Judgment K.Ahmad, J. 1. This application arises out of a receivership matter in a suit for dissolution of partnership and partition of its assets. The suit was instituted, as it appears from the number given to it, sometime in 1937. The preliminary decree in that suit was passed on 7-8-1940. As against the decree, First Appeal No. 140 of 1940 was brought to this Court, and that was finally disposed of on 20-3-1942. Thereafter, an application was made in the Court below for a final decree. This was completed by the Court below on 18-3-1955. Now, against that final decree an appeal has again been filed in this Court, which has been numbered as First Appeal No. 37 of 1955, and is still pending disposal. 2. In the meantime, a Receiver had been appointed at the trial, who had taken possession of all the properties owned by the partnership, in-cluding a distillery known as Manpur Distillery. It is said that the Receiver, while acting as such, had prepared a list showing therein the entire asset of Manpur Distillery. This had been done by him sometime between November, 1953 and January, 1954. Subsequently, with the sanction of the Court, the Receiver sold this Manpur Distillery by auction to one Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan of Ranchi for a total consideration of Rs. 1,99,500.00 under a registered deed of sale, dated 31-8-I954. This sale, it is said, was completed on the basis of the list which had already been prepared by the Receiver in between November, 1953 and January, 1954. In the present application before me, the purchaser, Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan, has been impleaded as opposite party No. 1, and it was his application filed in the court below which has given rise to it. Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan claims that, on the basis of the aforesaid sale made in his favour, he ultimately got possession over the distillery in between 14th September and 21st September, 1954; but in the course of this transfer all the articles that found mention in the list referred to above were not delivered to him. Accordingly, the purchaser, on 29-9-1955 made a petition in the court below which read as follows : "1. That though the properties mentioned below were also sold to the petitioner and are included in the sale deed dated 31-8-1954 possession has not been, delivered to him as yet. 2. Accordingly, the purchaser, on 29-9-1955 made a petition in the court below which read as follows : "1. That though the properties mentioned below were also sold to the petitioner and are included in the sale deed dated 31-8-1954 possession has not been, delivered to him as yet. 2. That the petitioner being the purchaser is entitled to get possession of the said properties as well. 3. That in spite of demand the Receiver has not yet delivered possession of the same. And the prayer made therein was that "the Receiver be directed to deliver possession of the properties detailed below or in the alternative to refund the market price of the said articles." This application was disposed of by the Court below on 20-4-1956, and it is this which is the subject-matter of revision now. The Court below in the order has found that the articles as claimed have not been delivered to the auction-purchaser, though they were included in the list of articles as also in the sale deed and, further, that the liability for this rests with Mr. Jamilur Rahman. Accordingly, it has ordered an enquiry to be made into the description and valuation of those properties and the same to be compensated by Mr, Rahman to the purchaser. 3. It may be stated here that Mr. Jamilur Rahman, the petitioner in this case, is one of the partners of the partnership giving rise to the suit for dissolution. The Court below has fixed the liability on Mr. Rahman on the grounds -- (1) that ther list referred to above had been prepared, amongst others, in his presence, (2) that the key of the Distillery had been given, as reported by the Receiver, by Mr. Rahman, and (3) that in certain petitions Mr. Rahman had asserted that it was he who was in possession of the Distillery. These facts have been challenged before me by Mr. Asghar Hussain, who appears on behalf of Mr. Rahman in this case. 4. According to Mr. Asghar Hussain, the possession of this Distillery was originally taken over by Government sometime in the year 1948, and that was from one Torab AH, who was also, amongst others, one of the partners in the Concern. Thereafter, the Government, through the Superintendent of Excise, handed over the Distillery to the Custodian of Evacuee Properties. This was sometime in March or April, 1951. Thereafter, the Government, through the Superintendent of Excise, handed over the Distillery to the Custodian of Evacuee Properties. This was sometime in March or April, 1951. Then, on 19-5-1951, the plaintiff No. 1 in the court below took over charge of the same from the Custodian, and it was ultimately from him that the Receiver took charge sometime in 1952. Thus, according to Mr. Asghar Hussain, the Distillery never came in the actual possession of Mr. Rahman since sometime in 1948: and the person from whom the Receiver directly took charge of the Distillery was the plaintiff No. 1, and not Mr. Rahman. Accordingly, the contention of Mr. Hussain is that Mr. Rahman at no stage in the course of the litigation had anything to do with the direct physical possession of the Distillery, and, as such, the liability of the articles alleged to have been withheld from the purchaser cannot be fixed on Mr. Rahman. That, in my opinion, is a question which is out and out one of facts, and, unless proper evi dence is recorded on this point, it is difficult for! me, sitting in revision, to hold as to which way the truth lies. Here, therefore, what 1 take up for consideration is only the other two questions which have been canvassed before me in support of this application and which no doubt relate to the question of jurisdiction. 5. The first question raised in this connection is that the Court below had no jurisdiction to entertain an application of this nature inasmuch as1 Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan, the applicant for the relief, had never been a party to the original suit for dissolution of partnership. Secondly, Mr. Hussain, has contended that, even if it be conceded that the Court below had such a jurisdiction, then on the facts of this case exercise of that jurisdiction was both irregular and improper. 6. In my opinion, the first contention has no substance. In law it is well established that in certain "circumstances in matters like this the Court may resort to summary proceeding and award relief both for or against a third person who is not a party to the suit. 6. In my opinion, the first contention has no substance. In law it is well established that in certain "circumstances in matters like this the Court may resort to summary proceeding and award relief both for or against a third person who is not a party to the suit. This is based on the principle that once a Court is in possession of a property in, custodia legis through a Receiver, it is the duty of the Court to see that the property is kept intact and secure in the interests of those for whom the Court holds it. Necessarily, therefore, if a third person comes to deal with that property on the basis of a transaction entered into between him and the Court, either directly or through the Receiver, he, by implication, surrenders himself to the Court so far as the transaction relating to the property is concerned. In this case, it is not denied that the Manpur Distillery was at the relevant time in custodia legis and the Court was in possession of it through the Receiver, and that Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan got that property as a result of the transaction which he entered into with the Court through its Receiver. Therefore, to that extent, it cannot be said that the Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the relief that was brought to its notice in that connection, though at the instance of the third party purchaser. This is so is evident from the principles laid down in Chandra Sekhar Prosad Singh V/s. Hari Harendra Sahi, 10 Ind Cas 898 (Cal.) Surendra Keshub V/s. Doorga Soondery Dassee, ILR 15 Cal 253, Minatoonessa Bibee V/s. Khatoonnessa Bibee, ILR 21 Cal 479, Nasir Ahmed V/s. Lutf Ahmed, AIR 1949 Pat 496, T. K. Sivaranjan V/s. Official Receiver Quilon District Court. AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 205 and Bhagban Sahu V/s. Dasrathi Sahu, AIR 1954 Orissa 178. 7. That, however, does not finally dispose of the matter. The other question which has been raised by Mr. Asghar Hussain and which still remains to be decided is one relating to the exact scope of such a summary jurisdiction. AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 205 and Bhagban Sahu V/s. Dasrathi Sahu, AIR 1954 Orissa 178. 7. That, however, does not finally dispose of the matter. The other question which has been raised by Mr. Asghar Hussain and which still remains to be decided is one relating to the exact scope of such a summary jurisdiction. To this extent, I think it can be conceded without much, controversy that, if there is any hindrance put by any person in the way of the Court in collecting and in securing the property in custodia legis, then the Court has undoubted power to proceed against that person as so interfering with the property as also for enforcing an obligation which has been accepted by the third party in favour of the Court or its Receiver in relation to that property, for in such! cases the Court would not like to be placed as a suitor for securing those reliefs. Here, however, it appears that the transaction of sale had been completed, and in pursuance thereof Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan had on one part paid! the entire amount and the Receiver on the other delivered to him the possession of the Distillery. All that now remains to be done, is that some parts of the Distillery have, as alleged by Rai Saheb, still to be delivered to him. Had those parts been intact and traceable, it would not have been difficult for the Court to direct their transfer to the purchaser from the custody of anyone who may have been found in possession thereof, as was done in the case in ILR 21 Cal 479, or perhaps, as could be done in the case in ILR 15 Cal 253. In the former case, the sale related to immoveable property. All that was needed was the delivery of possession over that immoveable property by the Court to the third party purchaser at the Receivers sale. In the latter, the contract for lease had been, completed and what bad remained to be done was the execution of the deed of lease. There was no difficulty either in getting the lease executed or in giving possession over the immove-able property which was already there. Here, however, unfortunately, as already sfa-ted, there is no trace of the parts of the property which are alleged to have been withheld from and not delivered to the purchaser. There was no difficulty either in getting the lease executed or in giving possession over the immove-able property which was already there. Here, however, unfortunately, as already sfa-ted, there is no trace of the parts of the property which are alleged to have been withheld from and not delivered to the purchaser. That will necessarily give rise to some complicated question, for example, (1) as to who among the partners was originally in possession of those parts when the Distillery was taken over by the Receiver; (2) whether the Receiver had at any stage got possession over those parts ; (3) that if the Receiver did not get possession over them, did he take any action against the party in possession thereof and that with what result, and (4) as to who was the person or persons, either among the partners or third parties, who was directly responsible for the removal of those parts from the premises of the Distillery. Lastly, even if on enquiry it transpires, as it has to, that those parts are now at least not traceable, then the compensation to the purchaser has to be assessed in terms of the value of those parts. That will again in turn lead to the enquiry as to the condition in which those parts were then available in the Distillery and as to their respective values in relation to the condition they were in. All these, I think, are too much beyond the scope of a summary proceeding as contemplated by the rule of law which I have just stated. 8. Further, the relief sought in this case seems to be rather a belated one. As already stated, the possession of the Distillery had been made to Rai Saheb Laxmi Narayan in between 14th September and 21st September, 1954, but the complaint for the non-delivery of some of the parts was brought to the notice of the Court for the first time on 29-9-1955, that means, a year thereafter. This, in my opinion, is another factor which has to be weighed whether in such circumstances the summary jurisdiction should be exercised at all. This, in my opinion, is another factor which has to be weighed whether in such circumstances the summary jurisdiction should be exercised at all. After all, the relief sought being one of equitable nature, it was incumbent on the part of the purchaser to have come to Court at the earliest opportunity so that the investigation into his complaint could be disposed of without much difficulty and in the light of all available materials. By this time, I am sure, many of the relevant materials may have been lost or made non-available. In Sreedhar Chaudhury V/s. Nilmoni Chaudury, AIR 1925 Cal 681, it has been rightly pointed out by Ghose, J., if I may say so with all respects to the learned Judge, that an examination pro interessa suo is never made unless the applicant shows diligence. Here, as already stated, the step taken for the relief is rather too belated. For these reasons, I think, the second question, if not the first one as canvassed by Mr. Hussain, has to be answered in favour of his client and that, firstly, for the reason that the facts are too complicated to be adjudicated in an enquiry of a summary character, and, secondly, for the reason that the petition in this case was not filed in Court with the promptness with which it should have been done. 9. In such circumstances, I think the proper course for the Court to follow was to direct the purchaser to seek relief by way of suit and to give leave for the same. It has, however, been pointed out to me that now there may be some difficulty in the way of the purchaser in seeking remedy by way of suit. But that difficulty alone cannot be at ground for me to widen the scope of a summary proceeding like the one here, especially in view of what I have already stated in detail. Further, I think, the difficulty, even if any, in the way of relief by way of suit may not after all prove altogether unsurmountable. I, therefore, hold that the order passed by the Court below cannot be sustained in law and has to be set aside. Further, I think, the difficulty, even if any, in the way of relief by way of suit may not after all prove altogether unsurmountable. I, therefore, hold that the order passed by the Court below cannot be sustained in law and has to be set aside. But, in the circumstances of the case, it is, I think, just and proper that leave should be given to the purchaser to seek his remedy by way of suit, if he so likes, and that is hereby given. 10. In the result, therefore, the application is allowed and is disposed of in terms as stated above; but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.