JUDGMENT This appeal under the Letters Patent arises out of a judgment in Second Appeal which was delivered by a single Judge of this Court on 17 April 1957. The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether, upon the death of a Hindu widow after the Central Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1939 (XI of 1940) came into force, the occupancy land, which she had inherited from her husband before that Act, passed by inheritance to the heirs of her husband or devolved on the surviving coparceners of the Hindu joint family of which the husband was himself a coparcener at the time of his death. The facts of this case are simple and may be stated in a few words. Rewaram and his four brothers held certain occupancy plots which they had inherited from their father. Rewaram died in a state of jointness in 1931. His widow Mst. Budhia inherited the share of Rewaram in those plots. She died in 1944. In 1945-46, Mst. Laltabai, daughter of Rewaram and Mst. Budhia, made an application to the Tahsildar for partition of a fifth share of the plots, which she claimed to have inherited from her father after the determination of the intermediate limited estate held by her mother till her death in 1944. Thereupon, the surviving members of the joint family initiated this action for a declaration that Mst. Laltabai had no right or interest in the plots and for injunction to restrain her from seeking partition of these plots. The Court of first instance decreed the claim mainly on the finding that Mst. Budhia had surrendered her share in the plots and accepted payment. In first appeal, that finding was reverted and it was held that Rewaram's interest passed to Mst. Budhia and, after her death, to Mst. Laltabai. The learned single Judge, affirming that view, observed: It is obvious that under the Act of 1920 the widow and the daughter acquired vested rights which could not be taken away under the new law. In first appeal, that finding was reverted and it was held that Rewaram's interest passed to Mst. Budhia and, after her death, to Mst. Laltabai. The learned single Judge, affirming that view, observed: It is obvious that under the Act of 1920 the widow and the daughter acquired vested rights which could not be taken away under the new law. Section 11 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920 (I of 1920) as it stood prior to the amendment reads as follows: The interest of an occupancy tenant shall on his death pass by inheritance with his personal law: Provided that- (i) no person shall take any interest during the life-time of any ancestor of such person in the male line of descent from the tenant; (ii) no collateral shall be entitled to inherit unless he is a male in a male line of ascent or descent and within seven degrees of kindred from the tenant. Section 7 of the Central Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1939 (XI of 1940) replaced the above enactment by the following: The interest of an occupancy tenant in his holding shall on his death pass by inheritance or survivorship in accordance with his personal law. The precise question here is whether, when the succession opened in 1944, the new law, which had then come into force, or the old law as in force in 1931, governed the case. In Kambaljabai v. Motiram 1953 NLJ 381 Rao J. held that the sons of an occupancy tenant, who had inherited his holding from his father prior to the amending Act XI of 1940 were entitled to challenge an alienation made by their father after that Act on the ground that it was not justified by legal necessity. It was pointed out that the rights of the occupancy tenant prior to the change in law were in no way affected. On the other hand, the bar interposed by the statute, which prevented the sons from taking interest during the life-time of their father, having been removed, the personal law prevailed. The effect of this view was that, owing to the passing of the amending Act XI of 1940, the sons obtained an interest in the occupancy holding in which, before that event, they had no interest. A different view was, however, taken by Naik J. in Mansingh v. Mst. Jagotin S.A. No. 528 of 1952, D /. 26-9-1957. The effect of this view was that, owing to the passing of the amending Act XI of 1940, the sons obtained an interest in the occupancy holding in which, before that event, they had no interest. A different view was, however, taken by Naik J. in Mansingh v. Mst. Jagotin S.A. No. 528 of 1952, D /. 26-9-1957. The facts of that case were similar to those before us. It was held that the interest of an occupancy tenant, who died prior to the amending Act XI of 1940, passed by inheritance to his widow and, upon the death of the widow in 1943, to his daughters in preference to his joint brother. For the view too that Act XI of 1949 is not retrospective in operation, the learned Judge relied upon Tularam v. Tejilal 1942 NLJ 72 : AIR 1942 Nag. 49 : ILR 1942 Nag. 205. In that case, succession to the reversioners had opened on the death of the widow in 1935, that is, before the amendment. The amendment could not have any effect on the devolution of land for that reason and it was in this sense that it was observed that the amendment did not act restrospectively. To apply the Act to cases in which the succession opened after it came into force does not amount to giving it a retrospective effect. In this connexion, we may refer to the cases in which, although the male owner died before the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act II of 1929 was enacted, the provisions of that Act were applied when, upon the death of the limited owner, succession opened after that Act came into force: Lata Duni Chand v. Musammat Anar Kali 73 IA 187, Shrimati Shakuntala Devi v. Kaushalya Devi ILR 17 Lah. 356 : AIR 1936 Lah. 124, Bindeshari Singh v. Bail Nath Singh ILR 13 Luck. 380 : AIR 1937 Oudh 402, Pokhan Dusadh v. Musammat Manoa ILR 16 Pat. 215 (F.B.) : AIR 1937 Pat. 117, Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai ILR 58 All. 1041 (FB) : AIR 1936 All. 507, Lakshmi v. Anantharama ILR 1937 Mad. 948 (FB) : AIR 1937 Mad. 699 & Shankar v. Raghoba AIR 1938 Nag. 97 : ILR 1939 Nag. 383. 215 (F.B.) : AIR 1937 Pat. 117, Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai ILR 58 All. 1041 (FB) : AIR 1936 All. 507, Lakshmi v. Anantharama ILR 1937 Mad. 948 (FB) : AIR 1937 Mad. 699 & Shankar v. Raghoba AIR 1938 Nag. 97 : ILR 1939 Nag. 383. In Mansingh's case S.A. No. 528 of 1952 decided on 26-9-1967, Naik J. took the view by inheritance, the law of inheritance would continue to govern the devolution of the land and succession would open again upon the death of the widow for the purpose of determining the nearest reversionary heir then alive. In the judgment under appeal, the learned single Judge also observed that the widow and the daughter acquired vested rights which could not be taken away by the new law. With all due respect, we are of opinion that there was no vesting of the estate in the daughter or any one of the reversioners as at the date of death of the male holder. Also, during the life-time of the limited owner, the reversionary right was a mere possibility or spes successionis, for it could not be predicated who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death: Lala Duni Chand v. Musammat Anar Kali 731 IA 187. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer 431 IA 207, "her right is of the nature of a right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited; but......so long as she is alive, no one has any vested interest in the succession". It would thus appear that in this case there was no question of depriving by the new law the daughter, Mst. Laltabai, of any interest which had already vested in her. We also think that even the widow Mst. Budhia was not divested of her interest in the disputed occupancy plots which she inherited from her husband. The reason is this. The new section 11 was not attracted and did not come into operation until the widow died and the time came for the interest held by her to "pass by inheritance or survivorship". That being so, the widow continued to hold, until her death, the interest which she had inherited from her husband. The reason is this. The new section 11 was not attracted and did not come into operation until the widow died and the time came for the interest held by her to "pass by inheritance or survivorship". That being so, the widow continued to hold, until her death, the interest which she had inherited from her husband. Although the brothers of Rewaram obtained a vested interest in the lands on the commencement of the amending Act, they could not oust the widow on that basis in 1940. The rule that an enactment does not operate retrospectively, unless it is so provided either specifically or by necessary implication, rests on the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust. Its chief application is where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past transactions, or impair contracts. Having regard to the manner in which we think section 11 operated, it did not cause injustice or affect prejudicially vested rights. In our opinion, a contrary view would prevent the intention of the Legislature from taking effect even after the new law came into force not only in cases of widows like Mst. Budhia but also in cases of males. For example, if a Hindu male A possessed of joint family property, including occupancy land, died before the new law leaving behind him surviving his son B and grandson C, only his son B would inherit the occupancy land and the rest of the joint family property would devolve on B and C by survivorship. According to the contrary view, this would be repeated upon the death of B after the new law because C, who had no interest in the occupancy land before the death of B, would take that land by inheritance though he would obtain the rest of the property by survivorship. We think that the intention of Legislature as expressed in the new law, which provides for devolution of occupancy land held as joint family property by survivorship, should be given effect to when that can be done without causing injustice. In view of section 4 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (XVIII of 1937), as amended by (XI of 1938), that Act does not apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of that Act on 14th April 1937. In view of section 4 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (XVIII of 1937), as amended by (XI of 1938), that Act does not apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of that Act on 14th April 1937. That being so, the general Hindu law unaffected by that Act would govern this case. In the instant case, the position was this. Rewaram and his four brothers were members of a joint family and their joint family property included the disputed occupancy plots. These occupancy plots all the while retained their character as joint family property as understood under the general law although the old tenancy law prescribed a special mode of devolution for those plots. The new law governing cases of devolution arising in future replaced the special mode of devolution by devolution according to the general law. To effectuate that intention, the occupancy plots, which never lost their character as joint family property and which were held by the widow Mst. Budhia as a member of the joint family must be regarded as having passed to the coparceners of the joint family by survivorship. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree of one learned single Judge and that of the first appeal Court are set aside and the one passed by the Court of first instance is restored. The defendants shall bear their own costs and pay those of the plaintiffs throughout. Counsel's fee here according to schedule. Appeal allowed.