ORDER V.R. Nevaskar, J. These are seven revision petitions involving the question regarding jurisdiction of civil Courts to entertain a suit for recovery of arrears of rent in view of the provisions of Sections 132 and 147 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. Plaintiff Shrimati Thakurani Solankibai, claiming to hold the land comprised in all the seven suits as a Pakka-tenant within the meaning of the term as defined in Section 54(vii) of the Act aforesaid, filed the suit in each of the cases against her sub-tenant for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of the year 1952-53. The suits were filed in the year 1956 in the Court of Civil Judge, Second Class, Hotod. On objection by the Defendants that the suits are not cognizable by the civil Court the trial Court considered this question as preliminary and it held, relying upon the decision in Ratansingh v. Mukutsingh 1956 MBLJ 1458, and the provisions of Sections 132 and 147 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, that the claim of this nature being cognizable by the Court of Tahsildar the jurisdiction of civil Courts is totally excluded. He therefore ordered the return of the plaint in each case for presentation to proper Court. The Plaintiff preferred appeals against these orders which were heard by the Additional District Judge, Indore. The learned Judge disposed of all the appeals by a common judgment upholding the view taken by the trial Court and dismissing the same. The Plaintiff has now preferred these revision petitions. In order to consider the exact significance of the point raised it will be proper to refer to the provisions of Sections 132 and 147 of the Madhya Bharat "Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007: Section 132: Subject to rules made under this act a Pakka-tenant shall have a right to bring a suit in the Court of a Tahsildar for the recovery of arrears of rent due to him from his sub-tenants holding land on a valid sub-lease. Section 147: Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the Government are or a Revenue Officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. Section 147: Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the Government are or a Revenue Officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. It is clear from the wording of Section 132 that a suit for recovery of arrears by a Pakka tenant against his sub-tenant can be brought in the Court of Tahsildar within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situate. This follows from the fact that under this section the Pakka tenant has a right to bring a suit for recovery of arrears of rent due to him from his sub-tenant. If the Pakka tenant has such a right the Tahsildar having jurisdiction is empowered to decide such a suit. There is no other provision in the Act empowering specially a civil Court to entertain such a suit under particular circumstances or on certain conditions in spite of the power of Tahsildar to decide such a suit. It therefore follows from the wording of Section 147 that since the Tahsildar, who is a Revenue Officer, is empowered under Section 132 to entertain and decide a suit of this description the civil Court cannot entertain it. Mr. Chitale, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however contended that although a Tahsildar is empowered to entertain a suit by a Pakka tenant against his sub-tenant for arrears of rent within a period of two years from the date when the rent becomes due by reason of the period of limitation provided for such a suit in Schedule II Article 23 of the Act, yet where the arrears are in respect of period beyond two years but within three years the civil Courts should be held entitled to decide the disputes relating to such arrears. He contended, relying upon the decision in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. AIR 1940 PC 105 and Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Dev AIR 1955 SC 576 , that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of a suit or an issue which is normally within its competence can be brought about by clear and unambiguous language. In my opinion the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is devoid of any force. In my opinion the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is devoid of any force. It is no doubt true that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred unless such exclusion is either explicitly expressed or clearly implied, vide A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 105. In the present case the suit relates to recovery of arrears of rent. The right is contractual in nature and ordinarily the civil Courts would possess jurisdiction to entertain such a suit unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred (Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure code). But in this case the matter is open to no doubt. Provisions of Sections 132 and 147 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act are clear enough and having regard to them it has to be said that the language could not be more explicit in excluding the jurisdiction of civil Courts than what occurs in Section 147. The provision in the Act providing for shorter period of limitation has really no significance in the absence of any 'otherwise' provision in the Act (Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act) enabling the civil Courts to entertain such a suit. There are provisions elsewhere in the Act in question where specific exceptions are made for entertainment of suits by civil Courts. One such provision is in Section 86(4). That section deals with the question of mutation of names on loss of title of the former holder. Although Revenue Court is empowered to determine such a question the determination is summary and the jurisdiction of the civil Court to finally determine the disputed rights of parties is specifically saved. Similarly Section 91 deals with the question of reinstatement of a Pakka tenant improperly dispossessed. Power is given to Tahsildar to make an inquiry into the disputed claim and to secure possession to a party in whose favour he decides. Similar power is conferred upon him to secure reinstatement of an ordinary tenant as defined in the Act or a sub-tenant under Section 92. But Section 93 specifically saves the right of the aggrieved party to establish his claim against the opposite party by means of a suit in a competent civil Court. Similar power is conferred upon him to secure reinstatement of an ordinary tenant as defined in the Act or a sub-tenant under Section 92. But Section 93 specifically saves the right of the aggrieved party to establish his claim against the opposite party by means of a suit in a competent civil Court. It is thus clear from these provisions that the Legislature while enacting this statute has taken care to specify cases in which, in spite of the fact that a matter could be determined, decided or disposed of by a Revenue Officer, the civil Courts would have jurisdiction and further to say that the jurisdiction of the civil Court would be excluded with respect to matters which a Revenue Officer is by the Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of except as otherwise provided in this Act. In this state of things, since there is no provision in the Act enabling civil Courts to entertain suits for recovery of arrears from subtenants of Pakka tenants beyond two years such a suit is clearly barred. It further appears from Section 29 of the Limitation Act that that Act contemplates cases where a special or local law prescribes a period different from the one mentioned in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and lays down that in that event it is this differently provided period of limitation which will be deemed to be provided in that Schedule in place of what is mentioned therein. Mr. Chitale does not assail before me the legislative competency of the Madhya Bharat Legislature in enacting provisions of Sections 132 and 147 or the Schedule to the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. In that event by the very force of Section 29 of the Limitation Act there are no two periods of limitation. The only period is of two years as provided in the Schedule to the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act namely two years. On this view of the matter the argument put forward for suggesting entertainability of suits by civil Courts falls to the ground. The petitions are without force and are dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed