Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff, whose suit for eviction has been ultimately dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge of Trichur, is the appellant before me. 2. The suit was for eviction of the defendant from the plaint schedule properties with arrears of rent and also future rent on the basis of dated 13-11-1113, Ext. A in these proceedings. The plaintiff claimed eviction and also contended that the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act VIII/118 has no application and that in any event, she is entitled to claim eviction, because the transaction is one exempted under S.3 (c) of the said Act. The plaintiff claimed eviction also on an alternative basis namely, based upon S.8 (b) of the said Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, i. e. on the ground that the tenant has intentionally and wilfully committed acts of waste as are calculated to impair materially and permanently the value or utility of the holding. On this alternative basis, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant is not entitled to the protection even if such protection is given under Cochin Act VIII of 1118. In the same suit, apart from relying upon wilful waste as a ground for eviction, the plaintiff claimed as against the defendant, certain amounts as damages for loss caused to the plaintiff by the defendant in cutting and appropriating certain trees standing on the property. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants on the ground that the transaction evidenced by Ext. A is not exempted under S.3 (c) of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act. They also contended that they are not guilty of any acts contemplated under clause (b) of S.8 to entitle the plaintiff to get a decree for eviction. 4. Regarding the claim for damages, which had also been specifically made by the plaintiff as against the defendants, the latter contended that they have not committed any waste on the property by cutting the trees or otherwise. They set up a case that there was a cyclone and due to the cyclone, some of the trees fell and those trees were sold and the proceeds appropriated by the plaintiff herself through her agent and they contested the claim of the plaintiff to get any decree for damages. 5. The defendants, in the alternative also contended that they will be entitled to the value of improvements in case, eviction is ordered. 6. 5. The defendants, in the alternative also contended that they will be entitled to the value of improvements in case, eviction is ordered. 6. The learned District Munsiff was inclined to accept the case of the plaintiff that the transaction will be exempted under S.3 (c) of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act and that therefore, the defendants are not entitled to protection conferred under S.4 of the said Act. On the alternative ground for eviction based upon wilful waste under clause (b) of S.8 of the Act, the learned District Munsiff, though willing to come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of causing some waste, was of the view that the defendants cannot be considered to have acted wilfully and as such, this ground of eviction is not available to the plaintiff. That is, the learned District Munsiff was accepting the case of the plaintiff for eviction under clause (c) of S.3 of the Verumpattamdars Act, but was not prepared to grant eviction based upon clause (b) of S.8 of the said Act. 7. Regarding the claim made by the plaintiff for damages for waste committed by the defendants, the learned District Munsiff goes into the matter and after considering the evidence adduced in this case, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to get the full damages claimed in her plaint, but the defendants will be liable to pay damages on this head of claim to the plaintiff in a sum of Rs. 489-12-0. 8. Then again, the learned District Munsiff considered the plea of the defendants about their claim for the value of improvements. After a consideration of the materials placed before the court, the learned District Munsiff came to the conclusion that the defendant will be entitled to get a sum of Rs. 2,334-5-0 as and for the value of improvements due to him. Finally, the trial court granted a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiff with proportionate costs on the claim for damages. It also held that the defendant is entitled to the value of improvements fixed in the sum of Rs. 2,334-5-0. But it also passed a decree against the defendants that they are liable to pay a sum of Rs. 489-12-0 as damages for waste and also allowed mutual set off. It also held that the defendant is entitled to the value of improvements fixed in the sum of Rs. 2,334-5-0. But it also passed a decree against the defendants that they are liable to pay a sum of Rs. 489-12-0 as damages for waste and also allowed mutual set off. Ultimately, the plaintiff was allowed to get eviction, on depositing the balance amount as worked out on the basis of this decree. 9. As against the decree for eviction passed by the learned District Munsiff, defendants 2 and 3 filed A. S.153 of 1954 and the plaintiff filed an appeal A. S.161 of 1954 in so far as the decree of the trial court negativing his rights to get full damages for waste as claimed in that Court. Both the appeals were heard by the learned Additional District Judge of Trichur. The learned judge was not prepared to accept the reasoning of the trial court that the transaction in question will come within the exception provided in S.3 (c) of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act. After a consideration of this question, the learned judge differed from the finding of the trial court and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim for eviction cannot be supported on the basis of S.3 (c) of the Act. But the learned judge agreed with the view of the trial court that the plaintiff will not be entitled to get eviction on the alternative basis namely, intentional and wilful waste under clause (b) of S.8 of the said Act. On this point, the learned judge agreed with the trial court and held that the plaintiff will not be entitled to claim eviction on this ground. Therefore, inasmuch as she learned judge disagreed with the view of the trial court on S.3 (c) of the Act, the learned judge reversed the decree of the trial court ordering eviction and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for eviction. This means that the appeal of the defendants 2 and 3 namely, A.S.153 and 154 of '54 which was really against the order of eviction, was allowed by the learned judge. 10. Then dealing with the appeal filed by the plaintiff for enhanced damages, namely A.S.161 of 1954, it is seen that the plaintiff wanted at least a sum of Rs. 10. Then dealing with the appeal filed by the plaintiff for enhanced damages, namely A.S.161 of 1954, it is seen that the plaintiff wanted at least a sum of Rs. 300/- as damages for waste from the defendant and the plaintiff also wanted to have the value of improvements awarded to the defendant, reduced. The learned judge was not prepared to interfere with the order of the trial court fixing the value of improvements in the sum of Rs. 2,384-5-0. But when the learned judge was dealing with the question of enhanced damages claimed by the plaintiff, he was of the view that though she may not be entitled to get possession on the ground of waste under S.8 (b) nevertheless in law, she is entitled to claim compensation for any waste committed by the tenant. But according to the learned judge, an action for such a claim must be brought within 3 years of the felling down of the trees. It is also the view of the learned judge that there is nothing on record to show that the defendant felled any trees within 3 years prior to the date of the suit. In this view, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any compensation for waste in this suit. 11. One can understand, if the learned judge on this reasoning had dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff namely, A.S.161 of 1954 claiming some more amount as damages from the defendant. But what the learned judge actually did was, he reversed and set aside the decree of the trial court which had awarded to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 489-12-0 as and for damages on this head, notwithstanding the fact that there was no appeal before him regarding this decree and also in view of the fact that the defendant who filed an appeal against the decree for eviction, did not really challenge this portion of the decree for damages passed by the trial court as against them. 12. In the end, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to get eviction on any ground and he also held that the plaintiff is not entitled to get damages for waste committed by the tenant. 12. In the end, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to get eviction on any ground and he also held that the plaintiff is not entitled to get damages for waste committed by the tenant. On this reasoning, the learned judge allowed the tenant's appeal A. S.153 of 1954 and dismissed the landlady's appeal, A. S.161 of 1954. It is against the decree of the learned Additional District Judge that this Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 13. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. P. Sreedhara Menon, has raised two contentions namely (a) The view of the learned judge that the plaintiff is not entitled to get eviction either on the basis of clause (c) of S.3, or on the basis of clause (b) of S.8 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, is not correct. According to the learned counsel, the transaction covered by Ext. A clearly comes at any rate, within the exemption provided under clause (c) of S.3, irrespective of the fact that whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim eviction on the alternative basis of clause (b) of S.3; and (b) In any event, the decree of the learned District Judge reversing the decree of the trial court awarding damages for waste in favour of the appellant is totally without jurisdiction. These two points will be considered by me immediately. According to the learned counsel, the transaction evidenced by Ext. A should be construed to be a lease of the building with garden or land appurtenant thereto. The learned counsel emphasised upon the existence of a building on this property and also the liability undertaken by the tenant to keep the building property thatched and in good repair. The learned counsel therefore, contended that the transaction should really be considered to be exempted by clause (c) of S.3. Even on the analogous provisions contained in Kerala Act 1 of 1957, the learned counsel contended, that it cannot be construed to be a ‘holding' within S.2 (1) of Act 1 of 1957 and even there, it is exempted under clause (c) of S.3. Even on the analogous provisions contained in Kerala Act 1 of 1957, the learned counsel contended, that it cannot be construed to be a ‘holding' within S.2 (1) of Act 1 of 1957 and even there, it is exempted under clause (c) of S.3. The learned counsel also contended that in any event, even on an alternative basis, his client is entitled to get eviction on the ground mentioned under Clause (b) of S.8 especially in view of the fact, that the trial court has held that the tenant committed waste and has also awarded damages. 14. On the other hand, Mr. T. Chandrasekhara Menon learned counsel for the defendant-respondent, contended that a reading of the various clauses in Ext. A, will clearly show that in no sense can it be understood to be a lease of a building with land or garden appurtenant thereto. The learned counsel drew my attention to the fact that the property comprised by this transaction is about 6 and odd acres and with a very small thatched ]pc in the property. He also drew my attention to the existence of various fruit-bearing trees which will be considered by me when I recite the various clauses in the document itself. The learned counsel naturally laid emphasis upon the recital that 12 annas worth of hmgipe will be given as HmWimgvN in the month of Chingom before every Onam. According to the learned counsel, the transaction is essentially one of a 'holding' which will come under the definition of that expression as contained in S.2 (1) of Kerala Act 1 of 1957. 15. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel on both sides about the nature of the document, it is desirable that I set out the various clauses in the document itself at this stage. 16. Before I advert to the document, reference can also be made to the sections under which the landlady in this case claims to get eviction of the tenant from this property. The relief is claimed by the landlady under clause (c) of S.3 and clause (b) of S.8 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act VIII of 1118. 16. Before I advert to the document, reference can also be made to the sections under which the landlady in this case claims to get eviction of the tenant from this property. The relief is claimed by the landlady under clause (c) of S.3 and clause (b) of S.8 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act VIII of 1118. Clause (c) of S.3 runs as follows: "This Act shall not apply to leases of any building owned by a landlord including a house, shop or ware-house and the site thereof, together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto." Section 8 (1) says that no suit for eviction of a Verumpattamdar from his holding or any portion thereof shall lie except on the following grounds: "[b] that he has intentionally and wilfully committed such acts of waste as are calculated to impair materially and permanently the value or utility of the holding." The only other relevant section in this enactment which requires notice is S.4 to the following effect: "Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every Verumpattamdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in S.8 of this Act." The corresponding provisions in Kerala Act 1 of 1957 which require to be noticed are: - Section 2 (1) which defines 'holding' as "holding' means any immovable property held under a single transaction by which a leasehold right in the property is created and possession of the property is transferred by one person in favour of another and includes Kanapattom: Provided that in relation to cases governed by the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, and the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, 'holding' shall have the meaning respectively assigned to it in those Acts". Section 3 (c) of the Act is as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to buildings rented out including houses, shops or warehouses and the sites thereof together with gardens or lands appurtenant thereto." Section 4 gives protection from eviction in respect of the matters mentioned therein. 17. Sofar as the claim for eviction based on S.8(b) of theCochin Verumpattamdars Act is concerned, that point can be disposed of immediately before I consider the claim based upon S.3 (c). 17. Sofar as the claim for eviction based on S.8(b) of theCochin Verumpattamdars Act is concerned, that point can be disposed of immediately before I consider the claim based upon S.3 (c). According to S.8 (b), the landlord will be entitled to get eviction of a Verumpattamdar, if he is able to establish that the Verumpattomdar has intentionally and wilfully committed such acts of waste as are calculated to impair materially and permanently the value or utility of the 'holding'. In this case, though the trial court has awarded some amounts as damages for the cutting of trees, both the courts have concurrently held that the tenant is not guilty of intentionally and wilfully committing acts of waste as required under the provisions of Clause.8 (b) of S.8 and I accept these findings. Therefore, this ground of eviction is not available to the landlady in this case. 18. Then the question is whether the landlady is entitled to get eviction under S.3 (c) of the Verumpattamdars Acts Ext. A is dated 13-11-1113 and it is executed to one Parukutty Amma by Raman Nair and it styles itself. The subject-matter of the lease is stated to be standing on the land. The rent is fixed in the sum of Rs. 49/- per year and in addition to this, the tenant is also to give to the landlady a hmgipe worth 12 annas. Therefore, the total rent is stated to be Rs. 49-12-0. There, is also a recital to the effect that there is of Rs. 30/- given by the tenant to the landlady without any liability to pay interest and this is as security for the proper payment of rents that accrued. There is a further recital to the effect that the lessee undertakes to safeguard the boundary of the property as also the survey stones and he also undertakes to safeguard the and the ]pc on the property. There is a stipulation that out of the annul rent of Rs. 49/- agreed upon, a sum of Rs. 19/- is to be utilised by the tenant for thatching the ]pc for putting up fences and to safeguard the trees and other on the property and this amount the tenant is entitled to adjust towards the rent in a proper manner. 49/- agreed upon, a sum of Rs. 19/- is to be utilised by the tenant for thatching the ]pc for putting up fences and to safeguard the trees and other on the property and this amount the tenant is entitled to adjust towards the rent in a proper manner. There is an undertaking by the tenant to give this hmgipe worth 12 annas to the landlady in Chingom before Onam of every year. The balance rent of Rs. 30/- is undertaken to be paid by the tenant on the 30th Thulam of every year and after obtaining proper receipts or vouchers. After one year, it is stated, that the tenant agrees to surrender the property, take back the advance and also at that time. There is a stipulation for payment of interest at 12 per cent on the arrears of Pattern that may be outstanding. If there are arrears, they can be adjusted by the landlady from and out of the balance alone, if any, need be paid by the tenant and if there is any further balance to be paid by the tenant the latter undertakes to pay it separately. 19. Apart from these recitals, the document shows that the property is of an extent of 6 acres of land and it consists of 8 bearing and 8 non-bearing cocoanut trees, 220 bearing and 10 non-bearing arecanut trees, 450 bearing and 70 non-bearing cashewnut trees, 14 bearing and 14 non-bearing jack trees, 34 non-bearing mango trees and also a small pura thatched with straw. These are the salient features of this document and the question is whether it can be said to come within the exception provided under clause (c) of S.3 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act or clause (c) of S.3 of Kerala Act I of 1957. In my opinion, to attract the provisions of clause (c) of S.3 of the Verumpattamdars Act, or clause (c) of S.3 of Kerala Act I of, 1957, it must be mainly a lease of a building with garden or lands appurtenant thereto. 20. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. P. Sreedhara Menon that because there is a small o¬jro on this very extensive property with so many fruit-bearing trees enumerated above, it is to be considered to be a lease of a building. 20. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. P. Sreedhara Menon that because there is a small o¬jro on this very extensive property with so many fruit-bearing trees enumerated above, it is to be considered to be a lease of a building. The nature of the building itself has been described in the document and it is a very small building thatched with hay. On the other hand, the dominant intention seen from this transaction is that no emphasis at all is laid on the building as such. On the other hand, greater importance is given by the parties to the IpgnigdpIA enumerated above and also to the Paramba on which the IpgnigdpIA stand. The existence of so many fruit bearing trees on this property cannot be easily ignored and the document itself starts by saying that the subject-matter of the lease is the Paramba, IpgnigdpIA and the ]pc Apart from these, there is the significant fact associated generally with holdings namely, the payment of a HmWimgvN by the tenant and in this case, he agrees to give the hmgipe worth 12 annas before the Onam in Chingom of every year. There is nothing to show from this document that any rent was fixed for this building and the total rent of Rs. 49/- fixed does not give any indication about the rent, if any, fixed for the building as such. Giving the various clauses in the document their due importance, in my opinion, the learned judge was perfectly correct in coming to the conclusion that the transaction evidenced by Ext. A does not come within the exception provided under clause (c) of S.3 of the Verumpattamdars Act or clause (c) of S.3 of the Kerala Act 1 of 1957. Therefore, it follows that the appellant-landlady is not entitled to get eviction of the defendant from the land. Therefore, the learned judge was perfectly justified in reversing the decree for eviction passed by the trial court. 21. But there is another point that arises for decision and that is the second contention of Mr. P. Sreedhara Menon that the learned judge had absolutely no jurisdiction in reversing a decree for damages passed in favour of his client. According to Mr. Sreedhara Menon, there was a separate claim for damages made as against the tenant on the ground that he has committed waste by cutting the trees. P. Sreedhara Menon that the learned judge had absolutely no jurisdiction in reversing a decree for damages passed in favour of his client. According to Mr. Sreedhara Menon, there was a separate claim for damages made as against the tenant on the ground that he has committed waste by cutting the trees. No doubt, both the courts have held that he is not entitled to rely upon that as a ground for eviction under S.8 (b) of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act. But the trial court has considered the question of waste committed by the tenant and has awarded a decree for damages in the sum of Rs. 489-12-0 in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants filed A. S.153 of 1954 before the learned District Judge challenging only the decree for eviction passed by the trial court. They did not challenge at all the decree for damages which had been separately passed by the trial court as against them. The plaintiff wanted a higher compensation and therefore, the plaintiff filed an appeal A. S.161 of 1954. When the subject-matter of the decree for damages passed by the trial Court for waste as against the defendants was not challenged at all and had become final, according to the learned counsel, the learned District Judge has no jurisdiction to reverse that decree. In the appeal filed by the plaintiff, the only thing that the learned judge could do was to disallow the claim for higher compensation, but the learned judge has no jurisdiction to reverse a decree obtained by the plaintiff in the trial court and which was not being challenged before the learned Judge. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the appellate judge has no jurisdiction either in A. S.153 of 1954 filed by the tenant or in A. S.161 of 1954 filed by the plaintiff, to interfere with the decree of the trial court which had become final and which was not the subject-matter of these two appeals before that court. 22. On the other hand, Mr. 22. On the other hand, Mr. T. Chandrasekhara Menon, learned counsel, contended that his clients had no opportunity to contest the claim of the plaintiff for damages as such because they proceeded on the basis that in a suit for eviction, the landlord is entitled to claim compensation or damages for waste, if any, and those matters could be gone into and adjusted in the decree for eviction that may be passed; whereas in this case, the decree for damages is really contingent upon the decree for eviction. No doubt, it is open to a landlord, who complains of waste committed by a tenant to institute a separate suit for damages alone without asking relief for eviction. But in such a case, according to the learned counsel, the defendants will have an opportunity of pleading the bar of limitation; whereas in this case, the plaintiff herself has so mixed up all these claims as to make it appear that she wants all those reliefs to be worked out in case she finally succeeds in her claim for evicting the tenant from the land. Now the decree for eviction having been set aside by; the learned judge, according to the learned counsel, the learned District Judge had jurisdiction to consider also the correctness or otherwise, of a decree for damages that had been passed by the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that it was not the subject-matter of claim or controversy before the learned District Judge. The learned counsel also relied upon a provision of the Cochin Tenancy Act XV/1113. The section that is relied upon by the learned counsel in this Act is S.5(2) of the said Act which runs as follows: "If in such suit the Court finds any sum of money due by the defendant to the plaintiff for rent, michavaram or otherwise in respect of the tenancy, the court shall set off such sum against the sum found due under sub-section (1] and shall pass a decree declaring as the amount payable to him on eviction the amount if any, remaining due to the defendant after such set-off". The learned counsel contended that this particular section of the said Act clearly contemplates that the claim of the landlord as against a tenant and that of a tenant as against the landlord are all to be adjusted, only when a suit for eviction is decreed. 23. The learned counsel contended that this particular section of the said Act clearly contemplates that the claim of the landlord as against a tenant and that of a tenant as against the landlord are all to be adjusted, only when a suit for eviction is decreed. 23. After hearing Learned counsel on both sides, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Chandrasekhara Menon in this regard. Clause (2) of S.5 of the Cochin Tenancy Act XV/1113 gives power to the court to make all these adjustments at the time when the decree for eviction is passed. But in my view, that section has no bearing at all on the point that I have now to decide. The question is whether an appellate court has got jurisdiction to reverse or interfere with a decree of a trial court, when it has become final and when it was not challenged by a party aggrieved, more especially when the party who was aggrieved on 2 points namely, a decree for eviction and a decree for damages, filed an appeal challenging only the decree for eviction. I cannot also accept the contention of Mr. Chandrarsekhara Menon that the fact that when a decree for eviction is set aside on appeal, that has the effect also of automatically setting aside a decree for damages separately passed by the trial court. The learned counsel attempted to rely upon the frame of the plaint which also, in my opinion, does not at all carry the matter any far. I cannot also accept Mr. Chandrasekhara Menon's contention that this client had no occasion or opportunity to plead the bar of limitation, if any, as an alternative ground of attack in these proceedings themselves. In fact, a party has no right to expect that the result of the suit or a litigation will be only entirely in his favour. It is not as if that fixity of tenure was not available to him, even on the date of the institution of these proceedings, because S.4 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act recognises a fixity of tenure in such Verumpattamdar. Therefore, in this case, the defendants fought the plaintiff on all grounds. He never raised any question of limitation or otherwise regarding the claim for damages made as against him. Therefore, in this case, the defendants fought the plaintiff on all grounds. He never raised any question of limitation or otherwise regarding the claim for damages made as against him. :Having fought that litigation on all passible grounds of attack that was available to him and having failed even in the trial court so far as this claim for damages for waste is concerned, and having not challenged it in appeal before the District Judge, especially when he filed Appeal A. S.153 of 1954 challenging another part of the decree of that court, in my opinion, the learned judge has completely acted without jurisdiction in reversing the decree of the trial court regarding the award of damages. The point in controversy as disclosed by the 2 appeals before the learned judge was that there should be no eviction as contended by the tenant and that there should be an enhanced compensation as contended by the landlady. The learned judge has no power in law or jurisdiction given to him by virtue of any of the provisions of law to traverse beyond the subject-matter of the controversy before him and interfere with a decree of a trial court which had become already final. 24. Therefore, the decree of the learned District Judge in so far as it reverses the decree of the trial court awarding damages in favour of the appellant as against the defendant for waste in the sum of Rs. 489-12-0, is set aside and I also hereby declare that it is often to the plaintiff to independently execute that decree according to law as against the defendant. As the suit itself is based on the exception in clause (c) of S.3 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act and clause (b) of S.8 of the Verumpattamdars Act and as the decision is against the plaintiff-land-lady on both these points, the suit for eviction alone will stand dismissed. But so far as the decree for damages given by the trial court is concerned, that will be restored and that part of the decree will stand. Both parties will bear their own costs this Second Appeal. No leave.