Sharma, J.—This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the appellate judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Baran, dated the 18th of May 1953. 2. The plaintiff-appellant filed the suit in the court of the Munsiff, Baran out of which this appeal has arisen against the defendant-respondent for the recovery of Rs. 1,596/6/6 on the 11th of February, 1952. According to the plaint, the defendant-respondent appointed the plaintiff-appellant his aratia and purchased 200 tins of ghee, weighing 95 Mds.—39 Srs.—7 Chhs. through the plaintiffs arat, on Kartik Sudi 5. Smt. 2005, corresponding to the 6th of November 1948, for which the plaintiff had to spend Rs. 13,529/7/- on behalf of the defendant. This ghee was despatched to Deogarh Madaria in November, 1948, through Tulsiram, the agent of the defendant. Again, according to the instructions of the said Tulsiram, 200 tins more of ghee were purchased for the defendant by the plaintiff on Magsar Badi 10 Smt. 2005, corresponding to the 26th of November, 1948, which weighed 89 Mds., 10 Srs., 1 Chhatak and for which the plaintiff had to pay a sum of Rs. 14,313/6/-on behalf of the defendant. These 200 tins of ghee were taken by the said Tulsiram by truck to Kota and were deposited with Gaindilal Surajmal of Kota. The plaintiff also spent a sum of Rs. 115/4/6/- as miscellaneous charges on account of the above ghee. The plaintiff drew up a Hundi for the sum of Rs. 3,000/- on the defendant towards the payment of the amounts spent by the plaintiff but the defendant did not honour that Hundi and the plaintiff had therefore to pay an addition sum of Rs. 9/-to the Bank for Hundi expenses. The plaintiff thus spent a sum of Rs. 30,967/5/6 on account of the defendant. A sum of Rs. 3,000/- on account of the Hundi and another sum of Rs. 10,599/- on account of the price of the ghee sold at Deogarh Madaria and yet another sum of Rs. 13,197/13- on account of the price of the ghee sold through Gaindilal Surajmal of Kota, viz. a total sum of Rs, 29,796/13/-was credited in the account of the defendant. Thus, a sum of Rs. 1,170/8/6 remained due to the plaintiff on account of principal. 13,197/13- on account of the price of the ghee sold through Gaindilal Surajmal of Kota, viz. a total sum of Rs, 29,796/13/-was credited in the account of the defendant. Thus, a sum of Rs. 1,170/8/6 remained due to the plaintiff on account of principal. It had been stipulated that interest would be paid at the rate of 9% per annum and so the interest due to the plaintiff, came to Rs. 425/14/-. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 1,596/6/6 was due to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed a decree for the above amount. 3. The defendant filed his written statement pleading inter alia that the suit was barred by limitation. Learned Munsiff found that the plaintiff was entitled only to a sum of Rs. 820/4/-from the defendant. He held that the suit was within time as in his view it Was governed by Art. 85 of the Limitation Act. He consequently gave a decree to the plaintiff for the recovery of Rs. 820/4/- by his judgment dated the 24th of January, 1953. 4. Against the above judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff; both the parties went in appeal to the court of the Senior Civil Judge, Baran. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, but the appeal filed by the defendant was allowed by the judgment dated the 18th of May, 1953. Learned Senior Civil Judge held that Art. 85 did not apply to the facts of the case and that it was Art. 83 which applied. As more than three years had elapsed Since the payment made by the plaintiff on account of the defendant before the suit was brought, learned Senior Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit into. Against this judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, the plaintiff has come in appeal. 5. I have heard Shri P.C. Bhandari on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant and Shri D. P. Gupta, on behalf of the defendant-respondent. 6. The only point canvassed before me is that of limitation. It has been argued by Shri P.C. Bhandari that Art. 83 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the facts of the present case. It was argued that Art. 83 applied only when there is an express contract to indemnify between the parties,but in the present case,there was no express contract to indemnify. It was argued that by virtue of sec. It was argued that Art. 83 applied only when there is an express contract to indemnify between the parties,but in the present case,there was no express contract to indemnify. It was argued that by virtue of sec. 222 of the Contract Act, the principal is no doubt liable to indemnify his agent against consequences of lawful acts. But this liability arises by virtue of law and not by contract. Art. 83, therefore, did not apply. It was argued that the only other Art, is 61 of the Limitation Act, but that does not apply to the case of an agent and principal. There is, therefore no specific Article of Limitation Act applying to the facts of the present case and therefore Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, which applies when no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act should be applied to the facts of the present case. 7. On behalf of the respondent, it was argued by Shri D.P. Gupta that Art. 83 does not say that it is applicable only to the case of an express contract to indemnify. The word used is contract which may be an implied as well as an express contract. Sec. 222 of the Contract Act gives a right to the agent to be indemnified against consequences of lawful acts. In a contract of agency, therefore, there is an implied contract that the agent would be indemnified against consequences of lawful acts by the principal, and, therefore, Art. 83 is fully applicable to the case of an agent, who is indemnified in doing lawful acts for the principal. Learned counsel relied upon the following ruling in support of his contention—Manghiram vs. Firm of Ram Saran Das Mamen Chand, through Kundanlal (1). Upendra Nath vs. Kumar Bimalendu(2), Firm, Kadari Pershad Chhodilal vs. Har Bhagwan and Tirathram(3), The Firm Devi Sahji Ramji Das vs. Tirathram (4). Firm, Kirparam Lachhman Dass vs. Firm, Sawanmal Gopi Chand (5), Bhagwandas Gianiram vs. Mutsaddi Lal (6), Harakhchand Tarachand vs. Sumatilal Chunilal (7). 8. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Shri P.C. Bhandari relied upon a ruling of Madras High Court in Kandaswamy Pillai vs. Avayanbal alias Thangachi Ammal(8) in order to show that Art. 83 did not apply to a case like the present. 8. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Shri P.C. Bhandari relied upon a ruling of Madras High Court in Kandaswamy Pillai vs. Avayanbal alias Thangachi Ammal(8) in order to show that Art. 83 did not apply to a case like the present. In the said Madras case, Art 61 was made applicable but Shri Bhandari argued that so far as that decision holds that Art 61 is applicable, he did not rely upon it, because to his mind, only the residuary Art. 120 applied. 9. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. 10. I may say at once that I do not agree with Shri Bhandari that Art. 120 of the Limitation Act applies to the present case. That Article is a residuary Article and applies only when there is no other Article of Schedule I of the Limitation Act which can be made applicable. To my mind, the competition in the present case, can be only between Art. 61 and Art. 83 of the Limitation Act. Art. 61 is general and can be applied in any case, where the plaintiff sues for money paid for the defendant. In the present case, the price of the ghee was no doubt paid by the plaintiff for the defendant and therefore if Art. 83 or for the matter of that any other specific Article of the Limitation Act did not apply to the facts of the present case, Art. 61 would apply. 11. Hawing considered that rulings cited on behalf of both the parties, I am more inclined on the view that Art. 83 applies to the facts of the present case, and not Art. 61. Art. 83 is a special Article which applies to the case of a suit upon any contract to indemnify other than a contract covered by Art. 81, or Art. 82 which apply respectively to a suit by a surety against a principal-debtor and by a surety against a co surety. The present is not a suit by a surety against the principal-debtor, nor is it a suit by a surety against a co-surety. If, therefore, there is a contract to indemnify in the present case, it is a contract other than a contract envisaged by Art. 81 or Art. 82. The question to be seen is whether there is a contract to indemnify in the present case. 12. If, therefore, there is a contract to indemnify in the present case, it is a contract other than a contract envisaged by Art. 81 or Art. 82. The question to be seen is whether there is a contract to indemnify in the present case. 12. There can be no doubt that there is no express contract to indemnify, but the words used in Art. 83 are not express contract but contract only. The contract may, therefore, well be an implied contract. Now by virtue of sec. 222 of the Contract Act, the employer of an agent is bound to indemnify him against the consequence of all lawful acts done by such agent in exercise of the authority conferred upon him. The contract of agency, therefore, implies a contract by the principal to indemnify the agent against the consequences of all lawful acts done by such agent in exercise of the authority conferred upon him. In the present case, the authority to purchase ghee was conferred upon the plaintiff. In paying for the price of that ghee on behalf of his principal, the plaintiff did a lawful act. In consequence of that act, the plaintiff was indemnified inasmuch as he was out of pocket for a certain amount to meet the liability of his principal. The suit is for the balance of the amount that remained due to the plaintiff out of the amount paid by him on account of the defendant. Art. 83, therefore, clearly applies to the facts of the present case. I have in my support the ruling of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Upendra Nath vs. Kumar Bimalendu (2), relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. It that case, the plaintiff was the defendants agent for looking after the criminal litigation started against his principal. The plaintiff spent a certain amount out of his own pocket in exercise of the authority conferred upon him by the defendant. The plaintiff filed a suit for the recovery of the said amount. It was observed- "Once the relationship of principal and agent is established, sec. 222, Contract Act, comes into operation. The obligation of the principal to indemnify the agent, therefore, flows from the nexus of the principal and agent. It is a part of the contract of agency, although it is an obligation imposed by statute. It was observed- "Once the relationship of principal and agent is established, sec. 222, Contract Act, comes into operation. The obligation of the principal to indemnify the agent, therefore, flows from the nexus of the principal and agent. It is a part of the contract of agency, although it is an obligation imposed by statute. We are, therefore, of opinion that the liability under Sec. 222. Contract Act, to indemnify the agent is a liability under a contract within the meaning of Art. 83, Limitation Act." As to the starting point of limitation, it was held that— "An agent is damnified when he makes the payment on behalf of the principal; in other words, when the expenses incurred by him are recoverable." As the amount in that suit was spent by the plaintiff more than three years before the institution of the suit, the suit was held to be time barred. Besides the above ruling, there is a string of rulings of Lahore High Court in which it has been held that Art. 83 of the Contract Act applies to the case of an aratia suing for the money spent on behalf of his principal. The earliest ruling is that of Punjab Chief Court, which was the predecessor of Lahore High Court. In that case (1), it was held that— "The right of an agent to be recouped by his principal in respect of losses sustained by the agent in his agency is a direct consequence of the agency contract, and a suit to enforce the right is governed by Art. 83 of the Limitation Act." It was observed that— "......Sec. 222 of the Contract Act purports to be and is an integral part of the law of contract and it merely affirms and expressly lays down one of the principles of the law contract. In effect it says that, unless there be some agreement to the contrary, the establishment of the relation of principal and agent shall inevitably bring in its terrain the liability of the principal to indemnify the agent. The right, instead of being merely implied in accordance with general principles is expressed clearly by the Statute." The suit having been brought more than three years after the plaintiffs were damni-fied, was held barred by time. The right, instead of being merely implied in accordance with general principles is expressed clearly by the Statute." The suit having been brought more than three years after the plaintiffs were damni-fied, was held barred by time. The same view was taken in the cases of Firm Kadari Pershad Cheddi Lal vs. Har Bhagwan and Tirathram (3), (The Firm) Devi Saha: Ramjidas vs. Tirathram (4). Firm Kirparam Lachhmandass vs. Firm Sawanmal Gopi Chand (5), and Bhagwandas Gianiram vs. Mutsaddilal (6) by Lahore High Court. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court has taken the same view in the case of Harak Chand Tarachand vs. Sumatilal Chunilal (7). In that case, a difference of opinion arose between Fawcett and Mirza, JJ. That case was the case of a commission agent aratia, paying losses of his principal on forward contract. Fawcett J. held that Art. 83 applied on forward contract, whereas Mirza J. held that it did not. The case was referred to a third Judge Patkar J., who agreed with Fawcett. J. and held that Art. 83 applied. It was observed by Patkar, J. that— "In Kandaswamys case (ILR 34 Madras 167) the Madras High Court appears to have held that the agents right to indemnification arises from the statute law, i.e., Sec. 222, Contract Act and is not a part of the agency contract. We think that the right to indemnification though recognized by statute is the necessary consequence of the agency contract. The contract to indemnify under Art. 83 Lim. Act. need not be by express stipulation, and may be either imposed by statute or implied or inferred in virtue of the jural relations of the parties : We think that a suit by a commission agent to recover loss on the transactions entered into on behalf of his constituents is governed by Art. 83 Lim. Act." Fawcett, J. after referring to Kandaswamy Pillais case and the cases of Lahore and other High Courts observed, as follows— "I. agree with the view taken in these latter cases (the cases of Lahore and Calcutta High Courts) because there is nothing in the article itself which, in my opinion, justifies the distinction made by the Madras High Court." (The words within the brackets are mine) 13. Thus, there is a preponderance of authority in favour of the view that a case like the present is governed by Art. 83 of the Limitation Act. The Madras High Court in the case of Kandaswamy Pillai thought that Art. 83 can be made applicable only to a case where there is an express contract of indemnity and because the duty of principal under sec. 222 of the Contract Act, to indemnify the agent is an obligation imposed by law and is attached to the relation of principal and agent constituted by act of parties, Art. 83 does not apply. For the reasons given by me above and those in the rulings of the majority judgment of Bombay High Court and Lahore and Calcutta High Courts referred to above, I respectfully differ from the view taken by the Madras High Court in Kandaswamy Pillais case and hold that the present suit is barred by Art. 83 of the Limitation Act, as it was brought more than three years after the payment was made on account of the principal by the plaintiff. I may observe here that even if Art. 61 were to apply, the suit would be barred as it was brought more than three years after the payments were made and even if the view of the Madras High Court were to be preferred, the present suit will, all the same, be time barred and that is why Shri Bhandari did not rely upon the ruling of the Madras High Court so far as it says that Art. 61 applies. He relied upon that ruling only so far as it says that Art. 83 does not apply, 14. I see no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. 15. The appeal is dismissed. The defendant-respondent shall get his costs from the plaintiff-appellant.