Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against the acquittal of accused 1 and 2 respondents 1 and 2, the second respondent being the wife of the first respondent, in respect of a charge framed against them under S.448 I. P. C. The case was launched in the Court of the Second Class Magistrate at Cannanore upon a complaint preferred by the appellant alleging that the two respondents trespassed into paramba and house situated on it, plucked cocoanuts and committed mischief by cutting and removing'pothals' or coverings on the cocoanut trees, the offences being under S.447 and 417 I. P. C. The property including the paramba, the house and the trees was purported to be delivered over to the appellant, under two delivery records, Exts. P.10 and P. 11, dated the 12th March 1957, in execution of two decrees obtained by him against the first respondent. It is the appellant's case, that on the previous day, when he accompanied the amin to obtain delivery of possession the first respondent raised objections, and so, on the next day, delivery of possession was made, with the aid of the Police, but that when he visited the paramba on the 30th March 1957, he found respondents 1 and 2 in occupation of the house, and that'pothals' had been removed from the cocoanut trees and cocoanuts had been plucked. The complaint was made on these allegations. 2. The main ground, on which the appeal was pressed was that the Magistrate failed to give due weight to the records relating to the delivery of possession. The first respondent was not at the spot on the 19th March when delivery of possession was made. The evidence on behalf of the appellant is, that the second respondent collected her belongings which were in the house and vacated it, and afterwards the delivery of possession took place Exts. P. 3 and P. 4 evidence acknowledgments by the appellant, of his having taken possession. 3. At the trial, when examined under S.341 Crl.P.C. the first respondent stated, that he was not living in the house, and that the paramba was in the possession of one Kannan. The second respondent maintained however that she had been living in the house for about fifteen years and that there was no actual delivery of possession to the appellant. At the trial, when examined under S.341 Crl.P.C. the first respondent stated, that he was not living in the house, and that the paramba was in the possession of one Kannan. The second respondent maintained however that she had been living in the house for about fifteen years and that there was no actual delivery of possession to the appellant. The learned Magistrate discussed the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 5 and reached the conclusion that there was in fact no delivery of possession under Exts. P.10 and 11. He therefore held, that no question of trespass arose. 4. In the course that we propose to take in the decision of this appeal, we do not think it proper, to express our opinion on the reliability of these witnesses. The complaint of the learned counsel for the appellant, that due weight was not given to the delivery records, appears to us to be well-founded. Though delivery records are not conclusive in themselves, it is now well established, that criminal courts ought to attach doe weight to them, in deciding whether possession has passed under them We are constrained to observe, that the learned Magistrate in appreciating the oral evidence in the case failed to keep this principle before his mind. On the other hand the discussion of the evidence in the judgment under appeal suggests that he treated the case as one depending almost entirely on the appreciation of oral testimony. Accordingly, the Magistrate considered the evidence to be discrepant in several particulars. The only advertence to the delivery accounts in the judgment was in these terms:- "The suggestion of the defence is that the delivery accounts are prepared by P. W. 4 in collusion with P. W. I without actually going to the property. From the nature of the evidence given by P. W. 4, I am also satisfied that the contention of the defence is quite probable." We think this is hardly a compliance with the principle stated above. From the nature of the evidence given by P. W. 4, I am also satisfied that the contention of the defence is quite probable." We think this is hardly a compliance with the principle stated above. Counsel for the appellant had other arguments to advance, that in case the delivery accounts were bogus documents, the first respondent, who was a party to the decree, had remedies open to him in the civil court to cancel them, and that an application for the stay of the execution of the decree, which had been made by him in the appeal from one of the decrees, had been dismissed on the specific ground that the property itself had been delivered over. It is needless to pursue this, as we are of the opinion that the case must go back to the court of the Second Class Magistrate at Cannanore, for a fresh appreciation of the evidence in the light of the principle stated above It is open to this Court to interfere with an order of acquittal, when a basic principle has been ignored in evaluating the evidence. 5. The result is, that the order acquitting respondents 1 and 2 is hereby set aside, and the case sent back to the court below, for disposal a fresh, in accordance with law and in the light of the above observations. Allowed.