Judgment :- 1. This civil miscellaneous appeal arises from an order dismissing a petition for scaling down the debt covered by the decree in O.S. No. 27 of 1936 of the court of the subordinate Judge, Kozhikode. 2. The facts necessary for the decision of the case may be briefly stated: The decree in O. S. No. 27 of 1936 was for recovery of money under a deed mortgage (Ex. A-1) executed on 2-6-1923 by the paternal grand-father of the appellant in favour of one Gayathri Ayyar, manager of a joint Hindu family. The mortgage was for the sum of Rs. 8379 - 8-0. and this sum represented the balance due under an earlier mortgage dated 7th June, 1910. executed by the same person in favour of Gayathri Ayyar's predecessor Subramonian Pattar. Before the final decree in O.S. No. 27 of 1936 was passed a petition O.P. No. 72 of 1939 was filed by one of the debtors under S.19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, for scaling down the debt. This was allowed on 10-1-1940 and a final decree was passed for the reduced amount When the properties came up for sale in execution the appellant filed O. P. No. 61 of 1953 on 9-12-1953 for further scaling down of the debt under the provisions of the Act as amended by Acts XXIII of 1948 and XXIV of 1950. According to the appellant the whole decree was to be deemed discharged by the payments made after the execution of the first deed of mortgage of 1910 and the prayer was for a declaration to that effect. This prayer was based on the following averments:- The original principal sum under the deed of 1910 was Rs. 2,977-7-6. The deed or renewal, Ex. A-1, refers to a payment of Rs. 500/- towards the principal sum of Rs. 2,977-7-6 so that the balance due as principal was only Rs. 2,477-7-6. The subsequent payments amount to Rs 4975/-, i. e., more than twice the amount of the principal. In view of such payments the debt has to be deemed discharged under S.8(2) of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The petition was opposed by the decree-holder and was dismissed. This appeal has been preferred from the order dismissing the same. 3. Learned counsel for the decree-holder-respondent raised a preliminary objection based on the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, XXXI of 1958. The petition was opposed by the decree-holder and was dismissed. This appeal has been preferred from the order dismissing the same. 3. Learned counsel for the decree-holder-respondent raised a preliminary objection based on the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, XXXI of 1958. The properties charged under the decree have been purchased in execution by the decree-holder on 26-11-1955. According to the respondent the parties are now governed by the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, S.22 of which provides for setting aside sales of immovable property held on or after 1st November, 1956, or before 1st November, 1956 provided possession of property has not actually passed before 20th November, 1957. Possession has not passed to the decree-holder-auction-purchaser in this case. Under S.22, one-half of the purchase-money together with costs of execution must be deposited within six months of the commencement of the Act and the balance together with interest at 5 percent per annum in ten equal half-yearly instalments. The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, has been repealed by S.26 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, and it is contended that the provisions of S.22 of Act XXXI of 1958 (Kerala) not having been complied with, the appellant is not entitled to any relief. 4. The preliminary objection is not sustainable. S.4 (c) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act (Kerala) corresponding to S.6 (c) of the Indian Act provides that when any enactment is repealed, unless a different intention appears, such repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Under S.4 (e) such repeal shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. If the petitioner had a right under the Madras Act to get the debt scaled down, such right cannot be affected by the repealing Act. The petition to scale down the debt had been filedin 1953 and was pending in appeal at the commencement of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Belief Act. The execution sale also took place during the pendency of the petition. We therefore hold that the repeal of the Madras Act cannot affect the right of the appellant to have the matter adjudicated under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The preliminary objection is therefore over-ruled. 5. The petition however is bound to fail on another ground. The execution sale also took place during the pendency of the petition. We therefore hold that the repeal of the Madras Act cannot affect the right of the appellant to have the matter adjudicated under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The preliminary objection is therefore over-ruled. 5. The petition however is bound to fail on another ground. Reference has already been made to the fact that O.P. No. 72 of 1939 had been filed for scaling down the debt under S.19 of the Madras Act and that this was allowed. It is stated in the order of the court below that the records relating to this petition were not available. A copy of the decision in O. P. No. 72 of 1939 is in the records, and this shows that one Moosakutty, one of the judgment-debtors, had made an application under S.19 "to scale down the amount due under the decree in O. S.27 of 1936 and to amend the same and also to record full satisfaction of the decree". The relevant part of the order was in these terms: "that the amount be and is hereby scaled down to Rs. 6,878-15-7 with interest thereon at 61/4 per cent per annum from 1-10-1937 till 22-3-1938 & 6 per cent per annum thereafter till realisation". The question for decision is whether in view of the fact that the debt was once scaled down it is open for the debtor to make a fresh application for the same relief. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the order in O. P. No. 72 of 1939 will not operate as a bar to the petition which has given rise to this appeal as the law has been amended since then and fresh rights have been conferred on debtors by the amending Act. 6. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the order in O. P. No. 72 of 1939 will not operate as a bar to the petition which has given rise to this appeal as the law has been amended since then and fresh rights have been conferred on debtors by the amending Act. 6. This question has come up for decision before the Madras High Court in Narayanan Chettiar v. Ratinasamy Padayachi (1952-11- M. L. J. 859) and Hemavathi v. Padmavathi (1954-11 M. L. J. 724) In the earlier case Rajamannar, C J., held that a judgment-debtor would not have a right to file successive applications under S.20 or S.19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act if the reliefs which he claimed as being entitled to are the same in the several applications, but if a subsequent application is based upon a provision of law which was not in existence at the time of the prior application, he will not be debarred from filing the latter application simply because he had filed a prior application when the state of law did not entitle him to the relief to which he became entitled by a subsequent change in the law. This was followed by a Bench in the later decision referred to above. This, if we may say so with respect, is the correct position and the appellant has to show that he became entitled to some relief which was not available when the prior petition was filed in 1939. 7. The appellant relies for this purpose on Explanations I and III of S.8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act which were introduced by the amending Act of 1948. Explanations I and III are extracted below: "Explanation I - In determining the amount repayable by a debtor under this section every payment made by him shall be credited towards the principal, unless he has expressly stated in writing that such payment shall be in reduction of interest. Explanations I and III are extracted below: "Explanation I - In determining the amount repayable by a debtor under this section every payment made by him shall be credited towards the principal, unless he has expressly stated in writing that such payment shall be in reduction of interest. xxx xxx xxx xxx "Explanation III- Where a debt has been renewed or included in a fresh document executed before or after the commencement of this Act, whether by the same debtor or by his heirs, legal representatives or assigns or by any other person acting on his behalf, or in his interest and whether in favour of the same creditor or of any other person acting on his behalf or in his interest, the principal originally advanced together with such sums, if any, as have been subsequently advanced as principal shall alone be treated as the principal sum repayable under this section". 8. The argument based on the first explanation is that the payments towards discharge of the debt were not accompanied by any statement in writing that such payments should be in reduction of interest and that the same should therefore be applied in discharge of the principal sum. According to the appellant the written direction to appropriate the payment towards interest must be made contemporaneous with the payment. We are of opinion that this restricted construction is not warranted by the words of Explanation I and that a statement in writing antecedent to the payment would satisfy the requirements of Explanation I. So far as the document on which the decree is based is concerned there is an express provision that after discharge of the interest accruing on the principal, payment of any sum not below Rs. 200 if made would be credited towards principal. This means that so long as interest is outstanding, all payments would go towards discharge of the same and this satisfies the requirement of the Explanation. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that this provision was introduced for the first time by the amending Act of 1948 and a new right giving rise to a fresh cause of action was thus conferred on debtors. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that this provision was introduced for the first time by the amending Act of 1948 and a new right giving rise to a fresh cause of action was thus conferred on debtors. This explanation does not in any way affect this case because S.8 as it originally stood contained a provision that if twice the amount of the principal was paid by way of principal or interest or both, the debt would be deemed to be wholly discharged. The debtor admittedly had paid more than twice the sum of Rs. 2,477-7-6 before O. P. No. 72 of 1939 was filed. It cannot in these circumstances be said that a right which was not available to him when O.P. No. 72 was filed was conferred by the amending Act of 1948. 9. Coming to Explanation III to S.8, it provides that the creditor in whose favour the debt is renewed need not be the same as the original creditor for the purpose of treating the original sum lent as the principal. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that this provision was not in the Act at the time 0. P. No. 72 of 1939 was filed or decided and that the court therefore did not treat the sum of Rs. 2,477-7-6 as the principal when the amount was first scaled down. It may be that the court did not treat the said amount as the principal when the earlier order was passed, but it was not because the creditor in the renewed transaction was not the same as the original one. Ext. A-1 shows that the amount under the earlier deed of 1910 was advanced by Subramonian Pattar as manager of the joint family and further that Gayathri Ayyar took the renewal as manager of the family for and on behalf of the family. It is therefore clear that the creditor was the family and not Subramonian Pattar or Gayathri Ayyar who were acting only on behalf of the family. It was open to the debtor to urge in O. P. No. 72 of 1939 that the creditor was the family and that the principal under the earlier deed was to be taken as the principal for the purpose of scaling down the debt. It was open to the debtor to urge in O. P. No. 72 of 1939 that the creditor was the family and that the principal under the earlier deed was to be taken as the principal for the purpose of scaling down the debt. It appears from the order in O.P. No. 72 of 1939 that such a plea must have been advanced by the petitioner in that petition as the prayer in the petition was to treat the whole debt as discharged and this would have been possible only if the sum of Rs. 2,477-7-6 was the principal. The court did not accept this plea. The decision may be erroneous but that fact cannot help the appellant, as the real test is whether any right which was not available under the Act of 1938 as it originally stood was conferred for the first time by the amending Act of 1948, so far as this debt was concerned. On the facts of this case it cannot be held that a new right was conferred by Explanation III either, and the appellant cannot successfully urge that a fresh petition for scaling down the debt would lie on the strength of the amending Act of 1948. Following the principles laid down in the two decisions of the Madras High Court cited earlier, we hold that the petition for scaling down the debt is not maintainable. It follows that interference is not called for in appeal. 10. In the result, we confirm the order of the court below and dismiss the civil miscellaneous appeal with costs.