Order.- These matters have been referred by the office* for directions as to the maintainability of the above appeals. S.R. No. 37109 is an appeal against an order for judicial separation under section 10(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. The petition for judicial separation was filed by the husband on 10th September, 1957, in Sub-Court, Tanjore. S.R. No. 14179 is an appeal against an order dismissing an application for divorce. That petition was filed by the husband who is the appellant on 17th December, 1956, in the District Court of Tiruchirappalli. The petition was * Office Note.- A.E. 8/59 S.R. Nos. 27783, 37109, 14179 and 158. The question that arises for determination in these three cases is whether the forum for appeal under section 28 read with section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act (Central Act XXV of 1955) against the decision of a Subordinate Judge is the High Court or the District Court in view of the powers vested in the Subordinate Courts under G.O.Ms. No. 221 (Home) dated 29th January, 1957, to exercise jurisdiction in respect of matter -arising under the Act. According to section 19 of the Act it is the District Court that can hear the original proceedings arising under the Act. The expression " District Court" has been defined in section 3 (4) of the Act. Under the rulemaking powers vested in the State Government under the aforesaid provision, the Government has issued G.O. Ms. No. 221 (Home) dated 29th January, 1957, empowering the Subordinate Judge to hear proceedings arising under the Act within his respective jurisdiction. The above definition would appear to imply that even though an order is passed by a Subordinate Judge under the enabling provision contained in the Government Order aforesaid, he must "be deemed to have exercised the powers of a District Judge under section 19 of the Act. In such a case an appeal under section 28 would appear to be competent against the order of the Subordinate Judge in the High Court and not in the District Court. In such a case an appeal under section 28 would appear to be competent against the order of the Subordinate Judge in the High Court and not in the District Court. But there appears to be no uniformity in the principle followed by the Subordinate Courts in respect of the entertaining of the appellate proceedings arising under the Act, because in some cases, appeals are permitted to be laid in the District Court under section 28 of the Act against the decisions of the Subordinate Judges, while in others the appeals are directly preferred to the High Court under the same provision of the enactment. There is nothing in the Act that would warrant the filing of a Second Appeal when once an appeal has been heard and finally disposed of by the District Judge under section 28 of the Act. The present S.R. No. 27783 filed herein as C.M.S.A. in the High Court is purported to be under section 21 of the Act, while S. R. Nos. 37109 and 14179 are also sought to be presented in the High Court as Civil Miscellaneous (First) Appeals under section 28 of the Act. On account of there being no uniform practice followed with regard to the proper forum to be adopted for the appeal under section 28 of the Act in these cases, complications are bound to set in at subsequent stages, if under the same provision in the enactment both C.M.As. and C.M.S.As. are permitted to be filed in the High Court. On account of there being no uniform practice followed with regard to the proper forum to be adopted for the appeal under section 28 of the Act in these cases, complications are bound to set in at subsequent stages, if under the same provision in the enactment both C.M.As. and C.M.S.As. are permitted to be filed in the High Court. When an aggrieved party who has chosen the High Court as the forum for his appeal under the Act, against the order of the Subordinate Judge, he is entitled to take the matter, on further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent; but the same privilege cannot be extended to an aggrieved party, who under similar circumstances has chosen the District Court as the forum for his appeal and against the appellate order of the District Court he desires to take it on a further appeal to the High Court under the same provision as a C.M.S.A. This is because, in the latter case, an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will not be competent, unless the party has applied for and obtained a certificate at the time of delivery of judgment in the C.M.S.A. under Rule 95 of the Rules of the High Court Appellate Side. Hence the present note is submitted for an authoritative pronouncement on the subject as to what the proper forum for appeal is under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, viz., whether it is the High Court or the District Court. It may perhaps be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act which are briefly set out below: Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that subject to the other provisions contained in the Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under the Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). No rules appear to have been framed in the High Court under section 21 of the Act. No rules appear to have been framed in the High Court under section 21 of the Act. Section 28 of the Act provides that all the decrees and orders made by the Courts in any proceedings under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its Original Civil Jurisdiction are enforced and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force, provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only. Section 19 of the Act provides that every petition under the Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction the marriage was solmeniz ed or the husband and the wife reside or last resided together. It is clear from the above sections, that the forum for presenting the original petition under the Act is the District Court. later transferred by the District Judge to Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli, who passed an order dismissing the petition. S.R. No. 27783 is a C.M.S.A. against an order of the District Judge of South Arcot at Cuddalore reversing the order of the Sub-Court and granting a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The application was filed in the year 1956 originally in the District Court. It was later transferred for disposal to the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the application. On an appeal filed to the District Court by the husband an order for restitution of conjugal rights was passed. A C.M.S.A. is sought to be preferred to this. Court against the order. These references raise a question as to whether an appeal against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge under section 10, 13 or 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, would lie to the appropriate District Court or to the High Court direct. Prior to the passing of the Central Act XXV of 1955 there was a legislation in this State in respect of certain matrimonial disputes amongst Hindus. The Madras Hindu Bigamy Prevention and Divorce Act of 1949 declared all bigamous marriages by a Hindu void and punishable. It also provided for dissolution of certain marriages. Jurisdiction under that Act was given to the Subordinate Judge, District Judges and City Civil Judges within the limits of whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnised or the respondent resided. The Madras Hindu Bigamy Prevention and Divorce Act of 1949 declared all bigamous marriages by a Hindu void and punishable. It also provided for dissolution of certain marriages. Jurisdiction under that Act was given to the Subordinate Judge, District Judges and City Civil Judges within the limits of whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnised or the respondent resided. Against any order passed on the petition by anyone of the aforesaid Judges an appeal was declared to lie directly to the High Court. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Act XXV of 1955, was passed to codify the Hindu law of marriage. By so doing it has effected important changes in the marriage law. It granted rights of divorce, judicial separation and permanent alimony-It is unnecessary for the present purpose to refer to the other changes introduced by the Act in regard to the Hindu Law relating to marriages. The Act also provided for remedy in respect of the new rights created by it. The Act dealt with the preexisting right of either of the spouses to sue in a civil Court for restitution of conjugal rights. Section 9 provided for restitution of conjugal rights ; section 10 for judicial separation, sections 11 and 12 related to void and voidable marriages and section 13 related to divorce. Section 19 prescribed the Court to which a petition under the Act should be made. It runs as follows: “ Every petition under the Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction the marriage was solemnised or the husband and Wife reside or last resided together.” The term ‘District Court’ has been defined in section 3 (b) of the Act as meaning: ________________________________________________________________________________________________ The term “District Court” has been defined in section 3 (A) of the Act as meaning in any area for which there is a City Civil Court, that Court, and in any other area the Principal Civil Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction and includes any other Civil Courts which may be specified by the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazette as having jurisdiction in respect of matters dealt with in the Act. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid section 3 (A) of the Act has notified in G.O.Ms. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid section 3 (A) of the Act has notified in G.O.Ms. No. 221 (Home), dated 29th January, 1957, that the Subordinate Judges’ ‘Courts in the State shall have jurisdiction in respect of matters dealt with under the Act and arising in their respective jurisdiction. A reading of the above provisions of the enactments would seem to imply that though an order is passed by a Subordinate Judge in the exercise of his functions under section 3 (A) of the Act, it must be deemed to have been passed only by the District Court and in such a case an appeal cannot lie to the District Court against the decision of the Subordinate Judge because the proper forum Would in such a case be only the High Court and not the District Court. In the circumstances mentioned above, it is for consideration and orders as to What the proper forum for appeal is under section a8 of the Act, and whether the above S.R. Nos. 37109 and 14.170, of 1958 filed as Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are in order ; and if so whether S.R. No. 27783 filed as a C.M.S.A. should be held to be not competent though there appears to be no objection for a Civil Revision Petition being entertained when an appeal under section 28 of the Act had been heard and decided already by the District Judge and a further appeal to the High Court is considered as not maintainable. “In any area for which there is a City Civil Court, that Court, and in any other area the Principal Civil Court of Original Civil jurisdiction and includes any other Civil Courts which may be specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette as having jurisdiction in respect of matters dealt in this Act”. Under the authority conferred by this Act the State Government has issued G.O. 221, Home, dated 29th January, 1957, empowering the Subordinate Judges of the various places to hear proceedings arising under the Act within their respective jurisdiction. Section 28 of the Act deals with the execution of orders passed by the Court and also provides for a right of appeal. Section 28 of the Act deals with the execution of orders passed by the Court and also provides for a right of appeal. That states: “All decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceedings under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction are enforced and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force; provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only” . On a reading of section 19, it is clear that the jurisdiction under the Act is given to an existing civil Court. It is no doubt true that rights unknown previously to the Hindu Law are created by the Act. But the remedy in respect of those rights which are civil rights are given to the existing Courts and should therefore be deemed to be an extension of their jurisdiction. Section 21 provides for the application of the rules of civil procedure in the absence of any special rules being made by the High Court for the conduct of the trial of petitions under the Act. Section 28 which I have set out above also emphasises this aspect. Section 28 while it gives a right of appeal to the aggrieved spouse does not prescribe the forum. It simply says that appeals would lie as if they were decrees or orders of the Court. Section 28 recognised the well-established principle in regard to procedure when a new jurisdiction was given to an existing Court. The rule has been stated by Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, in National Telephone Co. v. The Post-Master General1thus: “ When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court, it, in my opinion, imports that ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.” In Secretary of State for India v. Chellakanni Rama Rao2 jurisdiction to decide certain disputes under the Forests Act was given to the District Judge. There was no provision under the Madras Forests Act for an appeal. The question arose whether an appeal would lie against an order by the District Judge under that Act. There was no provision under the Madras Forests Act for an appeal. The question arose whether an appeal would lie against an order by the District Judge under that Act. At page 624, Lord Shaw observed: “When proceedings of this character reach the District Court that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of civil procedure can be applied.” To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar3, where their Lordships held that where a legal right was in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country were seized of such dispute the Courts were governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal could lie if authorised by such rules notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which did not in turn confer a right of appeal. “Regular or special appeals shall when such appeals are allowed by law, lie from the decrees and orders of the District Court to the High Court. Appeals from the decrees and orders of Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs shall, when such appeals are allowed by law, he to the District Court, except when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000 in which case the appeals shall lie to the High Court” . It is unnecessary for the present purpose to refer to the three provisos to the section. In regard to a matrimonial dispute, it cannot be stated that the subject-matter of the dispute exceeds Rs. 10,000. That is a matter which is not capable of valuation. It would, therefore, appear that if a Subordinate Judge were given jurisdiction under the Act, an appeal from his decision would, under section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, lie only to the District Judge. As the decision in the matrimonial disputes under section 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act should be deemed to be a decree, a further appeal would lie from the decision of the District Judge on appeal. It is, however, contended for the appellant in the first two of the above cases that an appeal from the Suboridnate Judge would only lie to the High Court, and not to the District Court. It is, however, contended for the appellant in the first two of the above cases that an appeal from the Suboridnate Judge would only lie to the High Court, and not to the District Court. The argument is that a Subordinate Judge who obtains jurisdiction by virtue of the notification made by the State Government under section 3 (b) of the Act should be deemed to be a District Court for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction under the Act, and being deemed to be a District Court it is contended that an appeal from any order or decree of that Court should necessarily lie only to the High Court, and not to any subordinate authority. 1 cannot, however, agree with this contention. Under the Act jurisdiction in regard to the adjudication of matrimonial disputes is given to a particular class of civil Courts. These have been compendiously described in the Act as a District Court: vide section 3 (b). The definition, of a District Court under section 3 (b) does not mean that a Court which is notified by the State Government becomes a District Court. What the section provides is that ordinarily it is the City Civil Court or the District Court that would have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes under the Act. But power is given to the State Government to designate by notification other Courts as well. By virtue of the notification other Courts will have jurisdiction as such Courts and not as a District Court, and it cannot be held that for the purpose of the Act, Courts other than the District Court would by virtue of the notification become a District Court. It would, therefore, follow that if by virtue of the notification under section 3 (b) a Court other than the District Court is given jurisdiction under the Act it is only an extension of jurisdiction of that Court and appeals under section 28 of the Act would lie only to that forum to which appeals generally lie from the decree and orders of that Court. In Venkatarama Iyer v. Srinivasa Sastrigal1, a question arose as to what was the proper forum of appeal in regard to an application under rules 7 and 9 made under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. In Venkatarama Iyer v. Srinivasa Sastrigal1, a question arose as to what was the proper forum of appeal in regard to an application under rules 7 and 9 made under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. Rule 9 simply provided that an order declaring the amount of debt due under rule 7 would be subject to appeal and second appeal as if it were a decree in an original suit. The learned Judges held that the rule attracted the procedure relating to appeals including the provisions governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts which were essentially a matter of procedure. It, therefore held that section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act would apply and the forum of appeal would be determined in accordance with it. In Prabhakar v. Usha Prabhaker2 a question arose as to the proper forum of an appeal in a case under the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947. Originally under section 5 of the Act jurisdiction was given only to the District Judge. Later by an amendment the District Courts were enabled to transfer the matrimonial disputes to an Assistant or a Civil Judge in the District. In that case a suit under the Act was instituted prior to the amendment. But after the amendment the matter was transferred to the Civil Judge and he passed a decree for divorce. The learned Judges held that by virtue of the provisions of section 5-A the suit transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge should be regarded as a suit orginally instituted in the Court for the purpose of exercising powers and jurisdiction in respect of trial of the suit and that an appeal from that Court would lie only to the District Judge, notwithstanding the fact that the suit was originally filed in the District Court and later transferred to the Civil Judge. An exeception, however, was made to this rule in regard to a suit which was instituted before the coming into force of the amended section giving jurisdiction to the Civil Judge. In such a case it was held that the appeal would lie directly to the High Court. I am of opinion that the principle of the decision in that case would apply to the present one. The notification of the State Government investing jurisdiction in the Sub-Courts in regard to cases arising under the Hindu Marriage Act was made on 29th January, 1957. I am of opinion that the principle of the decision in that case would apply to the present one. The notification of the State Government investing jurisdiction in the Sub-Courts in regard to cases arising under the Hindu Marriage Act was made on 29th January, 1957. The decree or order of the Sub-Court in regard to petition instituted thereafter being given in the exercise of its own jurisdiction section 13 of the Civil Courts Act would apply to the case and an appeal would lie only to the appropriate District Court. I have already indicated that on such matters there is no question of valuation. So appeals from decrees in respect of petitions instituted in the Sub-Court after 29th January, 1957, would lie only to the District Court. The forum will be the same even if the petition had been instituted in the District Court after that date and transferred by that Court for disposal to the Sub-Court. S. R. No. 37109 would, therefore, be returned to the appellant for being presented to the proper District Court. S. R. No. 14179 was filed on 17th December, 1956, in the District Court and after the notification, was transferred to the Sub-Court for disposal. An appeal is sought to be filed directly to this Court against the decree of the lower Court. It is now well settled that a right of appeal to a superior Tribunal is a vested right in a litigant and such a right could not be taken away except by statute either expressly or by necessary implication taking away such a right. In the instant case on the date on which the petition was presented to the District Court, the Sub-Court had no jurisdiction. An appeal would, therefore, lie to the High Court in respect of proceedings intitiated before the notification. Such a right of appeal would be a vested one. In Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving1, an application was made to the Privy Council to dismiss an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland on the ground that the power of the Court to give leave to appeal had been abrogated by an Act. The action in respect of which the appeal was brought was commenced prior to the passing of that enactment, though leave to appeal was given subsequently. The action in respect of which the appeal was brought was commenced prior to the passing of that enactment, though leave to appeal was given subsequently. Lord Macnaghten observed at page 372, “As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded. On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellant would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or Was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships, that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure.” The Privy Council, therefore, dismissed the Application holding that the leave was properly granted. In the instant case, the appellant had a right on the date of the notification by the Government to file an appeal to the High Court. That right could only be taken away by a provision in the statute. There is no such provision in the Hindu Marriage Act. The effect of section 3 (b) is only to empower the State Government to invest certain Courts with jurisdiction under the Act. Such a notification cannot mean that the right of appeal to a particular Court which inhered in a party prior to its coming into force has been either expressly or impliedly taken away. Indeed the State Government would appear to have no such power as the only power given to them under section 3 (b) is to prescribe a Court and not to modify other provisions of the Act. On this principle S.R. No. 14179 should be held to be properly filed in this Court and the appeal will be numbered. Indeed the State Government would appear to have no such power as the only power given to them under section 3 (b) is to prescribe a Court and not to modify other provisions of the Act. On this principle S.R. No. 14179 should be held to be properly filed in this Court and the appeal will be numbered. S.R. No. 27783.- In this case the petition was filed before the notification was made by the Government on 29th January, 1957. The petitioner would, therefore, have a right of appeal to the High Court on the date when the application was filed. During the pendency of the petition in the District Court, the State Government made the notification referred to already and as a result thereof the District Judge transferred the petition to the Sub-Court. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the application. On the principles set out above an appeal would lie from the decision of the Subordinate Judge only to this Court. The petitioner filed an appeal in a Court which had no jurisdiction and that Court purporting to act under an appellate jurisdiction set aside the order of the Sub-Court. The respondent to the application has filed the appeal as the lower appellate Court had no jurisdiction. The proper way of correcting that error is by second appeal to this Court. The District Judge purported to act as appellate Court and the question whether he had jurisdiction so to act is a matter in respect of which a second appeal would lie. It, therefore, follows that S.R. No. 27783 has been properly filed as a C.M.S.A. It would be admitted and numbered. V.S. ------------- Order accordingly.