Judgment :- 1. This petition challenges the validity of an order, Ext. A, passed by the first respondent, the State of Kerala on August 25,1958, cancelling a resolution passed by the second respondent, the Kozhikode Municipal Council, or simply the Council, on August 30,1954, by which the latter refused an application, to register certain lands as burial grounds, made by the third respondent, who is now the President of Karaparamba Juma Mosque committee, the fourth respondent being now its Secretary. To appreciate the points in controversy, it is necessary to set out a few facts as disclosed by the affidavits of the parties and by the file of papers placed in my hands by the learned counsel who appeared for respondents 1 & 2. 2. The petitioners, seven in number, claim to be residents in the vicinity of the mosque. Some of them and others presented to the Collector, Malabar, a petition on March 9,1953, which was marked by me as Ext R-1 (a), and which referred to earlier petitions of the years 1950, 1952, on the subject addressed to the Collector, to the Municipal Health Officer and to the Municipal Commissioner, Kozhikode, objecting to the move for registration under S.278(1) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920, hereinafter referred to as the Act, of the compound attached to the aforesaid mosque, as a burial ground. It was forwarded by the Collector to the Municipal Commissioner, Kozhikode, for a consideration of the objections to registration. The third respondent, who at the time was the Secretary of the mosque committee, applied on March 23,1953 to the Municipal Commissioner, Kozhikode for the registration of the land set out by him in a schedule but without specifying its survey numbers, as burial ground. Later, when called upon, he specified them by Ext. R-4 dated July 6, 1954, as survey number 384/ 7, being land which was described as the seat of the mosque and covered by a wakf more than 100 years ago, and as survey number 385, being land which had been obtained by the mosque by deed, number 992 of the year 1952. A third plot of land which is also involved in this controversy, hearing survey number. 384/4 was not specified or referred to in Ext, R-4. A third plot of land which is also involved in this controversy, hearing survey number. 384/4 was not specified or referred to in Ext, R-4. The Council thereupon constituted a special committee, which after inspecting the lands, hearing the parties or their lawyers, and perusing the documents produced, reported to the Council against registration of any of the lands bearing survey numbers 384/7, 385 & 384/4; it may be mentioned, that a claim for registration of land bearing survey number 384/4 also had been made before the special committee, producing a title deed for it, of the year 1947. On August 30, 1954, after perusing the file of papers, and the reports of the special committee and of the Municipal Health Officer against registration, and on taking legal advice, the Council passed proceedings marked Ext. R-7, adopting the report of the special committee and declining registration. Later, there was a representation to the Collector, Malabar, by some of the Muslims for reconsideration which was forwarded by him to the Council. It is seen from Ext. R-8, that the prayer then made was, that if another suitable burial ground could not be provided, the Muslins residents of the locality may be allowed to bury the dead at least in the land bearing survey number 384/7. After further consideration, the Council confirmed its previous resolution by Ext. R-8 dated November 30,1954. On August 26,1955, a representation was made to the Madras Government on behalf of some of the Muslim inhabitants, requesting that the lands bearing survey numbers 384/7 & 385 at least, may be registered as burial ground, or that, if that was not possible, another place may be made available. By Ext. R-9 dated December 27,1956, the Government of Madras ordered, that they saw no reason to interfere with the resolution of the Council. 3. Nothing transpired till July, 1958, when a memorandum was presented by the third respondent to the Government of Kerala, after the formation of the Kerala State, requesting Government to intervene and secure the registration of the lands, or to provide other suitable burial ground. The Municipal Commissioner, Kozhikode, as directed, furnished his remarks thereon which were adverse to the claim for the registration of the lands. The Municipal Commissioner, Kozhikode, as directed, furnished his remarks thereon which were adverse to the claim for the registration of the lands. Government then decided to convene a conference of the Chairman, and the Commissioner of the Council, the leaders of the parties in the Council, and the President and the Secretary of the mosque committee, on August 18,1958, and a memorandum therefor was issued to the Chairman and the Commissioner of the Council, and to the others inviting them to be present. A conference was held on the appointed date, although, as was stated, the leaders of one of the parties did not attend. Thereafter, the order impugned, Ext. A, was passed on August 25, 1958, which stated that "Government find that Karaparamba Juma Mosque and the burial ground attached to it were in existence for nearly a century now"; the reason in support of the order was stated to be, that under S.278 of the Act, when an application is made for the registration of a land, which was being used as a burial ground on the date the Act come into force, the Council had no option but to register it, and to refuse to do so, was a contravention of S.278, and therefore an illegality. Accordingly, by Ext. A, the resolution of the Council, Ext. R-7 was cancelled and the Council was directed to "sanction registration of the Karaparamba burial ground forthwith"; Government "also ordered the refund of fines realised "for the alleged violation of orders of the Council prohibiting the use of the burial ground, and the withdrawal of prosecutions pending, if any, launched for such violation." 4. The petitioners' contentions are, that as residents of Karaparamba and as neighbours of the lands in question they are specially affected by the registration of the lands as burial grounds, that Ext. A was passed in contravention of S.36 of the Act, without affording the Council or the petitioners an opportunity for explaining their point of view that the Council is not bound, as supposed by Government, to register any application that may be made under S.278 of the Act, but has a discretion to refuse it on appropriate grounds, and that if Ext. A applied to the whole land denoted by the three survey numbers, it is vitiated by a patent error in that the lands bearing survey numbers 384/4 & 385 were not being used as burial grounds, at the date of the commencement of the Act, having come into the possession of the mosque itself only in the years 1947 & 1952 under the two deeds referred to above. The learned counsel, who appeared for the Council, also supported the stand taken by the petitioners and filed a counter-affidavit. It was represented that on a preliminary objection being taken by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, before M.S. Menon, J., when the case came on before him on a previous occasion, an opportunity was granted by him to the Council, to file either an independent original petition under Art.226, or a counter-affidavit elucidating and clarifying the matter covered by the earlier affidavit. The Council chose to adopt the latter course and filed a supplementary counter-affidavit, but no copy of it having been served on respondents 3 and 4, who are also contesting parties in this petition, I do not propose to make use of it for the disposal of this petition. The learned counsel for the first respondent contended, that the petitioners have no personal interest in the subject-matter to entitle them to move this court under Art.226, that they could not do so as the Council has not taken steps to challenge Ext. A, that Ext. A was validly passed after the issue of notice to the "Authority" concerned as prescribed by S.36 of the Act, and that there are no errors in Ext. A of fact or law as would attract the jurisdiction of this court. 5. The petitioner's contention based on S.36 of the Act may be disposed of first. The material parts of this provision are extracted below:- 36[1]. "The State Government may, by order in writing" [1]. "suspend or cancel any resolution passed in pursuance or under colour of this Act, if, in their opinion," [a]. "such resolution has not been legally passed" [b] [c] "Provided that the State Government shall before taking action under this section on any of the grounds referred to in clause [a] and [b] give the authority or person concerned an opportunity for explanation". "such resolution has not been legally passed" [b] [c] "Provided that the State Government shall before taking action under this section on any of the grounds referred to in clause [a] and [b] give the authority or person concerned an opportunity for explanation". It was faintly urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the word "or" in the expression "authority or person" in the proviso, must be read as meaning "and", and that so interpreted, not only the Council, but also the petitioners ought to have been given an opportunity for explanation. I am aware that a departure from the natural and plain meaning of this word can be made, whenever the context justifies it or makes it necessary so to do; but 1 also feel, that the departure ought not to be made, except for good and sufficient reasons which I am unable to find, in the present case. If so, it was sufficient if either the "authority" meaning the "council" which passed the resolution which was cancelled, or the petitioners had in fact the requisite opportunity; a hearing, with all its formalities is not contemplated. But then, where an "authority" is concerned, the opportunity must be that of the "authority" as such; a statutory authority can speak or act only in the manner prescribed by the statute. S.19 of the Act has provided that the Municipal administration shall vest in the Council, which shall not be entitled to exercise the functions expressly assigned by the Act or any other law to the Chairman or the executive authority who is the Commissioner; the functions so assigned are specified by S.13, in the case of the Chairman, and by S.13-A in the case of the Commissioner. It was not contended, that the power to register a burial ground is one of those assigned to either of them; on the contrary, S.278 assigns it to the Council. Neither the Chairman nor the Commissioner, much less the leader of any of the parties in the Council can speak or act on behalf of the Council, unless specially authorised by its resolution to do so. Neither the Chairman nor the Commissioner, much less the leader of any of the parties in the Council can speak or act on behalf of the Council, unless specially authorised by its resolution to do so. The memorandum for convening the conference having been issued to the Chairman and the Commissioner, some reliance was placed on S.327 of the Act which provides that "every summons or other document which is required by this Act to bear the signature of the Chairman or executive authority shall be deemed to be properly signed if it bears a facsimile of the signature of the Chairman or executive authority as the case may be, stamped thereon"; this has nothing to do with the competency of the Chairman or the Commissioner to represent the Council under S.36. The file does not show, that the Council held any deliberation over the matter, or that it passed any further resolution concerning it. No doubt, the report of the Commissioner happened to be in complete accord with the resolution of the Council. This, however, is different from the Council as such being given an opportunity to explain itself. It is true, that the Council could speak only through resolutions; even so, it cannot be predicted what form they might take or what reasons they might embody. The Council might even depute anyone to explain its point of view orally to the Government. Further, between the purpose or object of holding a conference, such as was convened, and that of exercising the jurisdiction vested under S.36 of the Act, is all the difference between a purely executive and a quasi-judicial exercise of power. It is .conceivable that the object of the conference might well have been to discover an agreed formula, or if that Was not possible, at least a formula which would reflect the greatest common measure of agreement between the opposing interests. It is .conceivable that the object of the conference might well have been to discover an agreed formula, or if that Was not possible, at least a formula which would reflect the greatest common measure of agreement between the opposing interests. If complete unanimity was secured, the court would no more be bothered about it, but where it was not, the jurisdiction under S.36 was attracted -and ought to have been properly exercised as prescribed; I am not prepared to hold that convening a conference in which the Chairman and the Commissioner of the Council, and also perhaps the leaders of the parties in the Council took part, was the exercise of a function in terms of S.36 and constituted sufficient compliance with the prescription of an "opportunity for explanation" for the concerned "authority or person" in the proviso to it. Though the plea that the Council was not given an opportunity to explain does not find a place in so many words in the first counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Council, I am satisfied that the necessary averments of facts have been set out with particularity, in Para.3 to 5 thereof, leading to the necessary inference, that the Council had not the requisite opportunity. I attach no importance whatever to the argument, that the counter-affidavit on behalf of the Council having been filed by the Commissioner, it is not open to the Council to plead want of representation by the Commissioner in the proceedings before Government. I hold that Ext. A was passed in disregard of S.36 of the Act. In passing Ext. A the first respondent has held, that when application was made under S.278(1) for registration of a burial ground the Council had no option but to allow registration and that its refusal amounted to an illegality. S.278(1) and (2) may now be reproduced. 278[1]. "Every owner or person having the control of any place used at the date of the coming into operation of this Act, as a place for burying, burning, or otherwise disposing of the dead shall, if such place be not already registered, apply to the council to have such place registered". [2]. "If it appears to the council that there is no owner or person having the control of such place, it shall assume such control and register such place, or may, with the sanction of the State Government, close it. [2]. "If it appears to the council that there is no owner or person having the control of such place, it shall assume such control and register such place, or may, with the sanction of the State Government, close it. It will be observed that, the specific provision in S.278(2) that in a case coming under it, the Council "shall register" is absent in S.278(1), but S.278(2) was relied on for respondents 3 and 4 to support their reasoning that the object of the provisions was to enable the Council to register all places of burial within its area. Even the learned Government Pleader did not contend for the extreme position taken in Ext. A, but was willing to concede, that when an application is based on untrue statements of fact, say, that the land was being used as a burial ground when the Act came into force, when it was not so used, the Council is not bound to register. It may be recalled, that the contention of the Council and of the petitioners has always been that at least, the lands bearing survey numbers 384/4 and 385 were not used as burial grounds, at the relevant date and came into the possession of the mosque itself only in the years 1947 and 1952 and that the present case of respondents 3 and 4 set out in their counter as to an anterior title of the mosque stands contradicted by Ext. R-4. According to the petitioners, these constituted errors apparent on the face of the record, but it is unnecessary to dwell on this aspect once it is found, that the Council was not given an opportunity for explanation within the meaning of the proviso to S.36. The merits of the controversy, therefore, do not arise. 7. Next, it was contended, that the petitioners have another remedy under S.283 (1) of the Act and that therefore this court need not now interfere. The merits of the controversy, therefore, do not arise. 7. Next, it was contended, that the petitioners have another remedy under S.283 (1) of the Act and that therefore this court need not now interfere. S.283(1) provides: 283 [1] "If the council is satisfied" [a.] "that any registered or licensed place for the disposal of the dead is in such state or situation as to be or to be likely to become, dangerous to the health of persons, living in the neighbourhood thereof, or" [b] "that any burial ground is overcrowded with graves, and if in the case of a public burial or burning, ground or other place as aforesaid another convenient place duly authorised for the disposal of the dead exists or has been provided for the persons who would ordinarily make use of such place, it may with the previous sanction of the State Government give notice that it shall not be lawful after a period to be named in such notice to bury, burn or otherwise dispose of any corpse at such place." It will be noted, that for obtaining relief under clause (a), a place wrongly registered under S.278 (1) has to be proved to be in such a state or situation, as to be or to be likely to become dangerous to the health of persons living in the neighbourhood, and for obtaining relief under clause (b), it has to be proved to be overcrowded with graves; there are other conditions too, which need not be considered. Suffice it to note that registrability of the land as a burial ground is not a live issue under S.283 (I). The contention as to the existence of an adequate remedy, therefore, fails. 8. It remains to dispose of the objection to the petitioners' locus standi to apply in certiorari pressed strenuously on behalf of the first respondent. The petitioners claim to be specially aggrieved by the registration of the lands as burial ground being residents in the immediate vicinity, and have complained of a contravention of S.278 (1) of the Act, by Government in registration being ordered, of lands, which, as found by the Council, were not in fact used as a burial ground on the date of the commencement of the Act. It is also seen, that the petitioners had been opposing registration, from the year 1950, till the Council rejected the application for registration. It is also seen, that the petitioners had been opposing registration, from the year 1950, till the Council rejected the application for registration. The Council, however, has not sought to bring up Ext. A, for quashing it; but the learned counsel who appeared for it, has supported the petitioners. The question to be determined is, whether the petitioners can be granted any relief under Art.226 in these circumstances. "As a general rule, certiorari will not issue at the instance of one, not named as a party to the proceeding, in which, the judgment or order sought to be reviewed was entered. It is not necessary that he be a party to the record, but only that he be interested in the subject-matter upon which the record acts" - Ferris on Extraordinary Legal Remedies 1926 Edition, page 199, Para.174. This principle has been accepted in India, in Damodar v. Narayan A.I.R. 1955 Assam 163. It is not therefore an insuperable objection, that the petitioners are not eo nomine parties to Ext. A, and that the Council has not applied under Art.226. 9. The Supreme Court has ruled in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, A.I.R. 1952 S. C. 12, that the existence of a right is the foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.226. The principles on which certiorari may issue in England are summarised in a book, entitled "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" by S. A, de Smith, recently published. At page 313 the learned author says: "The position may be summarised thus:- In strict law any member of the public may apply for certiorari to quash an order; in practice no application is likely to succeed except one made by a person aggrieved; the meaning of a person aggrieved is for this purpose much wider than in most other branches of the law; but an applicant's personal interest in the subject-matter of an impugned order may be too slight or too remote for him to be treated as a person aggrieved by it". Relying on R. v. Nicholson (1899) 2 Q.B. 455 at 471, persons aggrieved may be defined as those who "have a peculiar grievance of their own, beyond some grievance suffered by them in common with the rest of the public". In Rex v. Taunton, St. Relying on R. v. Nicholson (1899) 2 Q.B. 455 at 471, persons aggrieved may be defined as those who "have a peculiar grievance of their own, beyond some grievance suffered by them in common with the rest of the public". In Rex v. Taunton, St. Mary, (1815) 3 M & S 465, the question arose, whether the residents of a locality who were inconvenienced on account of an adjoining highway being kept in a state of disrepair were persons aggrieved for the purpose of certiorari and it was ruled, that by "living in the neighbour-hood and having been in the constant habit of passing to and fro on this highway, they have been obliged to abandon it, and take a more circuitous route which is a peculiar personal grievance beyond that which affects the public at large". S. A. de Smith remarks at page 312 of his book that "the category of persons aggrieved has been drawn widely" and quotes instances from decided eases to illustrate this, and as a result, observes, that the definition of persons aggrieved in Rex v. Nicholson "must be broadened to include members of a local community who have a special grievance of their own by virtue of their membership of that community", and relies for the authority of Rex v. Taunton, St. Mary. 10. The learned counsel for the first respondent had a contention, for which I am unable to see adequate foundation, that the principles on which the courts in India grant certiorari, are different. The cases cited by him, were decided as to the nature of the interest in the applicant to sustain a writs on the contrary, I find, that the same principles have been adopted substantially, in Damodar v. Narayan cited above, in which a voter in a constituency was held entitled to challenge the order of the election tribunal, declaring an election to be void, although the elected candidate himself had not chosen to impugn the Order. In P. K. N. Abdul Mazid v. State of Madras. In P. K. N. Abdul Mazid v. State of Madras. A.I.R. 1957 Madras 551 the petitioner, who operated a rice mill, objected to the grant of a licence to a rival for opening another rice mill in the same locality; it was held, that he was a "party aggrieved" within the meaning of the rule, his interest being different from that of the public, in seeing that the law as to the issue of licences is properly administered. Very strong reliance was placed on behalf of the first respondent on In re Ramamoorthi, A.I.R. 1953 Madras, 94, in which the petitioner who challenged the nomination of Shri Rajagopalachari to the Madras Legislative Council, was held to be not a party aggrieved having no personal right which could be said to have been infringed, even indirectly, by the nomination. Ramappa v. Secretary, Revenue Department, A.I.R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 318, cited was a case in which the question arose at the instance of one of the villagers, over the property of the assignment of a "poramboke" land; the petitioner did not succeed in establishing any special right in himself. In P. Sathyanarayan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959, Andhra Pradesh 429, the petitioner had sustained no violation of his personal rights, as the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing the timings of other buses, did not affect him. On the principles discussed above, I am of the view, that, as residents in the immediate neighbourhood, the petitioners have a special interest of their own, apart from their interest as members of the public, in challenging an order which was passed in contravention of S.36 of the Act, as held by me, and also of S.278 (1) of the Act, as alleged by them, and as found by the Council. The operative part of Ext. A directing the Council to register the land is hereby quashed, on the ground, that no "opportunity for explanation" was allowed to the Council or the petitioners as prescribed by the proviso to S.36. No costs.