MEHROTRA, J.: As common points of law arise in all these cases I propose to dispose them of by one common judgment. It will however be necessary to give separately the facts of each case. (2) Rule No. 85 arises out of an application by one Narendra Kumar Das under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of Certiorari quash­ing the order of the Appellate Board, Transport, Shillong (hereinafter called 'the Board') passed in its meeting on the 22nd July 1959. The petitioner in pursuance of a notice issued by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Nowgong, applied for a stage carriage permit for Nowgong-Rupahi-Lawkhoa-Ambagan-Silghat route. Along with him a number of other persons applied for grant of the permit. The Regional Transport Authority, Now­gong by its letter dated 6th February 1959 inform­ed the petitioner that he had been granted a per­mit for three years with effect from 1st January 1959. The petitioner alleges that he deposited the necessary permit fee and purchased a vehicle No. ASN 748 after selling his houses. The vehicle was put on route after incurring an expense of Rs. 14,500/-. By die order referred to above the Re­gional Transport Authority granted permits to num­ber of persons on that route. An appeal was filed to the Board by some of those whose petitions had been rejected by the Regional Transport Authority. The Board in its meeting held on 2iJnd July 1959 set aside the order of the Regional Transport Au­thority granting permit to the petitioner and direct­ed it to call for fresh applications and to fill up the vacancies in accordance with the prescribed pro­cedure. It should be pointed out that twenty-five buses were permitted to ply on this route and thus per­mits were granted to twenty-five persons. The Ap­pellate Board by its impugned order of the 22od July 1959 maintained the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting permit in respect of nine persons and set aside the order granting per­mit to sixteen persons including the petitioner. None of the appellants was however granted a permit by the Board except one Sri Debananda Barua. The remaining vacancies were directed to be filled in by inviting fresh applications. Petition No. 90 has been filed by one Mohoram Nath who had also been granted a permit for the aforesaid route and the Appellate Board by its impugned order cancelled the permit granted to him also. The remaining vacancies were directed to be filled in by inviting fresh applications. Petition No. 90 has been filed by one Mohoram Nath who had also been granted a permit for the aforesaid route and the Appellate Board by its impugned order cancelled the permit granted to him also. Rule No. 94 arises out of the petition filed by Nabin Chandra Barua who was one of the twenty-five persons who had been granted permit on the same route and whose permit was also cancelled by the Appellate Board. Rule No. 114 arises out of an application by Sri Ramani Kanta Hazarika who had been granted a stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority, Nowgong in res­pect of the said route which was cancelled by the Appellate Board and Rule No. 131 arises out of an application by Sri Harendra Nath Barkataki who had been granted a stage carriage permit in respect of this route by the Regional Transport Authority Nowgong which was cancelled by the Appellate Board. In these five petitions the main contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that the Appellate Board had exceeded its jurisdiction in cancelling the permits granted to the petitioners and direct­ing the Regional Transport Authority to invite fresh applications for the said route. The contention in substance is that on an appeal filed under section 34(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act by persons whose petitions for grant of permit have been rejected, the Appellate Board has no jurisdiction to cancel the permits granted to other applicants unless it is necessary to give relief to the appellants. It was further contended that the appeal was not disposed of according to law. The grounds on which the permits granted to the applicants have been re­jected are extraneous to the provisions of the Mo­tor Vehicles Act and are not relevant for the grant or refusal of a permit. It was further contended that there was no material on the record to justify the findings ar­rived at by the Appellate Board. The applicants were given no opportunity to contest the allega­tions against them and as such the principles of natural justice were not observed by the Board in deciding the appeals. The grounds on which the Board has cancelled the permits granted to the applicants were never urged against them before the Regional Transport Authority. The applicants were given no opportunity to contest the allega­tions against them and as such the principles of natural justice were not observed by the Board in deciding the appeals. The grounds on which the Board has cancelled the permits granted to the applicants were never urged against them before the Regional Transport Authority. (3) It will be convenient to refer to some of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act in order to appreciate the points raised. Section 47 of the Act provides as follows:- ''47. Procedure of Regional Transport Authoarising from journeys not being broken; (c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pend­ing; (f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area; and shall also take into consideration any repre­sentations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any as­sociation representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies: Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a co-operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being, as far as may be, be given prefe­rence over applications from individual owners. (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall re­fuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any timetable furnished that the provisions of this Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened: Provided that before such refusal an oppor­tunity shall be given to the applicant to amend the timetable so as to conform to the said provi­sions. (3) A Regional Transport Authority may, hav­ing regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or any specified route within the region," Section 48 lays down that "subject to the provisions of section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit." Sub-section (3) of section 48 then enumerates the conditions which may be attached to a permit. Section 57 lays down the procedure to be observed by the Regional Transport Authority in dealing with the applications for permits. Sub-section (3) of Section 57 provides that die application for the stage carriage permit is to be published in a pres­cribed manner giving opportunity to people who object to grant of a permit to make representation and sub-section (4) lays down that no representa­tion made beyond the appointed date will be consi­dered. Section 58 lays down the duration and provides for the procedure to be followed in the cases of renewal. Any determination by the Regional Trans­port Authority in the matter of grunt or refusal of a permit is appealable under section 64 of the Act, the material portion of which provides as follows:- "64. Any person- (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or * * * * * * * * * (f) being a local authority or police authority Or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, may, within the prescribed time and in the pres­cribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the Original autho­rity an opportunity of being heard." Section 67 gives power to the State Government to make rules to regulate certain matters enumerated therein and S. 68 gives power to the State Gov­ernment to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter. Section 133 also gives rule making power. Section 133 also gives rule making power. The Assam Motor Vehicles Rules 1940 are admit­ted to be the valid rules enforced at the relevant time. After the careful examination of these rules it cannot be disputed that the Regional Transport Authority in dealing with the applications for grant or refusal of a permit acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. The Act has clearly laid down the matters which are to be considered by the Regional Trans­port Authority in granting permits. The determi­nation by the Regional Transport Authority has to be a judicial determination affecting the rights of the parties. The decision therefore of the Regional Transport Authority will be amenable to a writ of certiorari by this Court. The decision of the Appellate Board is also not disputed to be a judi­cial determination and the Board acts as a quasi-judicial body. Its orders are therefore, amenable to a writ of certiorari by this court. (4) The leading case laying down the tests on which an administrative tribunal can be said to act in quasi-judicial capacity to be amenable to a writ of certiorari is that of Rex v. Electricity Com­missioners, 1924-1 KB 171, where Atkia L.J. stated as follows:- "Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are sub­ject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs." Slesser L. J. in the case of King v. London County Council, (1931) 2 KB 215 has also concurred in the aforesaid dictum of Atkin L. J. The learned Chief Justice in the case of "Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani', 1950 SCJ 451: ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ) also observed as follows:- "It seems to me that the true position is that when the law, under which the authority is mak­ing a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an enquiry judicial provided in coming to a decision well re­cognised principles of approach are required to be followed. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an enquiry judicial provided in coming to a decision well re­cognised principles of approach are required to be followed. In my opinion, the conditions laid down by Slesser L. J. in the judgment correctly bring out the distinction between a judicial and quasi-judi­cial decision on the one hand and the administra­tive decision on the other." It cannot be now disputed that a writ of certiorari will issue against the administrative body acting in a quasi judicial capacity if such a body has exceed­ed its jurisdiction or has failed to exercise jurisdic­tion vested in it or has failed to observe the prin­ciples of natural justice in the exercise of its juris­diction or it has committed a manifest error of law. It is difficult to lay down with any amount of precision the error which can be regarded as a mani­fest error of law or an error apparent on the face of the record. This power however, cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court. The power of review by this court based upon the analogy of the relationship by the appellate and trial courts cannot be accepted. Such an analogy loses sight of the fact that the administrative process itself is the outgrowth of conditions far different from those which shaped the judicial process. The differences in origin and function, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's phrase, 'preclude the wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts .. to assimilate the relation of these administrative bodies and the courts to the relationship between lower and upper courts is to disregard the origin and purposes of the movement for administrative regulation and at the same time to disregard the traditional scope, however far reaching, of the judicial process. Unless these vital differentiations between the functions of judicial and administra­tive tribunals are observed, courts will stray Out­side their province and read the laws of Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal doctrine." (Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., (1940) 309 US 134 at pp. 143-44). (5) The various clauses of section 64 of the Act deal with different situations and each is in­dependent of the other. This section is not con­cerned with defining the powers of the appellate authority and does not purport to do so. 143-44). (5) The various clauses of section 64 of the Act deal with different situations and each is in­dependent of the other. This section is not con­cerned with defining the powers of the appellate authority and does not purport to do so. It only sets out the circumstances under which any person, has a right of appeal against the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority. The power of an appellate authority is to be determined from the nature of the power exercised by such authority. The Board hearing an appeal acts in a judicial capacity and necessarily the power is to be exer­cised in a judicial manner. The Board cannot in determining an appeal take into consideration matters which are extrane­ous to the object and the purpose of the Act. It can only deal with the subject matter of the ap­peal and must necessarily possess all powers to give the relief to which the appellant should be found entitled. If in order to give relief to the ap­pellant it is necessary to cancel the permits grant­ed to the respondents, it may do so, but it has got no power to cancel the permit irrespective of the fact whether it is necessary to grant relief to the appellant or not. It is also inherent in the very nature of the power exercised by the Board that it should confine its determination to the materials on the record and to deal with the points raised by the appellant. In the case of "The King v. Minister of Trans­port' reported in 1934-1 KB 277 the opponents to the grant of a road service licence and backing authorising the running of a service of motor-coa­ches along a particular route appealed to the Minis­ter against the grant on the ground that the service was not needed in the interest of the public. The only subject-matter of the appeal before him was-whether the licence and backing had been properly granted. But the Minister made an order to the effect that the Commissioner should revoke the licence and backing as soon as he was satisfied after consultation with the Traffic Commissioners for the Eastern Area, that adequate provision has been made for road services between Upminster and London. But the Minister made an order to the effect that the Commissioner should revoke the licence and backing as soon as he was satisfied after consultation with the Traffic Commissioners for the Eastern Area, that adequate provision has been made for road services between Upminster and London. This order was set aside by the court of ap­peal on the ground that the order of the Minister was in effect an usurpation of the original jurisdic­tion conferred upon the Commissioner. Reliance in that case was placed on the provisions of sec­tion 81 of the Road Traffic Act 1930 which gave very wide powers to the Minister to pass any order in appeal filed D-fore him in support of the order but the court of appeal set aside the order. The following observations of Romer L. J. will be ap­posite:- "No one can suppose that the Legislature in­tended to create a dictatorship in the person of the Minister of Transport, if and whenever an appeal happened to be brought before him under the sec­tion. It is equally incredible that the sub-section should have been intended to give the Minister power to make any order he might think fit relat­ing to road transport in general, or even road trans­port in the area affected by the matter brought before him on the appeal. The sub-section, after all, is not one dealing with the powers of the Mi­nister of Transport as such. It is dealing with his powers as an appeal tribunal exercising quasi ju­dicial functions, and the orders that he may make as such. The most natural, and, in my opinion, the proper meaning of the sub-section is that the Minis­ter may give such decision on the questions raised by any particular appeal as he may think right, and give such directions as may be necessary for giving effect to that decision. The most natural, and, in my opinion, the proper meaning of the sub-section is that the Minis­ter may give such decision on the questions raised by any particular appeal as he may think right, and give such directions as may be necessary for giving effect to that decision. But his decision must be confined, as in the case of other judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, to the questions brought before him on the appeal, and he must not travel outside them." In the case of Natesa Pillai v. Central Road Tra­ffic Board" reported in AIR 1952 Mad 39 it was held that the Regional Transport Authority in the exercise of his original jurisdiction and the Central Road Traffic Board and the Government in dis­charge of their appellate revisional jurisdiction were bound to act judicially and the Board cannot there­fore give a relief to an appellant in respect of a matter not covered by the appeal to the detriment of a person not a party to that appeal. (6) The counsel for the opposite party strongly relied upon the case of Ram Gopal v. Anant Prasad reported in AIR 1959 SC 851 . In that case Ram Gopal, appellant was the holder of a permit to run a stage carriage on Rewa-Singrauli route. The permit was due to expire on 11th December 1955 and on 12th December he made an application for its rene­wal for a further period. The respondent Anant Prasad made a representation against the renewal of the appellant's permit. He also applied for grant of a permit to himself. The State Transport Authority made an order only renewing the permit for three years. No express order was made on Anant Prasad's application for grant of permit. He preferred an appeal against the order to the Vindhya Pradesh Transport Appellate Tribunal, and it was contended by Ram Gopal that the ap­peal was not competent. This contention was re­jected by the Appellate Tribunal and the permit granted to him was cancelled and a permit was issued to Anant Prasad. He preferred an appeal against the order to the Vindhya Pradesh Transport Appellate Tribunal, and it was contended by Ram Gopal that the ap­peal was not competent. This contention was re­jected by the Appellate Tribunal and the permit granted to him was cancelled and a permit was issued to Anant Prasad. An application for a writ of certiorari was made to the Judicial Commis­sioner, Vindhya Pradesh on the ground that there was an error on the face of the record inasmuch as the order of refusal to file an appeal and clause (f) of the section gives a right to a local authority or police authority or an association or a person pro­viding transport facilities to file an appeal against the grant of a permit to a third party, provided he had opposed the grant of the permit. So far as the first contention it was held by the Supreme Court that when the permits of the appellant was renewed, by implication the application of the respondent for grant of a permit had been rejected and he had a right of appeal under section 64(a). As regards the second conten­tion it was held that all the clauses of section 64 were independent and once an appeal had been properly filed by an aggrieved person under clause (a), there was no limitation placed on the powers of the appellate authority to grant relief only if the appellant could have filed an appeal under clause In the present case it is not contended by the applicants that no appeal lay to the Board, nor is it contended that as no representation had been filed by the appellants to the grant of the permit to the respondents as contemplated by section 64(f), the Appellate Board had no jurisdiction to pass any order. The contention in the present case is that the Appellate Board has given no relief to the appellants and has not/ passed any order necessary for giving relief to the appellants. It has only can­celled the permit granted to the respondents which could be done by the Regional Transport Authority under section 60 of the Act. The contention in the present case is that the Appellate Board has given no relief to the appellants and has not/ passed any order necessary for giving relief to the appellants. It has only can­celled the permit granted to the respondents which could be done by the Regional Transport Authority under section 60 of the Act. Particular reference was- made by the respondents to the following passage in the Supreme Court Judgment (at page 854):- "Clause (f) deals with a case where an objec­tion had been filed against the fresh grant or the renewal of a permit but the permit has none the less been granted or renewed. The clause gives the objector a right of appeal against the result of the rejection of his objection if he is one of the persons mentioned in it. The clause gives him that -right irrespective of the fact whether he has a right of appeal under airy of the other clauses or not. It does not say that a permit granted or renewed cannot be questioned except at the instance of the persons mentioned in clause (f); it does not affect the right of appeal under the other clauses. If an appeal lies under any of the other clauses, that of course must be an effective appeal and the ap­pellate authority must therefore have all powers to give the relief to which the appellant is found entitled." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case approved of the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, reported in (S) AIR 1955 Mad 386 and disapproved of the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of "Dholapur Co-operative Transport and Multipurpose Union Ltd. v. Appellate Authority, Rajasthan and others-" reported in AIR 1955 Raj 19 . In the Madras case the Regional Transport Authority dealt with two applications, one for renewal of a permit and the other for the issue of a permit on the same route. The application for renewal was granted and it was further stated therein that the applicant's objections against the renewal on the ground of infringements by the permit-holder of certain conditions will be considered when they arose. On appeal by the objector the Central Road Traffic Board rejected it on the ground that no ap­peal lay against the order granting renewal of the permit. On appeal by the objector the Central Road Traffic Board rejected it on the ground that no ap­peal lay against the order granting renewal of the permit. On a petition to the High Court it was held that the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was erroneous as it failed to exercise a juris­diction vested in it. It was observed that "the grant of a permit to one would automati­cally mean the refusal of a permit to the other and the appeal was thus perfectly competent as an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority refusing to grant a permit. The fact that such an appeal involved an attack on the order granting a renewal of a permit to the respondent, would not prevent the appeal being an appeal against the refusal to grant a permit to the appellant. The Board erred in presuming that it was not open to them in the appeal to consider the merits of the order granting renewal of the fourth respondent's permit. The filing of the appeal by the appellant set at large the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the renewal." (7) In the case of AIR 1955 Raj 19 (ibid) the Rajasthan High Court held that where an anneal had been made under clause (a) of S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the refusal of a permit, the appellate authority will generally have the right to give relief to the appellant by granting a per­mit but will not have any jurisdiction to can­cel the permit granted to another person unless a foundation has been laid before the Regional Trans­port Authority for an appeal provided by cl. (f) by an objection by somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. The Supreme Court disapproved of the deci­sion of the Rajasthan High Court in so far as it laid down that no objection having been filed against any of the competing applicants for the grant of a permit the Appellate Authority had no power in such circumstances on appeal by a person whose application for the grant of the permit had been refused to give relief by cancelling a permit grant­ed by the subordinate authority to one of the ap­plicants. The other part of the decision was not disapproved. The other part of the decision was not disapproved. In fact the Supreme Court held that the Rajasthan High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that to the same effect was the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of "Nadar Transports Tiruchirapalli v. State of Mad­ras" reported in AIR 1953 Mad 1 . The Supreme Court decision therefore, does not deal with the question before us. Section 57 of the Act gives power to the Regional Transport Autho­rity to consider the respective claims of the various applicants. The Regional Transport Authority can in making a selection look into the comparative merits of the claimants and prefer some of the applicants to others. The Appellate Board in hearing the appeal possesses a co-extensive power and might go into the respective claims of the parties. It might consider whether the appellants' applica­tions have been wrongly rejected or that the pro­per procedure has or has been not followed in con­sidering the applications made by the appellants. Before the Appellate Board can come to the conclusion whether the appellant was preferable to others, it may be necessary to look into the merit: of the respondents' applications. Unless the Ap­pellate Board comes to the conclusion that the permits were erroneously granted to the respon­dents, no occasion may arise for the grant of a permit to the appellants. But to my mind even this wide power given to the appellate Board does not participate in the proceedings when the case of such an individual is being considered, but that; by itself is no ground for the Appellate Authority to set aside all the selections made by the Regional Transport Authority and order calling of fresh ap­plications. The Appellate Authority has set aside the selection of Sri Hazi Hazar Hussain Munshi and Sri Narendra Kumar Das, on the ground, to quote its own words: "they are already well provided with their share of the world's good things or riches and they have already a good trade or business for their maintenance. The Appellate Authority has set aside the selection of Sri Hazi Hazar Hussain Munshi and Sri Narendra Kumar Das, on the ground, to quote its own words: "they are already well provided with their share of the world's good things or riches and they have already a good trade or business for their maintenance. In these days of wide spread un­employment, even among the educated youth and others, this Authority sees no valid reason why such well established persons with steady income on lines of trades or occupations or business should be preferred, when others who are not so substantial nor placed in well settled business or who would like to settle themselves in life with established business in transport industry have not been favour­ed." If the authority had taken these facts into consi­deration in preferring the appellants or any other applicant to the respondents, perhaps it could have 'been argued that the order cannot be regarded as an arbitrary or capricious order, but when these observations are viewed in the light of the relief granted to the appellants, they are certainly con­siderations not germane to the matter in issue be­fore the Appellate Authority. If a person has al­ready a good trade or business enough to main­tain him, that cannot be regarded as a disqualifi­cation and is no reason to reject his application. No absolute standard can be laid down as to when and in what circumstances a person is en­titled to a grant of a permit. These are always comparative matters and when one is exercising his ; power of selection in order to judge the compara-; tive merits, it may be permissible to go into consi-' deration whether one is better provided otherwise than the other claimant, but as I have already said, they cannot be regarded as absolute standards. Moreover the petitioner whose selection has been set aside on that ground had no opportunity to show to the Appellate'Authority that the other business which the petitioner has, is not sufficient to pro­vide for the maintenance of the family. If the point had been raised before the Re­gional Transport Authority, the petitioner might have been in a position to point out that the other business which he carries on is not sufficient to maintain his family. If the point had been raised before the Re­gional Transport Authority, the petitioner might have been in a position to point out that the other business which he carries on is not sufficient to maintain his family. The selection of the other two persons Sri Ramani Kanta Hazarika and Sri Deobar Das was set aside as they had no finance to run the transport business. It is very difficult to reconcile the two reasonings. If a person has not sufficient funds and thus is not financially sound to run the transport, he is not according to the Board, entitled to be selected. On the other hand if a person has finances, it is regarded as a sufficient source of income to him and^ will, according to the Board, be a reason for rejecting his application. It is true that it is not for this court to scrutinise the reasons which promp­ted the Appellate Board to cancel the permit grant­ed to some of the applicants but these factors may be relevant in considering the respective merits of the various applicants; but by themselves they can­not be said to be the grounds on which a person can be disqualified to be granted a permit. As re­gards Sri Deobar Das the Board's reasoning may be quoted: "Secondly as regards Sri Deobar Das, it is nod denied that he is a man of no substance and is work­ing as a cart driver of Shri Bilash Ch. Das, who has his own permit not merely in his name but also in the name of his son. Under such circums­tances, there is no doubt that it will be felt that an undeserving man, who has transactions with some permit holders, has been favoured. This may or may not be the case. However, in view of the pressing claims of many hundreds of others, who are more suitable, the Appellate Authority has no hesitation in setting aside this selection." These observations to our mind clearly indicate that the Tribunal had not proceeded judicially to determine the appeal. There may be thousands of people in this land who may be needy and who when compared with some of the applicants for the permit may be preferable, but that by itself is no ground for cancelling the permit granted to some of the applicants by the Regional Transport Authority. There may be thousands of people in this land who may be needy and who when compared with some of the applicants for the permit may be preferable, but that by itself is no ground for cancelling the permit granted to some of the applicants by the Regional Transport Authority. As I have already pointed out the Re­gional Transport Authority as well as the Appel­late Atuhority may consider the respective claims of the various applicants but it cannot refuse to exercise its power of selection on the mere off-chance of getting some other candidates in future who may be considered more deserving by the authority if another opportunity is given to them to make a selection. Shri Maharam Nath's selection has been set aside on the ground that his son had already got a truck permit but it was surrendered with a view to secure a permit on this route. There were also allegations of his being close­ly related to one of the members of the Regional Transport Authority which was thereby unduly pre­judiced in his favour. It cannot be doubted that I the Regional Transport Authority which acts in a! quasi-judicial capacity is as much bound to observe j the rules of natural justice as a court of law and the principles governing the doctrine of bias vis-a-1 vis judicial tribunals are equally applicable to j authorities, though they are not courts of justice I or judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others, namely authorities who are empowered to discharge quasi-judicial func­tions. The principles governing the 'doctrine of bias' vis-a-vis judicial tribunals are well settled and they are: (i) no man shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The result of these principles is that even a member of a judicial body is subject to a bias in favour of or against any party to a dispute or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist, he ought not to take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal and interests other than pecuniary will have the same effect if it is sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias. Vide Nageswararao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376 . Vide Nageswararao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376 . In the present case however the allegations that he was closely related to one of the members of the Regional Transport Authority was never exa­mined by the Regional Transport Authority, nor sufficient materials were placed before the Appel­late Board to come to any categorical finding on that issue. It is not necessary to further examine the reasoning of the Appellate Board in each case. The Appellate Board did not consider the claims of various appellants. The board has observed as fol­lows: "It is evident that some of them have qualifi­cations which could be regarded as impressive, but in view of the fact that a large number of vacan­cies will have arisen as a result of the orders al­ready passed, it would appear to be desirable that application should be called for by the R. T. A. and vacancies filled up in accordance with the prescribed procedure." For this reason the authority considered it unneces­sary to examine further in detail the claims of the respective appellants. From the perusal of the order it is clear that no attempt was made by the Board to weigh the comparative merits of the various applicants, including the appellants and the respondents. Although the permits granted to the respondents were cancelled on reasons given by the Board, there was no consideration of the comparative merits with a view to prefer one to the other. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Board to my mind is confined to the consideration of the respective merits of the various applicants in order to prefer one as against the other. The error in which the Board seems to have fallen is that it has judged the case of each of the respondents on its own merit and has given reasons as to why in its opinion the permits granted to them should be cancelled. Though the Board has held that on certain reasons mentioned in its order the selection of the respondents was not proper but in effect it has not considered the respective merits of the various applicants in order to prefer one to the other but has cancelled the permits granted to the respondents and has therefore, clearly in our opinion committed an error of law. It was contended by the counsel for the op­posite party that the Appellate Board had ample jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting permit to the res­pondents and grant any relief to the appellants be­fore it. The relief granted by the Board in send­ing back the matter to the Regional Transport Authority with the direction that fresh application should be invited, was a proper relief which could be granted by the Board and particularly in the present case when the appellants before the Board have made no grievance of it. It is not open to the applicants now to impugn the order of the Appellate Board on that ground. We are not prepared to accept the contention of the counsel for the opposite parties. The fact that the appellants whose appeals were rejected have not made any grievance to this court is no ground for not examining the validity of the order passed by the Board. On the finding that the order of the Board is beyond the scope of its authority, this court can quash the order under Art. 226 of the Constitution at the instance of any person who is interested in the subject-matter of the order. That the appellants before the Appellate Board will also have fresh opportunity to compete along with others when fresh applications are invited, cannot be re­garded as any relief granted to them in appeal by the Board. The appellants had to establish their preferential claim as against those who had been granted permits while the effect of the order will be that there may Le a large number of other fresh applicants and therefore the area of making selection becomes wider and the appellants before the Board in substance get no relief under the order. It cannot be doubted that the" power to enter­tain an appeal must comprise within its ambit the power to dispose of the appeal in the manner known to law. An Appellate Board has no doubt a right to set aside an order under appeal and substitute its own order. It may merely quash the order ap­pealed against and require the subordinate autho­rity to restore the original proceeding and to decide it afresh. An Appellate Board has no doubt a right to set aside an order under appeal and substitute its own order. It may merely quash the order ap­pealed against and require the subordinate autho­rity to restore the original proceeding and to decide it afresh. The appellate authority may have power while disposing of an appeal under S. 64 of the Act to remand, such a power being ancillary and identical to the power to dispose of an appeal But the Board has no power to direct the Regional Transport Authority to start afresh with renotifying the route and inviting fresh applications. Such an order will result in obvious injustice, for, that would be allowing the parties who had not already applied, to apply for permit on the route now for the first time. In fact the Board has made such a direction purposely with a view to give opportunity to other people to apply now who might be found more deserving. This in our opinion the Board could not do and they had to restrict their choice confined to the appellants and the respon­dents - - amongst whom the dispute lay at that stage. (9) In the result therefore, we allow these peti­tions and quash the order of the Appellate Board. Tile order of the Board having been removed, the appeal filed before the Board in effect remains un­disposed of and the Board will decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made by us. (10) DEKA, J. : I agree. BD/D.H.Z. Petitions allowed.