JUDGMENT B. Upadhya, J. - This is an appeal from an order passed by Mr. Justice James under Article 226 of the Constitution directing the Municipal Board, Hapur, district Meerut, to refrain from realising water tax from the petitioners until the tax is imposed in accordance with law. 2. The petitioners alleged that the appellant Board served them with notices of demand in respect of water tax purporting to have been levied by it. The petitioners contended that the tax had not been levied in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The proposals to impose the tax were not published and no opportunity was given to the applicants and other persons residing within the Municipality to raise objections to the proposals. The preliminary proposal and the draft rules in respect of the tax were not published in the manner prescribed under the Act, and the prescribed procedure not having been followed, the imposition was not valid. The petitioners based their objections on certain other similar grounds which it is unnecessary to mention. Notice was issued to the appellant Board and a counter-affidavit was filed. It is averred that the Water Works Committee and the Municipal Board, Hapur considered in the first instance the draft rules for the assessment and collection of water tax on lands and buildings within the municipality, and the draft rules as approved by the Committee were placed before the Board for its consideration along with a resolution which was passed by it. The Board adopted the draft rules by a special resolution no. 295 of the 23rd November 1955 and framed proposals as required by Sec. 13 of the U.P. Municipalities Act in the form of a special resolution. It was alleged that the proposals and the rules as drafted were published by posting a copy of the resolution on the notice board of the Municipal Board's office and were also announced in the town by beat of drum. It was contended that there being no `suitable newspaper having wide circulation' in the town at that time the manner of publication adopted by the Board was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Sec. 94 (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. It was contended that there being no `suitable newspaper having wide circulation' in the town at that time the manner of publication adopted by the Board was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Sec. 94 (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. It was further contended that the Municipal Board gave an opportunity to the inhabitants of the Municipality to submit their objections to the draft rules and proposals within a period of 15 days of the notice published in the manner mentioned above in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 132 (1). No objection having been received by the Board a special resolution no. 338 of the 25th Jan. 1956, adopting the proposals and the draft rules, was passed. The proposals were sent to the Commissioner, Meerut Division as required under Sec. 132 (4) of the Act, and the Commissioner published the draft rules under Sec. 300 (1) of the Act in the U.P. Gazette dated the 10th March 1956 and invited objections to the rules. The Commissioner thereafter is said to have modified some of the draft rules and republished them in the U.P. Gazette dated the 28th April 1956 and he invited objections to the modified rules as well. Finally, the Commissioner confirmed these rules by a notification dated the 20th August 1956 under Sec. 134 (1) of the Act. The appellant Board further says that on confirmation of the rules as required by Sec. 134 (2) of the Act the Board passed the resolution no. 296 on September 8, 1956, resolving to levy water tax with effect from the 1st April 1957. This resolution was sent to the Commissioner again in compliance with the requirements, of Sec. 135 (2) of the Act. The Commissioner thereafter notified in the official Gazette the imposition of water tax in the Hapur Municipality with effect from the 1st. April 1957. This notification was published in the U.P. Gazette dated the 11th December, 1956. The petitioners were served with notices of assessment, objections were filed by some of them, which were disposed of, and the petitioners were served with bills for payment of the tax assessed finally in the months of January and February 1958 relating to the period 1st April 1957 to 31st March 1958. The petitioners were served with notices of assessment, objections were filed by some of them, which were disposed of, and the petitioners were served with bills for payment of the tax assessed finally in the months of January and February 1958 relating to the period 1st April 1957 to 31st March 1958. Lastly it was contended that the water tax in question had been levied according to law and the petitioners were not entitled to the relief claimed by them. 3. The learned Judge who heard the writ petition found that the special resolution passed by the Municipal Board was never published in any newspaper, though two Hindi weeklies entitled `Janmat' and `Bharatvarsh' and one Hindi daily entitled `Vyapar' are published at Hapur. He took the view that the Board was not justified in not publishing the resolution in any newspaper on the ground that the papers published at Hapur did not have a `wide circulation.' The learned Judge observed that all that the law requires is that the resolution should be published in a local paper published in Hindi. He held that the provisions of Sec. 131 (3) with regard to publication in the manner prescribed in Sec. 94 (3) are mandatory and the Board was guilty of contravening this provision of the statute in not publishing the resolution in the local newspaper `Vyapar'. The learned Judge found that the statement contained in the affidavit relating to the publication by posting a copy of the resolution on the notice board and by beat of drum was not proved. The counter affidavit was not sworn on personal knowledge by the head clerk of the Board who gave it. The learned Judge felt that he could not accept the statement that publication was made in the manner alleged by the Board. This omission to publish was a contravention of Sec. 131 (3) of the Act. 4. It was further contended on behalf of the Board that the notification published under Sec. 135 (3) was conclusive proof that the tax had been imposed in accordance with law, and that it was not open to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the imposition. 4. It was further contended on behalf of the Board that the notification published under Sec. 135 (3) was conclusive proof that the tax had been imposed in accordance with law, and that it was not open to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the imposition. After considering certain cases the learned Judge held that this provision was in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution, and, in the circumstances of the case, the notification could not validate the imposition of the tax which in fact had not been levied according to law. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant Board argued the case at some length. He urged that all the essential steps required under the U.P. Municipalities Act had in fact been taken and the publication of the Board's resolution by posting a notice on the notice Board and by beat of drum was sufficient compliance with the law. It was further urged that Sec. 135 (3) was not hit by Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution and the view taken by the learned Judge was not correct. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties it appears that there is no dispute about the fact that Sec. 128 of the U.P. Municipalities Act authorises a Board to impose the taxes enumerated in that section including a water tax on the annual value of buildings or land or of both. This power, however, is to be exercised subject to the restrictions mentioned in Sec. 129 of the Act and in the manner prescribed. Secs. 131 to 135 lay down the procedure to be followed for the imposition of a tax by the Board. These provisions of the statute have been summed up with his usual lucidity by Mootham, C. J. in Kedarnath v. Municipal Board, Gorakhpur, 1956 ALJ R. 198. Briefly stated, the Board is required to frame proposals by a special resolution specifying the tax it desires to impose, the persons or class of persons to be made liable and the description of property or other taxable thing or circumstances, in respect of which the imposition is intended, the amount or rate leviable, and any other matter required by rules to be specified. The Board is also required to prepare a draft of the Rules which it desires the State Government to make in this connection and to publish the proposal and the draft Rules along with a notice in a prescribed form in the manner prescribed in Sec. 94. This section says how the resolution of a Board may be published. Sec. 94 (3) says:- "Every resolution passed by a board at a meeting shall, as soon thereafter as may be, be published in a local paper published in Hindi and where there is no such local paper, in such manner as the State Government may, by general or special order, direct." 7. Within a fortnight of the publication of the notice, the inhabitants of the Municipality can submit their objections in writing and the Board is then to consider these objections and pass orders thereon by a special resolution. In the event of a modification the modified proposals have to be published again similarly and objections are to be invited. After finally settling its proposals the Board has to submit them along with the objections received to the `prescribed authority'. In the instant case it is admitted that the prescribed authority was the Commissioner of Meerut Division. The prescribed authority is required to submit the proposals and objections to the State Government, which may pass any of the orders mentioned in the statute. After the proposals have been sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority or the State Government after taking into consideration the draft rules submitted by the Board, the Rules are made by the prescribed authority or the State Government, as the case may be, and the order of sanction, with a copy of such Rules, is then to be sent to the Municipal Board concerned and thereupon the Board is required by a special resolution to direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date to be specified in the resolution. Sec. 135 then provides that a copy of the resolution passed as above has to be submitted to the State Government if the tax has been sanctioned by the State Government and to the Prescribed Authority in any other case. Sec. 135 then provides that a copy of the resolution passed as above has to be submitted to the State Government if the tax has been sanctioned by the State Government and to the Prescribed Authority in any other case. Upon receipt of the copy of such resolution the imposition of the tax from the appointed date is to be notified by the State Government or the Prescribed Authority as the case may be, in the Official Gazette and such notification is a condition precedent to the imposition of a tax. Then comes sub-sec. (3) which has been the subject of considerable debate in this appeal. It says:- "135(3). A notification of the imposition of a tax under sub-Sec. (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act." 8. The Board's contention that the posting of the notice in dispute at the Municipal Board's Office and the announcement of the proposals and the Rules by beat of drum was sufficient publication is hardly tenable in view of the express language of the statute which required every resolution passed under Sec. 131 to be published in a local paper published in Hindi. The alternative mode of publication which the Board claims to have adopted is permissible according to Sec. 94 (3) only where there is no such local paper and the State Government so directs. The explanation offered by the Board that the papers published at Hapur were not `suitable' or did not have `wide circulation' cannot be entertained. The statute does not require that the local paper must have a wide circulation. The qualifications of the paper in which the resolution to be published are that the paper should be a local one and should be one in `Hindi'. It is, therefore, clear that the resolution which is said to have been passed by the Board containing the proposals and approving of the draft Rules was not published in the manner required by law. In Kedar Nath's case, 1956 A.L.J.R 198 referred to above the absence of publication of a notice as required by Sec. 131 (3) was held to amount to a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the Act essential to a legal imposition of tax. With that view we respectfully agree. 9. In Kedar Nath's case, 1956 A.L.J.R 198 referred to above the absence of publication of a notice as required by Sec. 131 (3) was held to amount to a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the Act essential to a legal imposition of tax. With that view we respectfully agree. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant relies on the provisions of Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 of the Act and contends that, even if there had been non-compliance of certain provisions of Secs. 131 to 134 of the Act, the validity of the imposition of the tax cannot be questioned. Sec. 135 is: "Imposition of tax:- (1) A copy of the resolution passed under Sec. 134 shall be submitted to the State Government if the tax has been sanctioned by the State Government, and to the Prescribed Authority, in any other case. (2) Upon receipt of the copy of the resolution the State Government, or Prescribed Authority, as the case may be, shall notify in the official Gazette, the imposition of the tax from the appointed date, and the imposition of a tax shall in all cases be subject to the condition that it has been so notified. (3) A notification of the imposition of a tax under sub-Sec. (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 10. It will be seen that what is made conclusive proof of the fact that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act is a notification of the imposition of a tax under sub-Sec. (2). Such a notification can be issued by the Prescribed Authority upon receipt of the copy of the resolution, and the resolution referred to is the special resolution passed by the Board in pursuance of the provisions of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 134. If the Prescribed Authority notifies the imposition of the tax from a certain date on any other basis, that notification will not be a notification under sub-Sec, (2) of Sec. 135 and therefore cannot be conclusive proof about the valid imposition of the tax. If the Prescribed Authority notifies the imposition of the tax from a certain date on any other basis, that notification will not be a notification under sub-Sec, (2) of Sec. 135 and therefore cannot be conclusive proof about the valid imposition of the tax. It is significant that sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 further provides that "the imposition of a tax shall in all cases be subject to the condition that it has been so notified." The mere publication of the notice mentioning the date from which the tax would be imposed does not suffice to impose the tax as the imposition of the tax is subject to a certain condition and that condition is that the imposition had been notified in accordance with what is mentioned in sub-Sec. (2). The expression "so notified" has great significance and means that a notification published after complying with the various formalities laid down in connection with the imposition of the tax would be the real notification which would govern the imposition of the tax. If a notification has been made without the formalities being complied with, it would be not the notification contemplated by sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 to govern the imposition of the tax. 11. The Board was competent to pass a special resolution directing the imposition of the tax with effect from a date to be specified in the resolution under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 134 only when the order of sanction of the proposals and the rules made by the State Government had been received by the Board. The special resolution No. 296 dated the 28th September 1956 was passed after the Commissioner had made the rules and had possibly sanctioned the proposals. It is not clear from the record what proposals had been sent to him. In fact, as the Board did not frame any proposals about the imposition of the tax, no proposals as contemplated by sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 132 could have been submitted to the Commissioner, nor could any objections to the proposals have been submitted to him. It follows that the Commissioner's sanction of the proposals submitted to him was sanction of certain proposals which were not contemplated by sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 132. It follows that the Commissioner's sanction of the proposals submitted to him was sanction of certain proposals which were not contemplated by sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 132. The result is that the Board's special resolution No. 296 of the 28th September 1956 was not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down in sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 134 of the Act. 12. On the 23rd November 1955 the Board approved the water tax and water supply rules and those draft rules appear to have been as published by the Commissioner in March 1956 and as are mentioned in Annexure `C' to the counter affidavit. These draft rules consist of eight rules. Rules 9 and 10 really described the tax. This appears to have been realised by the Commissioner who re-published the rules in the U.P. Gazette dated the 28th April 1956 and in this re-publication omitted to publish the description of the tax. This view finds support from the fact that the final notification purporting to be under Sec. 135 (2) of the Act mentioned the description of the tax and numbered the paragraphs dealing with it as 9 and 10, the numbers they bore when they formed part of the draft rules as originally published by the Commissioner. This consideration further supports the finding that the Board passed no special resolution framing proposals specifying the particulars mentioned in Cls. (a) to (d) of Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 131 of the Act. The rules containing the description of the tax were prepared by the Water Works Committee and were approved by the Board on the 23rd November, 1955. The Board did not first frame any proposals. The description of the tax in the draft rules does not contain all the particulars to be mentioned under the various clauses of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 131. The draft rules are to follow the framing of the proposals. Without the proposals the subsidiary matter, i.e. the rules, cannot be taken up. Even these draft rules containing the description of the tax were not published in the manner prescribed in Sec. 94 as required by sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131. The draft rules are to follow the framing of the proposals. Without the proposals the subsidiary matter, i.e. the rules, cannot be taken up. Even these draft rules containing the description of the tax were not published in the manner prescribed in Sec. 94 as required by sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131. The publication of the proposals and the draft rules, according to paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, was done by pasting a copy of the resolution on a notice board of the Municipal Board and by announcement in the town by beating of drums in view of the absence of any suitable local paper having wide circulation in the town at the time. The learned Judge has rightly found that there were local papers having circulation in the town and that the aforesaid mode of publication was therefore not warranted. We agree with this finding. The pasting of the resolution on the notice board and its announcement by beating of drums hardly amount to the publication of the proposals and the draft rules. The resolution did not embody the proposals and the draft rules. It simply said that the water tax and water supply rules passed by the Water Works Committee were approved. The pasting of this resolution could hardly be of any use to the potential assessees within the limits of the Municipal Board. They could not possibly have filed any objection in the absence of knowledge of what the proposals and the draft rules were. It is hardly to be presumed that the announcement by beating of drums would have mentioned the proposals and the draft rules in detail. Even if the announcer took the trouble of repeating them, that would have been hardly of any use to the inhabitants for the purposes of their examining them and filing any objections they might have against them. 13. Further, Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131 required the publication of a notice in the form set forth in Schedule III. The form is: "SCHEDULE III. NOTICE OF PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE TAX (Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131). 13. Further, Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131 required the publication of a notice in the form set forth in Schedule III. The form is: "SCHEDULE III. NOTICE OF PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE TAX (Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131). Notice is hereby given to the inhabitants of the Municipality of that the Municipal Board desires to impose the tax, rate, toll, octroi or cess (as the case may be) described in the proposals appended [in lieu of the tax known as the] To be inserted if the tax is to be substituted for any existing tax. Any inhabitant of the Municipality objecting to the proposals or rules appended hereto may, within a fortnight from the date of this notice, send his objections in writing to the Municipal Board. PROPOSALS [The proposals framed by the board tinder sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 131 are to be appended here]. RULES [The rules prepared by the board under sub-Sec, (2) of Sec. 131 are to be appended here], 14. Compliance of this provision, according to paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, was done by the notice, Annexure `B' to the counter affidavit. This notice simply informed the people that the Municipal Board had, under sub-Secs. (1) and (2) of Sec. 131 (though printed as 139), decided to levy water tax at 10 per cent of the annual value of the houses and land and had also prepared rules for collection of the tax. It also informed the people that the Board would finalise them on or after the 22nd January 1956 and that any objection received by the Executive Officer by the 22nd January 1956 would be considered. Annexure `B' indicates that the information of this notice was given to hardly two dozen people. Further, this notice did not have the proposals and the draft rules as annexures and therefore could not be a notice contemplated by Schedule III of the Act. 15. It is clear from the above that no proposals were framed, no proposals or draft rules were properly published and the inhabitants of the municipality hardly had occasion to file objections against them and that therefore the proposals, in whatever inform they were submitted to the Commissioner under Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 132, were not really the proposals contemplated by that sub-section. It follows, as already mentioned, that any sanction of such proposals could not be the sanction contemplated by sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 134 and that therefore any special resolution passed by the Municipal Board under Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 134 with respect to the imposition of the tax was not the proper resolution and that no notification under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 could be issued by the State Government on such a resolution. It is clear therefore that the condition which governed the imposition of the tax in view of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 of the Act had not been satisfied and that there had been no imposition of the tax and consequently there could be no notification of the imposition of the tax under Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135. 16. We are therefore of opinion that the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 of the Act do not bar the proving of the non-compliance of any provisions of the Act relating to the procedure for the imposition of the tax. 17. The opinion we have formed on the basis of the interpretation of the various provisions of Secs. 131 to 135 of the Act finds support from general considerations and the rationals of some decided cases. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 of the Act by its language lays down a provision in connection with evidence about certain matters. It is not a provisions for validating anything done not in conformity with the provisions of the Act with respect to the imposition of a tax. This sub-section therefore apparently was not to protect the invalidity of a tax if it be invalid on account of its being imposed without following the legal procedure. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the case of Emperor v. Har Datt, AIR 1936 Allahabad 743 : 1936 A.L.J.R. 962 In that case the validity of the toll tax levied by the Municipal Board was challenged on the ground that it was not a tax on vehicles but was a tax on passengers. It was held to be a valid tax as it was a tax on vehicles and not on passengers. The Court however further observed at page 744. It was held to be a valid tax as it was a tax on vehicles and not on passengers. The Court however further observed at page 744. "The question whether the tax is in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Act or not is concluded by the fact that the imposition of the tax has been notified in the Gazette by the Government. After the notification it is not open to anybody to question the validity of the tax." 19. The question raised before us was not raised in that case as the validity of the tax was not challenged then on the ground that there had been no compliance with the procedure laid down for the imposition of the tax. It did not arise for consideration therefore whether the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 barred an assessee from showing that the tax had been imposed without following the necessary procedure laid down for the imposition of the tax. 20. In Radha Swami Satsang Sabha v. Tara Chand, AIR 1939 Allahabad 557 : 1939 A.L.J.R. 757 the Court had to consider the provision of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which is :- "The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the Local Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing." 21. It was observed at page 560 :- "There can be no doubt that a declaration under Sec. 6 (3) of the Act is ordinarily conclusive of the fact that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. But we do not think it can be conclusive of the liability to acquisition if it be found that any illegality was committed at the proceedings or if there was material violation of any of the provisions of the Act in any of the stages prior to the declaration." 22. But we do not think it can be conclusive of the liability to acquisition if it be found that any illegality was committed at the proceedings or if there was material violation of any of the provisions of the Act in any of the stages prior to the declaration." 22. On this reasoning it can be said that the notification under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 may be proof that the tax had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and yet be not conclusive proof against the assessee with respect to his liability to pay the tax, in case he can prove that any illegality was committed in the proceedings leading to the notification or that there had been material violation of any of the provisions of the Act in any of the stages prior to the notification. 23. This Court again dealt with the effect of the declaration under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in Ram Charan Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1952 A.L.J.R. 319. Agarwala, J. delivering the judgment of the Court, observed at page 321:- "The provision of section 6 (3) that the declaration under Sec. 6 (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose is based upon the assumption that the declaration has been made within jurisdiction after complying with the provisions of Sec. 5-A. Where the provisions of Sec. 5-A have not been complied with, the declaration made by the State Government under Sec. 6 is without jurisdiction and the conclusiveness provided for in Sec. 6 (3) does not attach to it." 24. This observation fully supports our approach to the scope of the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 of the Act. When the provisions relating to the imposition of the tax and leading to the notification under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 have not been complied with, the notification under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 about the imposition of the tax from a certain date is made without jurisdiction and therefore the conclusiveness provided to such a notification under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 is not available to the Municipal Board. 25. 25. In Kedar Nath v. Municipal Board, Gorakhpur, 1956 A.L.J.R 198, Mootham, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Bench held that the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 131 of the Municipalities Act had not been complied with and then observed at page 200:- "Upon this view of the matter it would be unnecessary to consider any further point were it not for the argument of learned counsel that under Sec. 135(3) the second notice published on the 5th August 1950 was conclusive proof that the tax had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. As I have already pointed out, Sec. 134(1), read with Secs. 296 and 300, imposes on the State Government the duty (which in this case has been delegated to the Commissioner) of making rules after previous publication, and it is only when that has been done and the other steps have been taken for which provision is made in Secs. 134(2) and 134 (1) that the Commissioner can notify in the Gazette the imposition of the tax from the appointed date." 26. The Commissioner's competence to notify the imposition of the tax from the appointed date arises on the compliance of the steps leading to the stage of notification. In this particular case Mootham, C. J. held that the notification relied upon as a notification under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 135 was not really a notification under that sub Section but was published in purported compliance with the provisions of Sec. 300. 27. In Azimullah v. Suraj Kumar Singh, AIR 1957 Allahabad 307 Gurtu, J. observed at page 310:- "But where the very foundation of the authority given under Sec. 135 of the Act is lacking, namely, the existence of a special resolution under Sec. 134 of the Act, then the notification of any alleged special resolution was quite outside the competence of the State Government or the prescribed authority and in such a case, despite the notification, there would be no conclusiveness in regard to the procedure under the Act having been followed." 28. Two cases with respect to the certificate of incorporation under the Indian Companies Act, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, are not of much help. In Moosa Goolam Ariff v. Ebrahim Goolam Ariff, I.L.R. 40 Cal. 1 : 10 ALJR. Two cases with respect to the certificate of incorporation under the Indian Companies Act, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, are not of much help. In Moosa Goolam Ariff v. Ebrahim Goolam Ariff, I.L.R. 40 Cal. 1 : 10 ALJR. 486 their Lordships of the Privy Council had to determine whether a certain company had been duly incorporated or not. With respect to the conclusiveness of the certificate of incorporation of the company their Lordships observed at page 17:- "In dealing with the first question their Lordships will assume that the conditions of registration prescribed by the Indian Companies Act were not duly complied with, that there were not seven subscribers to the memorandum of association, and that the Registrar of Companies ought not to have granted a certificate of incorporation. As a matter of fact a certificate of incorporation was granted. In their Lordship's opinion the certificate of incorporation is conclusive for all purposes." The Indian Companies Act of 1882 had no statutory provision making the certificate of incorporation conclusive for all purposes. As that Act followed the lines of the Imperial Act of 1862, the law of England about the conclusiveness of the certificate of incorporation was applied to corresponding certificate in India under the Indian Companies Act. The case is therefore not helpful in construing sub-See. (3) of Sec. 135 of the Act. 29. In Collector of Moradabad v. Equity Insurance Co., Ltd., A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 197 it was observed at page 200 : "The certificate is, therefore, conclusive evidence of the fact that each subscriber wrote opposite his name the number of shares he took." 30. This was said in view of Sec. 24 (1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which is :- "A certificate of incorporation given by the Registrar in respect of any association shall be conclusive evidence that all the requirements of this Act in respect of registration and of matters precedent and incidental thereto have been complied with and that the association is a company authorised to be registered and duly registered under this Act." 31. What was made conclusive evidence by this provision was the certificate of incorporation given by the Registrar in respect of any association and therefore it was not necessary to see whether that certificate of incorporation had been issued in conformity with the provisions of the Act. What was made conclusive evidence by this provision was the certificate of incorporation given by the Registrar in respect of any association and therefore it was not necessary to see whether that certificate of incorporation had been issued in conformity with the provisions of the Act. It was not a certificate under certain section of the Act which was made conclusive evidence and therefore it was not necessary to see whether that certificate had been rightly issued or not. 32. We are therefore of opinion that the water tax imposed by the Hapur Municipality had not been validly imposed and that therefore the order of the learned Judge is perfectly correct. 33. In view of the above, it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions on behalf of the respondent challenging the validity of the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 135 of the Act on the grounds of their being ultra vires of the U.P. Legislature and being void on account of their contravening the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.