Ramaswami, J.- This appeal is directed against the Decree and Judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore, in O.S. No. 69 of 1954. It is a statutory suit filed under section 62 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the persons aggrieved who consist of Sri Ramanasramam by its Secretary G. Sambasiva Rao, T. N. Venkaraman, A.W. Chadwick, S. S. Cohen, Framji Dorabji, A. Devaraja Mudaliar and C. Somasundaram Pillai. The defendant is the Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras. The question for consideration is whether the component part of Sri Ramanasramam, by name Sri Mathru-bootheswara Swami Temple, an institution registered under the Societies Registration Act, (Exhibit A-23, dated nth September, 1950), is a temple as contemplated by section 6 (17) of the Act, as has been held by the learned Subordinate Judge or a public religious trust as has been contended by the plaintiffs, with the following objects viz., to carry out the provisions in the Will of Sri Bhagwan, to administer Sri Ramanasramam, Sri Mathrubootheswara Swami temple, the Samadhi of Sri Bhagwan Ramana Maharishi with the properties and assets attached thereto and for propagating the sayings of the Bhagwan. Section 6 (17) of the Act defines a temple as, “a place, by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to, or for the benefit of or use as of right by, the Hindu Community or any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship.” In regard to what constitutes a public religious trust in Hindu Law, we have three authoritative works of Pandit Pran Nath Saraswati’s Hindu Law of Endowments, Tagore Law Lectures, (1892), P.R. Ganapathi Ayyar’s Hindu and Moham-madan Endowments, Second Edition (1918) and B. K. Mukherjea’s (late Chief Justice of India) Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, Tagore Law Lectures (1952) and the following information can be gathered therefrom. In the Hindu system there is no line of demarcation between religion and charity. On the other hand, charity is regarded as part of religion. This is because the Hindu Religion recognises the existence of a life after death, and it believes in the Law of Karma according to which the good or bad deeds of a man produce corresponding results in the life to come. On the other hand, charity is regarded as part of religion. This is because the Hindu Religion recognises the existence of a life after death, and it believes in the Law of Karma according to which the good or bad deeds of a man produce corresponding results in the life to come. Therefore, all the Hindu sages concur in holding that charitable gifts are pious acts par excellence which bring appropriate rewards to the donor. Hindu religious and charitable acts have been from the earliest time classified under two heads, viz., istha and purtta. The two words are often used conjointly and they are as old as the Rig Veda. The compound word istha-purtta has been retained in the writings of all Brahminical sages and commentators down to modern days, and although the connotation of these two expressions was extended to some extent in course of time, the fundamental ideas involved in them remain practically the same. By istha is meant Vedic sacrifices, and rites and gifts in connection with the same; purtta on the other hand means and signifies other pious and charitable acts which are unconnected with any srauta or Vedic sacrifice. The meaning of those two expressions has been discussed elaborately by Pandit Pran Nath Saraswati, in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Endowments. Following a text of Sankha quoted by Hemadri, Pandit Pran Nath Saraswati, makes the following enumeration of istha works, viz.,(i) Vedic sacrifices, etc., (2) gifts offered to priests at the same, (3) preserving the Vedas, (4) Religious austerity, (5) Rectitude, (6) Vaiswadev sacrifices and (7-) hospitality. The purtta works not only signified such works of public utility as excavation of tank, wells, etc., but included all acts which either conferred some kind of benefit on those who were in need of it, or were regarded as meritorious from the spiritual or religious point of view. From the numerous Smriti texts bearing on the point, Pandit Pran Nath Saraswati has compiled a list of purtta works which are generally recognised as such by Brahminical writers. From the numerous Smriti texts bearing on the point, Pandit Pran Nath Saraswati has compiled a list of purtta works which are generally recognised as such by Brahminical writers. These are: (1) gifts offered outside the sacrificial ground,(2) gifts on the occasion of an eclipse, solstice and other special occasions, (3) the construction of works for the storage of water, as wells, tanks, etc., (4) the construction of temples for the Gods, (5) the establishment of procession for the honour of the Gods, (6) the gift of food and (7) the relief of the sick. This list is by no means exhaustive. One other form of religious and charitable endowment which is popular with the Hindus is to create places where hospitality can be combined with dissimination of religious knowledge and facilities for meditation. Charitable trusts are of two kinds - public and private. The Hindu Law itself knows no distinction between public and private religious or charitable trusts: Rupa v. Krshnaji1. Hence it was that West, J., remarked in general terms in Manohar v. Laxmiram2, that a trust for a Hindu idol and temple is to be regarded in India as one created for public charitable purposes within the meaning of section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, corresponding to section 92 of the present Code. Still that distinction is not without its meaning in Hindu Law as now administered. It is therefore necessary to show here where the distinction lies. In English law the terms “ public” and “private” are thus defined:- By “ public” must be under-stood such as arc constituted for the benefit either of the public at large or of some considerable portion of it answering a particular description. The essential elements of a public charity are that it is not confined to privileged individuals but it is open to the indefinite public, or some portion thereof or upon an indefinite class of persons. It is this unrestricted quality that gives it its public character: (Ten American Jurisprudence, 588). The line of distinction between purposes of a public nature and of a. private nature is fine and practically incapable of definition; (IV Halsbury, third Edition, page 211). See also Ram Saroop v. Sahi1, a case under Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act and also Moti Das v. Sahi2. The line of distinction between purposes of a public nature and of a. private nature is fine and practically incapable of definition; (IV Halsbury, third Edition, page 211). See also Ram Saroop v. Sahi1, a case under Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act and also Moti Das v. Sahi2. To this class of “ public trust” belong all trusts for charitable purposes and indeed public trusts and charitable trusts may be considered in general as synonymous expressions. In private trusts the beneficial interest is vested absolutely, in one or more individuals who are or within a certain time may be, definitely ascertained and to whom therefore collectively, unless under some legal disability, it is, or within the allowed time will be, competent to control, modify, or determine the trust. A public or charitable trust on the other hand has for its object the members of an uncertain and fluctuating body and the trust itself is of a permanent and indefinite character and is not confined within the limits prescribed to a settlement upon a private trust (Lewin on Trusts, page 18): The same distinction has been expresed in a simpler language by Mr. G. S. Shastri in his Hindu Law at page 491. He says that when property is dedicated to charitable, education or religious uses for the benefit of an indeterminate body of persons, the endowment is a public one and when property is set apart for the worship of a deity of a particular family in which no outsider is interested, the endowment is a private one. It seems that it was with this distinction in view that the Privy Council held in a Calcutta case that in the case of a family idol the concensus of the whole family might give the estate another direction: Kunwar Durga v. Ram3. This decision appears to have been followed in another case which went up to that High Court and approved in a somewhat analogous case by the Bombay High Court: Govind v. Debebdra4 Kettur Chander v. Haridas5, Rajaram v. Ganesh6. These decisions are obviously based on the belief that the endowment in each case was a private one. Mr. This decision appears to have been followed in another case which went up to that High Court and approved in a somewhat analogous case by the Bombay High Court: Govind v. Debebdra4 Kettur Chander v. Haridas5, Rajaram v. Ganesh6. These decisions are obviously based on the belief that the endowment in each case was a private one. Mr. Shastri has in view of the decisions gone so far as to assert that if all the members of the family to which an endowment belongs renounce Hinduism and choose to throw the family idol into the water of the Ganges and themselves enjoy its property, no outsider can raise any objection to that course ; (Shastri’s Hindu Law, page 491). The Allahabad High Court had on the other hand occasion to define what a public endowment was in the case of Mahant Puram Atal v. Darshandas7. Therein Chamiar, J., remarked: “ It seems beyond doubt that in order that a trust may be a trust for a public purpose it is not necessary that it should be a trust for the benefit of the public at large. It is sufficient to show that it is a trust for the benefit of a section of the public” . It seems it was with some such definition of a public trust in view that, where a Hindu provided for the creation and maintenance of a religious endowment in favour of the sect known as the Bhagawatas, appointing managers and directing the manner in which the profits of the endowed properties were to be spent, the Calcutta High Court held that there was a public religious endowment within the meaning of section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882: Kanaialal v. Shaligram8. In regard to abuses relating to public and private trusts and the powers of the civil Court to give reliefs like the framing of schemes of management, etc., in the case of public trusts, the powers are regulated by section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the case of private trusts, by a long series of decisions. It is enough to refer here to the following decisions: In Narayanaswami Naidu v. Balasundaram Naidu1, it was held that: "even in the case of private trusts, it is open to any member of the founder’s family where his:rights are impugned to seek redress in Courts of law... . It is enough to refer here to the following decisions: In Narayanaswami Naidu v. Balasundaram Naidu1, it was held that: "even in the case of private trusts, it is open to any member of the founder’s family where his:rights are impugned to seek redress in Courts of law... . The Court cannot refuse to frame a scheme in the matter of a private trust. So far as the members of the family are concerned who are interested in the trust, if the trustee for the time being mismanages or acts in breach of trust, it is a civil right which is infringed and under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, they are entitled to seek redress in Court for the purpose of remedying the mischief." In Chellam Pillai v. Chathan Pillai2, it has been held that: " though section 92, Civil Procedure Code in terms does not apply because it relates specifically and definitely to the case of public trusts, in the case of a private family trust the Court has got juris-diction to frame a scheme for the management of the trust ‘. In Vaithinatha Aiyar v. S. Thyagaraja Aiyer3, two plaintiffs instituted the suit under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, as the descendants of the founder of the charity, a chatram. On the question of their right to institute the suit, it was held that: " the fact that the plaintiffs belong to the family of the founder would naturally give them an interest in the family charity so as to enable them to bring a suit under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code ". In addition, the powers of the civil Court in the case of private trusts to frame a scheme have been affirmed in a Bench decision of this Court in A.S. No. 221 of 1951, to which one of us was a party. Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the facts of this case and find out whether the institution under consideration is a temple within the meaning of section 6 (17) of the Act, or is a public religious trust as contended for by the appellants before us. Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the facts of this case and find out whether the institution under consideration is a temple within the meaning of section 6 (17) of the Act, or is a public religious trust as contended for by the appellants before us. In order to find out whether this institution falls within the scope of the Act, we must first of all determine the connotation of a temple which consists of the following component parts, viz., firstly that it must be an exclusively Hindu institution and secondly, that it must be exclusively a place of Hindu public religious worship. In regard to the first point, in The Uramu Seshachalam Chettiar Charities, Tiru-chirapalli by its Board of Trustees v. The State of Madras and others4, Balakrishna Ayyar, J., has construed the Long title and Preamble to the Act which run as follows: "An Act to provide for the better administration and governance of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions and Endowments in the State of Madras. Whereas it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law relating to the administration and governance of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions and Endowments in the State of Madras; it is hereby enacted as follows." The learned Judge observed: " I would draw attention to the words ‘Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions and Endowments " occurring in both the Long tide and the Preamble. The Act is intended to apply to (1) Hindu religious institutions and endowments, and (2) Hindu charitable institutions and endowments. It seems to me to be manifest that the word ‘Hindu’ is not used in one sense in relation to religious institutions and endowments and in another sense in relation to charitable institutions and endowments. The word ‘Hindu’ must be given the same connotation whether it is read in connection with religious institutions and endowments or whether it is read in connection with charitable institutions and endowments. Now, we can have a Hindu religious institution or a Christian religious institution or a Muslim religious institution. But, I do not see how we can have a religious institution which is at one and the same time partly Hindu and partly Christian or partly Muslim. I am not aware that any religious institution exists in the State which bears such a composite character. But, I do not see how we can have a religious institution which is at one and the same time partly Hindu and partly Christian or partly Muslim. I am not aware that any religious institution exists in the State which bears such a composite character. There can be no doubt whatever that so far as religious institutions are concerned, the Act is intended to apply only to religious institutions and endowments which are exclusively Hindu in character. The omission of the word ‘exclusively’ on which Mr. Srinivasan laid stress, is of no consequence. In fact, the introduction of such a qualifying word was entirely unnecessary and would only have led to confusion and controversy in other places in the Act. The expression ‘Hindu Temple’ is plain enough. By saying ‘exclusively Hindu temple’ we are not making the meaning plainer; we are only introducing degree of annoyance. “.......section 9 of the Act enjoins that the Commissioner, every Deputy Commissioner, every Assistant Commissioner and every other officer or servant appointed to carry out the purposes of the Act, by whomsoever appointed, shall be a Hindu. The section also enacts that should a person so appointed cease to be a Hindu he shall also cease to hold office. Likewise, section 22 requires that no person shall be appointed to be a trustee of a religious institution.....unless he is a Hindu. Provisions of this kind would be appropriate only in respect of institutions which are exclusively Hindu. The Legislature could hardly have intended that provisions of this kind should apply to what may be called mixed or composite institutions, that is to say, institutions which are only partly Hindu and partly non-Hindu. That would amount to discrimination based on religion. It would also probably be correct to say .... that the Act would apply to institutions which are exclusively Hindu in character.” The evidence in the instant case shows that this institution is a composite institution and it is only in accordance with Sri Ramana Maharishi’s universal outlook making his Asramam open to devotees of all religions: vide B-16, pages 94 and 284 ; Exhibit A-29, page 201 and Exhibit A-30, page 13. The contributions, came also largely from non-Hindus: see Exhibits A-38 to A-47 and the account books of the Asramam (Exhibits A-17 and A-14). The contributions, came also largely from non-Hindus: see Exhibits A-38 to A-47 and the account books of the Asramam (Exhibits A-17 and A-14). It stands to commonsense also that no exclusively Hindu shrine would be an appendage of a cosmopolitan Asramam, and which would have been totally inconsistent with Sri Ramana Maharishi’s teachings and life. This is not the place for further dealing with the life and teachings of Sri Ramana Maharishi, which would amply bear out this conclusion, because they are not in dispute ; it would be enough to refer here to a valuable publication of the life and teachings of Sri Ramana Maharishi by the late Sri B. V. Narasimha-swami, a distinguished lawyer and legislator of this State, of which the 5th Edition has been revised by Mr. S. S. Cohen, one of the appellants before us. The oral evidence has established beyond doubt that persons of other religions were consistently paying homage at the shrine: see Exhibit A-50 and the deposition of Dr. Syed. In other words, the evidence in this case clearly shows that the first requirement, viz., that it must be a place exclusively dedicated to the Hindus and is an exclusively religious place, does not stand made out. Then we have to define the religious worship of Hindus. The term religion whatever its best definition, clearly refers to certain characteristic types of data (beliefs, practice, feelings, moods, attitudes, etc.). It primarily involves some immediate consciousness of transcendent realities of supreme personal worth vitally influencing life and thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire stage of development reached by the individual and his invironments and tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies, philosophies and scientific doctrines. The lexicographers’ definition of religion can be gathered from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Funk & Wagnll’s New Dictinary of the English Language, Webster’s International Dictionary of the English language, Murray’s New English Dictionary and Earl Jowitt’s (Former Lord Chanceller of England) Law Dictionary (1959). (i) Action or conduct indicating a belief in, reverence for, and desire to please, a divine ruling power: the exercise or practice of rites or observances implying this. (ii) Some system of faith and practice, resting on the idea of the existence of one God, the creator and Ruler, to whom his creatures owe obedience and love. (i) Action or conduct indicating a belief in, reverence for, and desire to please, a divine ruling power: the exercise or practice of rites or observances implying this. (ii) Some system of faith and practice, resting on the idea of the existence of one God, the creator and Ruler, to whom his creatures owe obedience and love. As to conditions as to religion, see Re Allen1 , Re Wolfe,2 , Re Allen (No. 2)3. (iii) A belief in an invisible superhuman power (or powers) conceived of after the analogy of the human spirit, on which (or when) man regards himself as dependant, and to which (or whom ) he thinks himself in some degree responsible together with the feelings and practices which naturally flow from such a belief. , (iv) The outward act or form by which men indicate their recognition of the existence of a God or of Gods having power over their destiny, to whom obedience, service, and honour are due ; the feeling or expression of human love, fear or awe of some superhuman and overruling power, whether by profession of belief, by observance of rites and ceremonies, or by the conduct of life; a system of faith and worship; a manifestation of piety as, ethical religions, monotheistic religions, natural religion, revealed religion, the religion of idol worshippers. Religion (as distinguished from theology) is subjective, designating the feelings and acts of men which relate to God. As distinguished from morality, religion denotes the influences and motives to human duty which are found in the character and will of God, while morality described the duties to man, to which true religion always influences. Religions, by which are meant the modes of divine worship proper to different tribes, nations, or communities, and based on the belief held in common by the members of them severally. There is no living religion without something like doctrine. What is worship? The word itself is English and almost untranslatable into other languages. Originally it implied acts prompted by veneration, but with stress of tune and weight of usage, it has come to be applied to the whole range of religious behaviour, so that one might well say that worship is the active side of religion. (Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. Originally it implied acts prompted by veneration, but with stress of tune and weight of usage, it has come to be applied to the whole range of religious behaviour, so that one might well say that worship is the active side of religion. (Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, page 752 and foll.) The lexicographers definition of worship can be gathered from Ballentine Law Dictionary, Websters International Dictionary of the English Language, Murray New English Dictionary, Funk and Wagnalls New Dictionary of the English Language Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as follows: Worship is the act of paying honour to the Supreme Being; religious reverence and homage, adoration paid to God or a Being viewed as God with appropriate acts, rites or ceremonies See Hansher v. Hansher1. So far as the Hindus are concerned, worship includes the place of worship, and forms in which this active behaviour and venerations should be expressed and those are all regulated by Agama Sastras. In Saraswathi v. Rajagopal Ammal2, it has been held by the Supreme Court that in the case of Hindus the institution must be shown to have a Shastraic basis. This Shastraic basis is not only provided for by the Agama Sastras, but it has also got an equivalent when particular practices have obtained recognition as constituting long religious practices and usage of a substantially large class of persons. Thus in South India several places of public worship not governed by the Agama Sastras have grown up, on account of the superimposition of the Aryan culture over the Dravidian native culture. (See Kanakasabhai Pillai’s Tamil Eighteen Hundred Years Ago (Reprint by the South India Saiva Siddhanta Works, Tirunelveli), Chapter xv, page 226 and foll). One illustration may be given, in The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Pidugu Narasimham and others3, the curious temple consisted of the images of as many as 66 heroes who were said to have been killed in a war between two-neighbouring kingdoms m the 13th century and they were systematically worshipped. Similarly, cave temples, and the vilage deities like Poleri Amman, Mariammam, Ellai Amman, etc., which have no roof over their heads may not conform to the Agama Sastras. But on account of the long worship by the Hindu public they have in course of time come to be classed as temples. Similarly, cave temples, and the vilage deities like Poleri Amman, Mariammam, Ellai Amman, etc., which have no roof over their heads may not conform to the Agama Sastras. But on account of the long worship by the Hindu public they have in course of time come to be classed as temples. In other words, a temple must confirm to Agama Sastras or by immemorial public usage must have come to be regarded as places of public religious worship notwithstanding its non-conformance with the Agama Sastras. It it as against this background we have got to examine whether the Mathrubootheswarar temple in the Ramansramam is Samadhi only or has evolved into a public temple. In Elumalai Chetty v. Commissioner, H. R. & C. E., Madras4, one of us has set out the origin and development of temples in Southern India. In India during the Vedic period there were no temples on account of the domestic character of Vedic worship (Saraswati,Tagore Law Lectures, page 34). No traces of temples built in the pre-Buddhist period is known. But the Ramayana and Mahabharata mentioned Chaityas in several places. Originally Chaitya seems to have been a tree planted on the grave. Tree planted on the Chiti became Chaitya. Later shrines probably of wood were erected; It is even possible that they had upper storeys. For the Ramayana in one place (Book 1) compares the upper parts of the places in Ayodhya to the Vimanas of the Siddhas, a species of Gods. Although the Arthasastra of of Kautilya does not describe anywhere a temple, it mentions Chaityas and gives in Book 2, 3 description of the temple of Kuman, the goddess of war Kautilya agrees with Megasthanes that the temples were under the control of Government and there was a special department to govern religious institutions and its head was known as the Superintendent of Religious Institutions. Religious edifices are certainly known for the first time in Buddhism Hindu temples doubtless owen much in their inception to Buddhism and proliferated into a great variety in structure, size and ornamentation. Temple buildings reached fresh heights in the Gupta period The Agama Sastras naturally came into existence to formalise and regularise temples and worship in temples. So far as Southern India is concerned, in course of time by the 7th centuary A.D. substantial temples in stones came to be constructed. Temple buildings reached fresh heights in the Gupta period The Agama Sastras naturally came into existence to formalise and regularise temples and worship in temples. So far as Southern India is concerned, in course of time by the 7th centuary A.D. substantial temples in stones came to be constructed. The earliest well-known Hindu temples in South India are those of Mahabalipuram in the Chingleput District The inscriptions show that they were hewn out of the living rock by the Pallavas in the 7th century A.D. There has subsequently been a ceaseless building of temples by the warrior Kings and noblemen and men and women of piety of all castes. It is enough to mention here that one type of shrines was built at graves. The connection with the graves is seen not only in the case of the temples of the village deities but in that of temples of certain Gods like Sivasmasaneswara. Shrines over and near the burial grounds called Palli-padai are recorded in the inscription of the 9th century A.D. at Solapuram in North Arcot District recording that the Chola King Rasaditya caused a Siva temple to be built on the spot where where his father had been buried. Similar inscriptions relate to Tondamanad in Chittoor District and Choleswara temple in Melpadi. We have already referred to the shrine of the 66 heroes who fell in battle. In the South Arcot District there are shrines in existence called Veerakkals commemorating the fallen village heroes grappling with marauding tigers. Over the tombs of Saints shrines have also been built and gurapoojas performed. It is quite tree that notwithstanding the non-conformity with the Ratnavelu Mudaliar v. Commissioner for H. R. &38; C. E.1, a Bench of this Court had to consider whether an institution known as Apparswami.Pagoda situate in Mylapore, is a temple. It is reputed to be the samadhi or tomb of one Apparswami. It attracted a concourse of worshippers and the building has got all the normal features of a temple in that it has got a Prakaram, Dhwajastham, Bali-peetam and Nandikeswara, and there are shrines for Bhairavar, Kasi Visalakshi, Chandikeswarar and other deities. It has a 16 pillar Mantapam and there are Gopurams all over the shrines. Festivals are being performed and the deity is taken in procession and Archanas are performed by the worshippers. It has a 16 pillar Mantapam and there are Gopurams all over the shrines. Festivals are being performed and the deity is taken in procession and Archanas are performed by the worshippers. The Bench held that on account of the fact that this institution for over a century at least had been regarded as a place of religious worship by the public entitled thereof as a matter of right, though the institution had its reputed origin in a Samadhi and continued to retain traces of its origin and Gurupooja was performed in the precincts, the institution would be a temple. Reference was made in the judgment to the decision of Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Ramaswami v. the Board of Commissioners, Madras, H.R.E.2, where on account of the long public religious worship wat were orginally memorials for heroes or martyrs had subsequently developed into temples and came to be recognised as temples. In Bodendraswami Mutt v. President, H.R.E. Board3, it was held that a Samadhi of a holy man and a saint cannot ordinarily evolve into a temple for public religious worship and that the mere presence of idols of Gods and recognised deities in the Matam round the Samadhi and the festivals which have grown up round such Samadhi inevitable in the case of all tombs of saints and great men in this country, would not bring it within the definition of a temple and that a Samadhi is not a temple. We have already referred to the Supreme Court decision in Saraswathi v. Rajagopal Ammal1, in which it was held that dedication of property for worship at a tomb is not sanctioned by Shatraic practices and is not valid among Hindus. A number of decisions of this Court were referred to with approval viz., Kunhamutty v. Thondikkodan Ahmad Miasaliar and two others2. A. Draiviasundaram Pillai v. Subra-mania Pillai3, Veluswami Goundan v. Dandapani4, for the position that the building of a Samadhi or tomb over the remains of a person and the making of the provision for the performance of Gurupooja and other ceremonies in connection with the same, cannot be recognised as charitable or religious purposes according to Hindu Law. That the institution in question called Mathrubootheswaraswami is only a Samadhi and not a temple is established by the facts of this case. That the institution in question called Mathrubootheswaraswami is only a Samadhi and not a temple is established by the facts of this case. It is admitteldy the Samadhi of a Hindu Brahmin widow, viz., the mother of Sri Ramana Maharishi. It is elementary that a South Indian Hindu Brahmin widow is not entitled to Sanyasam. If support is required, see Exhibit A-28 and the deposition of P.W. 6. If that lady who was the Baktha of her own son was not entitled to Sanyasam, she is certainly not entitled to Samadhi, since our Hindu Sastras require that she should be cremated. In fact the classic instance of the mother of the great Adi Sankaracharya can be remembered. That lady was a widow when her son wanted to become at a very early age a Sanyasi and she would not give her consent which was necessary be-fre a Brahmin can become a Sanyasi repudiating his obligations. It is said that one day while bathing a crocodile caught hold of the young Sankaracharya and his mother when she begged piteously from the shores of the river for the freeing of her son, she was told by him that the crocodile would free him only if she allowed him to become a Bala Sanyasi. The mother agreed on one condition, viz., that on her death her son should perform her last obsequies and cremate her and not leave her to the tender mercies of the hostile Nambudri reversioners. It is said that Sri Sankaracharya when the moment of his mother’s death came to be known to him by his foresight, he managed to be at the spot and the cremation of the mother was done by him which normally he could not having renounced the world but for the promise made to his mother. So, even Sri Ramana Maharishi could not confer Sanyasam on his deceased mother-in fact it must be said that he never thought of it even. Such a Samadhi cannot be consecrated and Prana Prathishta done, which is essential for the installation of the idol. Otherwise, the Lingam would be a mere piece of stone and nothing else. It is only Prana Prathishta which makes it a living God, a juristic entity, entitling it to be an object of gift. Such a Samadhi cannot be consecrated and Prana Prathishta done, which is essential for the installation of the idol. Otherwise, the Lingam would be a mere piece of stone and nothing else. It is only Prana Prathishta which makes it a living God, a juristic entity, entitling it to be an object of gift. Then there is another provision in the will for the installation of statute or image or symbo1 of Sri Ramana Maharishi himself and certainly it would be idle to centend that this would evolve into a public temple. It is also seen that along with this Brahmin widow laid to rest, a cow by name Lakshmi a dog and a monkey also lie buried there. From the point of view of the Maharishi, who saw Divinity in every thing, this is not a bizarre, but certainly it would be outrageous to say that the burial place of the bipeds and quadrupeds would evolve into a public temple. In fact so far as Hindus are concerned, entering Rudra Bhoomi causes pollution and has to be expiated by a bath and it need not be pointed out also that a burial place for cows, dogs and monkeys would certainly be considered by Hindus as being sacrilegious adjunct to the temple. In fact even if deaths are to occur inci-dentally inside the premises there can be no worship until Samprokshanam is performed. Then only worship will be resumed. In the circumstances of this case it cannot also be said that there has been a dedication exclusively to the Hindu public or a section thereof. In fact contrary to the notions of Hindus, Sri Ramana Maharishi, who was above all rules and restrictions and practices governing the lives of Hindus in the matter of religious worship, considered that the death of his mother did not cause any pollution. Similarly, the Bhagwan, universal in his outlook, threw open his Asramam to devotees of all religions. This Asramam itself, as mentioned before, has been built by contributions given largely by non-Hindus. The oral evidence shows that persons of other religions came to pay homage at the shrine. It stands to common sense that there would not have been an exclusively Hindu shrine in the cosmopolitan Asramam, inconsistent with Sri Ramana Maharishi’s teachings and life. This Asramam itself, as mentioned before, has been built by contributions given largely by non-Hindus. The oral evidence shows that persons of other religions came to pay homage at the shrine. It stands to common sense that there would not have been an exclusively Hindu shrine in the cosmopolitan Asramam, inconsistent with Sri Ramana Maharishi’s teachings and life. So, if there was a dedication, that dedication must have been to persons of all castes and creeds and not to the Hindus only or to any definite section thereof only. In fact Exhibit A-12, the site-plan of the Asramam, shows that the frontage is Sri Ramana’s hall. This place was the magnet that attracted all the persons seeking self-realization. It was in search of Bhagwan and the solace of peace that his presence gave, that the devotees belonging to all castes and creeds came from all over the world. It is significant that for the celebrations within the Asramam invitations were not sent to all and sundry. But a list of invitees was kept, who were the devotees of the Asramam. This is borne out by Exhibit A-4, the deposition of Sri Ramana Maharishi (Exhibit A-18), the deposition of Sri K. Sundaram Chettiar (Exhibit A-37), Exhibit B-16 (pages 1 and 284), Exhibit A-29 (page 152) and Exhibit A-32 (pages 28 and 29), and the admission of Mouni, the contestant in the proceedings, and the other witnesses in the earlier case. To sum up, the Samadhi described as Mathrubootheswara Swami is an adjunct to the Asramam and is certainly not the core around which the Asramam grew. This can be tested from another angle also. The properties have been acquired only personally by Sri Ramana Maharishi according to whom, himself and his institution “Ramanasramam” are one entity ; vide Exhibit A-1, A-3 and A-6, documents relating to the acquisition of property and also the admission of D.W.4. The Asramam accounts show that the moneys were brought into the Bhagwan’s accounts and then disbursed. Exhibit A-4 recognises that the Bhagwan held properties as his own. The Bhagwan’s will Exhibit A-5 came into effect on his Siddhi. Nothing transpired on his Siddhi or thereafter to convert these private properties into public properties excepting by being registered under the Societies Registration Act. In fact what has really happened is absolutely clear The origin of the shrine is a matter of yesterday’s history. The Bhagwan’s will Exhibit A-5 came into effect on his Siddhi. Nothing transpired on his Siddhi or thereafter to convert these private properties into public properties excepting by being registered under the Societies Registration Act. In fact what has really happened is absolutely clear The origin of the shrine is a matter of yesterday’s history. In this case we are fortunately in possession of information showing the circumstances under which the Samadhi came into existence and the other appanages were built around it from the Bhagwan’s own mouth as well as of persons present at the foundation and construction. The remains of Sri Ramana Maharishi’s mother instead of being cremated were, by the devotees of Sri Ramana Maharishi, his brother and others, buried in a grave and a structure has been erected thereon and a Lingam, which was made available, was installed thereon. This is in accordance with the practice of honouring the dead prevalent among several sections of the people in Southern India and to which a more detailed reference will be made when we come to deal with the learned Government Pleader’s arguments. As pious and charitable people contributed funds for the glorification of this Samadhi, more and more appanages were built around. This Samadhi however continues to be a part of the various other places which have been erected within the Asramam compound and the frontage of the shrines, as mentioned before is the hall of the Bhagwan with a dais for him to sit upon. Naturally, legends have grown up regarding what happened to the mother and her demise These theological and philosophical aspects of what happened after the mother died, do not constitute any solid basis for discussion especially in view of Sri Ramana Maharishi’s own deposition Exhibit A-18 where there is no reference to any apotheosis of his mother. In Southern India it is the commonest thing that in announcing the death of elderly persons, it is generally stated that he or she has reached Sivapatham or attained mukthi or had become one with the Divine. In fact all the Brahmin. Ceremonies beginning from the tenth day and ending with the annual Shrardha are all directed towards the soul merging in the Divine. In fact all the Brahmin. Ceremonies beginning from the tenth day and ending with the annual Shrardha are all directed towards the soul merging in the Divine. But stripped of all these embellishments, the body of the deceased practically illiterate Brahmin widow whose only claim to fame was devoted service to her aliastramatic son was nothing more than a simple corpse buried there and in fact the Pooja is stated to be only for the Annai or mother. All the Ashramam publications inclusive of the Kumbabisheka Patrika, emphasise that the so-called temple enshrines the remains of the mother only. In this connection we may refer to the following publications: Exhibit B-16 (1944) Edition Self-realization; Exhibit A-29 (1931 Edition) Self-realizations ; Exhibit B-2 Kumbabisheka Patrika; Exhibit A-51 Sri Ramana Maharishi; Exhibit B-14 (1951) Tamil History of Sri Ramanasramam; Exhibit A-49 (1939) Sri Maharishi ; Exhibit A-52 (1947) Sri Ramana Maharishi ; and Exhibit B-15 (1951) Book on Sri Maharishi, in English. We may also refer to the oral evidence of persons present viz., P.W. 4, Raju Sastri (whose deposition before the Deputy Commissioner is marked as Exhibit A-28) and Sri Ramana Maharishi himself (Exhibit A-18). The learned Government pleader wants to get over this fact that the sanctum sanctorum enshrines only the mortal remains of Sri Ramana Maharishi’s mother and constitutes nothing more than a Samadhi of recent origin and it could not certainly be stated to have evolved into a temple by three arguments viz., (a) the extract from the judgment of Varadachariar, J., in Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments v. P. Narasimham1,(b) the Samadhi contained all the indicia of a temple, and (c) the public worship is to the Sivalingam installed on the Samadhi, which is the deity and not to the Samadhi. The following is the extract from the judgment of Varadachariar, J., relied upon by the learned Government Pleader: “That what the evidence in this case describes as taking place in connection with the institution is public worship can admit of no doubt. We think it is also religious. The test is not whether it conforms to any particular school of Agama Sastras; we think that the question must be decided with reference to the view of the class of people who take part in the worship. We think it is also religious. The test is not whether it conforms to any particular school of Agama Sastras; we think that the question must be decided with reference to the view of the class of people who take part in the worship. If they believe in its religious efficacy, in the sense that by such worship, they are making themselves the object of the bounty of some superhuman power, it must be regarded as a religious worship.” In regard to the indicia of a public temple, he relies upon the decision of this Court set out in paragraphs thirtythree to fortyfive of the decision in Elumalai Chetty v. Commissioner H. R. &38; C. E. Madras2, and add to these decisions the subsequent decisions in Ramanatha Ayyar v. Board of Commissioners for H. R. E.3 , Mahadeva Gurukkal v. Commissioner of H. R. E., Board4 Commissioner, H.R. &38; C. E. v. Kalyana-sundaram Mudaliar5, and Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar6. We have already discussed the scope of the observations of Varadachariar, J., about the possibility of having temples not governed by the Agama Sastras. But this does not mean that when according to the learned Government Pleader a Public temple was construsted as per Agama Sastras viz., with a Dwajasthambam, Prakaram, Balipeetam, etc., we can consider as irrelevant the established Shastraic injunction against constructing a temple over the tomb of a Brahmin widow not entitled to Sanyasam. We cannot invoke the Agama Sastras for one purpose and ignore it for another purpose, in the teeth of the decisions of this Court. Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar7, has laid down that Agama Sastras regulate the temple rituals, etc. In Veluswami Goundan v. Dandapani8, it was held that where a temple is only an adjunct to the tomb, a dedication of property for daily worship, gurupuja and annual annadhanam, even though there is provision also for worship three times a day with offerings of neivedyam, etc., and a Sivalingam was kept and worshipped there, will be wholly unlawful and the gift invalid and it would not make it a temple and the Lingam would be regarded as an adjunct to the tomb. It is unnecessary to multiply other instances to show that such a Samadhi cannot be evolved into a temple notwithstanding the rituals and appanages betokening the character of a temple. The learned Advocate Mr. It is unnecessary to multiply other instances to show that such a Samadhi cannot be evolved into a temple notwithstanding the rituals and appanages betokening the character of a temple. The learned Advocate Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar points out: Sivalingam is an emblem of the omniscient and all-pervading God Entity. It is a matter of common faith that God lives in every human being and God living in the limitations of the human body is described as the Jivatma. It is ordained according to the Sastras and the aphorisms of the great Sages that the object of every worthy life must be to bring about the unification of the Jivatma, the human life, with the Paramatma, the universal life. On the background of this faith, the achievement of a pure and purposed life is understood to be the union of the Jivatma and the Paramatma. Hence when a man dies, the remains of the body, wherever it is buried, are associated with the habitation of the Jivatma which when it deserts the body is supposed to have coalesced with the Universal Paramatma, which is signified in the form of a Linga, which is being placed on the grave. The graves of religious minded Hindus of the Saivite class are found to be mounted with a Sivalinga. The indication is that a Jiva whose physical body lies buried has attained its Mukti or union with the God of the universe which is represented in the world of form and name and matter as Sivalinga. The installations of a Sivalinga on the graves of religious-minded persons are not by themselves intended as dedications for worship of the Universal God Siva as He is described. They are not constructions of temples to God but are resting places of a Soul which by its own goodness, the mercy of God and the pious wishes of relatives and friends interested in its attainment of Heaven reach sayujyam. It means no more than this “Here lies the remains of one whose life has united with the Lord” . In fact one has only to travel along the highway from Madras to Conjeevaram to see the innumerable saliyar tank with a Sivalinga placed therein reverently tended with flowers lamps, etc., on either side of the road. Similarly on the road side of the Nandavanams of Nadars around Virudhunagar. In fact one has only to travel along the highway from Madras to Conjeevaram to see the innumerable saliyar tank with a Sivalinga placed therein reverently tended with flowers lamps, etc., on either side of the road. Similarly on the road side of the Nandavanams of Nadars around Virudhunagar. In the case of Vaishnavites, more often than not, a Thulasi plant is nurtured over the grave. In the case of pious Christians the Cross or the figure of the Virgin or some patron Saint or a symbol of the deceased is placed on the grave or tomb. The magnificent public cemeteries in Geneva, Florence and the tombs in the Church of Saint Peter at Rome are a few of the places where such symbols adorn the graves and are often the handiwork of the great Italian sculptors like Canova Michael Angelo, etc. They do not become churches notwithstanding the saying of prayers over the tombs by the pious Catholics or daily services like placing flowers, lighting lamps, etc. The use and purpose of the symbol is two fold: (1) to set forth in visible or audible likeness what cannot really or fully be expressed to the physical eye or ear, or even clearly conceived by the limited faculties of the human mind. All language is in the last resort symbolic, and religious language in an especial degree, for it endeavours to present a mystery, a reality too deep for words. The Hindu faith had at its service a language of the utmost delicacy and flexibility, with a vigorous and fertile growth and an almost unlimited vocabulary and found itself in a world of tropical luxuriance, with a tropical wealth of beauty and suggestiveness. It was not to be wondered at that it became profuse in type and symbol and laid under contribution all the facts and phenomena of nature to serve its religious and priestly ends. All the great Gods had their resemblances, animal or material forms, in which they presented themselves embodied to human sight, which served to recall to the worshipper the deity, whose mind and character they more or less inadequately reflected. Other more rare and refined symbols were presentative of qualities or attributes, as the lotus, the emblems of spotless purity preserved under the most unfriendly conditions. All idols, totems, fetishes are symbols. Other more rare and refined symbols were presentative of qualities or attributes, as the lotus, the emblems of spotless purity preserved under the most unfriendly conditions. All idols, totems, fetishes are symbols. The wise man does not worship the symbol, the shape in clay or wood or stone, but is thereby reminded of the invisible substance or reality which they each represent. (2) The image or symbol serves the purpose also of providing in material and suitable form a convenient object of reverence, to meet the religious need of those whose minds, through darkness and ignorance, are unable to grasp the conception of an unseen formless deity. Such men, if left without a visible object to which their reverence and fear may attach themselves, will wander in a maze of doubt, disquiet, and unbelief. It is better that they should worship erroneously, worship a thing, than that they should not worship at all. There is much that might be urged in favour of the Hindu view that regards the worship of the external symbol as a stepping stone to higher, clearer forms of belief; it is a view unacknowledged perhaps, but not unknown to other faiths. And in Hinduism, whatever may be said of or claimed by the wise and instructed thinker, the Puja of the multitude to the image of the God is reverent and sincere. In some respect also and within definite limits the Indian contention has justified itself that the symbol has proved a signpost and a guide to better, higher thoughts and to a truer worship of Him whom no form can express or language describe. (See Hastings Encyclopeadia of Religion and Ethics,, Volume 12, page 142). For an exposition of the symbolism of Sivalinga, see page 710 of Volume 4. of published by the Therefore, as repeatedly decided in the decisions of this Court, the Sivalingam is only an adjunct to a tomb and it will not evolve the tomb into a temple. The third point has already been discussed above and the mere fact that there are the appanages of a temple plus the front hall of Sri Ramana Maharishi, would not make this institution fall within the ambit of the cases set out above. The third point has already been discussed above and the mere fact that there are the appanages of a temple plus the front hall of Sri Ramana Maharishi, would not make this institution fall within the ambit of the cases set out above. A Samadhi of a Brahmin widow who died recently is a Samadhi and all the decisions of this Court cannot make it into a Hindu temple wherein Hindus can congregate for public religious worship as prescribed in the Sastras. The net result of this analysis is that the institution under consideration is not a temple but is a religious public trust of a cosmopolitan character. On that conclusion it follows that the issues have to be found as follows: Under Issue 1 that the Sri Mathrubhutheswarar shrine is not a temple within the meaning; of Act XIX of 1951 and is only an adjunct of the Sri Ramanasramam, a public religious Trust, under Issue 2 that the orders in Original Appeal No. 58 of 1952 and Appeal No. 36 of 1953 are illegal and have to be set aside ; and under Issue 3 that it does not arise for consideration. The decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and the suit is decreed for plaintiffs to the above extent. There will be no order for party and party costs in the circumstances of the case. The plaintiff will take their costs out of the Estate. Having come to the conclusion that the suit institution is a public religious trust and not a temple, we are also of the opinion that this is an eminently fit case where a scheme should be framed under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Advocate Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar for the appellants unhesitatingly shares our view. In fact the learned Advocate-General who appeared in Court at our instance was also agreeable to the framing of a scheme provided we came to the conclusion that this is a public religious trust and secondly indicated our views as to the necessity for the framing of a scheme. That if we came to the conclusion that the institution is not a temple as strenuously contended for by him but only a public religious trust, a scheme for the better management of the institution would be essential was not denied by the learned Government Pleader. That if we came to the conclusion that the institution is not a temple as strenuously contended for by him but only a public religious trust, a scheme for the better management of the institution would be essential was not denied by the learned Government Pleader. Therefore, we direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the learned Advocate-General for his taking the requisite action at an early date in the light of the observations made above. Anantanarayanan, J. — I find myself in entire agreement with the conclusions of my learned brother in the Judgment just delivered, which I had the advantage of study. I think that the question whether the suit institution is a ‘temple’ within the scope and definition of section 6(17) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Chan-table Endowments Act (XIX of 1951), which is the crucial issue before us, is one that cannot be satisfactorily determined if we are to leave out of account, particularly when we remember that the foundation or dedication is so recent, the life and ideas of the founder, himself, and the unique circumstances of the case, as evident in the record. As for the definition in section 6(17) itself, I am unable to see how it can be construed and applied apart from the entire purpose of the Legislation, or the scheme of the Act. I am in respectful agreement with the dictum of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in Seshachalam Chettiar Charities v. State of Madras1, that the Act itself is intended to apply only to religious institutions and endowments which are exclusively Hindu in character. It is with this broad perspective that we must approach the individual question of fact. In such a view, the words ‘used ... by the Hindu community or a section thereof, as a place of public religious worships’ would be all-important, in the definition. Clearly we are not concerned here with a shrine, a place of worship, or by whatever other designation the place is known, which transcends Hindu credal categories altogether, or is non-Hindu, in character. When this is borne in mind, I do not think that the case-law presents any peculiar difficulties. A samadhi over one who comes to be regarded as of the Illuminati or even the tombs of heroes, may evolve in course of time as a shrine of Hindu public religious worship. When this is borne in mind, I do not think that the case-law presents any peculiar difficulties. A samadhi over one who comes to be regarded as of the Illuminati or even the tombs of heroes, may evolve in course of time as a shrine of Hindu public religious worship. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Pidugu Narasimham and others2, and Ratnavelu Mudaliar v. Commissioner, for H. R, &38; C.E.3 relate to such instances. Nor is the existence or consecration of an idol, a prerequisite. See Ramaswami v. The Board of Commissioners, Madras4. But in all such cases, what must be essentially regarded, and never lost sight of, is the character of Hindu public religious worship evinced at such shrines, whether this has grown through the decades and attached itself to the institution, or whether it was the full-fledged purpose at the birth of the shrine. Where this is present and undeniable, it will not matter that the origin is un-Sastraic, that the temple evolved from a Samadhi, though ordinarily this conception is not in harmony with Hindu concepts, as emphasised in Bodendraswami Mutt v. President, H. R.E Board5 , or if the Agama Sastras had been adhered to or not. In my view, it is with this background that we should comprehend and appreciate the dicta of Varadachariar, J., in the Board of Commissioners for The Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Pidugu Narasimham &38; others2, to the effect that the test was not whether the foundation conformed to any particular school of Agama Sastras, or of Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Ramaswami v. The Board of Commissioners, Madras4, that it was sufficient that the worshippers considered themselves likely to be the recipients of the bounty or blessings of a Divine Presence, which they believed to exist at the place. Divorced from their contexts, such observations ought not to be interpreted as supporting a theory or thesis which would be opposed to the very purpose and scheme of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act But though Hinduism is a pervasive creed, with a genius for the assimilation of protestant movement which sprang up from its own field where such movements still retain their individuality and character, they ought not to be confused with it. Thus I do not think that it could be seriously maintained that a Jain or Buddhist temple is a ‘Hindu temple’, though the founders of those creeds were Hindus, conscious perhaps of a purificatory evangelism but not of a mission to destroy the background of religion that gave them birth. Equally, I do not think that it could be justifiably argued that a meditation hall of a Theosophical Society, or the Durga of a Muslim Saint with characteristic appanages (Pirs) is a ‘Hindu temple within the scope of the definition, merely because the Hindus also worship there in public on certain occasions. We must remember that the core of Hinduism is tolerance of all creeds and a tendency to bow the knee at the shrines of all faiths. Surely, the Legis-lature never intended that shrines or places of congregation and prayer or meditation, essentially non-Hindu in purpose and spirit, should be assimilated to Hinduism, or to Hindu religious institutions by a kind of legal fiction. That is not the purport of the Act at all. Particularly in the case of this institution where the life and teachings of the founder are so recent, and still vividly available to us, it will be a great mistake to ignore those aspects, and to assume that this shrine was ever intended to be a Hindu temple by its founder, or that it has already evolved into this, because of certain insignia, or of ritualistic worship, or the installation of a Sivalinga over the mortal remains of the mother of the Maharishi. My learned brother has already referred to, and discussed, these facts which so startlingly belie the interpretation that this shrine was ever intended to be a place of Hindu public religious worship or that it could be permitted to evolve into a Hindu temple, without desecration of the universal principles and of Realisation transcending all creeds including Hinduism, for which the Maharishi stood ; and which he expressed in his life. Certainly, those aspects which are definitely repugnant to Hindu notions of installation and worship ought not to be ignored, and this is no mere question of adherence to the agama sastras or perhaps unintentional and unknowing departures therefrom. Certainly, those aspects which are definitely repugnant to Hindu notions of installation and worship ought not to be ignored, and this is no mere question of adherence to the agama sastras or perhaps unintentional and unknowing departures therefrom. The samadhi of a Brahmin widow, even if she was a most worthy and excellent person who gave birth to one who was surely among the illuminati, cannot be consecrated ground according to the Sastras. Without prana pratishta, which spiritiual descent cannot be invoked at such a place, there can be no idol; and the linga installed can only be symbolic of a union (sayujya), like the Cross erected over a Christian tomb, as a symbol of redemption. The record is definitely against the interpretation that the Maharishi authorised the worship of his mother, as one who had attained realisation, a mukta. Certain words used by him support the interpretation on the contrary, that he considered all as muktas, and even included the dumb creation within the scope of his vast acceptance and affection. My learned brother has already referred to those facts which, if interpreted in the same mode, would authorise Hindu temple worship at the tomb of a cow or a pet monkey, which have equally found burial within the ashram premises. The Maharishi described himself as an atiyasrami, literally one who has transcended the four asrams of Hinduism, like Sukha or Jada Baratha. Thus, he could not even be described as a sanyasi. His teaching was a method of introspection into the centre of the self within each and all of us, the meditation “ Who am I?” carried on with ceaseless vigilance until the dawn of a perfect awareness obliterating the limited age. Such a teaching had its exemplary origin in the silence of the avatar Dakshina-murthi, rather than even the most refined metaphysics of advaita vedantha. Everything else appears to have been a concession to human frailties around him, which he did not care to meet with opposition. The record shows that the Maharishi could not be described as having devotees, for he gave no diksha (initiation) and acknowledged none as a disciple. He came away to Tiruvannamalai in his seventeenth year, penniless and friendless, and never accumulated wealth, personally speaking. The record shows that the Maharishi could not be described as having devotees, for he gave no diksha (initiation) and acknowledged none as a disciple. He came away to Tiruvannamalai in his seventeenth year, penniless and friendless, and never accumulated wealth, personally speaking. He never married, and had no family ; even the provisions in his will relating to the continued management of the shrine and ashram after him by his sanyasi brother Niranjanandaswami (Sarvadhikari), and that line of descent, were clearly prompted by a concern to retain his abode at Tiruvannamalai as a spiritual centre, not for self-glorification or the security of dependants. Are we to seriously accept the hypothesis that such a person desired to exclude a Muslim, European or Parsee attracted to his teachings, from his shrine? The Maharishi was perfectly aware of the normal postulates of Hinduism. He must have been aware that such a shrine over the samadhi of his mother, with a statue of himself as another symbol of adoration in the same hall, could be no Hindu temple. He was not an iconoclast, intent on a revolutionary . transformation of Hindu creeds or practice. The probabilities are overwhelming that, as far as the founder’s message, intentions and outlook are concerned, the Mathhrubutheswar shrine was not founded as a Hindu temple, but essentially as a public religious shrine or institution of a universal character. The evidence on record clearly establishes further that it is not a place of Hindu public religious worship though the forms of puja or archana might be similar to those adopted in Hindu temples, but that it is a shrine in which all who are drawn to the Maharishi’s teachings, whether Hindu, Christian, Parsi or Muslim, have equal rights of access and to the acquisition of spiritual benefit by prayer or meditation. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of my learned brother, and further fully endorse his view that it is most desirable in the interests of the wide public that a scheme should be framed under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for the better management of the shrine and the public trust or endowments relating thereto, conserving the universal spirit and character of this foundation so clearly expressed in the life and teachings of the Founder. I agree that this appeal should be allowed. V.S. ------------- Appeal allowed.