Jwala Prasad v. Sumiran — 1959 DIGILAW 43 (ALL)

JUDGMENT B. Mukherji, J. - This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment under Sec. 209 of Act I of 1951, viz., the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The circumstances which gave rise to the suit were these:- 2. One Suchit was the hereditary tenant of certain plots of land. On the 1st of July, 1942, Suchit sublet these plots to Jwala Prasad and others who were the defendants to the suit. Some years after subletting, Suchit died, and he was succeeded by Sumiran and Puran in respect of the lands. Sumiran and Puran filed a suit praying for a declaration of their rights in the land, for ejectment of the defendants and for delivery of possession being given to them of the lands from which the defendants were to be ejected. 3. On the 13th March, 1948, there was a compromise in the aforementioned suit and under the compromise the defendants were permitted to continue as sub-tenants of the land in suit till the end of 1359F., i.e. up to the 30th June, 1952. The defendants under the compromise were to pay Rs. 30/- per annum as rent and after that period viz., after the 30th June, 1952, they were to give up or relinquish possession in favour of the tenants-in-thief, the plaintiffs of that suit. 4. The defendants did not give up possession of the lands in suit after the expiry of the 30th June, 1952. They continued in possession and the desire of the plaintiffs to get back possession from them voluntarily proved of no avail. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the present suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. This suit was filed by Sumiran and Puran against Jwala Prasad, Shyam Sunder, Jagannath, and Daya Shankar, Pradhan of Gram Sabha of Udaipur. The suit was one, as we have said, under Sec. 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and was filed on the 2nd January, 1953. 5. The defence of Jwala Prasad and his co-defendants was that they had prescribed adhivasi rights under Sec. 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and, therefore, they were not liable to ejectment by enforcing a term of the compromise which had been entered into before the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into being, namely the compromise dated the 13th March, 1948. 6. 6. The learned Munsif of Tarabganj, Gonda, who tried the suit, held that the defendants had prescribed to themselves the rights of an adhivasi under Sec. 20 of Act I of 1951, but even so he held that because of the provisions of Sec. 231 of that Act the defendants were liable to be ejected because one of the "liabilities" which they had undertaken was the liability to go out of possession of the lands on the 30th June, 1952 in short what the trial court held was that since Sec. 231 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act recognised the liabilities which a person, prior to his becoming an adhivasi, undertook and since further, the defendants had under the compromise under-taken to go out of possession after the 30th June, 1952, therefore that liability of theirs could be enforce, by the suit. 7. There was an appeal and the lower appellate Court more or less took the same view which the trial Court had taken and affirmed the decree for ejectment which had been passed by the trial Court. 8. The defendants, therefore, have come up in second appeal to this Court. The second appeal originally came before a learned single Judge, who referred it for decision to a Bench. 9. The questions that arise for determination in this appeal may be stated thus :- (1) Did the defendants acquire the rights of an adhivasi under Sec. 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and if they did under which part of the section they acquired such rights ? (2) Whether after having acquired the rights of an adhivasi, if they did so by virtue of Sec. 20 of the Act could they be ejected from the lands in respect of which they acquired adhivasi rights because of the compromise entered into by them on the 13th March, 1948 ? (3) Whether the words 'the liabilities' mentioned in Sec. 231 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act referred to the liabilities of the type under which could come the liability which was undertaken, by the defendants by the compromise of March 1948 ? (3) Whether the words 'the liabilities' mentioned in Sec. 231 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act referred to the liabilities of the type under which could come the liability which was undertaken, by the defendants by the compromise of March 1948 ? (4) Could it be said that the defendants acquired the rights of an adhivasi on the basis of the compromise or did they acquire those rights independently of that compromise, and if they acquired the rights of an adhivasi independently of that compromise whether any obligations or any liability incurred under that compromise could or could not be enforced by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 231 of the Act ? (5) Whether an adhivasi can be ejected on any other grounds, including a contractual obligation made by him which did not quite fall within the grounds for ejectment mentioned in Sec. 234 of the Act ? As we have noticed earlier, the defendants were sub-tenants and as such they acquired adhivasi rights under the provisions of Sec. 20 (a) (ii) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It was conceded by Counsel on both sides, and indeed it was accepted by the Courts below too, that the defendants did acquire the status of an adhivasi. What however was not correctly stated by the lower appellate court was the provision under which that right was acquired. As we have said, in our view the defendants acquired adhivasi rights under Sec. 20 (a) (ii) and after acquiring adhivasi rights they were entitled to retain possession of the land in respect of which they acquired those rights. 10. Sec. 231 of the Act mentions the rights of adhivasis. This section is in these words :- "231. Rights of an adhivasi.- (l) Except as provided in Sec. 233, 234 and 237 and subject to his paying the rent, an adhivasi shall continue to have all the rights and the liabilities which he possessed, or was subject to in respect of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting : Provided that, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or other engagement, the rent payable by the adhivasi shall not be varied except as permitted by this Act. (2) When an adhivasi dies his interest in the holding shall, in the matter of devolution, be governed by the provisions contained in Secs. 171 to 173," 11. (2) When an adhivasi dies his interest in the holding shall, in the matter of devolution, be governed by the provisions contained in Secs. 171 to 173," 11. The provisions of the aforequoted Sec. 231 clearly indicate that die adhivasi is to continue to have all the rights and liabilities which he possessed or to which he was subject in respect of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. The question, therefore, that falls for determination under the circumstances of this case is whether the defendants could be said to have been under a liability as contemplated under Sec. 231 of going out of possession because they had under the compromise undertaken to go out of possession voluntarily after the 30th June, 1952: in short, the question is whether that agreement, in the compromise could be tarmed as one of the liabilities to which the defendants were subject to immediately preceding the date of vesting. If the defendants could be said to have acquired adhivasi rights by virtue of the compromise, then there could be no difficulty in saying that they were subject to the liabilities which they had under-taken under that compromise, if there was any liability under the terms of the compromise, but if the acquisition of their right as adhivasi was independent of and aliunde the compromise, then in our view it could not be contended reasonably that the defendant's rights as adhivasis were subject to any liabilities they had undertaken under the compromise. By the compromise the defendants did not acquire the status of a sub-tenant: that status they enjoyed prior to the compromise: the compromise only recognised that status so that immediately preceding the date of vesting they were sub-tenants. Under the compromise the defendants agreed to give up possession after the 30th June, 1952, but no specific date was fixed for their doing so. All that was recognised under the compromise was that the defendant were to continue to enjoy the status of a subtenant on payment of rent from 1355 to the end of 1359F. Under the compromise the defendants agreed to give up possession after the 30th June, 1952, but no specific date was fixed for their doing so. All that was recognised under the compromise was that the defendant were to continue to enjoy the status of a subtenant on payment of rent from 1355 to the end of 1359F. Immediately before the date of vesting the defendants were not under an obligation to give up possession so that under the compromise they could not be said validly to have undertaken any obligation to give up their status immediately prior to the date of vesting so that under the compromise there was no obligation which could be set up against them. 12. Sri Hargovind Dayal Srivastava appearing on behalf of the respondents strenuously contended that the words 'the liabilities' used in Sec. 231 referred to every kind of liability which was undertaken by the erstwhile sub-tenant who became an adhivasi subsequently : his contention was that it certainly included all contractual obligations to which the erst-while sub-tenant was subject. It is not necessary for our purposes to express an opinion as to whether or not the words 'the liabilities' mentioned in Sec. 231 were or were" not wide enough under certain circumstances to include contractual obligations and some liabilities in the nature of contractual obligations, for in the present case we are concerned with a particular type of contractual obligation which was being attempted to be enforced against the defendants. The question, therefore, is whether the particular obligation which had been undertaken by the defendants in the deed of compromise, namely to give up possession voluntarily after the close of 1359F., was such a liability as could be enforced against them. 13. Sec. 231 speaks of rights and liabilities which the adhivasi possessed or was subject to in respect of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. Can it be therefore said that the obligation which the defendants took upon themselves to voluntarily leave the land was in the nature of rights and liabilities which they possessed in respect of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting? Can it be therefore said that the obligation which the defendants took upon themselves to voluntarily leave the land was in the nature of rights and liabilities which they possessed in respect of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting? We do not think it was, for as we see the position we see it to be that immediately after the midnight of the 30th June, 1952, by the coming into force of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and on the making of the vesting order the defendants acquired certain statutory rights. These rights were acquired independently of the compromise of the 13th March, 1948. The fact that the defendants enjoyed the status of sub-tenants even under the compromise did not make the terms of the compromise any of "thy rights or liabilities" which they possessed immediately preceding the date of vesting as sub-tenants. We are of the opinion that the defendants acquired adhivasi rights independently of the compromise and the term, of the compromise did not in any manner affect the rights acquired by them under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Their rights could not, therefore, be said to be subject to anything which they had said or undertaken under the compromise. 14. The question that now arises for determination is that if the defendants were not bound by any declaration which they made in the compromise as a liability under the provisions of Sec. 231 could they be ejected under the provisions of Sec. 209 of the Act? Sec. 209 of the Act confers the rights to eject persons occupying land without any title. The defendants, on what we have said above, could not be said to have been occupying land without any title. They acquired an interest in the landon interest created in their favour by the Statute, namely, they acquired the status of an adhivasi which conferred on them rights and liabilities mentioned in Sec. 231 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Therefore, they could not possibly be deemed to have been persons taking or retaining possession of land otherwise then in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. Therefore, they could not possibly be deemed to have been persons taking or retaining possession of land otherwise then in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. They were retaining possession because under the provisions of Sec. 20 they had prescribed to themselves the character and the status of an adhivasi and as such under that very section they were entitled to take or retain possession of the land in respect of which they acquired such rights. Sec. 231 guarantees the continuance of the rights which an adhivasi acquires subject of course to the provisions of Secs. 233, 234 and 237 of the Act. Secs. 233 and 237 are not really pertinent for our present purposes but Sec. 234 is, in so far as, this section prescribes the grounds on which an adhivasi can be ejected. Sec. 234 is in these words:- "231. Ejectment of adhivasi - Without prejudice to the provisions of section 237, an adhivasi shall be liable to ejectment from the land held by him- (a) on the ground that he is in arrears of rent, (b) on the ground that he has made any transfer of his holding or part thereof, or (c) for using the land for any purpose not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming, and the provisions of Chapter VIII relating to the procedure and forum relating to suits and applications for ejectment on any of the grounds aforesaid shall, mutatis mutandis, apply as if the adhivasi were an asami." 15. The provisions of the aforequoted Sec. 234, therefore, indicate that an adhivast was liable to ejectment on certain grounds. Sri Hargovind Dayal Srivastava contended that the grounds mentioned in Sec. 234 were not exhaustive. It may be that, but nevertheless, in our opinion the grounds on which the ejectment of an adhivasi can be sought have got to be at any rate ejusdem generis the grounds mentioned in Sec. 234. The opening words in Sec. 231 are "except as provided in Sea. 233, 234 and 237" which give clear indication of the fact that the ejectment of an Adhivasi could take place only under Sec. 234. The opening words in Sec. 231 are "except as provided in Sea. 233, 234 and 237" which give clear indication of the fact that the ejectment of an Adhivasi could take place only under Sec. 234. In this connection it may be noticed that the entire object of the legislature in enacting the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the other pieces of connected or similar legislation was to confer on tenants rights which could not easily be defeated. That being the clear intention and policy underlying the legislation, it would be in our view incorrect to interpret the section in such terms, unless the language of the section forced such interpretation, which would defeat or materially affect the objects underlying the legislation. 16. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that this second appeal must succeed. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decrees of the courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we are of the opinion that the parties must bear their own costs of the litigation throughout.