JUDGMENT Mukerji, J. - This is an appeal by the Municipal Board of Shikohabad on special leave obtained from this Court u/s 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal made by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Mainpuri, Sri Ghattarpal Singh. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be briefly stated as follows: The Municipal Board of Shikohadad framed a byelaw under which it was obligatory for anyone who wished to establish a flour mill to first obtain a licence for the said purpose. Mahabir Sahai Pandey the Respondent to this appeal established a flour mill and it is the admitted case of the parties that he did not possess or obtain the necessary licence. 3. On 25-10-56 Yashpal Singh and Amar Singh two employees of the Municipal Board discovered that Mahabir Sahai Pandey not only had set U.P. a flour mill but was actually running that mill at about 5 O'clock on that date without a licence. Yashpal Singh therefore, put up a report, apparently, to the Chairman of the Board drawing his attention to the fact that Mahabir Sahai had set up a flour mill and was running it in contravention of the provisions of the Municipalities Act which required the obtaining of a licence before anybody could establish and run a flour mill. On receipt of the information, the President of the Municipal Board, Sri Kashi Ram Gupta, sanctioned the prosecution of Mahabir Sahai under the provisions of Section 299(1) of the Municipalities Act, this sanction by the President was made on 1-11-56. On 16-11-56 a formal complaint against Mahabir Sahai was filed by the President under his own signature. 4. On the aforementioned complaint Mahabir Sahai was prosecuted in the court of B.L. Agarwala, a Magistrate of the second class at Shikohabad. Before the learned Magistrate the evidence that was led on behalf of the Board was that under the bye law it was necessary for Mahabir Sahai to obtain a licence before he could establish or run a flour mill. Further evidence was led to show that on 25-10-56 Mahabir Sahai had actually been running the flour mill at about 5 O'clock in the evening. Mahabir Sahai did not challenge the fact of his having established a flour mill though at one stage of the proceedings he challenged the fact of his running the mill at about 5 O'clock. Further evidence was led to show that on 25-10-56 Mahabir Sahai had actually been running the flour mill at about 5 O'clock in the evening. Mahabir Sahai did not challenge the fact of his having established a flour mill though at one stage of the proceedings he challenged the fact of his running the mill at about 5 O'clock. The defence that was taken was that the byelaw, the breach of which was pleaded as an offence, was not a valid bye-law and secondly, that the prosecution could not succeed because a prosecution could only be launched under a resolution of the Municipal Board and not merely on the sanction and filing of the complaint by the President of the Board. Reliance was placed on the provisions of Section 314 of the Municipalities Act which is in these words: Unless otherwise expressly provided no court shall take cognizance of any of the offence punishable under this Act whereof a list is given in Schedule VIII for the purpose merely of easier reference or under any rule or bye-law, except on the complaint of, or upon information received from, the Board or some person authorized by the Board by general or special order in this behalf. 5. The learned Magistrate considered both these questions and came to the conclusion that the defence contention on neither of the two grounds was sustainable. The Magistrate therefore, found the Respondent guilty of having contravened byelaw No. (2) framed u/s 28(1) of the Municipalities Act and therefore liable to conviction u/s 299(1) of the said Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 40/- or to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks, in default of payment of fine. 6. An appeal was preferred by the Respondent and that appeal was heard by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge who allowed the appeal by setting aside the conviction of the Respondent as also the fine. The learned Judge allowed the appeal because in his view the prosecution which had been initiated by the president of the board was without authority and secondly, that the byelaw for the breach of which the Respondent was charged had not been duly published. 7. The learned Judge allowed the appeal because in his view the prosecution which had been initiated by the president of the board was without authority and secondly, that the byelaw for the breach of which the Respondent was charged had not been duly published. 7. In this appeal learned Counsel for the Municipal Board has contended that the appellate Judge has gone wrong on both the points and we may at the outset say that the learned Counsel's contention is well founded as would appear from what we shall say hereafter. 8. The power of the President of the Board are to be found in Section 50 of the Municipalities Act. The relevant persons of that section are in these words: The following powers, duties and functions of a Board may be exercised and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the Board and not otherwise, namely-- (a) ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... (c) ... ... ... (d) ... ... ... (e) all other duties, powers and functions of a Board with the exception of-- (i) where there is an Executive Officer, those vested in Executive Officer, by Section 60 and where there is a Medical Officer of Health, those vested in the Medical Officer of Health by Section 60--A. (ii) those specified in second column of Schedule 1, and (iii) those delegated by the Board u/s 112. 9. From what has been quoted above of Section 50 is should be plain that the President of the Board has, what may be called, all the residuary powers, apart from, those powers which are specifically conferred on him by the statute. It is also perfectly plain that where there is no Executive Officer and Medical Officer of Health then the powers which those two officers could exercise u/s 60 and Section 60A could also be exercised by the President for otherwise the position would bi that in a Board where there are none of aforementioned two officers, the powers which those officers could exercise would be more or less unexercisable, unless those powers were exercised by the Board by passing a resolution to that effect. Section 60(d) of the Act says that the powers conferred by the section or sub-sections specified in the first column of Schedule II or where such sections or sub-sections are followed by the words t-in part by such parts, thereof, as are indicated by the description in column 2 of the said schedule and the power to do all things necessary for the exercise of these powers. The penultimate item of Schedule II is in these words: Section Nature of powers or duties Remarks 314 To institute prosecutions by making complaints and giving information and to authorise other persons to make such complaints and give such information. 10. The Executive Officer of the Municipal Board where there is one, could without doubt therefore, initiate such prosecution or direct a prosecution to be initiated in his absence, that is to say where there was no Executive Officer, his functions were vested, in a sense, in the President and the President could exercise the aforementioned powers. It may here be stressed that it was admitted on all hands that the Board of Shikohabad had no Executive Officer. 11. A similar view was taken by Mr. Justice Oak in Criminal Miscellaneous case No. 2731 of 1956, decided on M-57. The decision of Mr. Justice Oak was placed by the counsel for the Municipal Board before the learned Judge below but the latter did not follow that decision though he was bound to follow that decision, being the decision of a higher court to which the learned Judge was subordinate. We should like to draw attention to the decision of this Court in Karam Husain Mukhtar v. Mohd. We should like to draw attention to the decision of this Court in Karam Husain Mukhtar v. Mohd. Khalil 1946 AWR (HC) 385 where a Bench of this Court presided over I by the then Chief Justice expressed the following view: It is the bounden duty of the Judges of courts 1 subordinate to this Court to implicitly follow the I decisions pronounced by this Court and we deprecate any attempt on their part to criticise them or to refuse to follow them and further: No authority is necessary for the proposition that a judicial precedent of a higher court does not cease to be binding upon subordinate courts merely because all the relevant reasons in support of or against the view taken by the higher court are not mentioned in the judgment or the actual decision is based upon a reason which does not appeal to the subordinate courts. 12. The learned Judge below in our opinion did not act, to say the least, with property in the matter of not following the latest decision of this Court which was directly in point to the case that was before him the justification which the learned Judge gave for not following the decision of Mr. justice Oak referred to above was, to quote his own words: It appears that the phrase 'any power, duty or function which by rule requires to be exercised, performed or discharged by the board itself by means of resolution' appearing in the end of Schedule I of the Municipalities Act was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. 13. We have been unable to follow this reasoning of the learned Judge for what is provided for at the end of Schedule I is this Section Power of duty Remarks General Any power, duty or function which any rule requires to be exercised, performed or discharged by the board itself by means of a resolution. 14. The learned Judge completely omitted to see that the aforequoted provision related to "power", "duty" or "function" which had to be performed or exercised by virtue of any rule. There, was no rule which made provisions for the exercise of the power of making a complaint by way of a resolution. Therefore, this provision had absolutely no effect on the circumstances of the case before the learned Judge. There, was no rule which made provisions for the exercise of the power of making a complaint by way of a resolution. Therefore, this provision had absolutely no effect on the circumstances of the case before the learned Judge. The learned Judge made reference to some reported decisions-also but he did not take the trouble of carefully scrutinising those decisions (sic) or not they were in point (sic) them not to be in point in the sense in which the learned Judge seems to have relied on. 15. In regard to the second point taken by the learned Judge namely that there was no proper publication of the byelaw, it appears that the learned Judge completely ignored the fact that the byelaws had been properly published in the Gazette as required by the Municipalities Act. Details regarding the publication were clearly stated in the Magistrate's order. That order pointed out that he byelaws h d been published in the Government Gazette dated 1-9-56. The fact that the lawyer who appeared before the learned Judge was unable to place the relevant Gazette before him was no justification for the learned Judge to hold that there was no such publication. Each District Court is supplied with copies of the Government Gazette and it is the duty of a court to spend a little labour and take a little trouble in finding out the relevant Government notification appearing in the Government Gazette, even if the party appearing before the court is not careful enough to place it before the court. 16. Counsel whose names appear on the brief as also on the Cause List did not appear before us either on Saturday when this case was partly heard or today so that we have had no help from counsel for the Respondents. Mr. B.N. Katju appealed on behalf of the State and contended that there was evidence in the case to indicate that the Board had by a resolution taken away the power of the President to initiate prosecutions. Reliance was placed on the evidence of defence witness Jagdish Narain Mathur, a lawyer, who was at one time a member of the Municipal Board. The evidence of Sri Mathur indicated that a resolution was moved on 17-1-57 whereby it was contemplated to confer certain powers on the President but that resolution was lost. Reliance was placed on the evidence of defence witness Jagdish Narain Mathur, a lawyer, who was at one time a member of the Municipal Board. The evidence of Sri Mathur indicated that a resolution was moved on 17-1-57 whereby it was contemplated to confer certain powers on the President but that resolution was lost. The mere fact that there was a resolution attempting to confer powers on the President and the mere fact that that resolution was lost did not in any way entitle the court to draw the inference that the President never had the power to launch a prosecution, a power which he possessed under the statute. This resolution in any event could not affect the present prosecution because the present prosecution was launched before the resolution was moved. 17. For the reasons given above it is clear that this appeal must be allowed and that the order the court below acquitting the Respondent must be sit aside. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the Assistant Sessions Judge of Mainpuri dated 17-1257 and convict the Respondent u/s 299(1) of the Municipalities Act and sentence him to a fine of Rs. 40/- or, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one week.