JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. This petition challenges the validity of certain provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 (Madras Act XIV of 1930) as amended by Acts XXXIII of 1951, VII of 1954 and XXII of 1956. Chapter II of the Act deals with "Fair Rents", and the contention is that the said Chapter violates the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose off property guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. 2. Part III of the Constitution deals with fundamental rights. Clause (1) of Article 3 which occurs in that Part provides : "All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void."; and clause (2) "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contradiction be void." The petitioner invokes Article 13. 3. Article 31 A of the Constitution provides an effective answer. That Article was inserted in Part III by S.4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, with retrospective effect. It was subsequently amended by S.3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, also with retrospective effect. 4. The relevant portion of the Article provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13", no law providing for "the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights" shall be deemed to be void "on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31". 5. 5. Sub clause (2) of the Article defines the expressions "estate" and "rights" as follows : "(a) The expression "estate" shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or meufi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala, any janmam right; (b) the expression '"rights", in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue." 6. The question as to whether the expression "estate" will comprehend the relationship between a jenmi and his verumpattamdar came up for consideration in 1959 KLJ 863 . This court, following the decision of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 556 of 1955, said that it will. There is nothing in the petition or the affidavit in support of it which induces a different conclusion or compels us to hold that Article 31 A is not applicable to the tenancy with which we are concerned. 7. The further contention of the petitioner is as regards the competency of the Legislature to pass the enactment concerned. Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule reads as follows : "Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." We entertain no doubt that this entry warrants and authorises the legislation. 8. In AIR 1959 SC 459 the principles that govern the construction of the entries in the Seventh Schedule arose for consideration. Their Lordships said: ''If is well established that these heads of legislation should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense but should be given a large and liberal interpretation."; and quoted with approval the statement of the Privy Council in AIR 1935 PC 158 to the effect that in interpreting a constitutent or organic statute that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted. In an earlier case -- AIR 1955 SC 58 -- the Supreme Court said : "The cardinal rule of interpretation is that words should be read in their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning subject to this rider that in construing words in a constitution enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude." 9. In the light of what is stated above, this petition has to be dismissed and we do so. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.