MEHROTRA, J. : (10-2-1959) This Rule was issued on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for issue of a writ of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or any other suitable direction under Articles 22& and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the refer­ence and the proceedings pending before the Presi­ding Officer, Labour Court, Assam, respondent: No. 2 in the present petition, in consequence thereof. Tocklai Experimental Station is a scientific research institute with its office at Tocklai within Sub-Division Jorhat, District, Sibsagar. Late Shri Chitra Kanta Saikia was a driver in the employment to the management of the aforesaid Tocklai Experimen­tal Station and was working as Director's driver. According to the petitioner, on 14-11-1957, whew, the late Shri Saikia was to drive Messrs. C. D. Wilson and N. S. Coldwell, members of the Com­mittee of the Indian Tea Association, Calcutta, from the Director's bungalow to a meeting, he was found drunk. He was suspended thereafter and charge-sheeted. By an order, dated 12-12-1957, the Manage­ment of the Research Institute decided to terminate his services with effect from the same date and Shri Saikia was given a month's salary in lieu of notice. After the termination of his services, Mr. Saikia died on 20-5-1958, and the State Government, by its notification, dated 25-6-1958, referred to the Presenting Officer, Labour Court, for adjudication, the despite regarding the termination of the services of deceas­ed Shri Saikia under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) as amended, here­inafter called 'the Act'. One of the points raised before the Labour Court by the present petitioner was that the refer­ence was void inasmuch as after the death of Shri Saikia there could be no; 'industrial dispute', within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act, in existence which could be referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court framed two preliminary issues -(1) whether the reference is void, without jurisdiction; and ultra vires of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and (2) whether there can be a subs­titution of the legal heirs of the deceased workman and the Union can proceed on with the matter. On 28-10-1958, the Labour Court disposed c? these two preliminary issues against the present peti­tioner and directed the reference to proceed. There after the present petition was filed in this Court on 20-11-1958, on which date this Rule was issued. On 28-10-1958, the Labour Court disposed c? these two preliminary issues against the present peti­tioner and directed the reference to proceed. There after the present petition was filed in this Court on 20-11-1958, on which date this Rule was issued. The main contention of the petitioner is that as' Shri Saikia was dead on the date when the State Government made the reference to the Labour Court under S. 10 of the Act, on that date there could be no dispute in existence and consequently the reference was incompetent and the proceedings1 before the Labour Court were without jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari quashing the notification by which reference has been made to the Labour Court, and a writ of prohibition directing the Labour Court not to proceed further with the adjudication, he having no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, have, therefore, been asked for. (2) The notification, dated 25-6-1958, by which the dispute was referred to the Labour Court, sets out that "whereas an Industrial Dispute has arisen in the matter specified in the schedule below between the workmen of Tocklai Experimental Station and the Management of Tocklai Experimental Sta­tion, the Government, in the exercise of its powers, conferred by cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 10 of the Act, is pleased to refer the dispute mentioned in the schedule, to the Labour Court." The dispute mentioned in the schedule to the noti­fication is as follows: "(1) Whether the Management of Tocklai Ex­perimental Station, Cinnamara P. O., are justified in terminating the service of Shri Chitra Kanta Saikia? (2) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof?" Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act provides that "where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the second schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication." The matters specified in the second schedule are as follows : "1. The propriety or legality of an order pass­ed by an employer under the standing orders; , 2. The application and interpretation of standing orders; 3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen includ­ing reinstatement of, or grant of relief to:, workmen, wrongfully dismissed; 4. The propriety or legality of an order pass­ed by an employer under the standing orders; , 2. The application and interpretation of standing orders; 3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen includ­ing reinstatement of, or grant of relief to:, workmen, wrongfully dismissed; 4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege; 5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lockout; and 6. All matters other than those specified in third schedule." It is clear that the matter referred to the Labour Court for adjudication was the dispute relating td a matter specified in cl. 3 of the second schedule. Jt is urged that the power of the appropriate Gov­ernment to refer a dispute to the Labour Court ari­ses only if the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists. If, on the admit­ted circumstances, no opinion could be formed that an industrial dispute was in existence, or that in fact no industrial dispute existed, the State Govern­ment had no jurisdiction to make a reference to the Labour Court. In the present case, the employee whose dis­missal was taken up by the workmen of the insti­tute being dead on the date of reference, there was no dispute which could be taken up by the work­men, much less an industrial dispute, and conse­quently the reference was void. This argument has been countered by the respondent on the ground that the existence or non-existence of the dispute has to be considered at the date when it is taken up by the workmen, and not on the date of reference. The matter of the discharge of the deceased having been taken up by the Union representing the workmen of the concern, it became an indus­trial dispute, and that industrial dispute continued even on the date of reference, no matter if the work­man whose non-employment was taken up by work­men of the concern as a dispute, may have since been dead. In this connection, it is further urged by the counsel for the respondents that the whole underlying object of the Act is to encourage collec­tive bargaining and to' bring about harmony between the employer and the employee so as to lead to indus­trial peace. In this connection, it is further urged by the counsel for the respondents that the whole underlying object of the Act is to encourage collec­tive bargaining and to' bring about harmony between the employer and the employee so as to lead to indus­trial peace. Once the dispute, though relating to the dis­charge of an individual workman, has been taken up by workmen, the entire community of workmen acquire an interest in the dispute; it ceases to be an individual dispute and is transformed into an in­dustrial dispute affecting the interest of the entire body of workmen. Any decision by the labour Court thus will affect the interest of the whole body of the workmen and the dispute, therefore, cannot die with the death of the individual workman whose discharge has been taken up by the entire body of workmen. (3) The necessary condition for reference by the State Government to a Labour Court of any dis­pute, for adjudication is the existence of an industrial dispute. 'Industrial dispute' has been defined under S. 2 (k) of the Act as meaning any dispute or dif­ference between employer and employers or bet­ween employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employ­ment or non-employment or the terms of employ­ment or with the conditions of labour, of any per­son. Whether an individual dispute can be an in­dustrial dispute, bas now been set at rest by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court. The Validity of the discharge of a single work­man or the question of his reinstatement no doubt is a question which relates to his non-employment, but it cannot be an industrial dispute unless it is taken up by workmen as a class. The Validity of the discharge of a single work­man or the question of his reinstatement no doubt is a question which relates to his non-employment, but it cannot be an industrial dispute unless it is taken up by workmen as a class. In the case of D. H. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 , it was observed that "the words 'industrial dispute' convey the mean­ing to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups of workmen and employers ranged on opposite sides, but at the same time, having regard to the modern conditions of so­ciety where capital and labour have organised them­selves into groups for the purpose of fighting their disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory that in union is strength, and collective bargaining has come to stay, a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute, when, as often happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which he is a member, and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress." A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in another case, Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal. U. P. (S) AIR 1957 SC 532 . So long as the dispute regarding non-employment of a single workman is not taken up collectively by the work­men as a class, it remains an individual dispute and does not assume the character of an industrial dis­pute; but as soon as it is taken up by workmen as a class, it becomes an industrial dispute. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that the dispute, though relates to the wrongful discharge of late Shri Saikia. was taken up by the workmen of the concern. It thus developed into an industrial dispute. It is the workmen as a class which approached the Government for reference to the Labour Court. From the opening clause of the notification under which the dispute has been referred, it is clear that the dispute was between the management of the Tocklai Experimental Station and the workmen of the said institute. This also indicates that the dispute no longer remained an individual dispute; it deve­loped into an industrial dispute. The entire body of the workmen took it up as their own cause, and the individual alone ceased to have a personal inte­rest in the dispute. This also indicates that the dispute no longer remained an individual dispute; it deve­loped into an industrial dispute. The entire body of the workmen took it up as their own cause, and the individual alone ceased to have a personal inte­rest in the dispute. Unless, therefore, it can be said that by the death of the workman, the dispute ceased to be an industrial dispute, it cannot be said that it was not in existence at the time when the reference was made. There is nothing in the definition of the words 'industrial dispute' to suggest that once the dispute has been taken up by the workmen and is1 transformed from an individual dispute into an in­dustrial dispute, it will cease to be so if the person whose non-employment was taken up by the work­men, dies. It was contended that the existence of an industrial dispute presupposes the existence of a dispute. The existence of a dispute presupposes the existence of two contesting parties to the dispute. If the person, whose non-employment was the subject-matter of the dispute, dies, one of the parties to the dispute is no longer in existence and thus there is' no dispute alive which could be taken up by the workmen. The fallacy in this argument lies in as­suming that the party to the dispute is the workman whose non-employment was the subject-matter of dispute. The entire body of workmen become party to the dispute as: soon as the question of termination of service of any workman is taken up by them. As I have already pointed out, from the open­ing words of the reference itself it is clear that the entire body of workmen were party to the dispute, and not late Shri Saikia alone. Having regard to the scheme and underlying object of the Act also, it is the entire body of the workmen which become party to the dispute. The object of all labour legis­lation is firstly to ensure fair terms to the workmen, and secondly, to prevent disputes between emplo­yers and employees, so that production might not) be adversely affected and the larger interest of the public might not suffer. The object of all labour legis­lation is firstly to ensure fair terms to the workmen, and secondly, to prevent disputes between emplo­yers and employees, so that production might not) be adversely affected and the larger interest of the public might not suffer. The scheme of the Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle disputes which involve the right of workmen as a class, and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of work­men. Section 18 of the Act also indicates that the party to the dispute is the entire body of workmen when the dispute has been taken up by them. Sec­tion 18 is as follows: "Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding: (i) A settlement arrived at by agreement bet­ween the employer and the workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding, shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (ii) An arbitration award which has become en­forceable, shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (iii) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable, shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute re­lates; (d) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were em­ployed in the establishment or part of the establish­ment, as the case may be, to which the dispute re­lates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." Clause (d) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 18 clearly assumes that there may be cases in which the parties to the industrial dispute under cl. (3) of S. 18 clearly assumes that there may be cases in which the parties to the industrial dispute under cl. (a) may be composed of workmen. It cannot, therefore, be said that the party to the dispute in the present case was late Shri Saikia and, therefore, after his death the dispute came to an end. Cases where the individual work­man dies before the dispute between him and his employer develops into an industrial dispute, may stand on a different footing. In those cases, it may be said that at no stage the dispute developed into an industrial dispute and consequently the question of its continuance and existence at the time of the reference, may not arise, but in cases where the dispute has been taken up by the workmen before the death of the workman, and the State Government recognises that fact and refers the dispute to the Labour Court as a dispute bet­ween the employer and the workmen, it will not cease to be an industrial dispute if the workman whose discharge is the subject-matter of the dispute, is dead at the time of the reference. The preamble of the Act lays down that it is an Act to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other purposes. After a reference has been made under S. 10 of the Act to a Board, Court or Tribunal, S. 11 provides for the procedure to be followed by Labour Courts. It lays down that the Labour Court shall follow such procedure as it may think fit. Sec­tion 15 then provides that where industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, it has to hold its proceedings expeditiously, and as soon as it is practicable on the conclusion of the proceedings, to Submit its award to the appropriate Government. Section 16 prescribes the form of the award. After the award has been given, it has got to be published by the appropriate Government. Section 18, which I have already quoted earlier, enumerates the per­sons on whom awards are binding. Section 16 prescribes the form of the award. After the award has been given, it has got to be published by the appropriate Government. Section 18, which I have already quoted earlier, enumerates the per­sons on whom awards are binding. Section 36 of the Act provides that workman who is a party to a dispute, shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by (a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in cl. (a) is affi­liated; (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by an officer of any trade union con­nected with, or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. Clause (2) of S. 36 then provides for the representa­tion of an employer. It is. therefore, clear from a reading of the Act as a whole that it provides for the machinery for settlement of industrial disputes. When an industrial dispute has been referred to the Labour Court, the Court has to confine its adjudi­cation to the points of dispute specified in the order of reference, and the matters incidental thereto. No provision has been made for substitution of the names of heirs of a workman if he dies during the pendency of the proceedings. The dispute having been once taken up by the workmen and referred to the Labour Court, the Labour Court has to ad­judicate upon the dispute. The scheme of the Act thus shows that the dis­pute will not cease to exist if the workman whose discharge has been taken up by the workmen of the concern, dies. It was contended by the appli­cant that in order to determine whether the dis­pute will cease to exist or not after the death of the workman whose non-employment has been the sub­ject-matter of the dispute, the nature of the dispute will have to be taken into consideration. It was contended by the appli­cant that in order to determine whether the dis­pute will cease to exist or not after the death of the workman whose non-employment has been the sub­ject-matter of the dispute, the nature of the dispute will have to be taken into consideration. If the dispute relates to the condition of employment of workmen as a class, such as bonus, scale of pay and gratuities, the dispute will not cease to be an indus­trial dispute even if the individual workman whose case has given rise to the dispute, dies; but in cases where the subject-matter of the dispute is such that it relates to the employment or non-em­ployment of an individual workman, the dispute can­not exist if the workman dies. In my judgment, there is no warrant in the Act for such a distinction. An, individual dispute simpliciter cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute unless it is taken up by workmen as a class. Once an individual dispute has been taken up by work­men, it becomes an industrial dispute, for the set­tlement of which the machinery provided under the Act can be set in motion, like any other dispute which, from its very nature affects the workmen as a class. There may be disputes which from their very nature affect workmen as a class. There may be other disputes which from their nature may only affect the interest of an individual workman, but when it is taken up by the workmen as a class, it becomes an industrial dispute and affects the body of workmen and, therefore, it cannot die with the death of the workman. (4) In the case of (S) AIR 1957 SC 532 ref­erred to above, it was observed that the object of the Act is .the prevention of industrial strife, strikes and lock-outs and the promotion of industrial peace, and not to take the place of the ordinary Tribunals of the land for the enforcement of contracts between an employer and an individual workman. Thus viewed, the provisions of the Act lead to the con­clusion that its applicability to an individual dispute, as opposed to dispute involving a group of work­men, is excluded unless it acquires the general cha­racteristics of an industrial dispute, namely, the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make a common cause with the individual workman. Thus viewed, the provisions of the Act lead to the con­clusion that its applicability to an individual dispute, as opposed to dispute involving a group of work­men, is excluded unless it acquires the general cha­racteristics of an industrial dispute, namely, the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make a common cause with the individual workman. It was then contended that S. 10 con­templates the existence of an industrial dispute at the time of reference, and as on the date of refe­rence the workman was dead, nothing could be taken up by the workmen as a class and, as such, there could be no industrial dispute in existence on the date when the reference was made. As has been pointed earlier, the individual dispute transforms itself into an industrial dispute when it is taken up by the workmen as a body. At the time when the cause of late Shri Saikia was taken up by the workmen, it became an industrial dispute and unless it can be said that subsequently it ceased to be so by the death of the workman, the dispute was in existence on the date when the re­ference was made. In the case of "Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union", (S) AIR 1957 SC 95 , interpreting S. 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, it was held that the section only re­quires, apart from other conditions, that there should be an industrial dispute before there can be a reference. It is an industrial dispute if it arises out of an existing industry. If that condition is satisfied, the* competence of the State for taking action under that section is complete, and the fact that the indus­try has since been closed can have no effect on it. On a true construction of S. 3, the power of the State to make a reference under that section must be determined with reference not to the date on which it is made but to the date on which the right which is the subject-matter of the dispute arises, and that the machinery provided under the Act would be available for working out the rights which had accrued prior to the dissolution of the business. In this case, there was a bona fide closure of the business after the dispute had arisen, and it was contended on behalf of the management that as on the date of reference, the industry had bona fide closed, there could be no industrial dispute which could be referred by the Government. This con­tention was rebelled. It was held that on the date when the right arose, the industry was in existence; and its subsequent closure would not make the refe­rence invalid. On the date when notice was given to late Shri Saikia terminating his services, a dis­pute arose, and on that date a right arose in favour of the workmen as a class to take up that dispute and transform it into an industrial dispute, and if that right was in fact exercised during the life-time of late Shri Saikia, the machinery of the Act was available to the workmen to get the dispute adjudi­cated. The reference under S. 10 was nothing but a step towards invoking the machinery provided under the Act for the adjudication of the dispute, the right to which had already accrued. It was very strongly contended by the counsel for the petitioner that if the reference is allowed to continue, it will lead to absurd results; it will not be possible for the Court to give any effective re­lief and any award, therefore, given by the Labour Court in those circumstances will only be a mere declaration. The Labour Court is not constituted for the purposes of granting a mere declaration. There are two-fold answers to this contention. Firstly, the Act nowhere provides for the nature of the re­lief which a Labour Court can grant. A Labour Court is primarily concerned with the adjudication of an industrial dispute, and not to grant any parti­cular relief to the aggrieved party. Section 10 (4) of the Act lays down that when an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court has been made and the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adju­dication, the Labour Court shall confine its adju­dication to those points and matters incidental thereto. Section 10 (4) of the Act lays down that when an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court has been made and the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adju­dication, the Labour Court shall confine its adju­dication to those points and matters incidental thereto. The award, therefore, embodies only the ad­judication of the Labour Court on the points re­ferred to it or matters incidental thereto, and un­less it can be said that the disputes which have been referred could not be decided by the Tribunal, the reference cannot become infructuous, if the work­man concerned dies. Secondly, question No. 1 only requires the Labour Court to decide if the manage­ment was justified in terminating the services of Sri Saikia. or not, and question No. 2 only requires it to decide if. in the event of the finding that the discharge was illegal, late Sri Saikia would be en­titled to reinstatement or any relief in lieu thereof, or not. The two questions could be answered by the Labour Court even though Sri Saikia was dead. On the second question, it was open to the Labour Court to hold that the late Sri Saikia was entitled 'to reinstatement. It may be that actual reinstate­ment could not be granted as Sri Saikia was dead; but there was no bar to the Labour Court deciding that he was entitled to reinstatement. It was pointed out by the counsel for the applicant that as the re­lief of reinstatement could not be granted in view of the death of Sri Saikia, the Labour Court could only grant an alternative relief of compensation, and as there is nothing in the Act specifying the persons who are entitled to1 get compensation in the event of the death of the workman, such a relief could not be effectively granted by the Labour Court. The fact that the Act does not provide for pay­ment of compensation to any one in the event of the death of the workman, points to the conclusion that the machinery for adjudication of any dispute in these circumstances could not be effectively set in motion, and thus the reference must cease to exist after the death of the workman. This argument, to my mind, is not sound. This argument, to my mind, is not sound. Having come to the con­clusion that the termination of the services was ille­gal, it was open for the Labour Court to hold that late Sri Saikia was entitled to reinstatement, and it was not incumbent upon the Labour Court to necessarily grant some compensation as it was not possible for the deceased workman to be reinstated. The award could be given deciding the disputes raised in the reference. The Labour Court is not empowered to decide abstract questions of law, but there is no bar to its declaring that the discharge of a particular workman was illegal and he was entitled to reinstatement. As I am holding that the refe­rence was competent, it is not desirable to specify the relief which should be granted by the Court in the present case, as that is likely to prejudice the case of the parties on merit. In my judgment, there­fore, the Labour Court was right in holding that the dispute did not cease to be an industrial dis­pute by the death of late Sri Saikia before the re­ference was made. The reference was1 not without jurisdiction, and no writ of certiorari can be issued quashing the notification, nor can a writ of. prohi­bition be issued directing the Labour Court not to proceed further with the reference. The application has no force and should be rejected, and the Rule discharged. SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. : (10-2-59) (5) I have had the advantage of reading the judg­ment prepared by my learned brother, but I regret that having given my anxious consideration to the matter. I cannot persuade myself to concur in his views. (6) The petitioner in this case has moved for an appropriate writ quashing the order of the Labour Court, dated 28-10-1958 and preventing the respon­dents from proceeding with the reference made by the State Government under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act No. XIV of 1947), as amended. (6) The petitioner in this case has moved for an appropriate writ quashing the order of the Labour Court, dated 28-10-1958 and preventing the respon­dents from proceeding with the reference made by the State Government under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act No. XIV of 1947), as amended. The section provides in effect that where in the opinion of the State Government, an industrial dispute exists, the Government may by order in writing "refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudica­tion.'' I will deal with the matters specified in the Second Schedule at a later stage when dwelling upon the terms of the reference made in this case. (7) The material facts, which have led to the reference, are brief. One Chitra Kanta Saikia was a driver in the employment of the petitioner. On 14-11-57, according to the petitioner, he was found guilty of drunken behaviour, suspended, charge-sheeted and eventually by an order D/- "2-12-1957 his services were terminated by the management. This led to a dispute with the management on the one side and the workmen On the other, which was evidently taken by the Cha Mazdoor Union on behalf of the workmen; but before the Government re­ferred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court under notification dated 25-6-1958. Sri Sai­kia (the workman) died on 20-5-1958. The ques­tion, therefore, which arises is whether on account of the death of the workman concerned, the refe­rence is incompetent or whether the industrial dis­pute still subsists so as to give jurisdiction to the Labour Court to proceed with the adjudication. (8) The answer to the question depends upon the-meaning of the word 'dispute' and the expression "industrial dispute". The expression 'industrial dis­pute" has been defined in S. 2 (k) of die Act to mean, inter alia, any dispute between an employer and a workman connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. It is now well settled that an individual dispute between a workman and an employer cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. It is now well settled that an individual dispute between a workman and an employer cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute. It is only when the dispute has been taken up by the other workmen in the establishment that the dispute acquires the character of an "industrial dis­pute" within the meaning of the Act. Thus the validity of the discharge of a single workman or the question of his reinstatement is doubtless a ques­tion, which relates to his non-employment and is essentially a question with reference to that indivi­dual workman: but if the dispute has been taken up by the workmen as a class, it would assume the importance of an industrial dispute. As the S. 2 (k) shows, the dispute or difference must be connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. The reason why an individual dispute is not regarded as an industrial dispute is that so long as it does not affect the peace and harmony of the industry or the management as a whole, the case of an individual workman would not matter: but where the workmen as a class take up the dispute of that individual, if develops into an industrial dispute, because in that case the workmen in the industry proceed on the principle of collective bargaining and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress of the grievances of their co-worker. The decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1953 SC 58 . and (S) AIR 1957 SC 532 , are clear authorities on the point. In the earlier case, it was observed that the words "industrial dispute" ordi­narily carry the meaning that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups of workmen on some general question on which they are bound to­gether by a community interest. In the present case, though the dispute related to the alleged wrongful dismissal of the late Sri Saikia, it was taken up by the workmen of the concern and thus! developed into1 an industrial dispute. From the order of reference itself, it is clear that the work­men as a class appeared to have approached the-Government for reference to the Labour Court. The point, however, still remains whether on the death of Sri Saikia. there is any subsisting dis­pute, which could be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. developed into1 an industrial dispute. From the order of reference itself, it is clear that the work­men as a class appeared to have approached the-Government for reference to the Labour Court. The point, however, still remains whether on the death of Sri Saikia. there is any subsisting dis­pute, which could be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. It is wrong to assume that in every case, merely because the dispute of the in­dividual workman has been taken up by the work­men as a class, the dispute must continue to exist even though the individual to whom the dispute concerned, is dead. The existence of an "industrial dispute" presupposes the existence of a "dispute"; but the existence of a "dispute" itself presupposes that there are not onlv two contesting parties to-the dispute, but also that the dispute or difference relates to some subject-matter. It may be that after the death of the indivi­dual workman, the other workmen, who were tak­ing interest in his dispute may be also regarded as parties to the dispute, but die main question is whether the dispute itself survives or the community of interest which the other workers had therein snaps because of the death of the individual. The determining factor is not merely "who are the par­ties to the dispute", but also "what is the nature and the subject-matter of the dispute". Therefore, much will depend upon the terms and conditions of the subject-matter in order to ascertain whether even after the death of the individual concerned, the dispute survives or the dispute ends on the principle of actio personalis cumi mauritus personum. We have thus to consider the terms of the reference .in this case, which indicates the subject-matter oi the dispute between the parties. The two points on which the reference has been made are as follows: (i) Whether the Management of Tocklai Ex­perimental Station, Cinnamara P. O., are justified in terminating the service of Shri Chitra Kanta Saikia? (ii) If not. is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof?" It is obvious that the subject-matter of dispute as contained in the terms of reference concerns only the workman in question. The question of invalid discharge or reinstatement of Sri Saikia had nothing to do in. particular with the other workmen in gene­ral. The other workmen are simply parties to the adjudication, because they had taken un his cause. The question of invalid discharge or reinstatement of Sri Saikia had nothing to do in. particular with the other workmen in gene­ral. The other workmen are simply parties to the adjudication, because they had taken un his cause. On the death of Sri Saikia, the question of his re­instatement, even if it is held that the order of his discharge was illegal, does not arise; nor would it be open to the Court to grant any other subsidiary relief in lieu of the order of reinstatement. The; Court was thus incompetent to deal with either of the reliefs contemplated by the terms of the refe­rence; and, in my judgment, after the death of Sri Saikia, the dispute lapsed and there was nothing further to be done in the matter. (9) I am not suggesting that the dispute must in every case, even if it has arisen at the instance of an individual workman, terminate on the death" of that workman. That would depend very much upon the nature of the dispute between the parties; and if the dispute is such as to affect the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any of the other workmen also, then necessarily, it is not only the interest of the individual workman which is involved in the matter, but that of the other work­men as well. There the community of interest in the dispute survives in favour of the workmen as a class, irrespective of the death of any individual workman. There may be thus two classes of disputes: (i) one class where the dispute per se affects only the 'individual concerned, but assumes the importance of an industrial dispute, inasmuch as his brother co-workers have also taken up his cause -in bargaining on his behalf with the management, (ii) There may be another class of dispute, where it does not affect simply the individual concerned, but affects the workmen or class of workmen in general. In the 'former class, on the death of the workman ipso facto, the dispute ceases, because there is nothing more to be done in the matter for obtaining relief for the in­dividual concerned. In the other class of cases, the dispute is bound to survive irrespective of the death of the indivi­dual concerned at whose instance the dispute origi­nally arose. This follows not from any provision of the Act. In the other class of cases, the dispute is bound to survive irrespective of the death of the indivi­dual concerned at whose instance the dispute origi­nally arose. This follows not from any provision of the Act. but from the inherent nature of the dispute itself and the very meaning of the word "dispute". The argument that there is no such provision in the Act making a distinction between the two classes of disputes is fallacious for the obvious reason that it ignores the nature of the dispute itself. The moment it is suggested that there is a principle of collective bargaining involved in cases of industrial disputes, it assumes that the bargain is for something objective and not for some­thing, which does not exist, or ceases to exist. Where, therefore, the bargain relates to a re-dressal of a wrong done to a particular individual, after the death of the individual, there is nothing to bargain for; but where the bargain relates to matters not only concerning that individual, but also affecting the fortunes of the other workers in the management, then the right to bargain survives in spite of the death of that individual. I, there­fore, see no reason why the principle of actio per­sonalis cum mauritus personum, in the class of cases where the bargain concerns merely the particular individual cannot be invoked, when the individual is dead. After him the dispute or bargain is for whom and for what? To rake up the cold and dead embers of the dispute after his death would benefit no one, not even the workers. (10) The Act itself contemplates such class o£ cases. A case of employment or non-employment may in most cases affect only the individual, but the terms of employment or the conditions of labour would affect not only a particular individual, but other workmen in the management, and where the dispute relates to these matters, surely the dispute Survives. Schedule II of the Act, to which refer­ence has been made in S. 10(1) (c), also contem­plates cases of this kind : for instance, where the) matter relates to an interpretation of standing orders; or to the propriety or legality of a standing order; or to the withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege; illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock­out; and other matters specified in the third Sche­dule, which relates to allowances, wages, bonus, profit-sharing, etc. Obviously, they affect the general body of workmen in the establishment and in such cases, the dispute would naturally survive irrespective of the fact that some of the workmen may have died; but for instance, item No. 3 in the Second Schedule, which relates to discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement or grant of relief to the workmen wrongfully dismissed, may affect in some cases, as it does in this case, only the individual workman concerned. This distinction, therefore, cannot be lost sight of, when dealing with the ques­tion, whether on the terms of the reference in the present case, on account of the death of Sri Saikia, the dispute has or has not terminated and there is no further competence in the Labour Court to pro­ceed to grant any relief to the workman concerned. The mere fact that the dispute of the workman had been taken up by the other workmen and thus developed into an industrial dispute would not give it an added importance, if the dispute itself has lapsed and there is nothing on the part of the work­men to bargain about. The question here related definitely only to the wrongful dismissal or other­wise of the driver Sri Saikia, since dead, and to the relief which could be granted to him by way of re­instatement or any other relief in lieu thereof, in case reinstatement could not be ordered. None of these reliefs can now be given to him. The ques­tion of relief is not a subsidiary question. That is in fact the main question on the terms of the refer­ence in determining the nature of the dispute; and it cannot be dismissed on the erroneous hypothesis that the Act is not intended for giving reliefs to workmen, but merely for the settlement of disputes. I agree that the Act is for the settlement of disputes, but the real point is where is the dispute. An examination of the scheme of the Act also shows that in such class of cases, the Act did not intend that the dispute should continue to subsist. As­suming for instance that the Court held that the order of discharge was illegal, what is the Court going to do; and how is the Court going to redress the grievance of the workman? As­suming for instance that the Court held that the order of discharge was illegal, what is the Court going to do; and how is the Court going to redress the grievance of the workman? There is no provision in the law as found by the Labour Court itself for substitution of the heirs of the workman, so that even if compensation could be given in lieu of the order of reinstatement, the heirs could get the compensation; nor is there any provision under which even if the order of com­pensation was passed in favour of the dead work­man, his heirs or legal representatives could pro­ceed to realise it. Section 18 itself shows that the; heirs of workmen cannot be parties to industrial disputes, though in the case of an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns can be impleaded as parties. Section 33O, under which any money pay­able to a workman under a settlement or award can be recovered, also relates to the workman concern­ed and does not refer to his heirs. Section 36 only provides that a workman, who is a party to a dis­pute shall be entitled to be represented in any pro­ceeding under the Act by an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member, etc. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is of course no provision for any substitution of heirs of the deceased workman or for grant of any relief to those heirs. In such circumstances, I am unable to see how, on the terms of the reference in this case, the dispute continues1 to subsist even if the workman concerned, who was entitled to get those reliefs if at all, is dead. It is to be remembered that the main relief is the reinstate­ment of the workman, the other reliefs are only "in lieu" thereof; and if the Court is incompetent to grant the main relief due to the death of the work­man, the Court is equally incompetent to grant any of the other subsidiary reliefs. The measure of the Court's competence is the same; and the Labour Court was in error in assuming that the relief of compensation could be "adjudicated without any modification of the Schedule". The measure of the Court's competence is the same; and the Labour Court was in error in assuming that the relief of compensation could be "adjudicated without any modification of the Schedule". (11) The contention must be upheld that the power of the State to make a reference under S. 1C) of the Act is determined with reference not to the; date on which it is made, but to the date on which the right which is the subject-matter of the dispute arises and that the machinery provided under the Act is then available for working out the rights, which have accrued to the parties. The principle is supported by the high authority of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1957 S.C. 95 . Here the position is quite different. Here the death of the individual workman has affected the dispute itself and the terms of the reference which relate to him and the reliefs to which he was entitled, if any, have be­come infructuous. The adjudication of the dispute itself means that there is some existing subject-mat­ter of the dispute and if that subject-matter itself disappears, I cannot understand how any dispute, much less an industrial dispute can continue to exist. I must, therefore, hold that the reference as it stands is infructuous, on account of the death of the work­man concerned and the Labour Court is not com­petent to adjudicate on the points raised and to grant any relief. (12) I would, in the circumstances, make the rule absolute and direct that a writ of certiorari should issue quashing the order of the Labour Court and also a writ of mandamus prohibiting the res­pondents from proceeding with the reference. The petitioner should be also entitled to has costs of this rule. ; H. DEKA J.: (13) This rule was issued on an appli­cation under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for a writ of Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohi­bition or any other appropriate writ for the purpose! of quashing a reference under S. 10(l)(c) of the In­dustrial Disputes Act as well as for prohibiting fur­ther proceedings in connection with that reference. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for a writ of Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohi­bition or any other appropriate writ for the purpose! of quashing a reference under S. 10(l)(c) of the In­dustrial Disputes Act as well as for prohibiting fur­ther proceedings in connection with that reference. (14) The admitted facts are that one Chitra Kanta Saikia - a motor driver in the employment of the petitioner - Management of Tocklai Experi­mental Station, was dismissed from his job by the order of the Management dated 12-12-1957 and was given one month's salary in lieu of the notice. The cause of the dismissed driver Chitra Kanta Sai­kia was taken up by the Union of the workmen who moved the State Government for reference and the State Government having accepted the aforesaid re­quest through proper channel, made a reference under S. 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act ;1947 by Gazette notification No. GLR/264/58/7i dated 25-6-1958. Another important fact however, is that Chitra Kanta Saikia the dismissed workman died on 20-5-1958 before the reference was made by the State Government as afore-mentioned. After getting no­tice about the reference from Mr. M. K. Barkataki, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, the petitioner rais­ed an objection as to the competence and continu­ance of the reference on the ground that Chitra Kanta Saikia whose dismissal and reinstatement were' the subject-matters of the dispute, - had already died and the reference has become infructuous. They further contended that the reference by the State Government itself was void and bad in law. The Union of the workmen of the Tocklai Ex­perimental Station joined issue and contested that even though Chitra Kanta was dead, the reference was valid and it continued to exist in spite of the death of the workman because it was now the in­dustrial dispute that had to be decided and not the cause of any individual workman. The learned Pre­siding Officer of the Labour Court decided in favour of the contestant namely the workmen's union and allowed the reference to proceed by his order of ,28-10-1958. It was practically against this order and the validity of the reference that the petitioner has come to this Court. The learned Pre­siding Officer of the Labour Court decided in favour of the contestant namely the workmen's union and allowed the reference to proceed by his order of ,28-10-1958. It was practically against this order and the validity of the reference that the petitioner has come to this Court. (15) The matter was heard by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon. Prosad C. J. and Mehrotra J. and their Lordships held divergent views on the question of the validity of the refer­ence as well as continuity of the proceeding and iti was thus that the matter has come up before me. (16) In my opinion I have to answer two thingsi namely - (1) as to whether there could be a valid reference under S. 10(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (which I shall hereafter call 'the Act') after the workman concerned was dead and (2) whether there is an industrial dispute under the Act as is legally understood. In case there is no such industrial dis­pute, then of course the reference will be ipso facto declared to be void. The two points that are re­ferred to the Labour Court for disposal under Gov­ernment orders are. "(1) Whether the Management of Tocklai Ex­perimental Station, Cinnamara P. O., are justified in terminating the service of Shri Chitra Kanta Saikia? (2) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof?" On the dispute being raised as to the validity of the reference and continuity of the proceeding, the Labour Court framed two' preliminary issues and they were as follows: "(1) Whether the reference is void and with­out jurisdiction and ultra vires the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act? (2) Whether there can be substitution of the legal heirs of the deceased workman and the Union can proceed on with the matter?" The Presiding Officer, Labour Court decided both the issues as I have already said, in favour of the Union and held that the reference was valid and intra vires and even though there could be no subs­titution of the legal heirs of the deceased, the. Union can proceed with the matter. Union can proceed with the matter. This view was sup­ported by Mehrotra J. who held that once there was a valid reference under S. 10(1) (c) of the Act; the reference must continue, since it is in the interest of the Union as a whole and does not re­present exclusively the interest of the deceased workman. Prasad, C. J. on the other hand held that after the workman is dead and since the reference itself concerns his dismissal and reinstatement, - there is no scope for settlement of a dispute which could be taken up by the workmen and converted into an industrial dispute; and as such, there could be no valid reference in this case. There is no direct authority on the point involved and that is what has led to the difference in view of the two Hon. Judges. (17) Mehrotra J. has relied mainly on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (S) AIR 1957 SC 95 for the purpose of holding that once there was an industrial dispute in the accepted Sense, it could not have met with natural death even after a particular individual who might be interested in the relief is dead or, has ceased to exist since the dispute has to be judged in reference to the points of time when it arose. In my opinion the Pipraich Sugar Mills' case (S) AIR 1957 SC 95 decides quite a different point, - - namely, as to validity of a reference after the industry is closed, in regard to the alleged outstanding liability or obli­gations created while the industry was functioning. The Supreme Court held therein that where the business has been closed and it is either admitted or found that the closure is real and bona fide, - any dispute arising with reference thereto would fall outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court held therein that where the business has been closed and it is either admitted or found that the closure is real and bona fide, - any dispute arising with reference thereto would fall outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. (18) In that case what happened was that the business of the Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. was closed due to financial loss on 21-3-51 but before its clo­sure a notice was given by the employer on 28-2-51 to the workers who were not ready to co-operate that they should consider themselves to be discharg­ed from 1-3-51 - and another notice was given on 14-3-51 intimating that they were going to hand over the plant from 15-3-51 to the purchasers •- and a number of workers were discharged in pur­suance to the earlier notice of 28-2-51. The U. P. Government on being moved by the Workers' Union made a reference of the Industrial Dispute on 16-11-51 - and the point raised by the employer was that the reference was not valid since the industry or the business is already closed. Tri­bunal decided the point against the employers and the Supreme Court also held that on a true cons­truction of S. 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act! 1947, - the power of the State to make a reference under that section must be determined with refer­ence not to the date on which it was made but to the date on which the right which is the subject matter of the dispute arose and that the machinery provided under the Industrial Disputes Act would be available. It is clear that the position here is not identical. It is nobody's case that late Chitra Kanta has any subsisting interest in the matter or any relief can be given to him under the Industrial Disputes Act or in this reference under the said Act. Whether the proceeding can be kept alive by the Union is the only point. (19) Mr. G. S. Bhattacharjee on behalf of the Workmiens' Union has contended before me that even though the relief primarily sought for was on behalf of the workman Chitra Kanta Saikia, the real interest in the dispute was of the Union who took up the cause of the dismissed workman. (19) Mr. G. S. Bhattacharjee on behalf of the Workmiens' Union has contended before me that even though the relief primarily sought for was on behalf of the workman Chitra Kanta Saikia, the real interest in the dispute was of the Union who took up the cause of the dismissed workman. On being questioned by me as to what is the relief they sought and on what principle, apart from the supposed re­lief to Chitra Kanta, Mr. Bhattacharjee suggested that the workmen of the Union were interested in a. decision of the Labour Court on the point that a dismissal as summary as that of Chitra Kanta Saikia from the employment was illegal. They would further like to be assured that pro­per procedure should be followed by the employer before any worker is dismissed without reasonable cause as is alleged in this case It is for the pur­pose of getting future protection from such a hasty dismissal that the Union wants a decision of the Labour Court on the point, even though reinstate­ment of Chitra Kanta Saikia may not be feasible or even though his heirs may not be substituted for the purpose of getting compensation if any. In my opinion that point is answered by the case of 'Work­men of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate' AIR 1958 SC 353 . In that case the workmens' Union took up the case of dismissal of one Dr, K. P. Banerjee who was a member of the Union but the Supreme Court held that since the other workers1 could not take up the case of Dr. Banerjee who belonged to a different cate­gory altogether from the workmen-who1 took up his case, - they had no direct nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment and even though he was a member of the same Trade Union, the dispute regarding his termination of service Was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act. In paragraph 21 of the majority judgment their Lordships summarised their views as follows : "Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act. In paragraph 21 of the majority judgment their Lordships summarised their views as follows : "Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act. and its other provisions, the expression 'any person' in S. 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two parts of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settle­ment or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must, be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute can­not be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or sub­stantial interest." (20) Now applying these two tests. - what do we find? The dispute should be one capable of set­tlement or adjudication by one party giving neces­sary relief to the other. In this case, there is no scope of giving relief to the workman who is dead- and therefore any settlement on that basis is out of the question. This limitation itself will indicate that Chitra Kanta does not come within the definition of "any person" - whose case the workmen were competent to espouse. The second limitation is also there, - the workers Union not being in a position to have a direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of one who is dead. The other two ingredients of a dispute name­ly, the "terms of employment and conditions of labour" - were not involved in this reference. The second limitation is also there, - the workers Union not being in a position to have a direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of one who is dead. The other two ingredients of a dispute name­ly, the "terms of employment and conditions of labour" - were not involved in this reference. (21) My learned brother Mehrotra J. has con­ceded that it might be a different thing if the cause of the workman was taken up after his death and not during his life time, as was the case. But will it make any difference if his cause was taken up during his life time but he died subsequently before any adjudication and became incapable of getting any relief under the Industrial Disputes Act ? The reference is in the interest of a, dead man - his employment or non-employment. In the case of an employer his antecedent liabi­lity would survive - the closure of his business, -'. but in the case of an employee his claim to rein­statement expires along with his death and it no longer remains a dispute capable of settlement or adjudication. Therefore a reference of such a dis­pute goes beyond the purview of the Industrial Dis­putes Act. Surely a Labour Court is neither in­terested in nor meant for giving decisions on mere academic points. Its purpose is to adjudicate a point in dispute with a view to give specific direc­tion for redress of the grievances and advise relief, though the relief may not be given directly by the Labour Court itself. It is not that its purpose is' not to give relief and this view finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dimakuchi T. Es.' case, AIR 1958 SC 353 (Supra). (22) Let us see whether it is the intention of the legislation that a reference of a dispute will con­tinue even though the person really interested does not live or alternatively whether his case can be taken up and continued solely by the Union. (22) Let us see whether it is the intention of the legislation that a reference of a dispute will con­tinue even though the person really interested does not live or alternatively whether his case can be taken up and continued solely by the Union. If it could in the Dimakuchi T. E.'s case, AIR 1958 SC 353 , the legality or otherwise of the order of dismis­sal of the doctor could have been gone into by the Tribunal for the benefit of the members of the Union who took up his cause, but their Lordships of the Supreme Court by a majority held in essence that the point could not be decided, - since there was no industrial dispute coming within the scope of the Act itself. In that case it was argued on behalf of the workmen that: "the workmen raising the dispute were vitally interested in it by reason of the fact that Dr. Banerjee (it is stated) belonged to their trade union and the dismissal of an employee without the formulation of a charge and without giving him an opportunity to meet any charge was a matter of general interest to all workmen in the same establishment." This contention was overruled. Their Lordships further observed: "It is the community of interest of the class as a whole - class of employers or class of workmen- which furnishes the real nexus between the dispute and the parties to the dispute." It is the absence of this nexus in this case that takes the dispute out of the category of industrial dispute as defined under the Act. (23) Mr. Goswami for the petitioner has further relied on two decisions of the Labour Courts repor­ted in Mazdoor Union Sugar Facfory v. Sakseria Biswan Sugar Factory Ltd., 1952 Lab AC 294 and Rahat Hossain v. M/s. Lipton Ltd. Calcutta, 1954 Lab AC 90. In the case of 1952 Lab AC 294, pre­sided over by two of the retired Judges of the Cal­cutta High Court it was held that a Union can take up the dispute concerning a workman and represent him only so long as he is alive. In the case of 1952 Lab AC 294, pre­sided over by two of the retired Judges of the Cal­cutta High Court it was held that a Union can take up the dispute concerning a workman and represent him only so long as he is alive. In this case the workman died during the pendency of the proceed­ings before the Industrial Court and the question was raised as to whether the Union could still pur­sue his claim, and it was held that he could not be validly represented by the Union. A similar view was taken in the case of 1954 Lab AC 90. The point that arose for decision in that case was as to whether one Golam Mohiuddin was rightly dis­missed. There the Tribunal had considered about the validity of dismissal of one Golam Mohiuddin. The relevant passage in the judgment is as follows: "We will first take up the question relating to Gholam Mohiuddin. We have already said ha died during the pendency of the proceedings be­fore the Tribunal. As his dismissal was upheld by the Tribunal, it had not to consider the question whether by his death the industrial dispute raised by the workmen of which he was the centre had come to an end. This question was considered by a Bench of this Tribunal, in the case of 1952 Lab A C 294. We agree with that decision. The cause of a workman can be taken up by other workmen but the latter can continue to> represent the former only so long as he is alive. The dispute centering round him ceases to be an industrial dispute after his death." This view is surely entitled to respect and it sup­ports the petitioner's contention. In this case also, in my opinion, the cause of the dead man cannot be taken up by the workmen's Union and even if they had an interest in the employment or non-em­ployment of the workman, -- it ceased along with his death. (24) Therefore the only point for consideration is whether the decision in the Pipraich Sugar Mills' case, (S) AIR 1957 SC 95 would make the cause Survive after the dispute was once taken up by the workmen of the Union of which the driver was a member. (24) Therefore the only point for consideration is whether the decision in the Pipraich Sugar Mills' case, (S) AIR 1957 SC 95 would make the cause Survive after the dispute was once taken up by the workmen of the Union of which the driver was a member. As I have already" interpreted, the Pip­raich Sugar Mills' case (S) AIR 1957 SC 95 will not go very far to> support this principle. I there­fore direct that the order of reference under S. 10 (1) (c) be quashed, - since in my view at the time of reference there was no industrial dispute which could ,be referred. The respondent No. 2 the President, Labour Court is prohibited from going on with the proceedings. The rule is accordingly made absolute. The parties in this case will bear their own costs. HC/D.R.R. Rule made absolute.