JUDGMENT M. S. Menon, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 101 of 1123 of the Court of the District Judge of Trichur. The respondents are the Chief Secretary to the Government (1st defendant) and Messrs. Chunduru Subba Rao Ankaramian Company, a firm of General Merchants and Commission Agents at Tenali in the Guntur District (2nd defendant). 2. The suit related to a cocoanut oil transaction between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. It was dismissed with costs and with interest on the costs at 6 per cent, per annum. 3. The sole question for determination as far as the claim against the 2nd defendant is concerned is whether the property in the oil passed from the plaintiff to the 2nd defendant prior to Ext. N, dated 21st December 1946, an order requisitioning the oil under the Cochin Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning Powers Proclamation, III of 1122. It is common ground that if our conclusion is that the title in the goods did not pass as alleged by the plaintiff, the claim against the 2nd defendant is unsustainable and the decree of the trial court has to be affirmed as far as the said defendant is concerned. 4. Ext. A is a telegram, dated 9th December 1946. By that telegram the 2nd defendant asked the plaintiff to quote for: "701 silver clean co-coil correct 37 lb. new kerosine black tins " ; and by Ext. B1, a telegram of the same date, the plaintiff made the following offer : " Offering one wagon thirty-seven gross blackout Trichur pass thirty four ten sales tax one per cent extra immediate express order with five thousand advance ", "The offer was accepted by Ext. C, a telegram, dated 10th Chief Secretary February 1946: " Recd accepted clean co-coil sent T/T five thousand dispatch urgently wire ". 5. The " advance" was received by the plaintiff only on 14th December 1946. On that date he sent the following telegram Ext. G1 to the 2nd defendant: "Advance reed only today loading earliest possible." 6. The correspondence that took place between Ext. C and Ext. G1 are not material for deciding the question before us and was not relied upon by counsel for the appellant. On that date he sent the following telegram Ext. G1 to the 2nd defendant: "Advance reed only today loading earliest possible." 6. The correspondence that took place between Ext. C and Ext. G1 are not material for deciding the question before us and was not relied upon by counsel for the appellant. The only documents relied on by him in support of his contention that the title in the oil passed from the plaintiff to the 2nd defendant were Exts. G1, II, III, K, XIV and P. 7. Ext. II is a letter from the plaintiff to the 2nd defendant, dated 14th December 1946 : " We are in receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. and the post card of the 11th inst. today. We received the bank intimation from the Indian Bank only today. We have accordingly received payment of the T.T. and have credited the same to your accounts and sent you the following telegram: "Advance received only today loading earliest possible " (Ext. Gl.) "We are making arrangements for the despatch of the wagon at the earliest. Ext. III is a further letter by the plaintiff to the 2nd defendant, dated 16th December 1946: "Received your post card, dated the 13th instant. We have made ready of the oil as per your order. Government have controlled the price of cocoanut oil and restricted its transportation by permit. We shall despatch you immediately the permit is received. " The order of the Government of Cochin referred to is Ext. IV, dated 14th December 1946 by which that Government fixed with effect from 15th December 1946 the maximum prices of copra and cocoanut oil (without containers) at Rs. 884 and Rs. 1,390 per ton respectively and prohibited export from the State of copra and cocoanut oil except under and in accordance with the terms conditions of a permit issued by the Director of Food Supplies or any Officer duly authorised by him in that behalf. 8. Ext. K, dated 18th December 1946 is the 2nd defendant's reply to Ext. II : " We came to understand referring your letter of 14th inst (Ext. II) that you were not yet, despatched our C. N. oil wagon since this day. Please despatch our C. N. oil wagon very urgently. " Ext. XIV, dated 20th December 1946 is the plaintiff's reply to Ext. II : " We came to understand referring your letter of 14th inst (Ext. II) that you were not yet, despatched our C. N. oil wagon since this day. Please despatch our C. N. oil wagon very urgently. " Ext. XIV, dated 20th December 1946 is the plaintiff's reply to Ext. K : "Received your post card of the 18th inst. (Ext. K). Hope you are in receipt of our letter of 16th inst. (Ext. III). The wagon of oil as per your order is ready here for despatch. We have applied for the permit for its despatch and as soon as the same is obtained, we shall immediately despatch the wagon. " and Ext. P dated 22nd December 1946 is the 2nd defendant's reply to the plaintiff's letter Ext. III: "Received your letter dated 16th inst. (Ext. III) and noted. You have written in your letter 'we shall despatch you immediately the permit is received '. In how many days you are expected. You shall receive the transport permit ? You know that we have been placed our order at the time before the Government have controlled the price of cocoanut oil and restricted its transportation by permit. If you delay in despatch by any reason whatsoever, we are afraiding that heavy loss may arise to this consignment unless you were not made the quick arrangements of the despatch of the wagon. Please despatch our co-coil wagon very urgently. Awaiting to hear from you by wire, that our wagon has been exported. " 9. Section 23 (1) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, provides : " Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. Such assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made. " Chalmers' comment on the corresponding provision in the English Act is: "The expression that the property in the goods passes by their 'appropriation to the contract', though consistently used in the modern cases, is not a fortunate one. Such assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made. " Chalmers' comment on the corresponding provision in the English Act is: "The expression that the property in the goods passes by their 'appropriation to the contract', though consistently used in the modern cases, is not a fortunate one. In the first place, as Parke, B. has pointed out, the term is used in two senses. It may mean that the goods are so far appropriated that the seller would break his contract by delivering any other goods, though they still remain his property, or it may, and usually does mean that the goods are finally appropriated to the contract so as to pass the property in them to the buyer. In the second place, if the decisions be carefully examined, it will be found that in every case where the property has been held to pass, there has been an actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the buyer. If the term ' delivery ' had been substituted for ' appropriation ', probably less difficulty would have arisen; and it seems a pity that this was not done by the Act". (Chalmers Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 13th Edition page 75). 10. The contention of the plaintiff is that there was a due appropriation by him of 701 tins of cocoanut oil to the contract and that there has been an implied assent to that appropriation by the defendant after it was made. We see no warrant for this contention; 11 According to counsel for the appellant the words " our C.N. oil wagon " in Ext. K and "our wagon '' in Ext. P evidence a consciousness on the part of the defendant that the goods had become his. We cannot agree. It may be that " 701 tins of cocoanut oil " and "a wagon of cocoanut oil " are synonymous expressions but the use of the word " our " so far as we can see is not indicative of any ownership or title. All that was apparently meant was: "the goods we ordered and which you agreed to supply ". 12. It is agreed that the words " Trichur pass " in Ext. B1 mean '' F.O.R. Trichur Railway Station ". All that was apparently meant was: "the goods we ordered and which you agreed to supply ". 12. It is agreed that the words " Trichur pass " in Ext. B1 mean '' F.O.R. Trichur Railway Station ". The plaintiff himself says as P.W. 1 : xxx xxx xxx In these circumstances it is not possible to understand why the defendant should agree to a transfer of title in the goods prior at any rate to their booking at the Trichur Railway Station. 13. Section 19 (3) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, provides: " Unless a different intention appears, the rules contained in sections 20 to 24 are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer ". This sub-section applies both to specific and unascertained goods and states the general proposition that the property passes in accordance with the rules mentioned in sections 20 to 24 only in the absence of a different intention. A different intention is clearly manifest in the contract and the subsequent conduct of the parties. The accounts of the appellant do not indicate that there was any appropriation and he admits : xxx xxx xxx 14. We entertain no doubt that the title in the goods was with the plaintiff at the time they were requisitioned by Ext. N. The only further contention of the plaintiff that arises for consideration is whether the requisitioning by the State was mala fide and without jurisdiction. Paragraph 7 of the trial court's judgment contains a careful consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances which led up to Ext- N: That paragraph concludes as follows: " The requisition concerned was not an isolated instance. All the available stock of oil with all the merchants in Cochin was requisitioned. Some of it went for internal consumption. Some went for export to certain Indian Provinces on the requisition of the Government of India. As already indicated at the time concerned, plans for the maintenance of supplies essential to the people of Cochin and the Indian Provinces were worked on an all India Policy. Some of it went for internal consumption. Some went for export to certain Indian Provinces on the requisition of the Government of India. As already indicated at the time concerned, plans for the maintenance of supplies essential to the people of Cochin and the Indian Provinces were worked on an all India Policy. So much so export of oil to Indian Provinces as required by the Government of India was necessary to make sure of the maintenance of other supplies essential to the life of the people of Cochin ; even though some of the oil concerned happened to belong to the plaintiff. The testimony of the plaintiff as P.W. 1 on the question of the necessity or otherwise of requisition of oil in general and his oil in particular is vague. Under Proclamation III of 1122 the Government had jurisdiction to requisition the oil if it was necessary to maintain supplies essential to the life of the community. The evidence and circumstances above adverted to make me hold that it was necessary and that there was no mala fides or want of jurisdiction in the matter of the requisition. The issue is answered against the plaintiff. " We see no reason to differ from this conclusion. 15. In the light of what is stated above this appeal has to be dismissed and we do so. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondents.