JUDGMENT P.K. Tare, J. This appeal has been referred to a Division Bench for decision by one of us (Tare J.), as it involves some substantial questions of law. It arises out of the decree passed by Shri Kasliram, District Judge, Raigarh in Civil Appeal No. 9-A of 1955 decided on 18-1-1956, reversing the decree passed by Shri V.N. Mishra, Civil Judge Class II, Raigarh in Civil Suit No. 26-A of 1953, decided on the 12th March, 1955. The suit was filed by Rameshwar; but, as he died during its pendency, the present Appellants were brought on record in his place as his legal representatives. The suit land with an area of 3.53 acres bearing khasra Nos. 280, 346. 369, 363, 382, 626, 1036, and 1108 rental Rs.3-14-0 of mauza Tarda originally belonged to one Jage Mahra in ryoti rights. He died in the year 1942, leaving his widow, Mst. Padma, and his pre-deceased son's widow, Mst. Jeera. He also left a brother by name, Khageshwar who was separate from him. After his death, the names of Mst. Padma and Mst. Jeera were recorded as ryots. Mst. Padma died in the year 1948 and Mst. Jeera was alleged to have remarried. The Appellants' predecessor, namely, Rameshwar, who was the Gaontia till the abolition of proprietary rights, filed the present suit for possession of the suit land and for a declaration that the sale-deeds dated 3-5-1950 (Ex. D-7) executed by Mst. Jeera in favour of Khageshwar and dated 26-7-1952 (Ex. D-6) executed by Khageshwar in favour of the present Respondent were not binding on the Gaontia, as there were no legal heirs of the deceased Jage and, therefore, the land was at the disposal of the Plaintiff gaontia vide Clause 29 of the Raigarh State Wajib-ul-arz. The deceased Rameshwar had applied to the Tahsildar on 3-12-1948 in Revenue Case No. 44-XXXIII-7 of 1948-49 for mutation of his name. Khageshwar and Mst. Jeera and some others filed objections. The Tahsildar directed the gaontia-Rameshwar's name to be recorded. But in appeal, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, vide order dated 6-10-1950, directed the parties to seek their remedy in a civil Court. Khageshwar's name was ordered to be mutated, as the person found in actual possession of the suit land. Khageshwar and Mst. Jeera and some others filed objections. The Tahsildar directed the gaontia-Rameshwar's name to be recorded. But in appeal, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, vide order dated 6-10-1950, directed the parties to seek their remedy in a civil Court. Khageshwar's name was ordered to be mutated, as the person found in actual possession of the suit land. The defence was that the transfer was bonafide and for valuable consideration; that the suit was barred by time, as it should have been filed within one year of the date of the passing of the order by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, and at any rate, it should have been filed within 2 years of the death of Mst. Padma. It was also averred that as the proprietary rights had been abolished, the gaontia or his successors had no right to claim possession of the suit land. The trial Judge held that Khageshwar was separate from his brother Jage and as such he could not be considered to be a joint co-sharer along with Jage. Therefore, upon the death of Jage, Mst. Padma, his widow, alone succeeded to the ryoti rights. It was also held that Mst. Jeera's re-marriage had not been proved. However, even as the widow of a predeceased son, she was not entitled to succeed to the suit land. As there was no lawful heir of the deceased Jage, the land escheated to the gaontia, Kameshwar, after the death of Mst. Padma. It was also found that Kameshwar did take possession of the suit land in exercise of his right of escheat and as such he was in possession till July, 1952, when he was unlawfully dispossessed by the present Respondent. The suit was held to be within time. It was further held that the sale-deed dated 3-5-1950 (Ex. D-7) executed by Mst. Jeera in favour of Khageshwar and the sale-deed dated 26-7-1952 (Ex. D-6) executed by Khageshwar in favour of the present Respondent Gautam. were not binding on the gaontia and, therefore, inoperative. The Appellants' claim for possession was decreed by the trial Judge. The learned appellate Judge reversed the decree of the trial Court, holding, that the gaontia, Rameshwar never entered into possession of the suit land after the death of Mst. Padma in the year 1948, and that the suit was not maintainable after the abolition of proprietary rights. The Appellants' claim for possession was decreed by the trial Judge. The learned appellate Judge reversed the decree of the trial Court, holding, that the gaontia, Rameshwar never entered into possession of the suit land after the death of Mst. Padma in the year 1948, and that the suit was not maintainable after the abolition of proprietary rights. It was further held that the gaontia could claim the land as a ryot; and, as his suit was not filed within one year of the enactment of the C.P. States Land Tenure Order, 1949, as required by Clause 25 thereof, it was barred by time. In the present case the following questions arise for our consideration. (i) Whether Mst. Jeera had a valid title to the suit land so as to be able to transfer the same in favour of Khageshwar, the vendor of the Respondent Gautam? (ii) Whether after the abolition of proprietary rights, the gaontia Rameshwar or his heirs, the present Appellants could maintain their suit for possesion? (iii) Whether the suit was barred by time under Clause 25 of the C.P. States Land Tenure Order, 1949? As to the right of Mst. Jeera, it is clear that she would have no right under Clause 29 of the Raigarh State Wazib-ul-arz, which is as follows: When a ryot dies, his holding shall descend to a son or son's son or to collaterals who were joint with the ryot at the time of his death. In default of such heirs, it will descend to his widow for her life-time or until she is remarried to a man other than her late husband's younger brother; but it shall not descend to collaterals who were not joint with the deceased at the time of his death. Daughters and their offspring shall have no right to inherit. In default of heirs as above, the holding of the deceased ryot shall be at the disposal of the gaontia. It will be seen that in the first instance, the ryoti land, under the said clause, devolves on lineal male descendants, and in the second instance on joint collaterals, and in the last instance upon the widow of the deceased as a limited owner. No other heir is thus entitled to inherit the ryoti land. In default of the enumerated heirs, the land becomes available to the gaontia. It is, therefore, clear that Mst. No other heir is thus entitled to inherit the ryoti land. In default of the enumerated heirs, the land becomes available to the gaontia. It is, therefore, clear that Mst. Jeera as a predeceased son's widow, was not entitled under the Raigarh State Wajib-ul-arz to inherit the suit land after the death of Mst. Padma. Although the Hindu law in general was applicable to the State of Raigarh prior to its merger with the then Central Provinces on 1-1-1948, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 was not applied to that area till the year 1949. Clause 3 of the C.P. States Land Tenure Order, 1949 providing for devolution of tenancy right by inheritance or survivorship was brought into force with effect from 16-3-1949. As Mst. Padma died in November 1948, Mst. Jeera as a pre-deceased son's widow could not get benefit of the said provisions, which can be applied only prospectively with effect from the year 1949. As regards the question whether the suit was tenable after the abolition of proprietary rights, we notice that in Chandansingh and Ors. v. Anandsingh and two Ors. FA No. 1 of 1950 decided on 5-1-1957, Hidayatullah C.J. and the late Chaturvedi J. applied the principle of Rahmatullah Khan v. Mahabirsingh 1956 NLJ 1 : ILR 1955 Nag. 983, and held that an ex-proprietor's suit for possession, not proprietor, but qua-land-holder entitled to possession of the specific land was maintainable, even after the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act I of 1951. Another Division Bench consisting of Hidayatullah C.J. and one of us, namely, Bhutt J., in Anantram v. Ramchandra FA No. 123 of 1950 decided on 19-4-1957, applied the principle of the Full Bench case of Chhotekhan v. Mohammad Obedullakhan 1953 NLJ 254 : ILR 1953 Nag. 702 and held that a landlord's suit for possession of land was not tenable after the abolition of proprietary rights. The point of distinction between these two cases, appears to be that an ex-proprietor loses all rights qua-proprietor and his suit qua-proprietor is not tenable after the abolition of proprietary rights, but where an ex-proprietor was otherwise entitled to possession of the land before the abolition of proprietary rights, his suit as a holder of the land is not defeated due to the operation of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act I of 1951. In this sense, if the Appellants' predecessor Rameshwar was entitled to possession of the suit land in November 1948 by escheat, when Mst. Padma died, his suit for possession would be maintainable, if his rights were those of a ryot. In case the land was held by him as home-farm, then also the suit would be maintainable, as he would be a malik-makbuza thereof under Section 53 of the Act. In either view, the suit is not liable to be dismissed on this ground. The last question relates to limitation. This depends upon the right, which the gaontia Rameshwar could claim in the suit land. When the land became available to him under Clause 29 of the Raigarh State Wajib-ul-arz, he could either bring it under personal cultivation or could deal with it in any other manner. If he brought it under personal cultivation, the suit would be governed by Section 2(g)(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act I of 1951. For the applicability of that Section, it is necessary that the land must be under the personal cultivation of the proprietor in the year 1949-50 and also on the date of vesting, namely, 31-3-1951. In the present case, the Appellants' predecessor, Rameshwar never brought the suit land under personal cultivation at any time after the death of Mst. Padma as found by the first appeal Court. As such, he could not claim it as his home-farm land under Section 2(g)(2) of the said Act. Therefore, the land could not become his malik-makbuza under Section 53 of the Act. However, he could claim ryoti rights in this land under Section 54 of the Act, provided he approached the Deputy Commissioner in that behalf and got a ryoti patta from the State. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the land could not be claimed by the Appellants' predecessor Rameshwar as home-farm land. We are unable to accept the Respondent's contention that the suit was barred by time under Clause 25 of the C.P. States Land Tenure Order, 1949. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 25 provides that any suit which would be barred under Sub-clause (1) may be instituted within one year next after the commencement of this Order or within the period of limitation previously in force, whichever period expires first. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 25 provides that any suit which would be barred under Sub-clause (1) may be instituted within one year next after the commencement of this Order or within the period of limitation previously in force, whichever period expires first. It does not affect the period of limitation of suits, time for which was still running on 10-3-1949, when the C.P. States Land Tenure Order, 1949, was brought into force. The period of limitation for such suits would be the former period provided by the second Schedule of the Order. In the present case Mst. Padma, after whose demise, Rameshwar claimed to be entitled to the land, died in the month of November 1948. As such the limitation for filing a suit in respect of land claiming ryoti rights expired in November 1951. However, the suit was filed on 30th March, 1953 when it was clearly barred by time under Article I, Schedule II of the Order. The rule of 12 years-limitation would not be available either to the Appellants or their predecessor for the reason that the suit land was never brought under personal cultivation before the abolition of proprietary rights; and, therefore, no malik-makbuza right could be claimed by the Appellants. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that this appeal is liable to be dismissed. It, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Under the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court as incurred. The costs of the lower Courts shall be borne as directed by the first appellate Court. Appeal dismissed