JUDGMENT Dwivedi, J. - Ajodhya Singh and others instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif against Kodai for a declaration that they were the Bhumidhars in possession of the disputed plots. They claimed an alter, native relief that if they were found to be out of possession, then a decree for recovery of possession should also, be passed in their favour. The allegations in the plaint were that the disputed plots were the sir and khudkasht of the Plaintiffs, that they had made a usufructuary mortgage of the plots with Kodai, that on the commencement of the UP ZA and LR Act (hereinafter called the Act), the usufructuary mortgage was converted into a simple mortgage, that the Defendant then ceased to hold possession of the disputed plots, that the Plaintiffs thereafter came into possession of the plots but the Defendant forcibly regained possession and that he was accordingly liable to be evicted. 2. The Defendant contested the suit and asserted that he was never the mortgage; of the plots, that he was in possession thereof as a tenant and that on the commencement of the Act, he became a bhumidhar. 3. The learned Munsif held that the Defendant was in possession of the disputed plots on the date of suit as a mortgagee, that the plots were the khudkasht of the Plaintiffs on the date of the mortgage and that the Defendant was therefore not entitled to retain possession of the plots after the date of vesting. The learned Munsif therefore granted a decree in favour of the plain-tiffs for recovery of possession. 4. Kodai preferred an appeal against the decree of the Munsif to the learned Civil Judge. The learned Civil judge held that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove the alleged mortgage in respect of plot No. 679/451. As regards the other plots he held that Kodai was in possession over them as a mortgagee from the Plaintiffs who were sirdar and khudkasht holders on the date of the mortgage. The learned Civil Judge accordingly set aside the decree of the learned Munsif in respect of the plot No. 679/451 only but affirmed his decree in respect of the other plots. 5. The learned Civil Judge accordingly set aside the decree of the learned Munsif in respect of the plot No. 679/451 only but affirmed his decree in respect of the other plots. 5. Aggrieved by the decree of the learned Civil Judge, Kodai filed the present appeal while the Plaintiffs filed a cross objection against that part of the decree of the learned Civil Judge which dismissed their suit in respect of the plot No. 679/451. 6. The cross objection does not raise any question of law and only seeks to challenge the finding of fact recorded by the learned Civil Judge that Kodai was In possession of the plot No. 679/451 as a tenant. The finding of the learned Civil Judge is binding on us in second appeal and we cannot go behind it. The cross objection must accordingly be dismissed. 7. The appeal of Kodai came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge in the first instance who referred it to a larger Bench for disposal because he was of the view that the decision in Bhikhi Singh v. Lakhpat 1958 AWR 481 (2) required reconsideration. The appeal has now come to us for disposal. 8. The first contention of learned Counsel for the Appellant is that in view of the aforesaid decision, the suit which has led to this appeal, was entertain able by a revenue Court and not by the learned Munsif. We will first examine the relevant provisions of the Act and then advert to the decision. Section 6 of the Act provides for the consequences which will ensue on the publication of the notification u/s 4. According to Clause (g)(i) of Section 6, every mortgage with possession existing on any estate or part of an estate ' on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 provides that subject to the privations of Sub-section (2), a mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting cease to have any right to hold or possess as such any land in such-estate. It follows, from these two provisions that Kodai could not continue in possession of the disputed plots after the date of vesting. It follows, from these two provisions that Kodai could not continue in possession of the disputed plots after the date of vesting. His usufructuary mortgage was converted into a simple mortgage and his right to continue in possession came to an end after the date of vesting. Although his initial possession being under the mortgage was lawful, but after coming into force of Sub-section (1) of Section 14, his retaining possession of the disputed plots was otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. He was therefore liable to be evicted on the suit of the Plaintiffs u/s 209 of the Act which provides for the ejectment of persons in possession otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, was instituted in the year 1953, when a suit u/s 209 was maintainable only in the Civil Court. The allegations in the plaint, which we have already set out, clearly bring the suit within the purview of Section 209 and it could, therefore, be entertained by the learned Munsif. 9. By Sub-section (2) of Section 14, it is provided that where the land, over which the mortgagee was in possession on the date of vesting, was the sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, it would be deemed to be the sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor, if it was not the sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the mortgagee would, by paying within six months from the date of vesting an amount equal to five times the rent calculated at the hereditary rates, be deemed to have held such land on the date of vesting as hereditary tenant. It is then provided that if the mortgagee failed to pay the amount aforesaid in the aforesaid manner, he would lose all rights in the land and be liable to ejectment on the suit of the Gaon Sabha u/s 209. 10. Kodai was not setting up mortgagee rights over the disputed plots; on the other hand he was claiming himself to-be the tenant of the plots. He did not therefore make an application under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 to the Assistant Collector First Class, who is the appropriate authority specified in Entry 3 of the II Schedule to the Act. 11. He did not therefore make an application under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 to the Assistant Collector First Class, who is the appropriate authority specified in Entry 3 of the II Schedule to the Act. 11. Kodai's failure to make an application u/s 14(2)(b) essentially distinguishes this case from Bhikhi Singh's case 1958 AWR 481 (2). In that case the mortgagee had made an application u/s 14(2)(b) and had obtained an order in his favour from the Assistant Collector First Glass. The plea of the mortgagor that the mortgaged plots were his sir and khudkasht on the date of mortgage was rejected by the Assistant Collector in that case. The suit, in that case, was instituted by the mortgagor after the passing of the order by the Assistant Collector. There the plaint allegations were that the Plaintiffs were the mortgagors, that the Defendants were the usufructuary mortgagees, that the mortgage had come to an end and that the Plaintiffs had become entitled by virtue of Section 14 to immediate possession of the mortgaged plots by reason of-the fact that the plots were their sir and khndkasht on the date of the mortgage. The Plaintiffs further alleged that the mortgagees had no further right and that the cause of action arose on 7-4-1953 when the Assistant Collector First Cass passed an order in favour of the Defendants u/s 14(2)(b). The plaint was construed by this Court to make a challenge to the effectiveness of the order of the Assistant Collector First Class for the purpose of conferring any right on the Defendants to remain in possession over the plots in suit, the Court framed the following question for determination: The question to be considered in this case whether upon the allegations contained in the plaint, this is a suit which falls u/s 209, or whether it a is suit in respect of an order passed or reliefs obtainable u/s 14 of the Act. 12. It was held that the Defendant-mortgagee, having obtained an order from the Assistant Collector First Class u/s 14(2)(b), could be deemed to be in lawful possession of the disputed plots and Section 209 was, therefore, inapplicable to the facts of the case. It was also held that Section 330 of the Act barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit relating to an order passed u/s 14(2)(b). It was also held that Section 330 of the Act barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit relating to an order passed u/s 14(2)(b). My learned brother, Guttu, J. who dictated the judgment, observed thus: We are of the view that inasmuch as the initial possession of the Defendants was in their capacity as mortgagees and inasmuch as their possession has continued after the vesting order under an order passed u/s 14 of the Act by a competent Court, it cannot be said that the Defendants, according to the allegations of the plaint, are trespassers. In our view, therefore, this suit did not fall u/s 209 of the Act. We have already quoted Section 330 of the said Act. That section clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit in respect of any order passed u/s 14 of Part I of the Act, so this suit is clearly barred both under that section and Section 331(1) of the Act. 13. Learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, seeks to, rely upon the following observation in the decision: That the mortgagee is deemed to hold the land all the times as sirdar is clear from the language of Section 19 of the Act. That section clearly indicates that where the mortgagee acquires rights u/s 14(2)(b), he must be deemed to be holding the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. In our view, therefore, a mortgagor, who asserts that the land in possession of a mortgagee is his sir or khudkasht, must assert his said right, if that is denied, by means of a proceeding u/s 14 of the said Act in the revenue court and get possession from the mortgagee under that section. 14. It is submitted that in view of the above, observations, specially the last Clause of it, the suit culminating in the instant appeal should have been instituted in the revenue court and not in the court of the Munsif. We are unable to accept this submission. The above quoted observations should, in our opinion, be read in the background of the facts of that case and should not be extended to other situations. In any case the remarks appear to us to be obiter. They were not necessary for deciding the case and it is therefore not necessary to reconsider that case. The above quoted observations should, in our opinion, be read in the background of the facts of that case and should not be extended to other situations. In any case the remarks appear to us to be obiter. They were not necessary for deciding the case and it is therefore not necessary to reconsider that case. We have already held that the facts of the case before us are entirely different and distinguishable from the facts of that case. On the facts of the case before us, we have no doubt that the Plaintiff's suit was rightly filed in the Court of the learned Munsif and we would therefore overrule the first contention of the Appellant. 15. It was then argued that the finding of the learned Civil Judge that the disputed plots had been usufructuarily mortgaged by the Plaintiff in favour of the Appellant and that the Plaintiffs were the sir or khudkasht holders thereof on the date of mortgage erroneous. The finding of the learned Civil Judge is a finding of fact and is binding on us in second appeal. It not, therefore, open to us to re examine the oral and documentary evidence. 16. For the reasons mentioned above, we find no force in the appeal and the cross-objection and they are accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.