Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution for quashing the appellate order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Palghat under S.17 of the Malabar Tenancy Act. The petitioner had filed a petition for fixing the fair rent of certain properties stated to have been taken on lease from the respondent. The application was opposed by the respondent land-lord on the ground that it was not maintainable. The grounds relied on in support of the objection were that all the items constituting the holding were not shown in the petition, that one item of property which was not covered by the lease was included in the petition, that the petitioner had sub-leased the property and was therefore incompetent to apply for fixing the fair rent, and that he was a co-owner of one of the items shown in the petition. Upholding these objections the Rent Court dismissed the petition. In appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Palghat held the last point in favour of the petitioner but found all the other points against him. It was also held that an appeal would lie only from an order fixing the fair rent and not one refusing to do so and that the appeal was therefore incompetent. The petitioner seeks to have this decision quashed. 2. Before considering the matter on the merits we may observe that the jurisdiction of this court under Art.227 is very limited. The scope of an application under Art.227 was considered by a special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee (AIR 1951 Cal. 193). Harris, C. J., held: "The power of superintendence as pointed out by Rankin, C. J., in his judgment in this case is not a power given to this court to correct errors, otherwise, it would be tantamount to a right to entertain appeals on law and fact. The right should be exercised only in cases where the Courts have clearly done something which they were not entitled to do. The power must be used to keep the Courts below within the bounds prescribed by law for such Courts. Here, as I have said, the most that can be said if anything can be said, is that the Court erred in law in treating a month's wages in lieu of leave as due. The power must be used to keep the Courts below within the bounds prescribed by law for such Courts. Here, as I have said, the most that can be said if anything can be said, is that the Court erred in law in treating a month's wages in lieu of leave as due. Further, it appears to me that there is no injustice in this case. The employers, for reasons best known to themselves, desired to get rid of this employee immediately. They made it impossible for him to take his month's leave and the order of the Court below even if it was not legally justified, could never be described as unjust or harsh". In Subodh Bala v. State of West Bengal (AIR. 1953 Cal. 702) it was held: "We are clearly of opinion that on an application under Art.227 of the Constitution it is not open to us, nor can it be proper to embark upon an examination of the evidence and substitute for the decision of the Court or tribunal below our own decision. As I have had occasion to explain elsewhere, the scope of Art.227 of the Constitution is perfectly clear. It is intended to authorise the High Courts to see that the Courts or tribunals which cannot be controlled under S.115 Civil P. C. are kept in their proper places and that they exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the laws they administer. If these two conditions are satisfied, namely, if the Court or the tribunal concerned does not exceed jurisdiction and if it does not depart from the principles that it is enjoined to follow by the statute or other law concerned, there can be no occasion for interference, under Art.227 of the Constitution with the substance of the decision upon a further examination of its merits". The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this question in Waryan Singh v. Amarnath (AIR 1954 SC 215). It was observed: "This power of superintendence conferred by Art.227 is as pointed out by Harries. C. J., in'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd v. Sukumar Mukkerjee', AIR 1951 Cal. 193 [SB.], to be exercised most sparingly and only inappropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". The petition has to be considered in the light of these decisions. 3. C. J., in'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd v. Sukumar Mukkerjee', AIR 1951 Cal. 193 [SB.], to be exercised most sparingly and only inappropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". The petition has to be considered in the light of these decisions. 3. The main point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Subordinate Judge who held that the appeal was not maintainable failed to exercise his jurisdiction. It is contended that this view of the learned judge is wrong. S.17 of the Malabar Tenancy Act which provides fox appeal against orders of Rent Courts is in these terms: "Any person aggrieved by any order passed by the Rent Court under S.16 may appeal against the order within such time as may be prescribed, to the Subordinate Judges or the Principal Subordinate judge, as the case may be, of the Subordinate Judge's Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the holding is situate. He shall hear the appeal as a persona designata and his decision thereon shall be final". It was held by the learned judge that an appeal would lie only from an order fixing the fair rent and not from an order refusing to fix the fair rent. We are unable to accept this view. Under S.16, the Rent Court may either fix the fair rent or decline to do so. S.17 provides that any person aggrieved by any order passed by the Rent Court under S.16 may appeal against the same. The expression'any order' under S.16 would include an order refusing to fix fair rent. If the intention of the legislature was that appeals would lie only from orders fixing fair cent, S.17 would have been worded differently, and instead of 'any order' a different expression such as 'orders fixing fair rent' would have been used in S.17. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the conclusion of the learned judge on the basis of certain decisions under S.25-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act before it was amended in 1948. We do not think that these decisions are useful for construing S.17 of the Malabar Tenancy Act. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the conclusion of the learned judge on the basis of certain decisions under S.25-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act before it was amended in 1948. We do not think that these decisions are useful for construing S.17 of the Malabar Tenancy Act. S.25-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act as it stood before the amendment was capable of the construction that an appeal would not lie from an order dismissing an application under S.19A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. We hold that the appeal was competent. However this is not a ground for allowing this petition as the learned judge considered the appeal on the merits and agreed with the finding of the Rent Court on all except one of the points. 4. Another finding of the learned judge, namely, that the petition was not maintainable in view of the sub-lease granted by the petitioner was also challenged before us by the petitioner. The tenant has a right under S.16 to apply for fixing the fair rent. The definition of 'tenant' in S.3 (27) includes an intermediary also and the expression 'intermediary' has been defined in the Act as follows: "'Intermediary' means any person who not being a jenmi, has an interest in land and is entitled by reasons of such interest, to possession thereof, but has transferred such possession to others". The grant of a sub-lease will not thus preclude a tenant from making an application under S.16, and the view taken by the learned judge cannot be supported. 5. The fact that we differ from the learned judge in respect of the two points dealt with above does not mean that the petitioner is entitled to relief under Art.227 of the Constitution. One of the grounds on which he was refused relief was that all items covered by the holding were not included in the petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was not bound to seek relief in respect of all the items as the provision in S.16 is that the tenant may apply for fixing the fair rent payable in respect of 'any land'. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was not bound to seek relief in respect of all the items as the provision in S.16 is that the tenant may apply for fixing the fair rent payable in respect of 'any land'. If this contention is accepted it would lead to the anomalous result that when the rent of different items comprised in a holding are not fixed separately at the time of the lease and the fair rent of some only is fixed, the rent of the items, note included in the petition would remain unsettled. It was suggested by the petitioner's counsel that in such a case the landlord should apply for fixing the fair rent of such items. We are unable to hold that in using the words 'any land' in S.16, the intention of the legislature was to confer a right on the tenant to apply for fixing the fair rent on part of a holding except in those cases in which the rent of each item is separately fixed at the time of lease. In this view it must be held that the application for fixing fair rent is not properly framed. 6. Another ground on which the petition was dismissed was that one of the properties included in the petition was not part of the holding. S.16 provides that an application for fixing the fair rent may be made when there is a dispute regarding the same. There cannot possibly be a dispute regarding a property which does not form part of the holding. The expression'any land' in S.16 cannot therefore include land not covered by the lease. The view taken by the learned judge on this point is correct. 7. Even assuming that the findings of the court below on these two points are incorrect there is no justification for interference under Art.227 of the Constitution. It is open for the petitioner to file a fresh petition and seek such relief as he may be entitled to. It is urged that if the petition is remanded for fresh decision the petitioner will get an opportunity to amend the petition. We do not consider this a proper ground for interference under Art.227. 8. In the result, the original petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. J. M. Dismissed.