JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. This is a revision preferred by the debtor against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Kottarakara holding that an application filed by him under clause (6) of S.11 of Kerala Act 31 of 1958 is not maintainable. There was a mortgage executed by the petitioner on 7-7-1123 in favour of respondents father and it is not now necessary for me to go into the various recitals in the said document. But it is seen that there was a lease back by the mortgagee in favour of the present petitioner regarding one item, comprised in the mortgage, namely, 4 cents of land and a building. In view of the default committed by the present petitioner in the payment of rent under the lease deed, it is seen that the respondent instituted O.S. No. 163 of 1958 in the court of the District Judge of Quilon and it is also seen that a decree was passed directing the present petitioner to surrender possession of the property and there was also a decree for arrears of rent claimed by the respondent. 2. It is stated in the order under revision by the learned Subordinate Judge: "It is not disputed that the said lease transaction or rent arrangement was not subsisting on the date of the commencement of the Act and that the mortgagee has recovered possession of the portion of the property mortgaged and which was rented out, long prior to the date of the Act on 4-4-1957 as per the delivery through court in execution of the decree in O. S. No. 163 of 1953 of the Quilon District Court obtained by the mortgagee on the basis of Ext. P2." This statement by the learned Judge was no doubt attempted to be controverted by Mr. K. C. John on the ground that there are records to show that his client has not parted with possession of the properties notwithstanding the decree in O.S. No. 163 of 1953. Mr. P2." This statement by the learned Judge was no doubt attempted to be controverted by Mr. K. C. John on the ground that there are records to show that his client has not parted with possession of the properties notwithstanding the decree in O.S. No. 163 of 1953. Mr. Mathew Muricken, learned counsel for the respondent, has in turn not only supported the reasoning of the learned Judge, but he has also categorically stated that there is documentary evidence to show that possession has been taken delivery of by his client and that those documents were not necessary to be filed in view of the fact that this fact was not being challenged by the present petitioner. I am not inclined to allow Mr. John to go behind the statement contained in this judgment, especially when the learned Judge has stated that it is not disputed that possession has been already taken delivery of long prior to the passing of Kerala Act 31 of 1958. Therefore, I will proceed on the basis that on the date of the passing of the Act, namely, 14-7-1958, the petitioner before me has parted with possession of the properties which had been leased back to him by the respondent. 3. Then the question will be whether the petitioner is entitled to claim relief under-clause (6) of S.11 of the Kerala Act, 31 of 1958. Clause (6) of S.11 of the Act runs as follows:- [6]. Nothing contained in sub-sections [2] to [5] shall apply to mortgages where the property mortgaged has been leased back to the mortgagor by the mortgagee and to such mortgages the following provisions shall apply: [a] the mortgage shall be deemed to be a simple mortgage from the date of the lease back and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the debt covered by the mortgage; [b] the interest payable on the mortgage amount after the commencement of this Act shall be at five per cent per annum. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, in view of the fact that the lease back arrangement has come to an end and possession of the property has also passed from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, respondent, there is no scope for the application of clause (6) of S.11 and the learned Judge has also stated that the remedy, if any, of the petitioner is to invoke relief under sub-sections (2) to (5) of S.11 for discharging the mortgage debt. 4. Mr. K.C. John, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that this view of the learned Judge is not correct and in support of his contention that clause (6) of S.11 will apply even to such cases, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of the learned Chief Justice sitting with Smt. Justice Anna Chandy reported in Thomas v. Krishna Iyer 1959 KLT. 1233=1959 K.L.R. 1047. After a perusal of the said decision, in my opinion, it will not assist Mr. John in his contention that clause (6) of S.11 will apply notwithstanding the fact that the lessor-lessee relationship has come to an end and the property has been taken possession of by the mortgagee. It will be seen from the said decision that the learned Judges had before them a case where the mortgagor was still in possession of the property on the date of the coming into force of Act 31 of 1958 and this possession the mortgagor maintained notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagee had obtained a decree for eviction as against him on the basis of the lease and also for recovery of arrears of rent. At page 1234 it is observed as follows: The mere fact that there has been a decree on the strength of the lease cannot ipso facto take away this right. In my opinion, this observation of the learned Judges will have to be taken along with the previous statement in the judgment to the effect that the mortgagor in that case was still in possession at the time of the coming into force of Act 31 of 1958 notwithstanding a decree for possession passed against him. Possession is emphasised by the learned Judges. The facts before me are totally different and as such there is no scope for the application of the decision in Thomas v. Krishna Iyer (1959 K L.R 1047) to the case before me. Possession is emphasised by the learned Judges. The facts before me are totally different and as such there is no scope for the application of the decision in Thomas v. Krishna Iyer (1959 K L.R 1047) to the case before me. As I mentioned earlier it is not open to Mr. John to contend in the face of the recital in the judgment that his client had not parted with possession of the property on the date of the coming into force of the Act. A clear reading of clause (6) of S.11 in my view supports the view of the lower court that it will apply only when the mortgagor is still in possession on the basis of the lease back transaction on the date of the passing of the Act. This condition not being satisfied in this case, it follows that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge holding that the petitioner is not entitled to claim relief under clause (6) of S.11 has to be held to be correct. 5. I express no opinion as to whether the petitioner will be entitled to any relief under the other sections of the Act. It is stated even in the order of the learned Judge that it is open to the petitioner to claim relief under sub-s.(2) to (5) of S.11 for discharging the mortgage debt. The order of the lower court does not require any interference by this court and as such the C. R. P. is dismissed with costs.