JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - This appeal is directed against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Kumaun at Naini Tal by which he acquitted Badri Prasad of the offence under Sec. 16 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows: According to the prosecution, on the 30th October, 1956, Sri Ram Asrey Katiyar, Food Inspector, Haldwani, went to the shop of Badri Prasad respondent and asked him to sell six chhataks of mustard oil to him by way of sample. The respondent who was a whole-sale licensee pleaded that he could not sell any quantity below one tin of mustard oil to the Food Inspector in view of the terms of the license Ext. D-l. The respondent, therefore, asked the Food Inspector to take the entire tin of oil as a sample. The Food Inspector, however, refused to do so, and instead, made a complaint against the respondent under Sec. 16(1) (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The facts of the case are not disputed. The only questions which have to be determined are whether the respondent Badri Prasad was under a legal obligation to sell six chhataks of mustard oil to the Food Inspector for purposes of sample and whether his refusal to do so amounted to an offence under Sec. 16 of the Act. 3. Sec. 10 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, provides that a Food Inspector shall have power to take sample of any article of food from any person selling such article. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 10 says that where any sample is taken under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1), its costs calculated at the rate at which the article is usually sold to the public shall be paid to the person from whom it is taken. It is thus clear that the Food Inspector, when he takes an article of Food from a shopkeeper by way of sample, is really purchasing that article and asking the dealer to sell it to him. It was conceded by the learned State counsel that it did amount to a sale as provided by Sec. 10 of the Act. It is thus clear that the Food Inspector, when he takes an article of Food from a shopkeeper by way of sample, is really purchasing that article and asking the dealer to sell it to him. It was conceded by the learned State counsel that it did amount to a sale as provided by Sec. 10 of the Act. The next question, therefore, to be considered is whether the respondent was bound to sell six chhataks of mustard oil to the Food Inspector even though that would have amounted to a breach of the license granted to him and would have made him punishable under Sec. 7 (iii) of the Act. Sec. 7 (iii) reads thus: "No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, or distribute any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence.'' 4. It is admitted that the respondent was a whole-sale dealer, and according to the conditions of his license, he could not legally sell mustard oil for a quantity of less than one tin. The Food Inspector admitted that the respondent had offered to sell one tin of mustard oil to him but that he only wanted six chhataks of oil and refused to purchase the whole tin. Obviously, therefore, there was no refusal on the part of the respondent to sell mustard oil to the Food Inspector. He only insisted that he should not be forced to sell in contravention of the terms of his licence and this, in our opinion, he was entitled to do. As a matter of fact, not only the licensee, i.e., the respondent, would have been guilty if he had sold six chhataks of mustard oil to the Food Inspector, but the Food Inspector himself would have abetted the commission of an offence under Sec. 7 (iii) of the Act, if he had purchased that quantity from the respondent. In the circumstances, no offence, in our opinion, was committed by the respondent in refusing to sell six chhataks of mustard oil as demanded by the Food Inspector. 5. In the circumstances, no offence, in our opinion, was committed by the respondent in refusing to sell six chhataks of mustard oil as demanded by the Food Inspector. 5. It was urged on behalf of the State that Sec. 10 of the Act should be so interpreted as to give power to the Food Inspector to take so much quantity of foodstuff by way of sample as may be necessary, and that he would not be debarred by the terms of the respondent's licence from taking such quantity as may be demanded by him. We are of the opinion that such an interpretation would be in direct conflict with the other provisions of the Act. The provisions of Sec. 7 and 16 are penal in their nature and should be interpreted so as to harmonise with the purpose of the Act and not to create conflict or inconsistency between its different provisions. If Sec. 10 were to be construed as authorising the Food Inspector to purchase even the prohibited quantity of food material from a dealer, then that would result in the prosecution of the dealer for the substantive offence and of the Food Inspector of an abettor. It would be stultifying the intention of the legislature to construe the language of Sec. 10 (1) (a) (i) as empowering a Food Inspector to take (by purchase) sample of any article of food in such quantity as would result in breach of the conditions of the seller's licence. Such an interpretation would be obnoxious to reason and commonsense, because while the taking of sample by the Food Inspector would be protected its sale by the shopkeeper against the conditions of his licence would expose him to punishment. It is a well recognised rule that in a penal statute such as this, it is the duty of the court to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they will not become traps for honest, unlearned (in law) and unwary men. The statement of the Food Inspector was that if the respondent had committed any breach of the conditions of his (wholesaler's) licence he would have challaned him under Sec. 7. The statement of the Food Inspector was that if the respondent had committed any breach of the conditions of his (wholesaler's) licence he would have challaned him under Sec. 7. So here was a trap laid for the respondent and if he did not oblige the Food Inspector in suffering a prosecution by committing breach of the conditions of his licence, he was only conforming to the letter of the law. 6. It may also be noted in this connection that where a Food Inspector suspects adulteration, the Legislature has made a specific provision empowering him to take possession of any article intended for human consumption irrespective of the question of quantity or value. This provision is to be found in sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 10 of the Act which runs as follows:- " (4) If any article intended for food appears to any Food Inspector to be adulterated or misbranded, he may seize and carry away or keep in the safe custody of the vendor such article in order that it may be dealt with as hereinafter provided." 7. It was, therefore, open to the Food Inspector to achieve his purpose by proceeding under this provision of law. Under the circumstances, his insistence in the purchase of the prohibited quantity of oil appears to be un-understandable and unreasonable. In our opinion an interpretation of penal law which results in consequences which are obviously unreasonable and unfair should be avoided. 8. For the above reasons we are of opinion that the prosecution of the respondent was unjustified and he was rightly acquitted. 9. We, accordingly, dismiss this appeal.