Judgment :- BALAKRISHNA AYYAR J. This is a petition by the Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., for the issue of a writ of prohibition to restrain the first respondent from carrying on any investigation into the affairs of the company in pursuance of an order made under section 33 of the Insurance Act by the Central Government The relevant facts are these : The petitioner company was incorporated on September 25, 1941, and came under the purview of the Insurance Act of 1938. The company applied for and obtained certificate of registration for carrying on various classes of insurance business. On October 15, 1956, there was an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the company at which four resolutions were passed. By the first it was resolved : "that the company do forthwith cease to carry on business as insurer in respect of fire, motor, marine, and accident and other general insurance business." The second resolution required the directors "to stop the carrying on the business of insurers in all the branches of the said business and not to issue any policy of insurance, cover notes or other contracts of insurance from and after this date." * The third resolution required the board of directors to "carry on the business of money lending as a loan company and also to do investment business." The fourth resolution authorised and instructed the directors to notify the Controller of Insurance that the company had with effect from the date ceased to carry on the business of insurers. The directors were also instructed not to apply for renewal of the licences which the company held, when those licences terminated in the usual course. On December 10, 1956, the Company wrote to the Controller of Insurance, Government of India, informing him that by reasons of the resolution that had been passed at the extra ordinary general meeting of the company held on October 15, 1956, "we cannot apply to you for the renewal of registration under sub-section (2) of section 3A of the Insurance Act, 1938, and we are, therefore, not applying to you for the renewal of registration which please note". On May 14, 1957, the Controller of Insurance wrote to the company stating that as the company had failed to obtain renewal of its certificates of registration, the previous certificates had been cancelled with effect from July 1, 1957. On May 14, 1957, the Controller of Insurance wrote to the company stating that as the company had failed to obtain renewal of its certificates of registration, the previous certificates had been cancelled with effect from July 1, 1957. The cancellation was also notified in the Gazette of IndiaIn October, 1956, and subsequently the Government of India received complaints against the company. On July 17, 1957, the Government of India passed an order directing the Controller of Insurance to investigate the affairs of this company and to submit a report. The Controller of Insurance appointed Messrs. Fraser and Ross, the first respondent in this petition, to be auditors to assist him in the investigation of the affairs of the company. Thereupon the company on October 9, 1957, wrote to the Controller of Insurance drawing his attention to the resolutions that had been passed and pointing out "We submit that the action taken by you purporting to be under section 33 of the Insurance Act of 1938, upon a direction from the Central Government in this behalf, is without jurisdiction and not warranted by provisions of the Act". The Controller wrote back overruling this objection raised by the Company. In consequence the company had come to this court and asked for the issue of a Writ of Prohibition Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, argued : The only provision in the Act which enables the Central Government to issue an order of the kind now complained of is to be found in section 33 of the Act. Jagadisa Aiyar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, argued : The only provision in the Act which enables the Central Government to issue an order of the kind now complained of is to be found in section 33 of the Act. The first sub-section of that section runs as follows "The Central Government may at any time, by order in writing, direct the Controller or any other person specified in the order to investigate the affairs of any insurer and to report to the Central Government on any investigation made by him." * The word "insurer" occurring in this sub-section is defined - so far as that definition is here relevant - in section 2(9) paragraph (b) in these terms "any body corporate (not being a person specified in sub-clause (c) of this clause) carrying on the business of insurance, which is a body corporate incorporated under any law for the time being in force in India, or stands to any such body corporate in the relation of a subsidiary company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, as defined by sub-section (2) of section 2 of that Act." * To come within the terms of the definition the body corporate must be actually carrying on the business of insurance. It is not sufficient if it had carried the business of insurance in the past; if it has ceased to carry on the business of insurance it would not be an "insurer" within the meaning of this definition; consequently it will be outside the scope of section 33 which cannot therefore be applied to its affairs Dealing with section 2D of the Act, Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar explained that it would not apply to a case like the present where a company has closed down every one of its various lines of insurance business. Section 2D enacts "Every insurer shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act in relation to any class of insurance business so long as his liabilities in India in respect of business of that class remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for." * Commenting on this section Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar explained A company may be carrying on several lines of insurance business, fire, marine, accident and so on. Jagadisa Aiyar explained A company may be carrying on several lines of insurance business, fire, marine, accident and so on. What section 2D says is that merely because it has closed down one line or department of insurance the company will not cease to be an "insurer" and will not cases to be subject to the liabilities imposed on it in respect of the other departments which it continues to carry on. It may even be that one can properly say that so long as it carries on any line of insurance business, it is an "insurer" and in consequence subject to the provisions of the Act even in respect of the branch or branches which it has shut down. Granting all that the position is that once a company had shut down all its branches of insurance business, it would cease to be an "insurer" and so an investigation cannot be ordered under section 33 of the Act in respect of its affairs. The word "insurer" in section 2D must be read as a person who is actually carrying on the business of insurance. Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar further pointed out that in this particular case the certificate of registration that had been issued to the company was cancelled with effect from July 1, 1957, and he argued that though it may be that such cancellation does not absolve the company from the obligations, if any, arising out of the policies it had issued in the past, it is entirely precluded from doing any further insurance business. That is another reason why section 33 cannot be utilised for directing an investigation into its affairsIt had ceased to do insurance business, it had also lost the right to do any insurance business, it therefore ceased to be an "insurer" within the meaning of section 33 of the Act I am unable to accept this line of reasoning. The word "insurer" is used in the Act to include (a) persons actually carrying on insurance business; (b) persons about to commence insurance business; and (c) persons who have stopped insurance business but against whom claims or liabilities might be outstanding Take section 7 to begin with. That requires every "insurer" who does not fall under section 2(9)(c), to deposit and keep deposited with the Reserve Bank of India various amounts of money. That requires every "insurer" who does not fall under section 2(9)(c), to deposit and keep deposited with the Reserve Bank of India various amounts of money. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) runs "Where the business done or to be done is life insurance only, two hundred thousand rupees." Eight other similar clauses follow. In every one of these clauses the expression used is "where the business done or to be done". Now the use of the expression "to be done" in relation to the word "insurer" is obviously intended to include a person who is about to commence the business. Then, there is section 9 which provides for situations "where an insurer has ceased to carry on in India any class of insurance business." If therefore in this section the word "insurer" means a person who is actually carrying on the business of insurance, then that section would be self contradictory and stand stultified. Further down we have got section 55, the first sub-section of which begins, "In the winding up of an insurance company or in the insolvency of any other insurer the value of the assets and the liabilities of the insurer shall be ascertained ..............." * in the manner subsequently provided for. It is obviously that after insolvency supervenes the business cannot be carried on and so the word "insurer" in this section must mean a person who has ceased to carry on business. The meaning of the word "insurer" in section 56 is also the sameAs regards the contention of Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar based on the cancellation of the certificates of registration, it would be enough to observe that it would logically lead to a situation where a person can profit by his own wrongful acts. A certificate of registration may be cancelled for failure to comply with one or other of the various requirements of the stature. A person who wants to avoid an investigation has only to do something or omit to do something which, by reason of the provisions of the Act, would lead to the cancellation of the certificate of registration. Thereafter if Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar was right it would be possible for him to say that since the registration has been cancelled there can be no investigation into his affairs I now come to section 33. Thereafter if Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar was right it would be possible for him to say that since the registration has been cancelled there can be no investigation into his affairs I now come to section 33. Under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of that section the Central Government may direct the Controller to cancel the registration of the insurer, which means that from that time the "insurer " cannot carry on the business of insurance. Then there is clause (c) which provides that the Central Government may direct the Controller to apply to the Court for the winding up of the insurer, if a company, whether the registration of the insurer has been cancelled under clause (b) or not." * If the argument of Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar were right we shall reach this position. The moment the registration is cancelled the company would cease to be "insurer". And if it ceases to be an "insurer" the Controller cannot proceed to direct an investigation of its affairs. None the less this clause provides that notwithstanding the cancellation of the registration, the Central Government may direct the Controller to apply to the Court for the winding up of the insurer and his company. In other words, even in sub-section (4) the word "insurer" is used to comprehend companies which have ceased to carry on the business of insurance. The only clean alternative would be the assumption that the Legislature has contradicted itself in the same clauseI agree with Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar that in the Act an attempt has been made for certain purposes to maintain a distinction between the various lines of business which an insurer may be carrying on. But from that it does not follow that the other parts of his contentions are sound. It seems to be that section 2D was deliberately inserted to provide for a contingency of the kind that has arisen in this case. It could only have been intended to prevent a person or company which has been carrying on the business of insurance from escaping the liabilities and duties imposed upon it by the Act by the simple device of stopping its insurance business. Mr. It could only have been intended to prevent a person or company which has been carrying on the business of insurance from escaping the liabilities and duties imposed upon it by the Act by the simple device of stopping its insurance business. Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar argued that if section 33 was intended to apply to situation where an insurer had ceased to carry on the business of insurance, then the Legislature would have added the phrase "notwithstanding that the insurer has ceased to carry on the business" at some appropriate place in that section. It seems to me that what the Legislature has done is this : Instead of using this phrase in numerous places in the Act, it inserted section 2D so that it could be made plain that for all purposes of the Act a person who had been carrying on the business of insurance would continue to be subject to the liabilities and obligations imposed by the Act "so long as his liabilities in India in respect of the business of that class remains unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for" Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar further argued : Even if it be that section 2D applied to an insurer who has ceased to transact business, it must appear that his liabilities in India in respect of the business he had been carrying on remain unsatisfied or unprovided for. In the order they made under section 33 of the Act the Central Government do not say that the liabilities of the petitioner company remain unsatisfied or unprovided for and till they record such a finding they cannot issue an order under section 33. On this argument certain comments may be made. In the first place, it is clear that certain claims are still pending against the company. Even in the reply affidavit of the petitioner it is admitted that one Mrs. Sarla Devi, Delhi, had obtained a decree for Rs. 50, 000, against the company and that an appeal from the decree is pending in the Punjab High Court. In respect of another item, item 10 in annexure B to the reply affidavit of the petitioner, the remarks made are : "Repudiated on the ground that the driver was acquitted in the criminal case." Apart from others these are sufficient to show that certain claims are still pending against the company. In respect of another item, item 10 in annexure B to the reply affidavit of the petitioner, the remarks made are : "Repudiated on the ground that the driver was acquitted in the criminal case." Apart from others these are sufficient to show that certain claims are still pending against the company. I express no opinion whatever in respect of any of the allegations that may have been made against the company by the persons who petitioned the Government of India. Secondly, it is no doubt true that the order which the Government of India made under section 33 does not make any reference to the liabilities of the company as subsisting. But then I can see nothing in section 33 which requires the Government of India to record any finding in that regard. That section does not say that the Government of India must be satisfied that any claims are outstanding. It does not even say that the Government of India must have received complaints. That section gives powers to the Central Government "at any time by order in writing" to direct the Controller or any other person they may specify to investigate the affairs of the insurer and report to them. Finally it will be realised that if the argument of Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar were pressed to its logical end an impasse will result. The Government cannot order the investigation unless it appears that there are liabilities which remain unsatisfied or unprovided for. But then this cannot be satisfactorily ascertained except after an enquiry. We thus move round in a vicious circle. We cannot have an inquiry because there is no finding; we cannot have a finding because there can be no enquiry. A line of reasoning that produces such a result cannot be acceptedI would repeat one point I made earlier. If the contentions of Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar were right, a company whose affairs are being conducted in a fraudulent or dishonest manner - I am not expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations made against this company - would be able to avert an enquiry by the very simple device of passing a resolution suspending all its business. That is not a device I am willing to countenance. In the result, this Writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. That is not a device I am willing to countenance. In the result, this Writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250 The petitioner appealed G. R. Jagadisan and T. S. Srinivasan for the appellant Government Pleader for the respondents The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAJAMANNAR C.J. - This is an appeal against the judgment of BALAKRISHNA AIYAR J. dismissing a petition filed by the appellant (W.P. No. 922 of 1957) under article 226 of the Constitution in the following circumstances The appellant, the Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. was incorporated in Madras on 25th September, 1941, under the Indian companies Act, 1913. The object inter alia of the said company was to carry on fire, motor, marine, accident and other general insurance business. It is common ground that the company was bound by the provisions of the Insurance Act, 1938. In accordance with the requirements of that Act, the company applied for and obtained certificate of registration for carrying on the aforesaid classes of insurance business. The necessary deposit to be made under section 7 of that Act was also made. It is common ground that the company was bound by the provisions of the Insurance Act, 1938. In accordance with the requirements of that Act, the company applied for and obtained certificate of registration for carrying on the aforesaid classes of insurance business. The necessary deposit to be made under section 7 of that Act was also made. At an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the company held on 15th October, 1956, the following resolutions were passed "Resolved that the company do forthwith cease to carry on the business as insurers in respect of fire, motor, marine and accident and other general insurance businessResolved that the board of directors of the company be and are hereby instructed to stop the carrying on the business of insurers in all the branches of the said business and not to issue any policy of insurance, cover notes or other contracts of insurance from and after this date Resolved that the board of directors be and are hereby instructed that the company shall hereafter carry on the business of money-lending as a loan company and also to do investment business Resolved that the directors be and are hereby authorised and instructed to notify the Controller of Insurance and that this company has with effect from this date ceased to carry on the business of Insurance and on the expiry of the present licence of insurance, not to apply for renewal thereof." The Company informed the Controller of Insurance by its letter dated 10th December, 1956, of the resolution ceasing to carry on the business of insurance and intimated that it could not therefore apply for renewal of registration. On 14th May, 1957, the Controller of Insurance gave notice to the company that as the company had failed to have its registration renewed for the year 1957, the certificates of registration bearing Nos. 380 and 380/2 dated 14th March, 1944, and 23rd August, 1944, respectively granted to the company under section 3 of the Insurance Act were cancelled with effect from 1st July, 1957, under sub-section (4) of that section. The notification of cancellation of registration of the company was also published in the Government of India Gazette dated 22nd July, 1957. 380 and 380/2 dated 14th March, 1944, and 23rd August, 1944, respectively granted to the company under section 3 of the Insurance Act were cancelled with effect from 1st July, 1957, under sub-section (4) of that section. The notification of cancellation of registration of the company was also published in the Government of India Gazette dated 22nd July, 1957. On 17th July, 1957, the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, passed the following order "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 33 of the Insurance Act, 1938, (IV of 1938), the Central Government hereby directs the Controller of Insurance to investigate the affairs of the Vanguard Insurance Company Ltd., and the Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. Madras, and to report to the Central Government on the investigation made by him." * Forwarding a copy of this order, the Controller of Insurance intimated to the Appellant company that he had appointed Messrs. Fraser and Ross, Madras, as the auditors to assist him in the investigation and a deposit of a sum of Rs. 2, 500 provisionally in respect of the fees of the auditors and called upon the company to give the auditors all information and facilities they may require for the investigation. Acknowledging this letter the company replied to the Controller of Insurance submitting that the action taken by the Controller purporting to be under section 33 of the Insurance Act upon a direction from the central Government was without jurisdiction and not warranted by the provisions of the Act, because the company was not an insurer within the meaning of the Act, having ceased to carry on the business of insurance in accordance with the resolution dated 15th October, 1956. The answer of the Controller to this objection was as follows "With reference to your letter dated the 9th October, 1957, on the above subject, I have to invite a reference to the provisions of section 20 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and to say that even though the registration of the company for transacting fire, marine, and miscellaneous classes of insurance business stands canceled and the company has stopped transactions in insurance business, it is subject to all the provisions of the Act as long as the liabilities in respect of the existing business are not fully satisfied or otherwise provided for. In the circumstances the company should comply with the requirements of this department's letter of even number dated the 17th September, 1957, without any further loss of time." * Thereupon the appellant company filed the writ petition out of which this appeal arises praying that this court may issue a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, direction or order to forbear Messrs. Fraser and Ross from carrying on any investigation against the company purporting to be under section 33 of the Insurance Act under order of the Controller of Insurance. The main ground on which the writ was sought was that the appellant was not an insurer within the meaning of the Act from the moment it ceased to carry on insurance business in pursuance of the resolution passed at the extraordinary general meeting dated 15th October, 1956, mentioned above. BALAKRISHNA AIYAR J. held that the appellant company musts be deemed to be an insurer within the meaning of the Act and dismissed the writ petition. BALAKRISHNA AIYAR J. held that the appellant company musts be deemed to be an insurer within the meaning of the Act and dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appealBefore dealing with the contentions and arguments put forward before us, it will be useful to refer to the provisions of the Insurance Act, which have a material bearing on the questions which arise in this appeal Section 2(9) defines inter alia "insurer" as "any body corporate (not being a person specified in sub-clause (c) of this clause) carrying on the business of insurance, which is a body corporate incorporated under any law for the time being in force in the States; or stands to any such body corporate in relation of a subsidiary company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, as defined by sub-section (2) of section 2 of that Act ...." * Section 2D which was inserted by the Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1939 runs thus "Every insurer shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act in relation to any class of insurance business so long as his liabilities in the States in respect of business of that class remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for." * Of the grounds on which the Controller can cancel registration of an insurer either wholly or in so far as it relates to a particular class of insurance business it is sufficient to refer to one of them, namely, section 3(4)(f) "If the insurer makes default in complying with, or acts in contravention of any requirement of this Act or of any rule or order made thereunder ...." Section 3(5B) declares the effect of cancellation of registration thus "When a registration is cancelled the insurer shall not, after the cancellation has taken effect, enter into any new contracts of insurance, but all rights and liabilities in respect of contracts of insurance entered into by him before such cancellation takes effect shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5D) continue as if the cancellation had not taken place." * Where the registration of an insurance company is cancelled under sub-section (4) of section 3, the Controller may, after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cancellation took effect, apply to the court for an order to wind up the insurance company, or wind up the affairs of the company in respect of a class of insurance business, unless the registration of the insurance company has been revived under sub-section (5C) or an application for winding up the company has been already presented to the court : section 3(5D). Section 7 provides for the deposit in cash, or in approved securities estimated at the market value of the securities, on the day of the deposit, or in both, with the Reserve Bank of India, of amounts specified for each class insurance business. Any deposit made under section 7 will be deemed to be part of the assets of the insurer, but it shall not be available for the discharge of any liability of the insurer other than the liabilities arising out of policies of insurance issued by the insurer so long as any such liabilities remain undischarged. Nor shall it be liable to attachment in execution of any decree except a decree obtained by a policyholder of the insurer in respect of a debt due upon a policy, which debt the policy holder has failed to realise in any other way : section 8(1). Where an insurer has ceased to carry on any class of insurance business in respect of which a deposit has been made under section 7 and his liabilities in respect of business of that class have been satisfied or otherwise provided for, the court may, on the application of the insurer, order the return to the insurer of so much of the deposit as does not relate to the classes of insurance, if any, which he continues to carry on : section 9(1). Section 10(1) of the Act requires the insurer carrying on business of more than one class of insurance to keep a separate account of all receipts and payments in respect of each such class of insurance business. Section 10(1) of the Act requires the insurer carrying on business of more than one class of insurance to keep a separate account of all receipts and payments in respect of each such class of insurance business. Section 33 of the Act, the application of which is the main point in controversy, in so far as it is material for the disposal of this appeal, runs as followsSection 33(1) : "The Central Government may at any time, by order in writing, direct the Controller or any other person specified in the order to investigate the affairs of any insurer and to report to the Central Government on any investigation made by him Provided that the Controller or the other person may, wherever necessary, employ an auditor or actuary or both for the purpose of assisting him in any investigation under this section (2) It shall be the duty of every manager, managing director or other officer of the insurer to produce before the person directed to make the investigation under sub-section (1) all such books of account, registers, and other documents in his custody or powers and to furnish him with any statements and information relating to the affairs of the insurer as the said person may require of him within such time as the said person may specify (4) On receipt of any report under sub-section (1), the Central Government may, after giving such opportunity to the insurer to make a representation in connection with the reports, as, in the opinion of the Central Government, seems reasonable, by order in writing, - (a) require the insurer to take such action in respect of any matter arising out of the reports as the Central Government may think fit, or (b) direct the Controller to cancel the registration of the insurer; or (c) direct the Controller to apply to the Court for the winding up of the insurer, if a company, whether the registration of the insurer has been cancelled under clause (b) or not (5) No order made under this section other than an order made under clause (b) of sub-section (4) shall be capable of being called in question in any court." * The contention of Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellant company, is that an order under section 33 of the Act can be passed only in respect of the affairs of an insurer, and the appellant is not an insurer because on the date of the order of the Government the company was not carrying on the business of insurance. Not only had the company resolved on 15th October, 1956, not to do any further insurance business, its registration had also been cancelled by the Controller with effect from 1st July, 1957. He relied on the provisions of section 3(5B) that when a registration is cancelled the insurer shall not after the cancellation has taken effect enter into any new contracts of insurance. The mere fact that there may be outstanding liabilities in respect of policies issued before the cancellation would not in law amount to carrying on of business. In support of his contention he cited certain decisions under the Income-tax Act, namely, the Liquidators of Pursa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax, Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax and Estate of Lala Shankar Sah v. Commissioner of Income-tax. He pressed upon us the following observations in the last mentioned case at page 509 "Counsel for the Department has further urged that inasmuch as outstandings of the money-lending business were realised by the executors, they should be taken to have carried on the business of money-lending too. It is, however, conceded by him that beyond realising the outstanding debts, nothing further was done by the executors and no new loans were advanced. In these circumstances, we do not consider that it can be reasonably argued that in merely collecting the outstanding dues, any business of money-lending was being carried on by the executors." * We do not think that the above observations and the decisions cited offer us much assistance. The phrase "carry on business" occurs in several enactments and has to be construed according to the context in which it occurs. It may be construed in one way for the purpose of section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and in a different way for purpose of income-tax. The phrase "carry on business" occurs in several enactments and has to be construed according to the context in which it occurs. It may be construed in one way for the purpose of section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and in a different way for purpose of income-tax. Equally unhelpful are the decisions cited by the learned Government Pleader to support his contention that so long as there are liabilities still remaining, there would be a carrying on of business, - Smith v. Anderson, and Central India Mining Co. v. Societe Colonial Anversoise. The following observations of BANKES L.J. at page 767 in Central India Mining Co. v. Societe Coloniale Anversoise, "But it must also be true that the appellants had made such arrangements as were necessary to enable the collection of debts and the discharge of liabilities to go on." must be taken along with the circumstances in that case, that there was an intention to continue the business as soon as it was possible. In our opinion the question must be decided on the meaning given to insurance business in the Act itself. Section 2(6A) defines fire insurance business as the business of effecting contracts of insurance against loss by or incidental to fire and clause (11) defines life insurance business as business of effecting contract of insurance upon human life, and miscellaneous insurance business is defined as the business of effecting contracts of insurance which is not principally or wholly of any kind or kinds included in previous clauses. The Act therefore means by insurance business, effecting contracts of insurance. When the definition of "insurer" in section 2(9)(b) refers to anybody corporate carrying on the business of insurance, the implication is that the body corporate is effecting contracts of insurance. Admittedly once there has been a cancellation of registration, the company cannot effect any new contracts of insurance. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Government pleaded that a company can be deemed to be carrying on business within the meaning of that expression in section 2(9) of the Act even after there has been a cancellation of registration. We may add that the Government and the Controller never appear to have taken up the position that the appellant company was carrying on business after its registration had been cancelled because there were certain liabilities outstandingIt now remains to consider the scope of section 2D. We may add that the Government and the Controller never appear to have taken up the position that the appellant company was carrying on business after its registration had been cancelled because there were certain liabilities outstandingIt now remains to consider the scope of section 2D. The contention of Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar was that the word "insurer" in that section should be construed strictly according to the definition of "insurer" in section 2(9), with the result that nobody could be deemed to be an insurer even for the purpose of section 2D after the body had ceased to carry on new business. He would limit the application of section 2D to the particular case where a corporate body was originally carrying on insurance business of several classes but subsequently it ceased to carry on one or more of such classes of insurance business, though continuing to carry on other classes of business. In such a case the body could be described as carrying on insurance business though the body had ceased to carry on business of a particular kind, because it was continuing to carry on insurance business of other kinds. We are unable to agree with this contention. Undoubtedly when a term is defined in an enactment, wherever that term occurs, the definition would ordinarily apply; but there is a well known canon of construction that in certain circumstances when a strict adherence to the rule would lead to an anomaly or repugnance, the rule would apply only when there is nothing repugnant to it in the context. Undoubtedly when a term is defined in an enactment, wherever that term occurs, the definition would ordinarily apply; but there is a well known canon of construction that in certain circumstances when a strict adherence to the rule would lead to an anomaly or repugnance, the rule would apply only when there is nothing repugnant to it in the context. Section 2 of the Act, which is the definition section, opens with the words "Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context." BLACKBURN J. said in R. v. Ramsgate "It is, I apprehend, in accordance with the general rule of construction that you are not only to look at the words, but you are to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter, and interpret the meaning according to what would appear to be meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances." * Craies draws from this rule the following inference "It follows from the rule thus variously stated that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification, variously expressed, in the definition clauses which create them, such as : 'unless the context otherwise requires'; or 'unless a contrary intention appears'; or 'if not inconsistent with the context or subject-matter'." * (Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn.) The word "insurer" occurs in several sections of the Act but it is obvious that in every place where it is used it would be anomalous to import the definition contained in section 2(9)(b) in its entirety. For instance section 9(1) of the Act which provides for the refund of the deposit made under section 7 says "Where an insurer has ceased to carry on in the States, any class of insurance business in respect of which a deposit has been made under section 7 ......." If we import the definition of "insurer" as it is, there would be a contradiction in terms. A body which has ceased to carry on a business cannot be a body carrying on the business. Section 55(1) provides that in the winding up of an insurance company or in the insolvency of any other insurer, the value of the assets and liabilities of the insurer shall be ascertained. In such a contingency there can be no question of anybody carrying on insurance business. Section 55(1) provides that in the winding up of an insurance company or in the insolvency of any other insurer, the value of the assets and liabilities of the insurer shall be ascertained. In such a contingency there can be no question of anybody carrying on insurance business. Nevertheless the word used is "insurer" (vide also section 56) In our opinion, the term insurer in section 2D must in certain circumstances be also understood as a body corporate which had been carrying on insurance business. In this connection we may refer to the provisions of section 3(5B) under which even though registration is cancelled, still in respect of the contracts of insurance entered into before the cancellation the rights and liabilities continue as if the cancellation had not taken place. Notionally the insurer would be deemed to be carrying on business for the specific purpose. In the same way, section 2D provides that the person who has been doing any class of insurance business but has ceased to do that class of business would nevertheless be subject to all the provisions of the Act so long as his liabilities in respect of that particular business remains unsatisfied, or not otherwise provided forMr. Jagadisa Aiyar made an attempt to get out of section 2D by contending that it cannot be said that the liabilities of the appellant are not otherwise provided for, when there was the deposit made by it under section 7. He, however, had to concede that there was nothing to show that a definite provision had been made for the discharge of particular liability remaining unsatisfied, say by constituting a fund or otherwise. He also contended that it is only when the Government is convinced that the liabilities remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for that the appellant can be deemed to come within the scope of section 2D, and there was no finding by the Government to that effect on record. We are unable to agree with this contention. There is sufficient material from which it is clear that all liabilities in respect of the business which was being carried on have not been satisfied or otherwise provided for Mr. We are unable to agree with this contention. There is sufficient material from which it is clear that all liabilities in respect of the business which was being carried on have not been satisfied or otherwise provided for Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar next urged that even after investigation and on receipt of the report on such investigation, all that the Central Government could do was one of three things specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) in section 33(4) of the Act. As the registration had been cancelled, it would be unnecessary to invoke clause (b). Under section 3(5D) when the registration is cancelled, the Controller may, after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cancellation took effect, apply to the court for an order to wind up the insurance company. So it was not necessary to rely upon clause (c). So far as clause (a) was concerned, there could be no direction because there was no insurer, as the business had ceased to be carried on. So his argument ran. It is true that clause (b) need not be invoked because the registration had been cancelled; but the Central Government could take action under clauses (a) and (c). No doubt, under section 3(5D) the controller himself may apply for winding up, but this provision is not inconsistent with the provision which enables the Government to direct the Controller to make an application for winding up if they think that it would be desirable to do so on a perusal of the report on the investigation. As we have already held that the word insurer need not always mean a body carrying on insurance business and may include a body which had been carrying on business it would be open to the Central Government under clause (a) to require the insurer to take such action as they may think fit in respect of any matter arising out of the reportWe, therefore, hold, agreeing with BALAKRISHNA AIYAR J. that the order passed by the Central Government under section 33 of the Act was valid though it was passed after the cancellation of registration The appeal fails and is dismissed with cost Advocate's fee Rs. 150 Appeal dismissed.