against him. On the termination of enquiry, final orders were passed on 12-1-1954 acquitting him of the charges and cancelling the order of suspension. The period of suspension was converted into one of privilege leave with full pay and the matter was closed. Eighteen months later the Government directed the Examiner of Local Fund Accounts to hold a departmental enquiry into the same charges. Ext.P4 is the order of the Government dated 25th June, 1955. The Government also directed the Police to enquire into the matter and report. After receipt of the reports the Government directed the Commissioner of the Corporation to place the petitioner again under suspension pending fresh enquiry. On the basis of the reports of the Examiner of Local Fund Accounts and the Police, charges were framed against the petitioner regarding "irregular use of advertisement tax seals of the Corporation with a view to misappropriation of Corporation revenue and also misappropriation of "Corporation Revenue by falsification and complicity in alterations and falsifications thereby of the receipts issued from the Corporation for advertisement tax revenue", and the petitioner was called upon by order (Ext. P6) dated 30th May, 1956, to show cause why his service should not be dispensed with. He submitted his explanation on 4-6-1956 denying the charges. On 23-9-1957 a memo (Ext. P7) signed by the Mayor was served on him stating that he had been found guilty of the charges and asking him to show cause why he should not be asked to retire from service after a period of two years and three months of suspension commencing from 27-6-1955. The petitioner submitted his explanation on. 14-10-1957, and on 27-11-1957, the Mayor passed an order (Ext. P8), placing him under Suspension for two years and three months from 27-6-1955 and treating him as retired from service on 27-9-1957. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Government but the same was dismissed on 15-4-1958 by order (Ext. P9). The petitioner submitted his explanation on. 14-10-1957, and on 27-11-1957, the Mayor passed an order (Ext. P8), placing him under Suspension for two years and three months from 27-6-1955 and treating him as retired from service on 27-9-1957. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Government but the same was dismissed on 15-4-1958 by order (Ext. P9). He has therefore preferred this petition under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution to quash the order of the Mayor (Ext. P8) and the appellate order of Government of Kerala (Ext. P9) by a writ of eertiorari or other appropriate writ, direction or order, on two grounds, namely, (I) that once having been found not guilty of the charges by the Mayor the second enquiry and the order of removal from service is invalid and (2) that the enquiry preceding the order (Ext. P8) is vitiated by contravention of principles of natural justice. 2. The first respondent is the State of Kerala. Though the State was represented at the final hearing, no counter affidavit has been filed. The second respondent, the Mayor, has filed a counter affidavit contending that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 and 227, that he has other adequate remedies, that the enquiry was properly conducted and that the order is not liable to be quashed. When this petition came up for hearing I ordered that the Corporation be impleaded as additional third respondent. Sri. P. Govindan Nair, counsel for the second respondent appeared on behalf of the third respondent also. 3. The first point relied on by the petitioner is that the first decision of the Mayor acquitting him of the charges having become final, a second enquiry into the same charges was not warranted by City Municipal Act, IV of 1116 (Travancore). Sri. P. Govindan Nair, counsel for the second respondent appeared on behalf of the third respondent also. 3. The first point relied on by the petitioner is that the first decision of the Mayor acquitting him of the charges having become final, a second enquiry into the same charges was not warranted by City Municipal Act, IV of 1116 (Travancore). S.91 of the Act makes provision to punish the members of the staff of the Corporation, and it reads as follows: "91 (1) Subject to the provisions of S.89, If any officer or servant in the service of the Corporation other than an officer appointed under S.80, S. 81 or subjection [3] of S.82 is guilty of any breach of any departmental rules or discipline or carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct, or is unfit, the authority competent to appoint such officer or servant may impose the following penalties on him namely: [i] Censure; [ii] withholding of increments or promotion, including stoppage at an efficiency bar; [iii] reduction to a lower post or timescale, or to lower stage in a timescale; [iv] fine; IV] recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation; [vi] suspension; [vii] removal from the service of the Corporation which does not disqualify from future employment; and [viii] dismissal from the service of the Corporation which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment. [2] Any order passed under sub-section [1] shall be final: Provided that any officer or servant in receipt of a monthly salary of not less than twenty rupees may appeal to the Mayor against any order of the Commissioner removing or dismissing him or suspending him for a period of more than one "month; Provided further that any officer or servant in receipt of a monthly salary exceeding one hundred rupees may appeal to Our Government against an order of the Mayor, reducing removing, dismissing or suspending him for a period of more than one month; Provided also that no Government servant employed by the Corporation shall be dismissed from such employment without the consent of Our Government. [3] Pending any order of the Mayor the Commissioner may suspend any officer appointed by the Mayor provided always that he shall forthwith report to the Mayor the reasons for his action." Sub-clause (2); shows that any order passed under sub-section (1) is final, subject to the result of the appeal to the proper authority. The order passed by the Mayor on 12-1-1954 was one under S.91 (1) of the Act, and the same having become final, it is not clear how the Mayor could again institute an enquiry on the same charges. No doubt, the Government appears to have addressed the Corporation to hold another enquiry, but there is no provision in the Act which confers such a power on the Government Ext P5 clearly shows that it was only on the basis of the Government's order (Ext. P4) and nothing else that the second enquiry was conducted. It was suggested on behalf of the first respondent that S.41, 42 and 43 of the Act confer certain powers on the Government and that Ext. P4 may be treated as a communication to the Corporation regarding the information obtained by the Government on enquiry. In my opinion, S.41 to 43 do not confer a power on the Government to direct the Corporation to revive proceedings relating to disciplinary action against a member of the staff who has been once found not guilty on the same charges. S.144 of the Act which occurs in Chapter VI dealing with finance confers power on the Government to appoint auditors to audit the accounts of the Corporation. This may enable the Government to pass on a report of the auditor to the Corporation for taking appropriate action. But the previous order of the Mayor having become final there is no scope for another enquiry or disciplinary action in respect of the same charges which were found not true. The order compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service must be quashed on the ground that it was passed without jurisdiction and in excess of the authority conferred on the Mayor by the Act. 4. In view of the above conclusion it is unnecessary to consider whether principles of natural justice were violated in the enquiry conducted on the basis of the Government's order and if so whether it is a valid ground for interference under Art.226 and 227. 4. In view of the above conclusion it is unnecessary to consider whether principles of natural justice were violated in the enquiry conducted on the basis of the Government's order and if so whether it is a valid ground for interference under Art.226 and 227. It was urged on behalf of the Corporation that Art.311 does not apply to servants of the Corporation who cannot be deemed civil servants. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Bibhuti Bhusan v. Damodar Valley Corpn (A.I.R 1953 Cal. 581), Bundraban v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1953. H. P. 103) and Ram Piari v. Municipal Committee (A.I.R.1956 Punjab 220) in support of the position that Art.311 would not apply to a case of this nature. As stated earlier it is not necessary to express any opinion on this question in this case, and 1 therefore leave it open. 5. In the result, the original petition is allowed and orders, Exts. P8 and P9, directing compulsory retirement of the petitioner from service and placing him under suspension for two years and three months from 27-6-1955, are quashed. The petitioner with get his costs moulding counsel's fee of Rs. 100/-from the third respondent. Allowed.