Somasundaram, J.- This Second Appeal relates to the construction of the terms of the decree passed in A.S. Nos. 128 and 133 of 1947, on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Dindigul. The material portion for the purposes of the construction of the terms of the decree is as follows:- “That the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 are each entitled to an one-fifth share in items, 1, 2 and 4 of the plaint schedule copied hereunder”. “That the said items 1, 2 and 4 be each divided into five equal shares and the plaintiff allotted one such share in each of the said items 1, 2 and 4”. The question is whether the one-fifth share allotted to each one of the parties is to be interpreted as the absolute property of that person or whether it should be construed as a woman’s estate, the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 being women. The facts of the case out of which this Second Appeal arises may briefly be stated as follows:- Plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and the mother of the 4th defendant are the daughters of one Narayanaswami Chettiar whose widow is the first defendant. The said Narayanaswami executed a settlement deed, dated 17th April, 1934, in respect of the plaint schedule properties. Under the terms of that settlement deed his wife was to take the properties after his lifetime. The wife was given a life estate in the properties after the death of her husband. Thereafter their issues, namely, the plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and the mother of defendant 4 are to get those properties with absolute rights in equal shares. After the execution of this settlement deed Narayanaswami executed another deed, Exhibit B-3 purporting to cancel the settlement deed, dated 17th April, 1934. Exhibit B-3 is dated 19th March, 1936. Subsequent to 19th March, 1936 deed the mother purporting to act on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughters executed a release deed in favour of her husband, (Exhibit B-4, dated 19th August, 1936). Narayanaswami died on 20th May, 1942. The plaintiff who had been married by this time filed O.S. No. 367 of 1946 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Periakulam, for partition and separate possession of her share in the properties mentioned in the settlement deed. The suit was decreed in her favour. Narayanaswami died on 20th May, 1942. The plaintiff who had been married by this time filed O.S. No. 367 of 1946 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Periakulam, for partition and separate possession of her share in the properties mentioned in the settlement deed. The suit was decreed in her favour. It may be mentioned here that the decree had been passed notwithstanding the fact that at the time when the plaintiff filed the suit for partition she was not entitled to any share under the settlement deed because she would be entitled to get the properties only after the death of her mother and at the time of the suit the mother was alive and she is still alive. Nevertheless she obtained a decree for partition and under the final decree she got one acre and 27½ cents of nanja lands in S.No. 82/3 of Vadagarai village and also Rs. 500 in cash There was thus left 4/5ths share in the properties of Narayanaswami. After this decree was passed defendants 1 to 4 executed a sale-deed, dated 4th August, 1954, (Exhibit B-1) in favour of the 5th defendant in respect of the plaint A schedule properties and they sold the trees that stood on the southern portion of the plaint A schedule properties to the 6th defendant. This suit out of which the present Second Appeal arises was filed for a declaration that the said sale-deed was void and was not binding on the plaintiff. In the written statement filed by the first defendant she stated that she executed the sale-deed for adequate consideration for purposes of necessity and that she only sold the withered trees to the 6th defendant and that the sale proceeds thereof were utilised for family expenses. The other defendants adopted the written statement of the first defendant. The question that camp up for determination was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration and injunction as prayed for and whether she has any cause of action. This question depends upon the construction of the terms of the decree passed in A.S. Nos. 128 and 133 of 1947 (O.S. No. 367 of 1946). As already stated the decrees merely stated that each one of the parties shall take one-fifth share There were no words of limitation under the terms of the decree. This question depends upon the construction of the terms of the decree passed in A.S. Nos. 128 and 133 of 1947 (O.S. No. 367 of 1946). As already stated the decrees merely stated that each one of the parties shall take one-fifth share There were no words of limitation under the terms of the decree. The contention of the plaintiff is that this being a division of the properties among the women the share allotted to each takes the character of limited estates and therefore the share that was allotted to each of the defendants in O. S. No. 367 of 1946 must be construed to mean and would convey only a limited interest and therefore any alienation made by her mother was not binding on the plaintiff. The first Court held in favour of the plaintiff and on appeal the appellate Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the widow, that is, the first defendant had got absolute title to the properties and that she had alienated them for purposes of necessity. The only question argued before me is whether the decree gives absolute rights to each of the parties or whether it is to be construed as conferring women’s estate only. The question, therefore, for decision turns upon the construction of the terms of the decree as to whether the share that each one of the defendants got under the decree was absolute property or the defendants got only a limited estate. Mr. Alwar Naidu appearing for the appellant contends that the properties given to each one of the parties under the terms of the decree take the character of a women’s estate as the property which the plaintiff got under an earlier suit was under the terms of a decree in a suit filed for partition and separate possession against her mother and sisters and as in a partition in a Hindu family the woman got only a limited interest the plaintiff must be considered to have taken the same kind of interest under the decree. In support of this contention learned counsel for the appellant relied on Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta1, Debt Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh2, Nathu Lal v. Babu Ram3, Appasami Pillai v. Thayammal4. In support of this contention learned counsel for the appellant relied on Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta1, Debt Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh2, Nathu Lal v. Babu Ram3, Appasami Pillai v. Thayammal4. In Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta1, the terms of the preliminary decree are set out thus: “The Commissioner is further directed to allot as little liquid cash to the share of plaintiff No. 2 (Sumitra Devi) as possible on partition and as a rule should allot such properties to her share of which she may receive income without trouble, but may not prejudice the reversioners by destroying the corpus.” Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held: “It follows, therefore, that under the Mitakshara law and also under the partition decree, Smt. Sumitra Devi did not have an absolute right or interest in the share allotted to her on partition”. It is quite clear from the terms of the decree, namely “but may not prejudice the reversioners by destroying the corpus” that what was given to Smt. Sumitra Devi under the decree was only a limited estate. In the above case the question was decided on the terms of the preliminary decree for partition which clearly showed that the lady got only a limited estate. In Devi Mangal Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad2, their Lordships of the Privy Council stated the law as follows, at p. 242:- “The question now arises whether there is any substantial difference in principle between a woman’s property acquired by inheritance and that acquired by partition. It is a question attended with some difficulties, especially in the construction of the Mitaskshara Law, whatever view of it may be taken. While a family remains joint, a woman has no right under the Mitakshara for a specific share of the family estate. She is only entitled to maintenance or in due course to her customary inheritance and if a partition takes place a mother gets a share equal to that of a son. If the share allotted to a widow on partition is given to her as a substitute for that to which she would be entitled upon inheritance then according to the foregoing authorities, it would seem reasonable that it should follow the same rule of descent and revert on her death to her husband’s heirs. If the share allotted to a widow on partition is given to her as a substitute for that to which she would be entitled upon inheritance then according to the foregoing authorities, it would seem reasonable that it should follow the same rule of descent and revert on her death to her husband’s heirs. If, on the other hand, it is given to her by way of provision for her maintenance it seems equally reasonable that when the necessity for her maintenance has ceased, the property should revert to the estate from which it was taken. Of course, the members of a joint family effecting a partition may agree that a portion of the property shall be transferred to the widow by way of absolute gift as part of her stridhan, so as to constitute a provision for her stridhan heirs ; but in the absence of any such intention their Lordships do not feel justified in putting property acquired by a widow on a partition of the joint estate, upon a footing different from that on which the property coming to her by way of inheritance has been placed.” In the above case the mother got certain items at a partition of the joint family properties. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in joint family property the woman is entitled only to maintenance and in lieu of maintenance she may be allotted some properties. It is obvious, therefore, that on the principles laid down the woman got only a limited interest in the properties allotted to her. In my opinion this case does not help the plaintiff’s contention in the present case. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is Nathulal v. Babu Ram3. The facts of the case are as follows:- When one Ji Sukh Ram died in 1891 he was a member of a joint Hindu family on which he and his elder brother Ram Sahai were members. Ram Sahai had a son called Shiam Lal but on the death of Ji Sukh, Shiam Lal who was a minor, alleged that Ji Sukh had adopted him in his lifetime. Mussamat Jumana (wife of Ji Sukh) claimed to be the heir of her husband. Ram Sahai had a son called Shiam Lal but on the death of Ji Sukh, Shiam Lal who was a minor, alleged that Ji Sukh had adopted him in his lifetime. Mussamat Jumana (wife of Ji Sukh) claimed to be the heir of her husband. Ram Sahai claimed that he being joint with Ji Sukh the whole of the property of Ji Sukh passed by survivorship and that his widow took nothing by inheritance. In these circumstances, a dispute arose before the revenue authorities and was being taken on appeal to the Collector, the question being whether Ram Sahai, Shiam Lal or Mussamat Jumana was entitled to be recorded as proprietor. Mussamat Jumana contended that a partition was necessary in order to put her in possession of her husband’s share as representing her husband’s estate. These disputes between Ram Sahai and Mussamat Jumana were referred to arbitration. The arbitrators gave Mussamat Jumana certain lands and also a portion of the dwelling house. There were no words of limitation in respect of this allotment. Their Lordships observe at page 468: “Their Lordships consider that the absolute title of Mussamat Jumana is established and that the learned Judges of the High Court were wrong in thinking that because her claim before the arbitrators was originally a claim by a Hindu woman to take he husband’s estate by inheritance the estate which she in fact obtained under the award was confined to a limited estate. By the bargain which she drove the reversioners of her husband were not damnified. She did not bind them or represent them and she was not their agent or trustee to acquire property for her husband’s estate”. In short they held that the plain words amounted to her getting an absolute interest in the properties. This decision, in my opinion, is more in favour of the respondents than in favour of the appellant. The next decision cited in support of the appellant’s case is Appasami Pillai v. Thayammal1, where a Division Bench of this Court has held that the parties by a compromise or surrender cannot convert a limited estate into an absolute one. In my opinion the facts of the case are quite different from those of the present case and therefore the decision would not apply to the case of the plaintiff. On behalf of the respondents the learned counsel Mr. In my opinion the facts of the case are quite different from those of the present case and therefore the decision would not apply to the case of the plaintiff. On behalf of the respondents the learned counsel Mr. Gopalakrishnan contends that in the absence of any express words of limitation the terms of the decree must be understood in the ordinary sense, that is to say, as conveying absolute rights in the properties allotted, and that it should make no difference whatsoever whether the estate is granted to a man or woman. He also points out that at the time when the plaintiff filed the suit for partition she was not entitled to any share in the properties and that if she had been given a share in the properties it must be only on the understanding that each one of the parties got an absolute estate. There is no evidence as regards this understanding but the learned counsel contends that it must be inferred from the circumstances of the case. That is, it is only on that understanding that the mother who is entitled to the entire properties must have consented to a share being allotted to the plaintiff as normally the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any right during the lifetime of her mother. The decision on which learned counsel for the respondents relied are Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao2, Krishnaswami Ayya v. Ramachandra Rao3, Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal4, which is followed in Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad5. In Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao2, which is a Bench decision of this Court there was a gift under a will by the testator to his two wives. The words used in the will were: “Out of the remaining half of the property these two persons, namely, my senior wife (S.K.) and junior wife (S.T.B.) shall take half and half.” What exactly was the nature of the estate taken by the two wives came up for consideration and the bench consisting of Sir John Wallis, Kt., Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar held as follows: “Unless a grant expressly gives only a limited estate or unless there is any uncertainty or ambi guity in the grant as to the extent of the interest conveyed, a grant to a Hindu female conveys an absolute estate and there is no presumption of law to the contrary at least in this presidency”. This clearly shows that unless there are words which expressly curtail the nature of the interest it must be taken to mean that it was the absolute interest that was conveyed, and not a limited interest as contended for the plaintiff in the present case, Krishnaswami Ayya v. Ramachandra Rao3, which followed Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao1, is also a decision by a bench of this Court consisting of Ramesam and Cornish, JJ. The same came up again for consideration after going to the Privy Council. The learned Judges held:- “There is no material difference between the terms of the devise to the adopted son (which are undoubtedly sufficient to carry an absolute estate) and the terms in which the devise to the widows is expressed, served to show that the testator intended to make no distinction in the quality of the estate given in either case”. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the widows took their portion as absolute owners. Ram Lal Gopal v. Nand Lal1, is a case where the terms of a deed of transfer came for consideration. There was a transfer of some items of properties in favour of a widow who had surrendered her interests in favour of the nearest reversioner, for her maintenance in lieu of her relinquishment. In the deed of transfer there were no words of limitation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that to convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given. It is enough if words are used of such amplitude as would convey full rights of ownership. They further held: The mere fact that the grant was made for the maintenance and residence of the widow could not be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the executant that the widow was to enjoy the property only during her lifetime. They further held: The mere fact that the grant was made for the maintenance and residence of the widow could not be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the executant that the widow was to enjoy the property only during her lifetime. The object of creating the relinquishment deed and the tamliknama contemporaneously was not merely to make provision for the maintenance of the widow ; the other and the more important object was to perfect the title of the minor to the estate and to quiet all disputes that might arise in respect of the same. “......There is nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumstances which would displace the presumption of full proprietary rights which the use of the word” Malik “ is apt ordinarily to convey. The widow got an absolute title to the properties on the Strength of the tamliknama”. This decision is referred to with approval in Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad2. In this case their Lordships stated the law as follows:- “According to law as understood at present where there are no express terms in a deed of gift by a donor having absolute rights there is no presumption one way or the other and there is no differencein the case of a male and the case of a female and the fact that the donee is a woman does not make the gift any the less absolute where the words would be sufficient to convey an absolute estate to a male. To convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given; it is enough if words are used of such amplitude as would convey full rights of ownership. It is clearly wrong to say that a will having been made by the father in favour of his daughter, it should be presumed that he intended to give her a limited life estate.” The above observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly establish, in my opinion, the rule that where there are no words of limitation the ordinary presumption is that the estate that is given is an absolute one. What the plaintiff got is not even a gift. It was under the terms of the decree that a share was allotted to the plaintiff and the other members of the family. What the plaintiff got is not even a gift. It was under the terms of the decree that a share was allotted to the plaintiff and the other members of the family. There is no reason to presume that what was allotted to each one of the parties under the terms of the decree was intended to convey only a limited interest simply because the person who gets the share happens to be a female. On the other hand the ordinary presumption that the persons who got the property under the terms of the decree got it absolutely must prevail. In the circumstances of the case I hold that what was given to each party under the decree conveyed an absolute interest. The lower appellate Court was, therefore, justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. In view of the fact that the decision turns upon the construction of the words used in the decree I grant leave to the appellant. V.S. ----- Second Appeal dismissed.