Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. There are 9 petitioners describing themselves as wholesale and retail textile dealers carrying on their business in Chalai Bazaar, Trivandrum City. The 1st respondent is the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Trivandrum and the 2nd respondent is the Municipal Corporation itself. The complaint is against the blocking made at the 1st respondent's instance, of two of three public roads forming the approach to the Chalai Bazaar at its western end. 2. The Chalai Bazaar road runs east to west from Karamanai to the East Fort Junction say'X' opposite to the Padmanabhaswamy Temple in Trivandrum City. At that junction it meets another public road running north to south from the Museum to the East Fort and just east of it. The shops in the Chalai Bazaar are situate on either side of the east to west road; the western-most of these shops lie near a point say 'Y' about 200 feet from the junction. There are two small branch roads curving out from this point 'Y' one northwest and the other the south-west so as to meet the north-south road at points say Z and Zl about 200 feet north and south of this junction X and leave two quadrant like strips, called Municipal Parks on either side of the central east to west road adjoining the junction. The vehicular traffic in Chalai Bazaar is one way and there is no entry into the Bazaar from the Bast Port side. The northwest branch YZ as well as the central Road YX are both closed to vehicular traffic coming out of the Chalai Bazaar; the south-west branch YY1 takes it. 3. The Corporation of the City of Trivandrum had been conducting an All-India Industrial, Agricultural & Arts Exhibition every year for the past 9 years. For this purpose it had been using the Cavalry grounds at Palayam. After that place was converted into the Police Stadium, the 1957 exhibition was held in the Police Parade ground and as that place became unavailable the 1958 exhibition was held in what is known as the Putharikandom Maidan recently reclaimed out of marshy land lying to the north-east of the junction above-mentioned, & touching the north-west branch YZ also above mentioned. This maidan by itself did not suffice for the purpose and so the 2 park strips were added to it and the whole area was made compact by blocking both the central road YX and the north-west branch YZ1. It was the blocking of these two roads as and from 15-1-1959 for purpose of the 1959 exhibition that was opened on 25-1-1959 and was intended to last till the end of February that led to the complaint herein on 20-1-1959. 4. The main grounds taken in the petition are two-fold, viz. (1) That the public roads in question were reserved under the control of the Government and have accordingly not vested in the 2nd respondent Corporation within the meaning of S.205 of the City Municipal Act IV of 1116 (Travancore) hereinafter called the Act and as such the Commissioner had no powers at all to exercise over them; and (ii) That the blocking of the roads was beyond the power of the Commissioner even under the provisions of the City Municipal Act. The respondents by counter-affidavit have relied on S.216 of the Act read with Schedule III R.4 clause (o) in support of the order of the 1st respondent Commissioner dated 13-1-1959 and directed to the closure of the roads to traffic for purpose of the exhibition. Reliance was also placed on S.207 (i) (c) of the Act whereby the turning or diversion of any public street within the City, by the Commissioner is authorised. 5. Before dealing with the merits of the petition I should not omit to mention that learned counsel for the petitioner sought to say that the exhibition here was not a Corporation matter but the activity of an extraneous body functioning outside the ambit of the City Municipal Act and therefore none of the provisions of the City Municipal Act applied. But this new factual background, though referred to in the reply affidavit of the petitioner was hardly warranted by anything alleged in the main petition and affidavit supporting it. The case therefore proceeded on the basis that the exhibition here was organised by the Corporation and the question was only one of necessary and sufficient powers under the Act. 6. It may be useful at this stage to extract the relevant statutory provisions. S.216 of the City Municipal Act runs as follows: "216. The case therefore proceeded on the basis that the exhibition here was organised by the Corporation and the question was only one of necessary and sufficient powers under the Act. 6. It may be useful at this stage to extract the relevant statutory provisions. S.216 of the City Municipal Act runs as follows: "216. The Commissioner may by an order temporarily close any street to traffic for repair, or in order to carry out any work connected with drainage, water-supply or lighting or any of the purposes specified in Schedule III: Provided that such work shall be completed and such street reopened to traffic with all reasonable speed." Schedule III enumerates the objects on which the Municipal Fund may be spent. These include among others: "The holding of exhibitions or fairs.", vide Clause.4 (c). S.216 occurs in Chapter IX dealing with streets of which public streets are dealt with under S.205 to 217 while private streets are dealt with under S.218 to 222. S.205 refers to the vesting of public streets and their appurtenances and says: "205. All public streets in the City not reserved under the control of Our Government, and the side drains, pavements, stones and other materials thereof, and all erections, materials, implements and other things provided for such streets and all trees, not being private property, growing thereon by the side thereof, shall vest in the Corporation." Finally S.3 (30) defines Public street as follows: "3 (30) 'Public Street' means any street, road, square, court alley, passage or riding-path whether a thorough-fare or not, over which the public have a right of way over and includes..." 7. The first question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners and based on the non-vesting in the 2nd respondent Corporation of the public streets concerned is not of much importance. For even though the respondents dispute the non-vesting as alleged they are willing nevertheless to assume the same and still maintain their plea under S.216 of the Act. 8. Taking up now the second question as to how far the 1st respondent was entitled under S.216 to close the roads, we notice first that the section is applicable to "any" street, without distinction maintained as to reservation under Government control and consequent non-vesting in the Corporation or otherwise. 8. Taking up now the second question as to how far the 1st respondent was entitled under S.216 to close the roads, we notice first that the section is applicable to "any" street, without distinction maintained as to reservation under Government control and consequent non-vesting in the Corporation or otherwise. We notice next that the temporary closure to traffic under the section must be for one of two main purposes (i) repair and (ii) carrying out some work connected with various purposes which may be (a) drainage, (b) water supply, (c) lighting, (d) or any of the purposes specified in schedule III e. g. the holding of an exhibition as here. The provision of a compact area within which to hold an exhibition must certainly be taken to involve the carrying out of a work connected with the holding of it. It is not contended that the closure here is not temporary. It appears clear therefore that the 1st respondent was sufficiently authorised in issuing his order for the closure of the roads on 15-1-1959. But says learned counsel, the work contemplated under the second group of purposes must be such, as after completion with all reasonable speed will leave the road open to traffic and not keep it closed, though temporarily. That is to say the work should not consist in the very closing of the roads for purpose of the exhibition as here; it can only be in the nature of preliminary activity connected with the holding of the exhibition and he relied on the wording of the proviso to S.216. I am not clear that the proviso warrants the construction contended for by learned counsel as above at any rate in respect of every one of the purposes comprised within the group. But if it does, it will amount to allowing a proviso to qualify the section to which it is attached, rather too far. As observed by Lord Herschell in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. But if it does, it will amount to allowing a proviso to qualify the section to which it is attached, rather too far. As observed by Lord Herschell in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. (1897) A.C. 647,655: "I decline to read into any enactment words which are not to be found there and which would alter its operative effect because of provisions to be found in any proviso." Reference may also be made to the observations of Moulton, L. J. in R. v. Dibdin (1910) P. 57,125, while considering the meaning of the proviso to S.1 of the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act, 1907, which afforded immunity to clergy from an act or omission in duties of their office: "The fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to seek. It sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. It treats it as if it were an independent enacting clause instead of being dependent on the main enactment. The courts, as, for instance, in Ex. P. Partington (1844) Q. B 649, 653, Re Brockle Bank (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 461, and Hill v. East and West India Dock Co. (1884) 9 App. Cas. 448 have frequently pointed out this fallacy, and have refused to be led astray by arguments such as these which have been addressed to us, which depend solely on taking words absolutely in their strict literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration that they appear in the proviso." It follows that the complaint as to lack of power in the 1st respondent Commissioner in the matter of the closure here is without substance. It is unnecessary in the above view to consider whether S.207 (1) (c) of the Act empowering the Commissioner to effect a temporary diversion or turning of a public road, the Chalai Bazaar Road in this instance can also support the respondents. The result is that the petition has to fail. It is therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200. Dismissed.