JUDGMENT B. Upadhya, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and recovery of damages for use and occupation of an accommodation. 2. The appellant is the owner of premises 47/14 Old, Gudri Bazar, Kanpur, and the respondent was a tenant on behalf of the appellant in a portion of the said premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 12|8/-. The month of tenancy commenced on the 5th day of each English Calender month and expired on the 4th day of the month following. The appellant obtained permission under Sec. 3 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act on the 10th July 1953 from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Kanpur and sent a notice on the 11th July 1953 to the respondent terminating his tenancy with effect from the 4th August 1953. On the 5th August 1953, the very next day after the termination of the tenancy, the suit to evict the respondent was filed. The permission, however, which had been obtained on the 10th July 1953 had been granted ex-parte, and on the 29th September 1953 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer revoked that permission, after hearing the respondent. 3. The suit was contested and inter alia it was pleaded that the permission obtained by the appellant having been revoked the suit was not maintainable and that the notice to quit given under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not in accordance with the provisions of that section and was bad in law. 4. The learned Munsif held that the suit having been instituted after obtaining a permission which was otherwise valid could not cease to be maintainable because of a subsequent revocation by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of the permission which he had granted. The learned Munsif also held that the notice to quit was valid and on these findings he decreed the plaintiff's suit. 5. The defendant went up in appeal where the above two questions were again pressed for consideration. The learned Civil Judge upheld the view taken by the learned Magistrate that the subsequent revocation of the permission by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not affect the maintainability of the suit. 5. The defendant went up in appeal where the above two questions were again pressed for consideration. The learned Civil Judge upheld the view taken by the learned Magistrate that the subsequent revocation of the permission by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not affect the maintainability of the suit. With respect to the notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, however, the learned Civil Judge took the view that the notice having been sent not by the appellant who was the owner but by Sri S. K. Shukla an Advocate who did not file the suit for ejectment and who had not been engaged in that suit by the plaintiff-appellant was not a valid notice because the notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must be sent by the landlord or by the person authorised by him in this behalf. On this finding the learned Judge upset the decision of the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the notice terminating the tenancy was valid in law. It is contended hat Sri S. K. Shukla is an Advocate and a member of the legal profession and when he sent the notice on behalf of the plaintiff appellant he acted in the discharge of his professional duties and should be deemed to be a person authorised by the appellant to do so. No specific form of conferring authority is prescribed under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and even if the appellant orally requested Sri Shukla to send a notice on her behalf to the respondent, sri Shukla was fully competent to send that notice. My attention has also been invited by learned counsel to the fact that the copy of the notice sent by the plaintiff-appellant was produced in evidence and has been admitted by the respondent. This notice contains a statement of Sri Shukla that he sent a notice under instructions from the appellant. In view of the fact that the ocument had been admitted it was not sential to produce further evidence to rove the fact that such instructions were given byte appellant to Sri Shukla. This fact was not disputed in the written statement. The contention urged is not without force. 7. In view of the fact that the ocument had been admitted it was not sential to produce further evidence to rove the fact that such instructions were given byte appellant to Sri Shukla. This fact was not disputed in the written statement. The contention urged is not without force. 7. In Surendra Nath v. Tarubala Dasi, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 158=1930 A.L.J. 489 the Judicial Committee considered the question as to whether an advocate in India had an authority to compromise a suit without any express authority in his vakalatnama to do so. Lord Atkin observed. "Their Lordships regard the power to compromise suit as inherent in the position of an advocate in India. The considerations which have led to this implied power being established in the advocates of England, Scotland and Ireland, apply in equal measure to India. It is a power deemed to exist because its existence is necessary to effectuate the relations between the advocate and client, to make possible the duties imposed upon the advocate by his acceptance of the cause of his client." 8. When Sri Shukla sent notice to the defendant terminating his tenancy under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act he expressly acted on behalf of his client, the landlord. A copy of the notice sent has been produced and it has been admitted by the defendant. All that Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires is that the notice terminating the tenancy, must be signed by the person giving it or on his behalf. The relevant portion of Sec. 106 reads as follows :- "Every notice under this section must lie in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party, who is intended to be bound by it, or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence or if such tender or delivery is not practicable affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." 9. The notice in this case, which is signed by Sri Shukla is purported to be signed on behalf of the landlord. The notice in this case, which is signed by Sri Shukla is purported to be signed on behalf of the landlord. In Hamida Bi v. Abdul Ghaffar, AIR 1933 Rangoon 147 a learned Judge took the view that when a member of the Bar writes a letter purporting to be instructed by a client, there is a presumption until the contrary is proved that the letter is written under instructions. In the instant case nothing has been urged to show that on receipt of the notice sent by Sri Shukla the defendant challenged his authority to send that notice or disputed its validity on the ground that it had not been sent on behalf of the owner of the premises. Learned counsel contended that Sri Shukla was not one of the counsel engaged by the owner of the premises to file the suit for eviction and that therefore it cannot be held that he was authorised to act in the matter of the defendant's eviction. It is commonly found that a lawyer sends a notice on behalf of his client, the landlord, terminating the tenancy of a tenant and thereafter he institutes the suit for eviction, if the tenement is not vacated in accordance with the notice. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that if Sri Shukla had been one of the counsel engaged by the owner to institute the suit it could be contended that he had been authorised by the owner to send the notice. I am unable to appreciate this distinction. When a lawyer sends a notice on behalf of his client he cannot be said to be acting under any authority conferred by a Vakalatnama for a Vakalatnama is executed only when a lawyer is engaged to represent a litigant in a pending judicial proceeding. Prior to the institution ,of suit it cannot be said that a lawyer in India has any written document executed by' his client authorising him to act in the matter, in which he is instructed. When he does so he acts in his professional capacity. It is his privilege to advise his clients and to act on their behalf generally. Prior to the institution ,of suit it cannot be said that a lawyer in India has any written document executed by' his client authorising him to act in the matter, in which he is instructed. When he does so he acts in his professional capacity. It is his privilege to advise his clients and to act on their behalf generally. When Sri Shukla sent the notice he exercised, the powers which should be deemed to exist because their existence is essential in the words of Lord Atkin 'to effectuate the lotions between advocate and client.' I am, therefore, of opinion that the notice sent by Sri Shukla terminating the defendant's tenancy is not invalid because it was not signed by the plaintiff. 10. The finding of the lower appellate court relating to the maintainability of the suit after the revocation of the permission is in favour of the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, sought to support the dismissal of the suit by challenging the correctness of this finding. Learned counsel contended that Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act laid down that no suit could be instituted on grounds other titan those mentioned in that section without the permission of the District Magistrate. Such permission it was admitted could be granted either by the District Magistrate or by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who had been authorised by him in this behalf. After the application had been made by the appellant the Rent Control and Eviction Officer issued notice to the respondent. But on the 10th July 1953, the date fixed for the hearing of the petition, the defendant could not be present at the time when the matter was taken up, and an order was passed ex-parte granting the plaintiff-appellant permission to institute the suit. On the same date the defendant moved an application requesting the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to set aside the ex-parte order. Notice was ordered to be issued on that application. But there was some delay in the service of the notice and the matter was ultimately heard on the 25th September 1953 when the permission granted ex-parte on the 10th July 1953 was withdrawn. Notice was ordered to be issued on that application. But there was some delay in the service of the notice and the matter was ultimately heard on the 25th September 1953 when the permission granted ex-parte on the 10th July 1953 was withdrawn. Learned counsel contends that the order withdrawing the permission had the effect of annulling the permission and the suit instituted before the revocation should be deemed to have been filed without any permission and therefore not maintainable. The questions that arise for consideration are:- (1) Whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could legally withdraw or revoke a permission granted by him to institute the suit. (2) Whether, in case he is legally competent to revoke or withdraw the order granting permission, the revocation or withdrawal would, in law, affect the validity of a suit instituted after the permission had been granted but before it was revoked or withdrawn. 11. There is no provision in the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act expressly conferring on the District Magistrate or an Officer to whom he delegates such authority the powers to grant the permission mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act. The power to grant or refuse permission however has to be considered as conferred by the Statute in view of the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Act which say that on grounds other than those mentioned in that section no suit can be instituted to evict a tenant except with the permission of the District Magistrate. One of the well settled principles of law with regard to the effect of an enabling statute is that if the legislature enables something to be done it gives at the same time by necessary implication the power to do everything which is indispensable for giving effect to that power for the purpose of carrying out the purpose in view. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes has devoted a whole chapter to the topic of implied enactment and has dealt with a large number of cases where implied powers have been judicially recognised though they were not expressly set out in an enactment. At p. 360 (IX Edition) he says "'Where an Act confers a jurisdiction it also grants power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. 12. At p. 360 (IX Edition) he says "'Where an Act confers a jurisdiction it also grants power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. 12. S. 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act presents an instance where the legislature is attributed an intention which it has not expressed and it has to be considered how far the above principle may be extended in cons,truing the powers of the District Magistrate or the officer authorised by him to carry out the duties and exercise the powers thus impliedly conferred on him by Sec. 3 of the Act. Is it necessary that the officer must also have the power to recall or vacate the order passed by him? Ordinarily a Court or Tribunal exercising judicial powers does have the inherent power to vacate or review its own orders. In Sri Bhagwan Radha Kisen v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P., 1952 I.T.R. 104 a Bench of this Court had to consider whether an Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which had dismissed an appeal for default could set aside the order of dismissal for default or vacate an order passed on an appeal heard ex-parte. In that case Malik, C.J. observed:- "It is true that there is no such rule but it must be held that there is inherent jurisdiction in the Tribunal to set aside an order of dismissal for default or an order passed on an appeal heard ex-parte when it is satisfied that there was in fact no service of notice or that there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellant or the respondent from appearing on the date fixed." 13. In the present case, however, the powers which are exercised by the District Magistrate in granting or refusing permission under Sec. 3 of the Act have been construed to be powers which are of a discretionary character. The grounds on which he may be refuse or grant permission are not specified in the Act and the object in putting a check on the powers of the landlord to evict a tenant by making the permission of the District Magistrate a condition precedent to the institution of the suit is obviously intended to control and regulate the letting out of 'accommodation' to tenants. The District Magistrate has to exercise his discretion according to his own views and the circumstances of each case. The order passed by him is subject to the orders passed by the Commissioner in revision which again may be revised or modified by the State. The District Magistrate does not exercise functions of a Court; nor does he act in a strictly judicial capacity. It is contended therefore that he should not be considered to have the inherent jurisdiction to vacate an ex-parte order which Courts or Judicial Tribunals are ordinarily recognised to have. I fear it would not be correct to accept this contention. Wherever powers are vested in an authority to act, the possibility of an error or mistake cannot be ruled out and there appears to be no justification for taking the view that the authority that has acted erroneously cannot rectify its own mistake and so modify his act as to make it in conformity with his duties. The Rent Control Officer in the instant case had issued notice to the defendant and the defendant had filed his objections. The Rent Control Officer could have therefore considered the objections even when the defendant was not present at the hearing. Instead of doing so he does not appear to have considered those objections and passed orders ex-parte. If the defendant satisfied the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing at the hearing there seems to be no bar to the Officer considering the matter afresh and passing such orders as were right. I am therefore of opinion that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did possess the power to revoke his own orders which he had passed ex-parte. In this Court made certain observations which are said to be opposed to this view. In that case the District Magistrate had delegated powers under Sec. 3 of the Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the District Magistrate subsequently vacated the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the exercise of the powers so conferred on him. In that case the District Magistrate had delegated powers under Sec. 3 of the Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the District Magistrate subsequently vacated the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the exercise of the powers so conferred on him. The Bench took the view that the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate was coordinate to that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the matter and the District Magistrate not being a superior authority could not assume appellate or revisional powers in the matter and could not vacate an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. That was not a case where the order vacated had been passed by the same authority. Sec. 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act 1914 provides that:- "Where, 'by any Uttar Pradesh Act a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add, amend or vary or rescind any notification, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued." 14. This provision embodies the rule that every authority possesses the power to rectify its own mistake. 15. I am supported in this view by the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in C. D. Hans v. Munnu Lal, 1951 A.L.J. 479 In that case the suit had been filed after the permission had been rescinded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Court took the view that the officer was competent to revoke the permission which he had previously granted and the suit was subsequently filed was not maintainable. 16. Certain observations made by a Bench of this Court in Durga Prasad v. Rama Kant, 1951 A.L.J. R. 285 are relied upon to support the contention that the permission already granted could not be revoked. That was a case where the plaintiff had obtained permission under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for the institution of a suit for ejectment on the ground that he had no accommodation for himself. After the suit had been decided by the trial court and an appeal was pending the plaintiff was able to obtain possession of another house for his residence. After the suit had been decided by the trial court and an appeal was pending the plaintiff was able to obtain possession of another house for his residence. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff did not require the house in suit any longer, and, therefore, not withstanding the permission granted by the District Magistrate, the ground on which permission had been obtained having disappeared, the plaintiff's suit could not be decreed. The learned Judges after reviewing the legal position observed ed that under the Transfer of Property Act every landlord has an unfettered right to evict tenants at will. During the war when there was difficulty about accommodation, orders were issued under the Defence of India Rules to protect tenants against harrassment and after the Defence of India Act ceased to remain in force, it was followed by the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 with the same purpose. If a tenant is sought to be ejected on any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3 the permission of the District Magistrate is not necessary at all for the institution of a suit. If, however, the suit is to be instituted on any ground other than the ground's mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act, the landlord has to obtain previous permission of the District Magistrate. The District ,Magistrate has been granted the discretion of refusing or granting the permission and the grounds on which he may pass his orders arc not specified in the Act. The grant of the permission under Sec. 3 merely removed the bar which the then statute had placed in the way of the landlord asserting his right to evict the tenant. The sights which he had under the Transfer of Property Act as a landlord became available to him as soon as the permission was granted and the suit, therefore, which had been instituted after the permission was granted could not be thrown out as not maintainable merely because due to subsequent events a situation was created in Which the District Magistrate would not have in all probability granted the permission. The Bench observed:- "This subsequent event cannot reimpose a bar against the plaintiff which was removed, by the grant of permission to him by the District Magistrate. The Bench observed:- "This subsequent event cannot reimpose a bar against the plaintiff which was removed, by the grant of permission to him by the District Magistrate. The bar once removed cannot be reimposed." In that case there was no revocation of his permission by the District Magistrate at all The ground on which the permission had been accorded might have ceased to exist, yet, inasmuch as the District Magistrate had not cancelled his permission it was not open to the court to review the matter and to assume that the permission had been rescinded. The question as to what would have happened if the District Magistrate himself revoked the permission granted by him was not before the Bench. In R. N. Seth v. Girija Shanker, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 819 already referred to earlier the learned Judges observed:- "Under this provision (S. 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act) the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could presumably rescind the order which had been previously passed by him." 17. The same view taken by Misra, J. in C. D. Hans v. Mannu Lal, 1951 A.L.J. 479 was upheld by a Bench of this Court presided over by Malik, C. J. in Mannu Lal v. Chakradhar Hans, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 859=1952 A.L.J. 278 The learned Chief Justice observed:- "Here there could be no doubt that the District Magistrate is entitled to act in his discretion, and as we have already stated there are no guiding principles in any way to limit the discretion which no doubt should be honestly exercised. In the circumstances the power being merely administrative it cannot be said that if on further consideration the learned Magistrate thought it proper to revise his previous order he had no jurisdiction to do so." In syed Abdul Hamid v. Smt. Fatima Begum, 1955 A.L.J. R. 132 (F.B.) a question was referred to the Full Bench as to whether the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could be cancelled by the District Magistrate. The Full Bench answered this question in the affirmative. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the law it is clear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could legally withdraw or revoke the permission granted by him to institute the suit for eviction." 18. The Full Bench answered this question in the affirmative. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the law it is clear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could legally withdraw or revoke the permission granted by him to institute the suit for eviction." 18. The other question as to the effect of such a revocation on the maintainability of the suit already instituted has now to be considered. In Kripa Shanker v. Banwari Lal, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 414 a Division Bench of this Court expressed the view that if a permission given under clause 14 of the Meerut House Rent Control Order (1945) had been acted upon and a suit was instituted on its basis and a decree had been passed it was not competent for the controller to recall the permission at that stage. In that case the plaintiff obtained the permission of the Controller to sue the defendant for ejectment under clause 14 of the Meerut House Rent Control Order 1945. This clause read as follows:- "No landlord shall evict any tenant from any building and no person shall file a suit in any civil court for eviction of a person without the permission of the Rent Control Officer or the Controller." 19. The defence taken was that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for eviction with out joining the other cosharer his own brother, that the rent had been paid and that the permission obtained by the plaintiff had been granted ex-parte in the defendant's absence and was invalid. The trial court rejected the defence and decreed the suit finding that the permission was valid. While passing a decree, however, the learned Munsif added a rider that the decree for ejectment could be executed if and when conditions of clause (14) of the Meerut House Rent Control Order were satisfied. Pending the suit the defendant had by an application attempted to get the permission already granted by the Controller cancelled on the ground that it had been granted ex-parte, without the defendant's knowledge. Before however any order could be passed by the Controller on that application, the learned Munsif had passed a decree. Pending an appeal from the decree, the Controller withdrew the permission by passing another order. Before however any order could be passed by the Controller on that application, the learned Munsif had passed a decree. Pending an appeal from the decree, the Controller withdrew the permission by passing another order. The question that arose before the Bench was whether the Controller was competent to withdraw the permission already granted by him, which had been acted upon by the plaintiff when he instituted the suit for eviction. The Bench was of opinion that the proceedings before the Controller initiated by the plaintiff application were not of a judicial nature and that under the provisions of the Control Order it was not necessary for the controller to issue any notice to the tenant before granting the permission. The order passed was considered to be purely of a administrative nature and the rules of procedure applicable normally to courts were not held to be applicable to proceedings before him. It was held that although it might have been desirable for the controller to have sent notice to the tenant before granting the permission the order passed by him ex-parte could not be illegal or void in the absence of such a notice." The Bench however did not consider it necessary to decide as to whether the permission once granted by him could or could not be recalled. But the question which did receive their attention was whether, if permission had been acted upon and a suit had been instituted on its basis and a decree passed, it was competent for the Controller to recall the permission. The learned Judges were of opinion that the Controller had no such authority. Bind Basni Prasad, J. observed:- "The permission he had granted had spent itself out and if the Controller were given a power to recall the permission at any time it would mean that the Controller can nullify a decree of the civil Court by the mere recall of the permission. Certainly that could never have been the intention that by executive orders the decree of the Civil.Courts could be rendered nugatory." 20. The same question arose under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in L. Ram Rakshpal v. Surendra Nath, 1955 A.L.J. R. 372 before a learned single Judge. Certainly that could never have been the intention that by executive orders the decree of the Civil.Courts could be rendered nugatory." 20. The same question arose under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in L. Ram Rakshpal v. Surendra Nath, 1955 A.L.J. R. 372 before a learned single Judge. The view expressed was that the grant of permission to evict a tenant did not operate to create a title in the plaintiff, it merely removed the, bar to the filing of the suit. If therefore, the suit was instituted after obtaining the District Magistrate's permission it was validly instituted and that it was not essential that the permission must exist at the time when the suit is to be decreed. Gurtu, J. observed:- "no doubt as from the date when the permission was cancelled, it ceased to exist; but from that it does not follow that it must be held that the cancellation had the effect of making the previously granted permission non-existent even before the cancellation. In my view the previously granted permission must be deemed to have lost its force only on the date on which that permission was withdrawn. Sec. 3 of the Act, as framed, does not require the continuing existence of the District Magistrate's permission to enable a decree to be passed. All that that section says is that no suit shall be filed without permission of the District Magistrate. If the permission exists when the suit is filed, in my view, the cancellation of the permission later would not retrospectively affect the validity of the filing of the suit." 21. My attention has been invited to some cases where the order passed by the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been set aside by the Commissioner in revision or by the State and it has been held that the plaintiff's suit could not be held to be maintainable because no valid permission existed. These decisions are based on the general principle that when an order of the inferior court or Tribunal is set aside by a superior Court or Tribunal, the order of an inferior Court or Tribunal is merged in that of the superior Court or Tribunal. These decisions are based on the general principle that when an order of the inferior court or Tribunal is set aside by a superior Court or Tribunal, the order of an inferior Court or Tribunal is merged in that of the superior Court or Tribunal. This general principle has not been recognised as applicable to a case where the Rent Control and Eviction Officer vacates his own order after the order has been acted upon. The view that the order passed by the District Magistrate under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is not a judicial order but is an administrative order has been repeatedly expressed. It has also been observed that the grant of permission by the District Magistrate confers no title on the plaintiff but merely removes a bar created by the statute in public interest in the way of landlord asserting his well recognised right of ejecting his tenant. If the grant of a permission removes the bar and the suit is instituted, the subsequent reimposition of the bar resulting from the withdrawal of the permission could not affect the validity of the initiation of the suit. In respectful agreement with the views expressed by the learned Judges in the above mentioned cases, I hold that the revocation of the permission by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer subsequent to the institution of the plaintiff's suit, did not vitiate the filing of the suit and the suit was, therefore, maintainable. 22. In view of the above findings that the notice sent under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not invalid, and that the cancellation of the permission by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not affect the maintainability of the suit, or the decree passed thereunder. I am of opinion that this appeal must succeed. It is, therefore, allowed with costs and the suit is decreed with costs throughout. 23. Leave to appeal is granted.