JUDGMENT V.D. Bhargava, J. - These are two connected second appeals arising out of two suits filed by the Plaintiff Appellants against the Defendants. Suit No. 537 of 1947 was for declaration that the Plaintiffs were owners of the crop which stood in the plots mentioned in the plaint and were entitled to get Rs. 1,000/- deposited in the criminal Court u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure being the sale proceeds of the crop attached thereunder. Suit No. 673 of 1947 was for recovery of Rs. 1,500/- as price of the crop wrongfully removed by the Defendants. 2. The facts of the case according to the Plaintiffs are that the Defendants were the tenants of the plots and were ejected therefrom on 1-6 46 u/s 163 of the U.P. T. Act and the Zamindar, Sahu Bhagwati Prasad obtained possession of the holding on (sic) and gave it to the Plaintiffs on rent who executed two Qabuliats and obtained possession of the land from Sahu Bhagwati Pd. They sowed Kharif crop in the plots and appropriated it and thereafter they sowed Rabi crop in those plots. When the time for harvesting the Rabi crop came the Defendants instituted proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure and got the crop attached. The crop was sold and the sale proceeds Rs. 1.000/- were deposited in the court and in respect of that amount suit No. 53 of 1947 was instituted. The other suit No. 673, of 1947, was with respect to the Kharif crop of 1947, alleged to have been wrongfully cut and removed by the Defendants. 3. The Defendants contested the suit on the ground inter alia that the crop in suit was sown by them and it belonged to them and that the Plaintiffs had nothing to do with it. They further alleged that the proceedings u/s 163 of the U.P. T. Act were fraudulent, that the Defendants had never been ejected, that they had all along been in possession and that the suit was barred u/s 42 of the Specific Reliefs Act. Special costs were also claimed u/s 35, Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The learned Munsif held that the suit for declaration alone was maintainable, that it was not bad for multifarious ness, that the Plaintiffs were not the owners of the crop in suit and that the crop belonged to the Defendants. Special costs were also claimed u/s 35, Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The learned Munsif held that the suit for declaration alone was maintainable, that it was not bad for multifarious ness, that the Plaintiffs were not the owners of the crop in suit and that the crop belonged to the Defendants. He further held that the suit was vexatious and had been brought to harass the Defendants. He therefore, awarded Rs. 50/- as special costs to the Defendants. Accordingly both the suits were dismissed. The Plaintiffs filed appeals. The question in both the appeals was whether the Plaintiffs were the owners of the crop in suit. 5. The lower appellate court, after considering the entire evidence on the record, came to the conclusion that the Defendants had never been ejected and they had all along been in possession of the property and therefore, the Plaintiffs had not sown the crop and having not been in possession were not entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,000/- or Rs. 1,500/-. The finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is as follows: Having regard to the entire evidence both oral and documentary on the record I have not the least hesitation in holding that the Plaintiffs never got actual possession over the plots in suit and they never sowed any crop in them and the Defendants had always been in possession over the land and the finding of the learned Munsif is absolutely correct. 6. No other point was pressed before the lower appellate court and the finding about possession is a finding of fact binding upon me in second appeal and actually no question of law arises. But learned Counsel for the Appellants has vehemently argued that the finding arrived at by the criminal court that two months prior to the date of attachment the Plaintiffs were in possession was a finding binding upon the Civil Courts and reliance has been placed on Seva Das v. Ram Prakash AIR 1947 Lah. But learned Counsel for the Appellants has vehemently argued that the finding arrived at by the criminal court that two months prior to the date of attachment the Plaintiffs were in possession was a finding binding upon the Civil Courts and reliance has been placed on Seva Das v. Ram Prakash AIR 1947 Lah. 173 where it was held that: It is not open, in my judgment, to a civil Court to go behind or to question that finding (finding of the criminal court), although it is open, in my view, to a Civil Court to decide that a person found or deemed to be in possession of the property had no right or title whatsoever to be or to remain in possession and to put any other person in possession if his right or tide to get into possession are found for him.... At all events the legal effect of the order u/s 145 would be to place the person found to be in possession (in possession) which will be protected if any attempt is made to contravene the order. I would also assume that the party found in possession by the criminal Court continues to do so until evicted in due course of law. 7. I am unable to agree that the effect of the judgment of the criminal court is binding upon the civil court. It can only be admissible as a piece of evidence which the civil court may take into consideration. But it does not in any way debar the civil court from going behind that finding. This judgment will not be admissible except probably u/s 13 of the Evidence Act and no more value than a piece of evidence can be attached to it. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Dayal Gir v. Irshad Ali Khun AIR 1916 Cal. 582 has held as follows: A finding in the order of a criminal court u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is not admissible in evidence, though the order itself is admissible for a limited purpose, namely, to show the parties in dispute, the land in dispute and the person declared entitled to retain possession. 8. In holding this the Calcutta High Court has relied upon a dictum of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani ILR 29 Cal. 187. 9. 8. In holding this the Calcutta High Court has relied upon a dictum of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani ILR 29 Cal. 187. 9. In my opinion any order passed u/s 145 does not in any way affect the rights of the parties because it has been passed in summary proceedings and it does not give rise to any presumption in favour of the successful party and it is always open to the civil court on the material placed before it to come to an altogether different conclusion from that of the Magistrate. As I have already said, while coming to its conclusions the civil court might consider the judgment of the criminal court only for this purpose that on the date when the order was passed one of the parties was put in possession. 10. The present suit which has been filed for the damages of the crop or for the price of the crop which had been sown and it is an elementary principle of law that a person will not be entitled to damages or price of a certain article unless he establishes that he was the owner of that article which has been wrongly taken. Here, if the Plaintiff had failed to prove that he had sown the Rabi crop of 1946 or the Kharif crop of 1947 he cannot succeed. He may or may not have been in possession. Actually the question as to who was in possession on a certain date is immaterial. From the finding of the court below on the evidence it is clear that this crop was sown by the Defendants and harvested by them. If that was so and the Plaintiffs had no title 1 fail to see how they are entitled to claim damages for the same though they may have been in possession technically of the land. 11. In ILR 29 Cal. 187 (Supra) the Privy Council said that the orders passed u/s 145 relating to disputes as to immovable property are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace and decide no question of title. If they are only police orders then, in my opinion, they cannot take the place of a judgment of a court which decides matters after considering all the questions relating to title. If they are only police orders then, in my opinion, they cannot take the place of a judgment of a court which decides matters after considering all the questions relating to title. In the same judgment it has been held: Such orders are admissible in evidence on general principles as well as under the Evidence Act (I of 1872) Section 13 to show the fact that such orders were made. This necessarily makes them evidence of the following facts appearing in the orders themselves, viz., who the parties to the dispute were; what the land in dispute was; and who was declared entitled to retain possession. For this purpose and to this extent such orders are admissible in evidence.... 12. In the circumstances I do not think that the argument of learned Counsel for the Appellant that the finding of the criminal court was binding upon the civil court is correct. 13. There is no force in this appeal; it is accordingly dismissed with costs.