Judgment :- 1. These two cases were heard together as the matter involved in both are connected and the parties are the same. 2. A.S. No. 268 of 1958 arises from an order in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 78 of 1951 of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Palghat. The decree was for eviction of the appellant, a tenant of the plaintiff, and for recovery of past and future rent from him. The appellant was the first defendant in the suit and the other defendants were his sub-tenants. The decree directed the first defendant to pay the amount decreed in instalments and further provided that on default of such payment, the plaintiff would be allowed to recover possession of the properties. The properties were delivered over to the decree-holder from the possession of sub-tenants on 11-4-1957. After delivery the first defendant filed E. A. No. 602 of 1957 stating that delivery was effected after the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance, I of 1957 came into force and that she was entitled to re-delivery of the properties under S.9 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, I of 1957. The 1st defendant stated that actual physical possession was not handed over to the decree-holder and that the amin merely prepared a record of delivery. The application was opposed mainly on two grounds, namely, (1) that possession having been recovered in execution from sub-tenants of the first defendant, the latter was not competent to apply for re-delivery and (2) that the question of re-delivery did not arise, as the first defendant did not admit the fact of delivery of possession. These objections were upheld and the first defendant's application was dismissed. She has preferred this appeal from the order dismissing the application for re-delivery. 3. After obtaining delivery of possession the decree-holder instituted another suit, O. S. No. 128 of 1957, against certain persons who were alleged to have trespassed on the property after the date of delivery. The suit was decreed and an application was made for appointment of a receiver for the properties. This was allowed by the court below. Stating that the defendants in the suit had surrendered possession to her, the original tenant applied for stay of proceedings under Act I of 1957. This was dismissed and C. R. P. No. 73 of 1959 is preferred by the tenant against this order. 4. This was allowed by the court below. Stating that the defendants in the suit had surrendered possession to her, the original tenant applied for stay of proceedings under Act I of 1957. This was dismissed and C. R. P. No. 73 of 1959 is preferred by the tenant against this order. 4. A. S. No. 268 of 1958 may be considered first. Delivery of possession in 0. S. No. 78 of 1951 took place on 11th April 1957. Ordinance I of 1957 which provided for stay of eviction proceedings came into force on the same day and the appellant's case is that the alleged delivery of possession is without jurisdiction. The Ordinance was later replaced by Act I of 1957. S.4 of the Ordinance provided as follows: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, no suit or other proceedings for eviction of a person from his holding shall be instituted in any court and all suits, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings for such eviction shall be stayed: Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the court from granting any relief to which the lessor is entitled other than eviction from the holding". S. 4 of Act I of 1957 was in the same terms as S.4 of the Ordinance but the proviso was later omitted by an amending Act. It is clear from the terms of S.4 that if this is a case of eviction of a person from his holding the section operates as a complete bar to such eviction and that the delivery proceedings are without jurisdiction. Though this position is not seriously disputed by the respondent it is strenuously contended that the appellant is not entitled to re-delivery under S.9 of the Act. It is urged that S.9 applies only to cases covered by S.6 &7 of the Act. S.6, 7, & 9 may be extracted. "6. Though this position is not seriously disputed by the respondent it is strenuously contended that the appellant is not entitled to re-delivery under S.9 of the Act. It is urged that S.9 applies only to cases covered by S.6 &7 of the Act. S.6, 7, & 9 may be extracted. "6. [1] Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract [i] subject to the provisions of clause [ii] where in respect of any land there is a Varomdar at the commencement of this Act, such Varomdar; [ii] where a Varomdar, in respect of any land, has not started agricultural operations at the commencement of this Act and a person other than that Varomdar had cultivated the land under a varom agreement in the cultivation season immediately preceding such commencement, such other person; [iii], where in respect of any land there is no Varomdar and the agricultural operations have not been started at the commencement of this Act, the person, if any, who had cultivated the land under a varom agreement during the cultivation season immediately preceding such commencement; and [iv] where in respect of any land there is no Varomdar at the commencement of this Act but the person who had cultivated the land under a varom agreement during the cultivation season immediately preceding such commencement had started the agricultural operations of the land at such commencement, such person shall be entitled to cultivate the land on the same terms and conditions under which he was cultivating the land at the commencement of this Act or during the cultivation season immediately preceding such commencement, as the case may be. [2] All agricultural operations carried out before the commencement of this Act, by a person entitled to cultivate the land under clause [iv] of sub-section [1] shall be deemed to have been lawfully carried out in exercise of the right, conferred on him under that clause. 7. Any person cultivating the land of another, whether as an agent or otherwise, under a Sambalapattom or Coolypattom arrangement or under any licence at the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding the expiry or termination of such arrangement or licence, be entitled to continue on the same terms and conditions as were applicable to him at such commencement, to cultivate the land. Where, after the commencement of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance, 1957, any person, who has acquired a right to continue in possession of, or to cultivate, any land or to continue in possession of any kudiyiruppu under the said Ordinance or under this Act, has been deprived of any of the aforesaid rights, he shall be entitled to apply to the Court having jurisdiction in regard to a suit for eviction from the land or kudiyiruppu for the restoration to him of such rights and the Court shall, if satisfied after such summary enquiry as the Court deems fit, restore to him, the said rights subject to all the obligations which he had immediately prior to such deprivation: Provided that where a person has been deprived of any of the aforesaid rights under the orders of any court, the application for the restoration of such rights shall be made to that court." The respondents's case is that only a varomdar or a person cultivating the land of another on sambalapattom or coolipattom arrangement or under a licence can apply for re-delivery under S.9 and not one who has sub-leased the properties. This argument cannot be accepted. The transactions referred to in S.6 & 7 are not really lease transactions and it can be seen that even a licencee's rights are protected by S.7. These sections appear to have been introduced to cover cases in which the lands cultivated by such persons would not come within the definition of 'holding'. In order to constitute a'holding' as defined in the Act a lease-hold interest must be created in immovable property and it cannot be said that a lease-hold interest is created in the cases covered by S.6 & 7. Besides, what S.9 provides is that if any person who has acquired a right to continue in possession of any kudiyiruppu under the Ordinance or the Act is evicted, he will be entitled to apply for restoration to him of such rights. It cannot be denied that the appellant was one who had acquired a right to cultivate or continue in possession of the lands in question. The right to continue in possession contemplated in S.9 appears to be such right of the tenant as against the landlord. In our opinion S.9 is not capable of the restricted meaning sought to be given by the respondent. The right to continue in possession contemplated in S.9 appears to be such right of the tenant as against the landlord. In our opinion S.9 is not capable of the restricted meaning sought to be given by the respondent. The mere fact that the tenant had sub-leased the properties cannot therefore deprive him of the right conferred by S.9. 5. Another contention urged by the respondent is that a person who has been evicted can be restored to such rights as he had, only subject to all the obligations which he had immediately prior to deprivation of the same. It is argued that on the date of delivery the appellant had forfeited his right to possession by reason of the default in payment of the amounts provided for by the decree and that possession could be restored to him only subject to the obligations under the decree We do not see how this can affect the question. Stay of eviction is granted by S.4 (of Ordinance 1 of 1957) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. This argument may have some force in a case of re-delivery under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in view of the provisions of Act I of 1957, the fact that certain obligations are imposed by the decree cannot affect the appellant's right to obtain re-delivery of possession. 6. One of the grounds on which the application was refused by the court below was that the first defendant did not admit the fact of delivery. This is immaterial as the court below has found that there was actual physical dispossession and that the leases alleged to have been granted by the first defendant were spurious. The appellant cannot be denied relief on this ground either. 7. It follows that the order of the court below cannot be supported. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the court below and direct re-delivery of possession of the properties to the appellant. 8. The civil revision petition may now be considered. In view of the conclusion reached by us in A. S. No. 268 of 1958 that possession of properties is to be restored to the appellant, the question of the receiver taking possession of the same does not arise. 8. The civil revision petition may now be considered. In view of the conclusion reached by us in A. S. No. 268 of 1958 that possession of properties is to be restored to the appellant, the question of the receiver taking possession of the same does not arise. If the receiver has secured possession he should restore such possession to the petitioner. The civil revision petition is allowed in these terms. 9. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs in the appeal as well as in the civil revision petition. Allowed.