JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. In this appeal from the concurrent decisions dismissing his suit, the Plaintiff's basic contention is that: In the erstwhile Jaora State, the Chief Minister, officially described as the Madarul. Muham, was competent at the relevant time under the Ruler's firman to exercise all his powers; however, any officiating or incharge Chief Minister could not pass such orders or exercise the powers of the Ruler. Accordingly, the order passed by the Chief Minister-in-charge one Naiyar Huseen, on 7-10-1944 holding that the principal on the mortgage held by the Plaintiff on the suit lands had been satisfied out of the income and that the lands should in accordance with a circular having the effect of law, be returned to the mortgagee-Defendant, was bad for want of jurisdiction, and is therefore fit to be set aside by the civil Court, in a suit filed after the Jaora State had been abolished and the State of Madhya Bharat had come into existence. A complete answer to this contention is in the fact that the order of Naiyar Hussen, incharge Chief Minister, was taken up in appeal or memorial to the permanent Chief Minister who upheld it by his order dated 29-4-1945, so that whether or not Naiyar Hussen as Chief Minister-in-charge, could exercise all the powers of the Ruler, the same order had been passed by the permanent Chief Minister himself who undoubtedly and admittedly, could exercise these powers. Stated thus, the position is simple and there was a case for the return of the plaint. However, the Plaintiff did not mention this in his plaint and brought the suit just as if the order of Naiyar Hussen was the final order and has involved himself into the trouble and expense inevitable in litigation, trying to open matters settled in the regime of the erstwhile Jaora Durbar. The relevant facts are the following: In the erstwhile Jaora State, there was an "Inam" called "shujauta inam" of which the Inamdar was Khushalsingh, father of the Defendant-Respondent Rupsingh. In his time, he had mortgaged certain areas which are the subject-matter of the suit, to one Nanda Sutar, who, in his turn, transferred or assigned the mortgage in 1909 to the father of the present Plaintiff-Appellant. In his time, he had mortgaged certain areas which are the subject-matter of the suit, to one Nanda Sutar, who, in his turn, transferred or assigned the mortgage in 1909 to the father of the present Plaintiff-Appellant. It had been described as a mortgage with possession, though, the Plaintiff contends that for a larger part of the period, the mortgagee the Inamdar Khushalsingh or Rupsingh, as the case may be, had been in possession. In 1912 itself, there seems to have been some dispute and the Chief Secretary disposing of a revenue appeal ordered that the land should be restored to the mortgagee's that is, the Plaintiff's or his father's possession. It is not clear how long the Plaintiff was in possession on the strength of this order; but we hear that again in 1935, there was a change in the rules at that time and the powers of the Political Agent to hear revenue appeals had been withdrawn but certain pending appeals were reopened. Because of this or some other reason, the matter was reopened and it was ordered in 1941 that the land should be left or given in the possession of the Plaintiff mortgagee. By that time, both Khumchand mortgagee and Khushalsingh mortgagor had died and their respective sons, the parties to this suit, had taken their places. Anyway, in 1941 it was decided by the Chief Minister Madar-ul-Muham that the mortgagee should continue in possession. It may be noted that the Chief Minister at that time was for all administrative, legislative and judicial purposes, the Ruler himself and whatever order he passed in such matters was final, he happening to be the highest executive and judicial authority at the same time. This power he derived from a firmam or proclamation made by the Ruler on the 25th January, 1941, published in extraordinary Gazette of that date. It is to the effect that for reasons of health His Highness the Nawab was empowering his Chief Minister, Madar-ul-Muham Saheb, to exercise all his powers in relation to all things arising in revenue Courts and executive affairs. It is also of interest to note that nobody was empowered as persona designata, but the power goes to the office of the Chief Minister. After three or four years during which the mortgagee continued in possession, the matter was raised again in 1944. It is also of interest to note that nobody was empowered as persona designata, but the power goes to the office of the Chief Minister. After three or four years during which the mortgagee continued in possession, the matter was raised again in 1944. The relevant order is one dated 7-10-1944 made by Shri Naiyar Hussen, who has described himself "inchare Chief Minister", while the permanent Chief Minister was one Shri Buniad Hussen. It appears that the permanent post of Naiyar Hussen was that of the Assistant Madar-ul-Muham but when the permanent functionery was away, he exercised powers as the Madar-ul-Muham incharge. When the matter came up before him in October 1944, he found that the mortgagee had got out of the land a total profit already in excess of the principal. Accordingly, under the law contained in a circular (No. 2-Misc-dated 18th January 1909) he ordered that he should vacate possession without any payment in April 1945, that is to say, at the end of that agricultural year. This order was accordingly communicated to the mortgagee. So far the Plaintiff has mentioned in his plaint; but he has failed to mention what has been brought out in the evidence and has not been challenged on facts, that the matter was taken by him to the permanent Chief Minister himself. The latter ordered on 29-4-1945 confirming the order of the Chief Minister incharge, and accordingly, the mortgagee was evicted at the end of that agricultural year in April or in May, and the lands restored to the mortgagor. The Plaintiff found it convenient to wait till the political changes had taken place, and came to the civil Court in 1950 mainly on two contentions; firstly, that by prescription he, the unredeemed mortgagee, had become full owner by 1945, and secondly, that the order of 1944 by the Chief Minister incharge was incompetent. He therefore, invited the Court, to declare his title and restore possession. The Defendant, for his part, took his stand on the course of events, the competency of the Chief Minister, whether permanent or officiating or incharge, and the confirmation by the permanent Chief Minister of the incharge Chief Minister's order. He therefore, invited the Court, to declare his title and restore possession. The Defendant, for his part, took his stand on the course of events, the competency of the Chief Minister, whether permanent or officiating or incharge, and the confirmation by the permanent Chief Minister of the incharge Chief Minister's order. He might also have added that though they were competent to act on their own sense of justice in the set up that used to be in the erstwhile Jaora State, they were actually acting under a law contained in a circular. In the absence of the statute showing limitation, it cannot be held that already the mortgagee had prescribed full rights of owner. A bare mention of the facts is sufficient to show that the Plaintiff's suit was illconceived. No doubt, on earlier occasions, that is, in 1930, and again in 1941 the authorities concerned had maintained the mortgagee's possession not as one who had already prescribed to himself full title but as mortgagee entitled to continue. By 1944 the authorities found, whether rightly or otherwise is not our concern at this stage, that the profit the mortgagee had made out of the land, was already equal to the principal. Accordingly, under the circular already mentioned, they ordered that the land should be restored. This order was made by an authority exercising all the powers of the Ruler which were absolute and, as it happened, under a law in force in the erstwhile State of Jaora and after hearing the mortgagee. He had no doubt, tried to make a fine point that the actual order was made by the incharge Chief Minister. Even if it had been made by the incharge Chief Minister, it is a competent order as the proclamation already quoted does not make any reservation or mention anybody by name or describe as the permanent Chief Minister. The incharge Chief Minister is Chief Minister for the day. Unless there is a mistake or fraud, his order is as good as that of the permanent Chief Minister. The most one could say is that it was open to change by the Chief Minister. For all practical purposes it is an order by the Chief Minister himself. The incharge Chief Minister is Chief Minister for the day. Unless there is a mistake or fraud, his order is as good as that of the permanent Chief Minister. The most one could say is that it was open to change by the Chief Minister. For all practical purposes it is an order by the Chief Minister himself. It is unfortunate that the Plaintiff does not mention this in his plaint but confronted with it, he does not deny that there was an order by the Chief Minister himself, in May 1945, anyway, the existence of this order is a finding of fact. In the result, the second appeal is without substance and is dismissed with costs and pleader's fee according to rules payable to the Defendant-Respondent. Appeal dismissed