This appeal by the plaintiff arises out of an action for declaration of title and confirmation of possession in respect of the plain­tiff's half share in 2 plots of land, which are men­tioned by patta numbers. In periodic patta No. Sb, there are 77 bighas and 7 lechas of land, and in patta No. 33, there are 11 bighas, 4 kathas and 10 lechas of land. The trial Court held that out of patta No. 58, the plaintiff was entitled to an area of 31 bighas, 3 kathas and 8 lechas, and out of the other patta No. 33, he was entitled to 3 bighas, 2 kathas and 15 lechas. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, gave a decree in the following terms : "The decree would be effective only on pay­ment of the deficit court-fee by the plaintiff with­in 15 days of this judgment; failing which the suit stands dismissed........." This judgment was passed on 15-3-1957, and ac­cording to the judgment, the last date for payment of the deficit court-fee was 30-3-1957, and, on this point, there is no difference between the parties. A day previous, namely, on 29-3-1957, a prayer was made on behalf of the plaintiff for an extension of time for payment of the deficit Court-fee. The time prayed for and extended was fifteen days more from 30-3-1957. The deficit court-fee, how­ever, was paid within a. few days on 4-4-1957, and ultimately the decree was signed and sealed on 11-4-57. (2) It appears that the plaintiff having not been satisfied with the decree of the trial Court, went up in appeal to the learned District Judge, and the defendants also filed a cross-objection on the ground that the plaintiff not having paid the deficit court-fee within the time allowed by the judgment, he could not take any advantage of the decree which had been passed in his favour, by the trial Court. The learned Additional District Judge has held that the extension of time given by the trial Court was illegal and without jurisdiction and, therefore, the deficit court-fee not having been paid within the time allowed by the judgment, the suit failed in its entirety. According to him, the ap­peal being an appeal against a decree which was not in existence, it was dismissed, and the cross-objection allowed. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has come up to this Court in second appeal. According to him, the ap­peal being an appeal against a decree which was not in existence, it was dismissed, and the cross-objection allowed. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has come up to this Court in second appeal. (3) The question that has got to be answered is whether the trial Court which gave a conditional decree to the plaintiff, had jurisdiction to extend the time mentioned in the judgment for payment of the deficit court-fee. (4) It has to be borne in mind that the time given by the judgment for payment of deficit court-fee was to expire on 30-3-1957, and that just a day before that, on an application by the plaintiff, it was further extended, and then within the ex­tended time the deficit court-fee was paid. It is well settled that rules of procedure are intended to further justice, and not to hinder it, and a Court must make all efforts to do justice if it could possi­bly be clone. Now, in this connection, Ss. 148 and 149, and O. 20, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure have to be read. Section 148 : "Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allow­ed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired." Section 149 : "Where the whole or any part of any fee pres­cribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees, has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment, the docu­ment in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." Order 20, R. 3, C. P. Code, will be quoted here­after. As I read the ordering portion of the judg­ment, which has already been quoted, it appears to me that on the date the judgment was given, no decree could have been drawn up for the rea­son that the judgment was a conditional one de­pending upon whether the plaintiff did or did not do what he was required to do under the judgment. Until the 30th of March, 1957, upon the judgment itself, the deficit court-fee could have been paid. So, until that date the trial Court had complete juris­diction over the matter, and one of the obligations of the order was that if the deficit court-fee was paid on or before 30-3-1957, the Court had to ac­cept it under the terms of its own order. If the Court had jurisdiction in the case up to 30-3-1957, it passes my comprehension "as to how it would lose that jurisdiction in passing suitable orders in re­gard to payment of the deficit court-fee till that date. I would hold, therefore, that on 29-3-1957, when the Court extended the time for payment of the deficit, the extension of time was done well with­in its jurisdiction under the provisions of Ss. 148 and 149 of the C. P. Code. (5) Now, I read O. 20, R. 3 of the C. P. Code : ''The judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it, and, when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by S. 152 or on review." On the face of it, it appears that although Ss. 148 and 149 of the Code gave power to the trial Court to give and extend time-, the judgment, once signed, could not be altered or added to, save as provided by S. 152 or on review. I think S. 152 or the mat­ter of review has no application in the present case. The question is as to how to reconcile the provi­sions of Ss. 148 and 149 and O. 20, R. 3 of the Code. I think S. 152 or the mat­ter of review has no application in the present case. The question is as to how to reconcile the provi­sions of Ss. 148 and 149 and O. 20, R. 3 of the Code. 'Judgment' has been defined as meaning 'the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order"; and the word "decree" has been defined as meaning "the formal expression of an ad­judication which, so far as regards the Court ex­pressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either prelimi­nary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejec­tion of a plaint & the determination of any question within S. 47 or S. 144, but shall not include The question is - whether on the date, name­ly, on 15-3-57, a decree could have been passed on the basis of the judgment. In my opinion, the pass­ing of the decree had to wait until the expiry of the time given in the judgment for payment of the deficit court-fee, and, if no decree could have been passed before 30-3-57, in my judgment, till that date, the trial Court had jurisdiction to pass any orders in respect of the deficit court-lee for which time had been given till 30-3-57 for payment. The judgment, on the date it was passed, was not an effective judgment, because it depended upon the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the judg­ment, namely, whether the deficit court-fee was paid or not paid. In the event the deficit court-fee was paid with­in time, there was to be a decree in favour of the plaintiff; and in the event of default of payment, the suit had to be dismissed. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the trial Court had complete jurisdiction to pass orders extending the time for pay­ment of the deficit court-fee up to 30-3-57. I have: already mentioned that in this case, an application for extension of time was made on 29-3-57. The provisions of O. 20, R. 3 of the Code, therefore, in ray judgment, apply to a case where the judgment is not a conditional one. (6) Now, I should like to consider the authorities which the parties have cited at the bar. The provisions of O. 20, R. 3 of the Code, therefore, in ray judgment, apply to a case where the judgment is not a conditional one. (6) Now, I should like to consider the authorities which the parties have cited at the bar. In Surajmal Marwari v. Bhubaneshwar Prasad, AIR 1.940 Pat 50, the trial Court decreed the suit on the condition that 'the plaintiffs must file the deficit court-fee within a fortnight from to-day; otherwise they will not be entitled to have the aforesaid decree, and the suit will be dismissed.' This order was passed on 21-12-36. The deficit court-fee, however, was depo­sited by the plaintiff on 5-1-37. This was a day too late. On the facts of that case, it was held that as i'O final order had been passed in the suit, the learned Munsiff still had jurisdiction until the decree had been drawn up, & on 5-1-37 the decree had not been drawn up. On the peculiar facts of that case, their Lordships held 'that a final order had yet to be pas­sed in the suit on the date when the Munsiff ac­cepted the court-fee, and that he had jurisdiction to accept it.' That case, in my opinion, was a little dif­ferent, on facts, from the present case, and the present case, in my opinion, stands on a firmer ground, namely, that before the expiry of the time given by the judgment, the trial Court exercised its jurisdic­tion to extend the time. In Bajranglal Jhunjhunwalla v. Sm. Solaki Marwarini, AIR 1950 Cal 564 , an application under O. 9, R. 9, C. P. Code, was allowed on the condition that certain costs had to be paid by 10-2-50. Before the expiry of the period, the petitioner on 10-2-50, ask­ed for further time to deposit the costs. This was refused, but later on the same day, on another peti­tion by the petitioner, time was allowed till the next day, namely, 11-2-50, and the money or costs were accepted. I like to quote the following passage from tile decision of the learned Judge; "Once the period has expired and the order of dismissal has operated, then, clearly it can be said that whatever may be provided in S. 148, Civil P. Code, after the suit has actually been dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the order of dis­missal except by way of formal review. With great respect, I think it is going a little too far to say that orders in the form of the order passed by the Mun­siff here on 30th January are complete final orders. The orders are, as it were, in two parts, with a condi­tion, and, in my opinion, so long as the actual order of dismissal has not operated, the Court has still seisin of the case and has still jurisdiction to1 make use of the powers given under S.148, to extend the time." I respectfully agree with the view taken in that case. There, a reference was made to the case of Muhammad Asraf Ali v. Nabijan Bibi, 43 Cal WN 417: (AIR 1939 Cal 581), decided by Mr. Justice Edgley, which was distinguished on the ground that in that case, the application for extension of time had been made after the time had expired. Another case Jyotish Chandra Sen v. Rukmini Ballav Sen, AIR 1959 Cal 35 , was also relied upon by the learned counsel, but, in my opinion the facts were different there and. therefore, I do not like to deal with it exhaustively. In Sheo Prasad Kaur v. Bhanu Pratap Singh, AIR 1946 Oudh 52, on which reliance has been placed by the appellate Court below, (he facts were entirely different. In that case, a reference was made to the Patna case referred to above, and it was not at all distinguished, but the case proceeded upon certain decisions of the Oudh Court made prior to the judgment in hand. But, as I said, the facts of that case were entirely different. (7) In Khudadad v. Moriokhan, 34 Ind Gas 867: (AIR 1916 Sind 2), their Lordships made the fol­lowing observation : "Now the decree as pointed out in Ranjit Singh v. Ilahi Bakhsh, ILR 5 All 520, is 'in substance as well as in form the mouthpiece of the suit in its immediate result, and without it, the dispute bet­ween the parties would not be intelligible.' When, therefore, the Court gave a judgment but refused to give a decree, the Court postponed the decision of the suit. It said in effect, I am prepared to decide the suit in accordance with this judgment, but I shall not do so until you have paid the penalty under the Stamp Act. It said in effect, I am prepared to decide the suit in accordance with this judgment, but I shall not do so until you have paid the penalty under the Stamp Act. The effect of this order was to make the judgment delivered on 11-8-1913 a provisional judg­ment, which did not become an operative judgment until 21-11-1913, when preparation of the decree was ordered. We think the latter date is the date of the judgment as well as of the decree, from which limitation runs, and that the appeal is, therefore, in time." In Peari Dai Debi v. Jotindra Nath Bose, 4 Ind Cas 441 (Cal), it is observed as follows: "These cases, no doubt, lay down the proposi­tion that when an order or judgment of the Court has once been perfected, the Court has no jurisdic­tion to alter it. but that so long as the order has not been perfected, the Judge has the power to reconsi­der the matter." In Harjimal v. Shantilal Sakalchand. AIR 1934 Nag 109, Mr. Justice Vivian Bose, Additional Judicial Commissioner (as he then was) observed as follows (I am quoting from the placitum which clearly brings out the decision) : "The Court cannot extend the period originally fixed when the period has been fixed by a decree; but when the application for extension is made be­fore the decree, the Court is bound to consider it) and exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by S. 148 one way or the other. If it fails to consider an application through a mistake of its own, it has in­herent jurisdiction to rectify its mistake, even though it means the re-opening of a decree. For Courts exist to administer justice, and rules "which have been framed for the attainment of that end, should not be used to frustrate it." Now I should like to consider the cases cited by Mr. Ghose for the respondents. In Kshetra Mohon v. Gour Mohon, 37 Gal WN 878: (AIR 1934 Cal 21), the facts were entirely different. There, the Court directed payment of a certain sum of money within seven days. The money was not paid within seven days of the date of the order which was passed on 30-5-32. Ghose for the respondents. In Kshetra Mohon v. Gour Mohon, 37 Gal WN 878: (AIR 1934 Cal 21), the facts were entirely different. There, the Court directed payment of a certain sum of money within seven days. The money was not paid within seven days of the date of the order which was passed on 30-5-32. On 6-6-32, the respondent (judgment-debtor) put in a petition for time to deposit the amount ordered by the decree, and on 15-6-32, that is to say, a long time after the expiry of the date given In the judgment, the appellate Court allowed the appeal from the order of the Munsiff and allowed the application of the judgment-debtor as the sum of Rs. SO/- was deposited. In my opinion, it was rightly held there that the extension of time was without jurisdiction. The case of Eakub Sheikh v. Samjan Bibi, 44 Cal WN 449: (AIR 1940 Cal 275). was a case which was not con­cerned with the provisions of either S. 148 or S. 149 of the C. P. Code, but it was a case under S. 174 (3) (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and if S. 148 or S. 149 had no application, then, in my opinion, that case is not at all relevant, and it is mentioned in the judgment of that case as follows : "In any view of the matter, I do not think that S. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure could apply to an order such as that which we are now discus­sing, in which an extension of time was granted in respect of an act prescribed by S. 174 (3) (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as S. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure only authorises an enlargement of time in respect of acts prescribed or allowed by that Co_de." The cases of 43 Cal WN 417: (AIR 1939 Cal'581), Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad. AIR 1936 All 477. and Sreepathi Balaiah v. Darsi Ramayya, AIR 1941 Mad 706 are, in my opinion, not relevant, as the facts therein are entirely different. Then reliance was placed by him on the case of AIR 1939 Cal 581. This case, decided by a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, does support Mr. Ghose. AIR 1936 All 477. and Sreepathi Balaiah v. Darsi Ramayya, AIR 1941 Mad 706 are, in my opinion, not relevant, as the facts therein are entirely different. Then reliance was placed by him on the case of AIR 1939 Cal 581. This case, decided by a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, does support Mr. Ghose. It says that "where the terms of an order upon an applica­tion for setting aside sale, provide that if the de­cretal amount is paid within a certain time, the sale would be set aside, but on failure to deposit the amount within the stipulated period, the application would stand dismissed, such an order is final in it­self and no further reference to the Court is neces­sary for the purpose of implementing it. After such an order is passed, the Court ceases to have jurisdic­tion over the matter unless any aggrieved party files a properly constituted application for review of the order. This being so, the provisions of O. 20. R. 3 apply, and S. 148 can have, therefore, no application to such a case." I respectfully differ from the learned Judge. In a case like the present case, where an extension of time is asked for, in my opinion, there could be no grounds of review. The grounds of review are men­tioned in O. 47, R. 1, C. P. Code, and a case of this kind is not contemplated to be covered by O. 47, R. 1. (8) Having given my best consideration to this case, in my opinion, the judgment of the Court of appeal below must be set aside and it must be held that the extension of time granted by the trial Court for payment of the deficit court-fee was within i jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, the appeal filed by the plaintiff must be disposed of on merits, I and the case is, therefore, remanded to the Court ' of the learned Additional District Judge, Lower As­sam Districts, Nowgong, for hearing the appeal on its merits. (9) The appeal, therefore, is allowed with costs. BD/D.R.R. Appeal allowed.