JUDGMENT A.N. Mulla, J. - Jamuna Prasad applicant was convicted under Sec. 186, I. P. Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- in default simple imprisonment for a fortnight by a first class Magistrate, Lucknow. He went up in appeal, but the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, upheld the order of the Magistrate and dismissed his appeal. It was contended by the counsel for the applicant that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence committed by the applicant as there was no proper complaint required by Sec. 195 (1) (a) of the Cr. P. C. and the whole trial was vitiated because of this illegality, but this contention was rejected by the appellate court. A few decisions were cited by the counsel for the applicant before the appellate court which supported this contention, but the view expressed by a Single Judge of this Court in Barkat v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Allahabad 6 was preferred by the appellate court and accepting that view it rejected the appeal. 2. The applicant then came up in revision before this Court and the revision came before one of us who found that there was overwhelming authority in support of the contention advanced by the applicant and there were also a few authorities against that contention. The revision was, therefore, referred to a Divisional Bench of this Court so that an authoritative decision may be given on the point involved. It is in these circumstances that this case has been placed before a Bench of this Court. 3. Before dealing with the point of law involved in the case it would be desirable to give briefly the fact of this case. The prosecution case is that Sri A. H. Chisthi, Sales Tax Officer, Lucknow, was inspecting the shop of Ahmad Hasan Wahid Hasan, Udaiganj, Cantonment Road, Lucknow, on the 19th of June, 1956, when the applicant case came there and interfered in the discharge of his official duties as a public servant and also misbehaved. Sri Chishti immediately afterwards lodged a report of this incident at the police station concerned. The police thereupon submitted a charge-sheet against the applicant under Sec. 186, I. P. Code. Sri Chishti appeared as a prosecution witness in this case and he proved the report which he had lodged. 4. Sri Chishti immediately afterwards lodged a report of this incident at the police station concerned. The police thereupon submitted a charge-sheet against the applicant under Sec. 186, I. P. Code. Sri Chishti appeared as a prosecution witness in this case and he proved the report which he had lodged. 4. The question to be decided in the case is whether the report lodged by Sri Chishti at the police station with a view that some action should be taken against the applicant fulfils the requirements of Sec. 195 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or not. We think it desirable to quote Sec. 195 (1) (a) at this stage. It runs as follows :- "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Secs. 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate." 5. The words quoted above are unambiguous and they make it imperative that a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate should be filed. The question, therefore, arises whether the report lodged by Sri Chishti can be construed as complaint. Complaint has been defined in Sec. 4 (1) (h) of the Cr. P. C. The definition is as follows :- "'Complaint' means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer." 6. It cannot be doubted that the word 'complaint' used in Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code is limited by the definition which we have cited above. There are two requirements which must be fulfilled before an accusation can be called a complaint. These requirements are :- (a) that the accusation should be made to a Magistrate, and (b) this accusation should be made with a view to his taking action under the Code. 7. A further requirement is laid down by Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code, namely that this accusation should be in the writing of the public servant himself or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. 7. A further requirement is laid down by Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code, namely that this accusation should be in the writing of the public servant himself or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. As these three requirements are conditions precedent which must exist before the complaint can be entertained, we have to see whether the report of Sri Chishti fulfils these requirements. 8. Admittedly this accusation was not made to a Magistrate either orally or in writing, but it was made at the police station. Again this accusation was lodged not with a view that the Magistrate should take any action against the applicant, but that the police should take action against the applicant. The report was a scribed report, but as it was the presented to the Magistrate but at the police station it cannot be described as a complaint in writing. We, therefore, find that none of the three requirements of a law were fulfilled. On a plain reading of Sec. 195 (1) (a) and the definition of the word 'complaint' given in Sec. 4 (1) (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code, we could have easily decided the question before us, but as there are conflicting views taken by the Judges of the various High Courts in interpreting the word 'complaint' it is necessary to examine this question in detail. 9. Before entering into this conflict of authority, we would like to observe how in our opinion the words of the statute should be interpreted. Where the words provide a clear and unambiguous meaning, the courts of law are not entitled to read something more in those words than what is contained in them. The legislature speaks through the statute and the courts have to carry out the directions given in the statute so long as the directions are clear and distinct. It is only where the language of the statute is capable of more than one meaning that the courts of law can seek their guidance from the intention of the legislature or the principles of equity. The definition of 'complaint' is neither ambiguous nor does the plain meaning of its words in any way militate against the intention of the legislature. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to travel beyond the express direction given by the words of this definition. The definition of 'complaint' is neither ambiguous nor does the plain meaning of its words in any way militate against the intention of the legislature. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to travel beyond the express direction given by the words of this definition. Before an accusation can be termed a complaint, it must be addressed to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action. Any communication addressed to any one else except a Magistrate is, therefore, outside the definition of the word 'complaint' given in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legislature as a matter of fact went out of its way to make its intention perfectly clear. It clearly stated in the definition of the word 'complaint' that it does not include the report of a police officer. What has been expressly excluded by the legislature cannot be included in the definition by courts of law. Where an aggrieved public servant lodges a report at the police station and the police in its turn submits a charge-sheet, the proceedings before the Magistrate do not start on the report lodged by the public servant, but on the charge-sheet submitted by the police officer. In other words the proceedings in such a case start on the report of a police. officer and this has been expressly excluded by the definition of the word 'complaint' cited above. That the ball was set rolling by the report lodged by the public servant is quite irrelevant to the question before us. The report of Sri Chishti was, therefore, merely an information given to the police and it was upto the police concerned to prosecute the applicant or not. The right to prosecute in cases which; are covered by Sec. 195 (1) (a), Cr. P. Code is vested only in the public servant and it cannot be delegated. No one can represent the public servant or act on his behalf or be his substitute as a complainant. 10. A Magistrate can take cognizance only under Sec. 190, Cr. P. Code under the following conditions as given in that section :- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. 11. 11. The words of (a) and (b) make it perfectly clear that a complaint is not the same thing as a report and the legislature clearly made a distinction between the two. The right to entertain a complaint is, however, restricted by the provisions of Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code and a few following Sections. The reason why this restriction has been placed can well be understood. The principle underlying Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code is that where offences in contempt of lawful authority or against public justice are committed, then only the public servants or the courts concerned can initiate proceedings in the matter. This was to stop private persons from wreaking vengeance against such offenders. A discretion was, therefore, to be exercised by the public servants and the courts concerned before such prosecutions could be launched. Another reason why it was considered necessary to fetter the initiation of such criminal proceedings was that the offences which amount to contempt of lawful authority of public servants or which are committed against administration of public justice are of so many shades that a prosecution in respect of every such offence was not desirable. It was, therefore, considered necessary that the public servants should be given the discretion to prosecute such offenders or not. It was perhaps for these reasons that it was considered necessary that the public servant concerned should file a complaint in writing before a Magistrate. Such a written complaint would be a guarantee that the prosecution was well considered. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the restriction imposed by Sec. 195, Cr, P. Code are not a mere technicality, but there is a definite purpose behind these restrictions. In our opinion the legislature intended that the magistrate should take cognizance only when a formal complaint in writing was duly presented by the public servant or his superior and in no other case. 12. There are a large number of cases which support the view which we have expressed above. It would not be possible for us to refer to all these cases, but we will mention a few of them. We will first take up the decisions of our own High Court. 12. There are a large number of cases which support the view which we have expressed above. It would not be possible for us to refer to all these cases, but we will mention a few of them. We will first take up the decisions of our own High Court. The first case which touches this point is Baldeo Singh v. King-Emperor, A.I.R. 1925 Allahabad 566 In that case the Circle Inspector submitted a report to the Superintendent of Police praying that permission to prosecute the accused under Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code be given. This prayer was made under a mistaken notion that sanction was necessary. Actually no such sanction was necessary. When this report came to the Superintendent of Police he forwarded it to a Magistrate with the endorsement that necessary action should be taken and it should be disposed of. Daniels, J. hold that the endorsement of Superintendent of Police did not come within the definition of a complaint as it was not an allegation made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action. In the case cited above it was the superior officer of the public servant who had made the endorsement and yet this endorsement was not considered equivalent to a complaint. This decision was approved by a Bench of our High Court is a subsequent decision. That case is Lakhan v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 Allahabad 788 A difference of opinion arose in this case between Sulaiman, C. J. and Bennet, J. and the case was referred to Rachhpal Singh, J., who agreed with Sulaiman, C. J. The view of the majority of the judges was that a report made to a police officer does not amount to a complaint. A similar view was expressed by Desai, J. in Sumer Goshain v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 560. 13. The only case of our High Court in which a contrary view was expressed is Barkat v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Allahabad 6 Allsop, J. observed : "In the first place, the term 'complaint' as defined in Sec. 4 (1) (h), Cr. P. C., has the meaning therein given, unless a different intention appears from the subject or context. A complaint, as defined, does not include the report of a police officer. P. C., has the meaning therein given, unless a different intention appears from the subject or context. A complaint, as defined, does not include the report of a police officer. It is obvious that the term 'complaint' in Sec. 195 (1) (a) cannot be used in that sense because otherwise, it would be possible for any person to obstruct a police officer in the execution of his duty without rendering himself liable to punishment under Sec. 186, Penal Code'. It seems to me that the intention of Sr 195, Cr. P. C., is only that the Magistrate should not punish any person excerst at the instance of the public officer to concerned or of his superior and I do not think that the term 'complaint' is used in the technical sense in which it is defined in Sec. 4." 14. With respect to the learned judge, we would like to observe that We have not been able to follow his liner E reasoning. We fail to see why a police officer, if such a situation arose, cannot file a written complaint to a Magistrate'. We also find no adequate reason for V& proposition that the word 'complaint'- used in Sec. 195 (I) (a), has wider scope than the definition of 'complaint' given in Sec. 4 (1) (h) of the same Code. Where words are defined they are at least applicable to that statute in which they are defined and we find no justification for the view that the word 'complaint' used in Sec. 195 (1) (a) , Cr. P. Code was to be given another meaning than the meaning given to it in the Code itself. 15. The view expressed by Allsop, J. hag been considered and dissented from in the following three cases:- 1. Lajja Ram v. The State; 2. Krishna Tukaram Jadhav v. The Secretary to the Chief Minister, Bombay States, AIR 1955 Bombay 315; 3. A Division Bench decision in Raghunath Rai v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1958 Rajasthan 91 16. Only one High Court followed the view taken by Allsop, J. in State v. Nandlal Karunashankar, A.I.R. 1951 Saurashtra 8 A Bench of the Saurashtra High Court followed this view. No authorities in favour of their interpretation were cited either by the judges of the Saurashtra High Court or by Allsop, J. of the Allahabad High Court. Only one High Court followed the view taken by Allsop, J. in State v. Nandlal Karunashankar, A.I.R. 1951 Saurashtra 8 A Bench of the Saurashtra High Court followed this view. No authorities in favour of their interpretation were cited either by the judges of the Saurashtra High Court or by Allsop, J. of the Allahabad High Court. The Saurashtra High Court, however, did not follow the above Division Bench ruling in another case, State v. Kathi and Unad Ranning'. We would also mention that when Allsop, J. expressed this view, he did not take into consideration the contrary view which was held by the other judges of our High Court and he made no reference to the other earlier decisions, which we have cited. 17. In the Bombay decision cited above (A.I.R. 1955 Bombay, 315), Shah, J. observed at page 317:- "A complaint in writing by the public servant concerned is a condition precedent to the cognizance being taken by a Magistrate of an offence mentioned in Sec. 195 (1) (a), Cr. P. C. and that condition must be strictly complied with. A complaint not by the public servant concerned or by some public servant to whom he is subordinate, but by person who is merely authorised in writing to file a complaint in his own name is not a good substitute for the requisite complaint so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Magistrate. Sec. 195, Cr. P.C. does not permit any delegation of authority by the public servant concerned." 18. We are in full agreement with the view expressed above and it seems to us that if the legislature contemplated that reports lodged by public servants could be treated as their complaints within the meaning of Sec. 195 (1) (a), Cr. P. C., the legislature would certainly have added the word 'report' also when it enacted this provision. We cannot read the words 'except on the complaint in writing of the public servant' as `except on the complaint or report in writing of the public servant'. 19. We say now cite a few decisions of the other High Courts which have also expressed the same view which we have taken. These decisions are : 1. Ram Singh v. Emperor, 36 Cr. L.J. 714 S. B. Pat 2. Banshilal Dukhiram v. The State, 1954 Cr. L.J. 15, Nag 3. Makaradhwaj Sahu v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Orissa 175 4. These decisions are : 1. Ram Singh v. Emperor, 36 Cr. L.J. 714 S. B. Pat 2. Banshilal Dukhiram v. The State, 1954 Cr. L.J. 15, Nag 3. Makaradhwaj Sahu v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Orissa 175 4. Babu v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 241 20. The consensus of authority, therefore, is clearly against the view taken by Allsop, J. Apart from the cases cited by us, we have already observed that the words of the statute themselves are not capable of the interpretation put upon them by Allsop, J. Where the definition of the word 'complaint' clearly excludes the report of a police officer, it is implied that it also excludes the report to a police officer. 21. In view of what we have observed above, we find that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. The provisions of Sec. 195, Cr. P. Code are imperative and a disregard of these provisions vitiates the whole proceedings and cannot be cured by the provisions of Sec. 537, Cr. P. C. 22. We therefore, allow the revision, set aside conviction of the applicant and acquit him. The fine, if paid by him, should be refunded.