JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal Shrivastava, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dismissing the Petitioner from service and for the issuance of an appropriate writ and direction for a declaration that the dismissal be deemed null and void and that the Petitioner be deemed to be in service. According to the Petitioner, he was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police in the former Holker State on January 1, 1937, under orders of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja Holker. On the formation of Madhya Bharat, his services continued and he was absorbed in the Madhya Bharat State under orders of the Inspector-General of Police contained in the notification published in the Madhya Bharat Police Gazette, dated August 31, 1950. On March 16, 1955, he was served with a charge-sheet by the District Superintendent of Police, Dewas and was suspended with effect from that date. After inquiry and giving him a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Bharat, Ujjain, by his order dated June 21, 1955, dismissed him from service. He preferred an appeal to the Inspector-General of Police, then a revision to the Government of Madhya Bharat and lastly, a review to that Government but all in vain. The order of dismissal is assailed on grounds that the Deputy Inspector-General of Police could not dismiss the Petitioner and in doing so, he transgressed the provisions contained in Article 311 of the Constitution, and secondly, that the Petitioner had no reasonable opportunity to satisfy the authorities concerned that his past record was not bad. In the return filed by the State Government, it has been averred that the service of the Petitioner in the Madhya Bharat State was on a temporary and provisional basis, and it was denied that his appointment was ever made by the Inspector-General of Police. It has also been explained in the Return that a mention of the past record in the order of dismissal was only incidental. Shri Chitale, learned Counsel for the Petitioner first contends that the Petitioner's original appointment having been made by the Government of Maharaja Holker, he could not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the Government. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramchandra Gopalrao's case 1957 MPLJ 437 : AIR 1957 M.P. 126 . Shri Chitale, learned Counsel for the Petitioner first contends that the Petitioner's original appointment having been made by the Government of Maharaja Holker, he could not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the Government. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramchandra Gopalrao's case 1957 MPLJ 437 : AIR 1957 M.P. 126 . In that case, it was held that a Sub-Inspector of Police who was originally appointed by the Ruler of Rat lam State but was not reappointed in the Madhya Bharat State after the merger of the Ratlam State in the new State, could only be removed by the Madhya Bharat Government and his dismissal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police was illegal. That case was decided before the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajvi Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1958 SC 228 . According to their Lordships' pronouncement, When one State is absorbed in another, whether by accession, conquest, merger or integration, all contracts of services between the prior Government and its servants automatically terminate and thereafter those who elect to serve in the new State, and are taken on by it, serve on such terms and conditions as the new Stale may choose to impose. Their Lordships have further held that this was nothing more, though on a more exalted scale, than an application of the principle that underlies the law of Master and Servant when there is a change of masters. Their Lordships have further held that the relevant Article (Article XVI) of the Covenant only guaranteed that the new conditions were not to be less advantageous than those on which the said person was serving on the date named in the Covenant. After the above-cited decision of the Supreme Court, the decision of this Court in Ramchandra Gopalrao's case 1957 MPLJ 437 : AIR 1957 M.P. 126 is no more a good law. Thus, although the Petitioner had been appointed by the Government of Maharaja Holker on the formation of the Madhya Bharat State, that service came to an end and the validity of the dismissal of the Petitioner is to be decided not according to those terms and conditions but according to the terms and conditions laid down by the new State of Madhya Bharat. The Police Powers Rules of 1949 which were framed in pursuance of Section 7 of the Madhya Bharat Police Act, and which were published on June 2, 1949, authorise the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to dismiss a Sub-Inspector. These Rules were applicable to the Petitioner on the date that he was dismissed (June 21, 1955). The conclusion is, that the dismissal of the Petitioner by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Bharat, is ultra vires the Police Powers Rules, 1949 and it cannot be said that his dismissal could not be ordered except by the Government of Madhya Bharat just because his original appointment order emanated from the Government of Maharaja Holker. The next contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner in the alternative is that he, having been appointed a Sub-Inspector by the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Bharat by his notification published in the Gazette dated August 31, 1950, could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General. The said notification merely gives a gradation list. Whether that notification constituted an order of appointment of Sub-Inspectors, has been determined by a Division Bench of this Court where the question has been answered in the negative and it has been held that the said gradation list was not an appointment order or one of confirmation. See Raghunath Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1959 MPLJ 423 : AIR 1959 M.P. 43 . During the course of the hearing, Shri Chitale makes an endeavour to set out a new case for the Petitioner. The argument is that under Article XVI of the Covenant, the services of the servants were either to be terminated or to be continued and since in the present case, the Petitioner's services were continued, such 'continuance' amounts to 'appointment' and such appointment must be deemed to have been made by the Government of the newly born State of Madhya Bharat. On these premises it is urged that no other authority, excepting the Government of Madhya Bharat, was competent to dismiss the Petitioner. This contention cannot be allowed to be raised inasmuch as it has not been taken in the petition. There is no material on record to show that the order of continuance of the Petitioner's services was made by the Government of Madhya Bharat and what the terms and conditions were. This contention cannot be allowed to be raised inasmuch as it has not been taken in the petition. There is no material on record to show that the order of continuance of the Petitioner's services was made by the Government of Madhya Bharat and what the terms and conditions were. It has been held in Govind Vinayak v. Additional Deputy Commissioner 1953 NLJ 385 : AIR 1953 Nag. 250, that-- It must be distinctly understood by litigants that the High Court has to examine the case only from the point of view of the challenge raised in the petition, and if no such challenge is raised, the High Court will not go out of its way to fish into the record to find out if there is or there is not some evidence in support of a particular finding, In the case of Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 M.B. 236, it was observed that- In regard to applications for prerogative writs, the settled practice of English and American Courts is that no ground shall be relied upon or relief sought at the hearing of the motion except the grounds and relief set out in the application and a writ would be refused where the case tendered by the petition is radically different from that set up upon argument. The practice being one whish only carries out the object with which a copy of the application for the issue of a writ is served on the opponent and he is called upon to show cause in respect of grounds stated in the application, must be adopted as regards applications under Article 226 also. (In AIR 1956 Bom. 368 ; 1956 Patna 228; 1955 All. 193; 1953 Cal. 548; and 1958 Andhra Pradesh 697, a similar view was taken). This brings me to the second ground on which the order of dismissal is challenged. The contention is that the charge-sheet which was delivered to the Petitioner on March 16, 1955, did not contain any allegation against the Petitioner that his past record was undesirable but in the order of dismissal the Deputy Inspector-General took into account his past record also and the Petitioner was thus deprived of an opportunity to explain those adverse entries, if any. On a perusal of the impugned order of dismissal, I think that the ground is based on a misconception. On a perusal of the impugned order of dismissal, I think that the ground is based on a misconception. It will be useful to quote the exact words used by the Deputy Inspector-General in the said order. After having held that the Petitioner was guilty on two counts of (i) not registering offences under the Gambling Act and taking action against the accused when produced before him; and (ii) burking a cognizable case under Section 420, Indian Penal Code of professional type, he said as follows: ... The question arises about the quantum of punishment to be inflicted on the Sub-Inspector. In inflicting any punishment due regard should be paid to the service record of the guilty officer concerned and also to frank acceptance of any guilt committed. The service record of this officer is not such as to merit any consideration. The second fact of frank" acceptance for purposes of mitigation of sentence is also missing. It is obvious enough that the Deputy Inspector-General took into consideration the Petitioner's past record just to see whether it could be used for the purpose of mitigating the punishment. It is very clear from the order itself that the past record of the officer was not taken into consideration either for finding that he was guilty of the charges levelled against him or for inflicting a more severe punishment. The mind of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police becomes clearer when the last sentence quoted above is read where the word 'also' is very significant. He found both the mitigating elements (a past meritorious record and a frank admission) to be absent in the case and therefore he thought that dismissal was the only proper punishment. For the reasons stated above, this petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed