ORDER This is an application by the ex-Chairman of the Territorial Council, Manipur for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 27-9-58 of the Administrator appointed under the Territorial Councils Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be called the "Act") by which the said Administrator acting under S. 22(2) of the said Act removed the petitioner from the Office of Chairman, agreeing with the resolution passed by a majority of the members of the said Council. 2. The Territorial Council, Manipur (hereinafter to be called the "Council") was constituted under the Act, and consisted of 32 members. The Chief Commissioner of Manipur is the Administrator for the Council. Under S. 22 of the Act, the Council had to elect a Chairman. On 3-9-57, the petitioner Shri Dwipamani Dev Sarma, who belonged to the Socialist Party, was elected Chairman of the Council by the votes of the Socialist, Communist and Independent members who had 16 seats as against the Congress Party, who had only 15 seats. One seat then remained vacant. After the election, the budget of the Council for 1957-1958 was also passed. 3. Thereafter, it appears that a realignment of the strength of the parties in the Council took place. The Congress party secured the support of some Independents and the strength of the Congress party became 17 as against 15 of the remaining parties including the Chairman. When the budget for 1958-1959 as amended by the Finance Committee was placed before the Council in March, 1958, it was rejected in toto, the Congress party, who had then the majority being responsible for such rejection. The result was that there was a dead-lock as the Council could not carry on its work without the budget. To resolve this dead-lock, the Government of India had to step in under S. 63 of the Territorial Councils Act and pass an order on 1-4-58 by which the Administrator was allowed to authorise the Council to incur expenditure from the Council Fund in the Financial year 1958-59 until the adoption by the Council of the budget estimates for that year. 4. The matter did not stop there. By 3-9-1958, one year had passed after the election of the petitioner as Chairman. No resolution for the removal of the elected Chairman can be brought within the period of one year. 4. The matter did not stop there. By 3-9-1958, one year had passed after the election of the petitioner as Chairman. No resolution for the removal of the elected Chairman can be brought within the period of one year. On 4-9-58, a notice signed by 12 members of the Council belonging to the Congress Party was delivered to the Administrator stating their intention to move a resolution for the removal of the petitioner from the Chairmanship of the Council. This was in accordance with S. 22(3) of the Act. Along with the notice, a statement of reasons for the resolution signed by 12 members was also delivered to the Administrator. A copy of the resolution to be moved was also enclosed with the names of the proposed mover and seconder. On receipt of this notice, the Administrator passed an order on 5-9-58 under S. 22(3) of the Act, fixing the meeting for the consideration of the resolution on 27-9-58. Under S. 22(3), the said meeting had to be held within 30 days from 4-9-58. 5. On the same day (5-9-58) notices for the said meeting were also drawn up and sent to the Superintendent, Government Press for publication in an extra-ordinary Gazette and also to the Chief Executive Officer of the Council to be sent to all the members of the Council (annexure-4). The notice was duly published in the Manipur Gazette Extraordinary on 8-9-58 (annexure-5). Along with the notices sent to the Chief Executive Officer of the Council, copies of the statement of reasons and the draft resolution had also been sent to him for service on the members. 6. It appears that in the copies of the statement of reasons so sent for service, the names of all the 12 members who had signed the same were not found, but only the first signatorys name with the word "etc." added. On 8-9-58, the petitioner wrote a D. O. letter (annexure-7) to the Administrator stating that the names of 11 out of the 12 signatories although cyclostyled in the copies appears to have been torn off from the copies and that he felt it had been done purposely. On 8-9-58, the petitioner wrote a D. O. letter (annexure-7) to the Administrator stating that the names of 11 out of the 12 signatories although cyclostyled in the copies appears to have been torn off from the copies and that he felt it had been done purposely. On the same day the Chief Executive Officer also wrote the letter (annexure-8) requesting that the names of all the 12 signatories may be supplied to his Office immediately in order to enable him to send out complete notices to the members. A reply was sent on the same day by the Administrators Office to the Chairman of the Council, supplying the 12 names, (annexure-9). Curiously enough the Chief Executive Officer returned the said letter in original to the Administrators Office on 10-9-58 stating that the Chairman in his D. O. letter dated 8-9-58 did not ask for the names of the signatories and that he has been directed to return the letter containing the 12 names. The Chief Executive Officer conveniently forgot that by his letter dated 8-9-58 (annexure-8), which was marked as top priority, he had also asked for the names of the signatories for issuing complete notices to the members. 7. As the time for the meeting was fast approaching and as according to S. 22(3), the Administrator had to convene the meeting after giving not less than 15 days notice thereof, the Administrator directed the I. G. of Police by letter dated 8-9-58 and 10-9-1958 to serve the notices on all the members and copies of the said letter were sent to the Chief Executive Officer. In the notices so sent, the names of all the 12 signatories were supplied (annexures 11 to 13). 8. It may be mentioned here that some of the members live in the interior of the hills in Manipur which have no access or communication except through foot and others live in villages far off from Imphal where the Council has its Office. The result was that some of the notices issued through the I. G. of Police happened to be served on some of the members within a period less than 15 days from 27-9-58. This is the most serious objection raised in this writ against the validity of the meeting held on 27-9-58. 9. The meeting duly took place on 27-9-58, with all the 32 members present. This is the most serious objection raised in this writ against the validity of the meeting held on 27-9-58. 9. The meeting duly took place on 27-9-58, with all the 32 members present. It was presided over by the Administrator as required under S. 22(3) of the Act. At the meeting various preliminary objections were raised to the validity of the meeting. It is unnecessary to detail those objections for the present as the same objections have been raised in this writ and will be dealt with in their proper place. The objections were overruled by the Administrator and he held the meeting to be legally convened. Thereupon, the opposition members walked out of the meeting saying that it was illegal and unconstitutional and that they will not take part. They knew that they were in a minority and that if the meeting was held, the Congress Party who were in a majority would pass the resolution. There were left only 17 Congress party members and one neutral. They passed the following resolution by 18 votes to nil : "Resolved that with a view to ensuring democratic functioning of the Council and resolving the long standing dead-lock of the Council, Sh. Dwijamani Dev Sarma, the present Chairman be removed from his Office of the Chairman with immediate effect." 10. Section 22(2) of the Act provided that if the resolution was passed by not less than 2/3rd of the total membership of the Council, such a resolution shall have the effect of removing the Chairman from his Office from the date of the resolution, but that if such resolution was passed by less than 2/3rd, but by not less than one half of the total membership of the Council, the Administrator may, by order in writing, remove for reasons to be recorded, the Chairman from his Office as from such date as may be specified in the order. This particular resolution was passed by a majority of the Council, but by less than 2/3rd. Hence the Administrator acting under S. 22(2) passed an order (annexure-15) on the same date, namely, 27-9-58 giving his reasons for agreeing with the resolution and removing the petitioner from the Office of Chairman with immediate effect, that is, from the afternoon of 27-9-58. The reasons given are in paragraph 5 of the said order. Hence the Administrator acting under S. 22(2) passed an order (annexure-15) on the same date, namely, 27-9-58 giving his reasons for agreeing with the resolution and removing the petitioner from the Office of Chairman with immediate effect, that is, from the afternoon of 27-9-58. The reasons given are in paragraph 5 of the said order. I shall quote them verbatim : "And whereas the Chairman Shri Dwijamani Dev Sarma had lost the confidence of the House and there has been a dead-lock in its working resulting in the suffering of public interest and specially of development activities, and it will be also against the principle of democracy if his term is continued even when he has lost the confidence of the House as he is now in a minority". 11. It is this order of the Administrator dated 27-9-1958 which is sought to be quashed in this writ. To complete the narrative, it may however be mentioned that respondent 14 was elected subsequently as the Chairman of the Council and that the Council has been since then carrying on its duties and functioning in a normal manner without any dead-lock. 12. Now the petitioners contentions are as follows : First, it was urged that the notice to the members of the Council of the meeting to be convened on 27-9-58, did not bear the signatures of 1/3rd of the members of the council as required by S. 22(3) and hence it is not a valid notice. The second contention which was raised in the course of the arguments, but not in the affidavit or petition was that the notice of the meeting was signed by an Asst. Secretary of the Manipur Administration and was not issued by the Administrator as required under S. 22(3) of the Act. The second contention which was raised in the course of the arguments, but not in the affidavit or petition was that the notice of the meeting was signed by an Asst. Secretary of the Manipur Administration and was not issued by the Administrator as required under S. 22(3) of the Act. Thirdly, it was argued (and this was the most important point urged before me) that the notices for the meeting were served on the respondents 24, 28 and 29 within less than 15 days of the date of the meeting, that such service contravened the mandatory provisions under S. 22(3) of the Act that "not less than 15 days notice of the meeting should be given by the Administrator to the Members" and that this failure to comply with the imperative provisions of the statute nullified the entire proceedings of the meeting and hence the order of the Administrator dated 27-9-58, removing the petitioner from the Office of the Chairman on the strength of the resolution passed at such an invalid meeting was illegal and without jurisdiction and should be set aside. 13. Next, it was urged that the Administrator was dealing with the matter in a quasi-judicial capacity, that this Court has therefore got to see that he has dealt with the matter in an impartial manner and that the reasons given by him are proper reasons. It was sought to be pointed out that the Administrator had taken sides with the Congress party and removed the petitioner in order to help that party. 14. The first respondent disputes all the above propositions. It was sought to be pointed out that the Administrator had taken sides with the Congress party and removed the petitioner in order to help that party. 14. The first respondent disputes all the above propositions. It was stated on his behalf that the notice of the intention to move a resolution to remove the Chairman was given on 4-9-58, signed by 12 out of 32 members of the Council, that it was not necessary in giving notice of the meeting to the members that the names of the 12 signatories should be sent to all the members, that publication of the notice on 8-9-58 in the Manipur Gazette extra-ordinary was sufficient notice to all the members of the Council under S. 22(3), that no personal service on all the members 15 days before the date of the meeting was contemplated under Sec. 22(3), that still, in spite of the non-co-operation of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer of the Council, every attempt was made to serve the members personally more than 15 days before the meeting, that in spite of best efforts some of the members in out-lying places could not be so served, that in any case the provision for giving not less than 15 days notice under S. 22(3) must be treated as directory and not mandatory, that there has been substantial compliance of the said provision and hence the meeting held on 27-9-58, was quite regular and according to rules, that as all the members of the Council attended the said meeting, it must be treated, that they have waived any irregularity in the service of the notice, that this Court cannot go into the validity of the reasons given by the Administrator for accepting the resolution passed by a majority of the members of the Council, that in accepting the resolution his motive was to see that the dead-lock in the council was resolved and that public interest should not suffer and that a person who did not command the confidence of the majority of the council should not continue and that he was not actuated by any desire to help any particular party. 15. I shall take up the contentions one by one. 15. I shall take up the contentions one by one. With regard to the first contention that the notice given to the Administrator on 4-9-58, was not signed by 1/3rd of the members of the Council, the original notice was produced in Court for my perusal and it was seen that 12 members out of the 32 members of the Council had signed the same. The petitioner produced a copy of the notice served on him, which gave only the name of "Alimuddin etc." as having signed in the notice. It was on the strength of this copy that the argument was advanced that 12 members had not signed the original notice. It was even hinted that the Administrator was thereby showing his partisanship in favour of the Congress party. But the original document produced before me clearly showed that the notice had been signed by 12 members of the Council. 16. The petitioner sought to read a mala fide intention on the part of the Administrator in giving only the name of Alimuddin and showing others as "etc." in the copies of the notices issued to the members. But under S. 22(3), it was not necessary for the Administrator to give notice enclosing the reasons given for moving the resolution or giving the names of the signatories, who have signed the notice given to him for convening the meeting. What he was called upon to do on receipt of such a notice signed by not less than 1/3rd of the members of the Council was to fix a date for the meeting for the consideration of the resolution not later than 30 days from the date of such notice and to give notice of the meeting to the members. The signatures of not less than 1/3rd of the members in giving the notice in writing of the intention to move the resolution were necessary only to give the Administrator jurisdiction to convene the meeting and it was not necessary for him to satisfy the other members of the Council in giving notice of the meeting that the original notice to him contained the signatures of not less than 1/3rd of the members. Thus in issuing along with the notices even the reasons given for moving the resolution the Administrator has actually done more than what he was called upon to do. Thus in issuing along with the notices even the reasons given for moving the resolution the Administrator has actually done more than what he was called upon to do. I may also add that as soon as the petitioner complained that the names of the 12 signatures had been purposely withheld, the Administrator supplied the omission by immediately giving all the names. The notices issued to the members convening the meeting on 27-9-58 mentioned the fact that a notice in writing of the intention to move the resolution signed by 12 members of the Council for the removal of the petitioner has been delivered to the Administrator. More than that was not contemplated under the section. This objection is not therefore valid. 17. The next contention of the petitioner though raised only at the time of arguments was that the notice to the members ought to have been given by the Administrator himself and not signed by an Assistant Secretary of the Manipur Administration. The notices showed that they were issued "by the orders of the Chief Commissioner" and that the Assistant Secretary had signed them by order of the Chief Commissioner. The Chief Commissioner of Manipur is the Administrator of the Union Territory under Article 239 of the Constitution. The name of the Office namely, Chief Commissioner continued to be adopted for the post as the said name has been in existence from 1949. The notice itself mentioned within brackets that the Chief Commissioner was the Administrator. Under S. 2 (1) of the Territorial Councils Act, 1956, - Administrator means the Administrator of a Union Territory. The Chief Commissioner had issued orders on 5-9-1958 calling the meeting on 27-9-1956 and directing issue of notice for the meeting. He cannot be expected to sign the notices and has necessarily got to act through deputies authorised by him. The notices signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Administration "by order of the Administrator" have to be treated as validly issued. 18. Now I come to the main contention of the petitioner, namely, that notices of the meeting convened for 27-9-58 were not given to some of the members of the Council as enjoined in S. 22(3) of the Act. In particular it was alleged in the petition that notices on Respondents 24, 28 and 29 were served on them less than 15 days before the date fixed for the meeting. In particular it was alleged in the petition that notices on Respondents 24, 28 and 29 were served on them less than 15 days before the date fixed for the meeting. According to the petitioners interpretation of S. 22(3) it is imperative under that section that notices of the meeting should have been served personally on all the members of the Council not less than 15 days before the date of the meeting and that as the said statutory provision was not satisfied in the present case, the meeting which followed became illegal and unconstitutional and the resolution passed at the meeting cannot be valid and the Administrator had no authority to issue an order removing the petitioner from Chairmanship on the basis of the said resolution. For understanding the argument on both sides regarding this point it is better to give S. 22 (2) and (3) in extenso : "22(1) .............. . (2) If a resolution for the removal of an elected Chairman is passed by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Council at a meeting convened in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3), such resolution shall have the effect of removing the Chairman from his office as from the date on which the resolution is so passed and if such resolution is passed by less than two-thirds but not less than one-half of the total membership of the Council, the Administrator may, by order in writing, remove for reasons to be recorded, the Chairman from his office as from such date as may be specified in the order : Provided that no such resolution shall be brought within one year from the date of election of the Chairman : Provided further that if the resolution is not passed by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Council, no other resolution for the removal of the Chairman shall be allowed to be considered within one year from the date on which such resolution was considered. (3) A notice in writing of the intention to move a resolution referred to in sub-section (2) signed by not less than one-third of the total membership of the Council together with a copy of the proposed resolution shall be delivered to the Administrator in accordance with the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf and the Administrator shall, after giving not less than fifteen days notice thereof, convene for the consideration of the resolution a meeting of the Council to be held in the Office of the Council on a date not later than thirty days from the date on which the notice was delivered to him and he shall preside over the meeting....." It will be seen from S. 22(3) that a notice in writing of the intention to move a resolution for the removal of the Chairman signed not less than 1/3rd of the total members of the Council has to be delivered to the Administrator. This is the first step. This was done in the present case on 4-9-58. On receipt of the notice, the next step is for the Administrator to fix a day for the meeting on a date not more than 30 days from the date on which the notice was delivered to him. That was also done in this case and the meeting was fixed for 27-9-58. The 3rd step is for the Administrator to give not less than 15 days notice of the meeting. The actual words used in the section are. The Administrator shall, after giving not less than 15 days notice thereof, convene ............ The question to be decided is whether these words mean that the Administrator must get the notice for the meeting personally served on every member of the council not less than 15 days before the date of the meeting as contended by the petitioner or whether it is sufficient if the Administrator publishes the notice in the Manipur Gazette Extraordinary by way of notice to the members not less than 15 days before the date of the meeting as contended for the contesting respondent. A third view is also possible, namely, that the notices for the meeting shall be issued by the Chief Commissioner not less than 15 days before the meeting. The question is which of the views should prevail in the present case. 19. A third view is also possible, namely, that the notices for the meeting shall be issued by the Chief Commissioner not less than 15 days before the meeting. The question is which of the views should prevail in the present case. 19. I shall take up the petitioners position first that there should be personal service on every member not less than 15 days before the meeting. It, may straightway be said that there is nothing in the section which states that there must be such personal service on every member. If that was the intention of the Legislature there was no difficulty to make the said intention clear by providing in the section the words after causing personal service of the notice of the meeting on every member not less than 15 days before-hand. Mr. Chakraverty appearing for the petitioner pointed out the provision in S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that a lease of immoveable property from month to month shall be terminable either on the part of the lessor or the lessee by 15 days notice expiring at the end of the month of the tenancy. He pointed out the decisions Gobinda Chandra v. Dwarka Nath, AIR 1915 Cal 313 and Subadini v. Durga Charan Lal, 4 Cal WN 790 where it was held that there must be personal service giving 15 days clear notice to quit. But S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the manner of the notice that every notice under the said section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either sent by post to the party, who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party or to one of his family or servants at his residence or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. It is in dealing with this manner of service enjoined in the section that the two decisions held that there must be personal service giving 15 clear days. But neither in the Territorial Councils Act nor in the rules framed under the Act by the Central Government is there any provision prescribing the manner of service of the notice to be given under S. 22(3) for the meeting. 20. But neither in the Territorial Councils Act nor in the rules framed under the Act by the Central Government is there any provision prescribing the manner of service of the notice to be given under S. 22(3) for the meeting. 20. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the case of a lessor or lessee and the notice may be given either by the lessor or lessee. But under section 22(3), it is the Administrator, who has to give the notice. It does not say that notice must be personally given to every member of the Council. There are 32 members in the Council, many of whom reside in the out-lying places in the valley and in the Hill areas in the State and if the meeting is to be held within one month from the date of delivery of the notice signed by not less than 1/3rd of the members, it follows that the Administrator has at best only a period of 15 days within which to serve all the 32 members personally, if such service is to be not less than 15 days from the date of the meeting and that too only if the meeting is fixed for the last day permissible under the section. It is quite likely that all the 32 members may not be available for service in their usual places of residence. They are all busy persons engaged in their own avocations and if personal service is required, many attempt at such service will have to be made. Thus it is likely to turn out to be an impossibility to have such personal service giving not less than 15 days notice and if such personal service is insisted on it will be impossible to hold a valid meeting as contemplated in the section. It is clear therefore, that we have to give a reasonable interpretation to the words in the section, particularly, when the words are not very explicit in their meaning. 21. We have to give such a construction to the language of the statute so that the object and the purpose for which it was enacted must be achieved. Here, the object of the statute was clearly that the meeting must be held within 30 days from the date of the notice delivered to the Administrator. 21. We have to give such a construction to the language of the statute so that the object and the purpose for which it was enacted must be achieved. Here, the object of the statute was clearly that the meeting must be held within 30 days from the date of the notice delivered to the Administrator. It is imperative that the meeting must be held within those 30 days. The Administrator has no power to delay the meeting beyond the date so fixed and if on account of any delay in the issue of the notices to the members or for any other reason, the meeting is delayed more than 30 days, there is no doubt that the meeting will be invalid. Thus, it is clearly mandatory that the meeting must be within 30 days. But the language in the section is not equally compelling as far as the notices of convening the meeting are concerned. The meeting is directed to be convened within 30 days after giving not less than 15 days notice thereof. It is clear from this that no importance is attached to personal service on the members and it is not intended that in the absence of such personal service giving not less than 15 days, notice, the meeting even if held within 30 days should be invalid. There is no doubt that the language of the section cannot be interpreted as necessitating personal service giving not less than 15 days notice. As stated already if there was any such intention of personal service it would have been easy to make it explicit in the section itself. 22. Mr. Chakraverty drew my attention to the text book Shackleton on Meetings, (fourth edition) page 19 and page 28. In defining notice, page 19 para 1 of the book states : "The term notice is derived from a Latin word meaning knowledge, hence it becomes to signify the bringing of knowledge". Para 3 at the same page is to this effect : "Where meetings concern elected or other properly constituted bodies, due and adequate notice must be given to every member of the body, and the rules or regulations of that body must be strictly observed on all matters appertaining to the authority to sue, attestation of and particular methods prescribed for, the service of notice". Page 28 of the same book contains : "The time prescribed for service is also of importance, and the stipulated number of days must elapse within which the act can be performed". It was pointed out from the above that as notice meant bringing of knowledge and as no rules and regulations for the issue or service of notices have been prescribed, there must be personal service giving the stipulated number of days before the date of the meeting. But the same book says at page 19 : "Notices may be oral, written, or in the form of advertisement, but in the case of advertisement, the form is usable where the interested party cannot be traced or where it is prescribed by any statute or rule". Again, at page 28 of the same book, it is stated : "Notice at least fourteen days before the date means that fourteen clear days must intervene between the issue of the advertisement or circular calling the meeting and the day of the meeting, and the notice so given is effectual though it may not actually reach the holder until some days afterwards". The above observations in the book are taken from the decision Sneath v. Valley Gold Ltd., (1893) 1 Ch. 477. 23. Applying the above statements in the book, the language of the section "after giving not less than 15 days notice thereof" will only mean that 15 clear days must intervene between the issue of the advertisement or circular calling the meeting and the date of the meeting and the notice so given is effectual though it may not actually reach the holder until some days afterwards. In the present case, the notices were issued by the Administrator on 5-9-58 as seen from annexure-4 and it was advertised in the Manipur Gazette Extraordinary on 8-9-58 (vide annexure-5), which is far more than 15 days from the date fixed for the meeting. 24. For the respondent, the text book, Manual on the Law of Meetings by Shaw and Wilson was cited. In the said book at page 50, we find it mentioned : "A meeting which is held to discharge a specific function and at which particular persons are under a duty, or have the right, to attend, must be duly constituted in a manner which enables that function to be discharged". In the said book at page 50, we find it mentioned : "A meeting which is held to discharge a specific function and at which particular persons are under a duty, or have the right, to attend, must be duly constituted in a manner which enables that function to be discharged". And further that : Notice of a meeting may take any form which sufficiently conveys to the person entitled to receive it, information enabling that person to attend the meeting and to participate in its deliberations; but the form of notice must be reasonable". Then, again at page 53, we find : "The mode of giving and the period of notice to be given will be determined by the constitution of the body convening a meeting and will be governed by standing orders, articles of association or statutory provisions. If no specific mode of giving notice is prescribed, any reasonable communication of the holding of the meeting will suffice". In the present case, I have already stated that no specific mode of giving notice is prescribed. In cases where we have to give notice to 32 members living in various parts of the State, reasonable communication is by publication in the official Gazette. 25. I may add further that in addition to such publication on 8-9-58, the Administrator has taken the precautionary measure of issuing separate notices on 5-9-58 itself for personal service on all the members through the Chief Executive Officer (vide annexure-4). If the latter had immediately taken steps to effect personal service, it may have been possible to serve all the members personally before 13-9-58. But it was the petitioner as Chairman, who delayed the issue of the notices by causing the Executive Officer, to write the letter (annexure-8) on 8-9-58 unnecessarily calling for the names of all the 12 signatories and delaying the issue of the notices. The Administrator felt that such conduct on the part of the Chief Executive Officer and the petitioner would delay the issue of notices, and so he recalled the notices and had them issued through the I. G. of Police on 11-9-58. When thus it was the petitioner, who caused the delay in personal service, it is open to question whether the petitioner can allege it as Appellant ground of grievance in this writ application. When thus it was the petitioner, who caused the delay in personal service, it is open to question whether the petitioner can allege it as Appellant ground of grievance in this writ application. This is based on the principle of law that no man should be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong or to found any claim upon his own inequity. Thus, if the petitioner had not delayed the services of the notice on the members by the frivolous objection which he raised, personal service would surely have been effected on all the members not less than 15 days before the meeting. Having thus caused the delay he cannot raise the want of proper service as a ground for invalidating the proceedings of the meeting. 26. In spite of this attempt to delay the service, the Administrator was able to cause personal service on every member of the Council through the I. G. of Police and 22 members were served within time, i.e. more than 15 days before the date of the meeting. Of the remaining 10, respondent 28 was served on 12-9-58 and respondents 8, 14, 24 and 32 were served on 13-9-58 while respondents 5, 6, 11 and 13 were served on 14-9-58, and respondents 29 the last person to be served got the notice on 15-9-58, which is 12 days before the meeting. The petitioner has raised the plea of want of proper service only on respondents 24, 28 and 29, because they belong to his group. Applying S. 9 of the General Clauses Act, it must be taken that respondent 28, who was served on 12-9-58, has been served with not less than 15 days notice. Thus the objection reduces itself to respondent 24, who got only 14 days notice and respondent 29, who got only 12 days. It is seen from annexure-14, that the only member who raised objection to the want of proper notice was Shri Yaima Singh, respondent 29, who got only 12 days notice. None of the other members raised any such objection. But when the Administrator over-ruled the preliminary objections raised for the holding of the meeting, all except the Congress party members walked out of the meeting and the meeting proceeded with only 18 members. 27. At this stage, it is relevant to emphasize that every member of the council attended the meeting. But when the Administrator over-ruled the preliminary objections raised for the holding of the meeting, all except the Congress party members walked out of the meeting and the meeting proceeded with only 18 members. 27. At this stage, it is relevant to emphasize that every member of the council attended the meeting. Thus the purpose for which notice of not less than 15 days was prescribed has been fully served. There can be no doubt that the Legislature prescribed 15 days notice in order to ensure that every member of the Council had sufficient time to attend the meeting wherever they may be. One can think of no other reason for it. It can never have been intended as a condition precedent to the validity of the meeting. The Legislature evidently fixed the period as not less than 15 days, as they considered it as adequate to serve the purpose. As it was a direction to the Administrator, a minimum period has to be fixed in the statute. If the statute only mentioned that the Administrator should give "sufficient notice" of the meeting, it will be vague and questions may crop up as to what was meant by sufficient notice. Hence to avoid vagueness, a definite period has been fixed. Such a provision in an enactment can be said to be only directory and not mandatory. Where there has been substantial compliance of the said provision and where as a result of such substantial compliance the purpose has been achieved in enabling the members to attend the meeting, it cannot be stated that the proceedings of the meeting subsequently held will become invalid. 28. Thus from what I have stated above, it is clear in the first place that in the case of a meeting of a statutory body held as required under a statute, no personal service on the members constituting the body is necessary unless the statute itself provides for such personal service. Where there is no such provision in the statute or in the rules framed thereunder prescribing the manner in which notice should be given, any form of notice, which is reasonable and which would reasonably convey the knowledge of the meeting to the members is sufficient. Where there is no such provision in the statute or in the rules framed thereunder prescribing the manner in which notice should be given, any form of notice, which is reasonable and which would reasonably convey the knowledge of the meeting to the members is sufficient. In the instant case, publication on 8-9-58 in the Manipur Gazette Extra-ordinary of the meeting to be held on 27-9-58 is sufficient and reasonable notice to the members, as there has been an interval of 15 clear days between the date of publication and the date of the meeting. 29. The observations at page 28 of the text book "Shackleton on Meetings" would even show that it is sufficient if 15 clear days intervened between the issue of the advertisement or circular calling the meeting and the day of the meeting. This would indicate that it is not even the interval between the date of the publication and the date of the meeting that matters, but the interval between the date of issue and the date of the meeting. Section 22(3) says that the Administrator shall give not less than 15 days notice. It only means that he must issue the notice not less than 15 days before the meeting and not that he should publish or serve personally. The publication and the service are not strictly within the competence of the Administrator. He has necessarily got to get them done through his deputies. Personal service would even depend on the availability of the members at their addresses. Thus it is clear that as far as the Administrator is concerned, the issue of the notice alone is within his competence and hence it is proper compliance of the section if there is an interval of not less than 15 days between the issue of the notice and the meeting. Annexures 4 and 5 show that the notice for the meeting on 27-9-58 was issued on 5-9-58, an interval of 21 clear days. The contentions of the petitioner cannot, therefore be accepted. 30. It was pointed out for the contesting respondent that even granting that S. 22(3) contemplated personal service of the notice not less than 15 days before the meeting, such a provision has to be treated as only directory and not mandatory and that substantial compliance of the provision would be sufficient. The leading case on this point is Montreal Street Rly. Co. The leading case on this point is Montreal Street Rly. Co. v. Normandian, AIR 1917 PC 142, where it is laid down : "Where the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of such duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duties and at the same time would not permit the main object of the Legislature it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable not affecting the validity of the acts done". Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes (10th edition) at page 374 states as follows : "When a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, the question often arises what intention is to be attributed by inference to the legislature? Where, indeed, the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other, no doubt can be entertained as to the intention". Again, at page 376, we find it observed : "But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative". These observations in Maxwell have been quoted with approval in the Privy Council decision cited above. 31. Crawford in his Construction of Statute observed at page 104 : "A statute, or one or more of its provisions, may be either mandatory or directory. These observations in Maxwell have been quoted with approval in the Privy Council decision cited above. 31. Crawford in his Construction of Statute observed at page 104 : "A statute, or one or more of its provisions, may be either mandatory or directory. While usually in order to ascertain whether a statute is mandatory or directory, one must apply the rules relating to the construction of statutes : yet it may be stated, as a general rule, that those whose provisions relate to the essence of the thing to be performed or to matters of substance, are mandatory, and those which do not relate to the essence and whose compliance is merely a matter of convenience rather than of substance, are directory". , at page 529 we get the observation : "As a general rule, a statute which regulates the manner in which public officials shall exercise the power vested in them, will be construed as directory rather than mandatory, especially where such regulation pertains to uniformity, order, and convenience, and neither public nor private rights will be injured or impaired thereby". 32. Applying the above principles to the present case, we find that it was a public duty imposed on the Administrator to give notice of not less than 15 days. The substantial and essential thing to be performed under S. 22(3) is that the meeting shall be convened not later than 30 days of the delivery of the notice to the Administrator. Any meeting convened after 30 days will be definitely against the injunction in the statute. But the stipulation relating to notice is more a direction to ensure that the members attend the meeting than a clause which would substantially affect its legality. The consequence of the inability to give not less than 15 days notice by personal service will be that the essential provision that the meeting shall be held within 30 days will be rendered nugatory, because the public official was not able to perform his duties within the time mentioned. The members of the Council who have the right under the statute to move a resolution to remove the Chairman will be thus deprived of that right. Thus the principal object of the Legislature will be defeated and injustice would be done to the members who wanted to move the resolution. The members of the Council who have the right under the statute to move a resolution to remove the Chairman will be thus deprived of that right. Thus the principal object of the Legislature will be defeated and injustice would be done to the members who wanted to move the resolution. In the present case, the resolution was passed by less than 2/3rd of the total members of the Council. If the meeting is declared as invalid, it would mean under the second proviso to section 22(2) that no other resolution for the removal of the Chairman can be brought for one more year. At the same time, we find that there has been no inconvenience to any of the members of the Council for want of proper notice as every member was able to attend the meeting, which was the sole purpose in providing for adequate notice. There can be no doubt that the provision relating to 15 days notice has to be treated as only directory and not mandatory and non-compliance will not invalidate the meeting. 33. A case almost similar to the present case which did not, of course, relate to notice for meetings arose in the Calcutta High Court in Ajit Kumar Sen v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 Cal 49 . Section 45(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, provided for publication fixing the date of election by a notification in the Official Gazette not less than two months before the date fixed. It happened that such publication took place only six weeks before the date fixed. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held that the said provision was only directory and that substantial compliance was sufficient. There has been such substantial compliance in the present case as 23 members got full 15 days notice, while 4 of them got 14 days notice, another four, 13 days notice and only one, 12 days notice, even, if we compute the time from the date of personal service. 34. The Supreme Court decision H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (S) AIR 1955 SC 196 holds that there is no universal rule to aid in determining whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. 34. The Supreme Court decision H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (S) AIR 1955 SC 196 holds that there is no universal rule to aid in determining whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. Another Supreme Court decision in the same volume Hari Vishnu Kamath v. State of Delhi, (S) AIR 1955 SC 233 holds that an enactment in form mandatory might be in substance directory, the true intention of the Legislature being the determining factor and that must ultimately depend on the context, and further that the distinction between a provision which is mandatory and one which is directory is that while the former must be directly observed, in the case of the latter it is sufficient that it is substantially complied with. Another Supreme Court decision Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 , holds that a construction which would defeat the object of the Legislature must, if that is possible, be avoided. Applying the above rules, it is clear that the words in S. 22(3) of the Territorial Councils Act after giving not less than 15 days notice thereof are only directory in their nature and substantial compliance is sufficient and if such compliance has been made the meeting will not be invalidated. This is only in answer to the plea that there must be personal service. I have already held earlier that such personal service was not necessary on a proper construction of the words and that notice by publication is quite sufficient and even that the interval referred to in the section need be only between the date of issue of the notice and the date of the meeting. 35. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to consider the further point raised by contesting respondent that even if there was non-compliance of the statutory provision relating to the notice, it must be treated that it has been waived by the fact that all the members of the Council attended and took part in the meeting. 35. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to consider the further point raised by contesting respondent that even if there was non-compliance of the statutory provision relating to the notice, it must be treated that it has been waived by the fact that all the members of the Council attended and took part in the meeting. It is sufficient to say that although all the members attended the meeting, the want of proper notice was raised and on the Administrators rejection of the said objection the members who were against holding the meeting walked out. It must be held therefore that there has been no waiver by at least respondents 24 and 29, who were among those who walked out. But the question of waiver does not arise as I have held that there has been compliance with the section. This objection of the petitioner has also to be overruled. 36. The last point raised was that even granting that the resolution has been passed validly at the meeting for the removal of the petitioner from the Office of Chairman, the Administrator had no reasons to accept the resolution and pass an order removing the petitioner from the Office of Chairman as the resolution was not passed by the requisite 2/3rd majority and further that the reasons given by the Administrator are improper reasons and betrayed his bias in favour of the Congress Party and that it is for this Court to weigh whether the reasons given by him were sufficient to accept the resolution. It was also pointed out that the Congress Party was out to create a dead-lock in the Council in order to oust the petitioner from the Office of the Chairman and that with the said motive they voted down the budget for 1958-59 unauthorisedly, even though many of the items in the budget were the same as those agreed to by them in the previous year 1957-58, that when a party was thus engaged in destructive tactics and creating a dead-lock, the fact of the existence of such dead-lock which was not brought about by the petitioner should not have been given as a reason by the Administrator for accepting the resolution passed by the party which caused the dead-lock. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the Administrator ought to have sent a report under S. 53 of the Act to the Central Government stating that the Council was not competent to perform and was persistently making default in the performance of its duties and that it should be superseded. Instead of doing so, his action in siding with the Congress Party and agreeing with the resolution passed by a bare majority and removing the petitioner from Chairmanship showed the mala fides of his action and an order passed with such bias must be quashed under Article 226. 37. On behalf of the respondent, it was pointed out that it was an Administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial order and that S. 22(2) required the Administrator to record his reasons and that a Court cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the reasons given or hold that such reasons were the result of bias or partisan spirit. It was also urged that the reasons given for agreeing with the resolution were substantial. 38. I cannot agree with the respondent that the order passed is of a purely administrative nature and is not judicial or quasi-judicial. It is an order passed as required under the statute which calls upon him to give his reasons for the order. The effect of the order is to divest the petitioner of his position as Chairman of the Council. Such an order cannot be said to be a pure administrative order though it has been passed in the capacity of Administrator of the Council. Section 22(3) of the Act directs that the Administrator shall preside over the meeting in which the resolution to remove the Chairman is discussed. He hears the arguments for and against the removal of the Chairman and thus he is able to judge the merits and de-merits of the resolution. Of course, if the resolution is passed by a 2/3rd majority then he has no further function as it will have the effect of removing the Chairman from the Office. He hears the arguments for and against the removal of the Chairman and thus he is able to judge the merits and de-merits of the resolution. Of course, if the resolution is passed by a 2/3rd majority then he has no further function as it will have the effect of removing the Chairman from the Office. But where it is passed by a bare majority of the members of the Council he is asked under S. 22(2) to decide whether on the resolution the Chairman should be removed from his Office and if he decides to remove the Chairman he has to do so in writing recording his reasons for doing so. It is a clear case where he acts in a quasi-judicial manner and hence his order can be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution. 39. But the Act has given the power to the Administrator to decide on the strength of such a resolution whether he should remove the Chairman or not. In other words he has got the jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is only in a case where he has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him that a writ will issue. Annexure-15 shows that he has recorded his reasons as required under S. 22(2) for deciding to remove the Chairman. Thus there has been a proper exercise of his jurisdiction. It is not for this Court to go into the question whether the reasons given are sufficient or even whether they are valid reasons. It may be that the reasoning can be pointed out to be erroneous. But erroneous decisions cannot be quashed by a writ unless such an error is apparent on the face of the record and goes to the very root of the matter as pointed out in the decision Dr. C. S. Krishnaswamy Ayyar v. Mohanlal Binjani, AIR 1949 Mad 535. But no such substantial error which goes to the very root of the matter has been pointed out against this order. 40. C. S. Krishnaswamy Ayyar v. Mohanlal Binjani, AIR 1949 Mad 535. But no such substantial error which goes to the very root of the matter has been pointed out against this order. 40. Annexure-15 has given as reasons that the Chairman had lost the confidence of the House, that there has been dead-lock in the working of the Council resulting in the suffering of public interest and specially of development activities, that it will be also against the principle of democracy if his term is continued when he has lost the confidence of the House as he is now in a minority. It was pointed out that all the reasons put together will simply show that the resolution has been passed against him by a majority and hence they are no reasons at all as they are implicit in the very fact of the resolution being passed. It was pointed out that the very mention of that fact as a reason showed that the Administrator was biassed in favour of the Congress Party which passed the resolution. Next, it was urged that the only other reason mentioned was that of the dead-lock in the working of the Council resulting in the suffering of public interest and specially of development activities and that this dead-lock was created by the very Congress Party which illegally voted down the budget in March, 1958, thereby acting against public interest and that to mention it as a reason for the removal of the petitioner when it was caused by the Congress Party again showed the bias of the Administrator. 41. Mr. Chakraverty even argued that the Congress Party had no power to throw out the budget as a whole and he relied on Mays Parliamentary Practice at pages 530 and 548, relating to inadmissible amendments. He also pointed out part III of the rules framed under the Act relating to budget estimates and pointed out that the budget has to be first considered by the Finance Committee of the Council and the budget as amended by the Finance Committee had to be laid before the Council and that there was no provision for throwing out the budget as a whole. Thus when the Congress Party threw out the budget illegally, the Administrator should have acted under S. 53 of the Act and sent a report to the Central Government for superseding the Territorial Council on the ground that the Council was making default in the performance of its duties. But instead of doing so, the Administrator waited for six months so that a years time may pass from the date of election of the Chairman, so that the Congress Party may move a resolution for the removal of the Chairman. It may be pointed out here that under S. 22(2) proviso a resolution for the removal of the Chairman can be brought only after a year from the date of election of a Chairman. It was further pointed out that when the Congress Party passed the resolution by a bare majority of the members of the Council, the Administrator accepted the resolution in order to side with the Congress party. Hence it was urged that the order of the Administrator was not an impartial order and that he was clearly siding with the Congress Party and hence such an order should be quashed. 42. It is no doubt correct that if the Administrator could be shown to have acted in a partisan spirit in passing the order, his order has to be corrected by means of a writ. But I am not satisfied that he has acted in any such spirit. In the first place, the statement that the budget cannot be thrown out by the Council is not correct. Part III Rule 34 of the rules framed under the Act provides for the budget being laid before the Council as amended by the Finance Committee and for amendments to be moved in the Council totally refusing the amounts of the grants demanded for any Department. It again provides for a resolution to be moved by the Chairman that the budget as amended by the Council be passed. If any such resolution has to be moved before the Council, then it stands to reason that the Council can either pass the budget or vote it down. Thus the assumption of the petitioner that the Council has no right to vote down the budget is wrong. If any such resolution has to be moved before the Council, then it stands to reason that the Council can either pass the budget or vote it down. Thus the assumption of the petitioner that the Council has no right to vote down the budget is wrong. Normally, in a Legislature, such voting down of a budget would mean a vote of no confidence on the Ministry then in power and the Ministry will be forced to resign. But in a Territorial Council such voting down of the budget will mean a dead-lock. 43. The question is whether the Administrator in not sending a report under S. 53 of the Act for superseding the Council on the ground that it has made default in the performance of its duties was acting with the idea of helping the Congress party which had the majority in the Council. That was a matter within the discretion of the Administrator and his omission to do so cannot be questioned in this writ. It is enough to point out that under S. 53, the default must be persistent in order to take action and a single instance of voting down the budget was not sufficient. Hence the Administrator cannot straightaway act under S. 53. He has to watch and see if the Territorial Council can be made to function properly without resorting to the extra-ordinary remedy of supersession within a year of its election. He was justified therefore in getting the budget certified under S. 63 of the Act. 44. It is clear for any one to see that the trouble in the Council was that the Chairman, who was entrusted with various duties under the Act and under the Rules did not have the confidence of the majority in the Council. Though a Territorial Council is not intended to work on any party basis as in the case of a Legislature, one cannot shut ones eyes to the fact that the elections to the Council took place on such a basis and that parties were formed in the Council. Thus the result was that the Chairman who was elected by a majority ceased to enjoy the confidence of the majority in the Council later on and this fact resulted in the deadlock in the working of the Council. Thus the result was that the Chairman who was elected by a majority ceased to enjoy the confidence of the majority in the Council later on and this fact resulted in the deadlock in the working of the Council. The Administrator who is entrusted under the Act and under the Rules with the task of seeing that the Council functioned properly had therefore to be watchful and to see in what manner the deadlock could be resolved and the Council be made to function properly. It did not mean that he was siding with any particular party. It only meant that he was interested in making the Council function if possible without the necessity of a supersession. Thus when a resolution for the removal of the Chairman was passed by a majority, he has to see whether the removal of the then Chairman and the election of a fresh Chairman would resolve the dead-lock and result in the functioning with beneficial results to the public and to the development activities entrusted to the Council. Here again it cannot be said that he was favouring the Congress Party in taking such a view. It is quite possible that if a congress party man was the Chairman and the Socialists and Independents got a majority and thereby the Chairman ceased to have the confidence of the majority and a resolution was passed to remove the Chairman the Administrator would have taken the same attitude as his main interest was that the Council should function. The reasons given by the Administrator in annexure-15 do not therefore disclose that the order was the result of bias. I may also add that the order of the Administrator removing the petitioner has resulted in attaining the object which he had in view, namely that a new Chairman enjoying the confidence of the majority has been elected and the Council has been functioning in a normal manner since then. It follows that this contention raised by the petitioner also fails. 45. For the foregoing reasons there are no merits in this writ application and it is accordingly dismissed with the costs of the contesting respondent. Advocate fee Rs. 100/- one set. 46. Mr. Chakraverty requested that if the writ was going to be dismissed he may be given a certificate for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. 45. For the foregoing reasons there are no merits in this writ application and it is accordingly dismissed with the costs of the contesting respondent. Advocate fee Rs. 100/- one set. 46. Mr. Chakraverty requested that if the writ was going to be dismissed he may be given a certificate for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. That is a matter to be separately considered on an application to be filed, as both parties will have to be heard on various questions which may arise for decision in such an application. Writ petition dismissed.