JUDGMENT N. Varadaraja Iyengar, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, The petitioner is Mr. Simon, proprietor, Simon Motors, Ayiroor, Thiruvalla. The complaint is that the 1st respondent, Regional Transport Authority, Alleppey, issued wrongly, according to the petitioner four temporary stage carriage permits for the period 16-2-1959 to 23-2-1959 for four State Transport buses represented by the 2nd respondent, Director of State Transport, Trivandrum. 2. On 6-2-1959 a Notification Ext. C dated 3-2-1959 was published by the 1st respondent inviting applications on or before 13-2-1959 from all bus operators in the Quilon and Alleppey Districts for issue of special permits in connection with the religious gathering or convention held annually at Maramon. The 2nd respondent accordingly made application and got the four permits herein on 12-2-1959 for the Thiruvella-Maramon route concerned. Petitioner is an operator on the Kozhencheri-Ranni and Thiruvella-Ranni routes and so was interested in opposing the 2nd respondent and also applying for himself in the matter of these permits. His objection Ext. D was dated 12-2-1959 and took the ground that the State Transport Buses were of more laden weight than 4 tons which the road could at all support. This objection was rejected because it was received after the grant of the permits. However the 1st respondent authority satisfied itself that the route was roadworthy from the point of view of the State Transport Buses, before actually they were put on the route vide Ext. R 1 report of the Executive Engineer dated 16-2-1959. Petitioner's application for two temporary permits was made on 13-2-1959 within the time and was in the usual course granted. Petitioner was still aggrieved and came forward with this petition on 16-2-1959 praying for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the issue of the temporary permits to the 2nd respondent. This petition is resisted by the 1st respondent. 3. Two points were taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first was that the 1st respondent authority was wrong in not waiting for and considering representations if any, that might be made against the 2nd respondent before granting them temporary permits as per their application. Secondly, Ext. C notification forbade the 1st respondent in any event from granting the 2nd respondent's application on 12-2-1959, before the expiry of 13-2-1959, which was the last day fixed under it. 4. Secondly, Ext. C notification forbade the 1st respondent in any event from granting the 2nd respondent's application on 12-2-1959, before the expiry of 13-2-1959, which was the last day fixed under it. 4. Taking up the second point first, for purpose of convenience, there does not appear to be anything in the terms of Ext. C which precluded the disposal of applications made in pursuance to it as and when they were made. There is ordinarily no invitation made for application for the issue of temporary permits under S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act; the section at any rate does not provide for it. Apparently the need here though temporary was great and that possibly accounted for the invitation under Ext. C addressed to all bus operators in the Districts of Quilon and Alleppey. The applications had of course to be sustained on their intrinsic merits from the point of view of subserving the purpose concerned. But apart from that there was no indication of any collective disposal after all applications were received, or in the light of objections that one applicant may raise as against any other. It is not complained that there was any discrimination among the various operators that came forward with their applications. If so there is nothing the conduct of the 1st respondent which implied any estoppel against them, either legal or equitable in the whole matter. The citation that the learned counsel made in this connection vis. Kumari Akthar v. Admission Committee, Osmania Medical College (1959) 1 Andhra Weekly Reporter, short notes page 9, does not therefore call for any application in this case. 5. Coming now to the first point, the learned counsel's argument was that the general principles contained in S.47 and 48 of the Act had to be kept in view even in the matter of grant of temporary permits under S.62 and on this basis, an issue of temporary permit without inviting and considering any representations from "persons (e. g. petitioner here) already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route" within the meaning of the provision in S.47, would stand unjustified, and he relied on Kotah Transport Ltd. v. R. T. Authority - 1954 Rajasthan 33 and Ambala Ex-Servicemen Transport Cooperative Society Ltd., Ambala City & Another v. The State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1959 Punjab 1. Now S.62 reads as follows :- "62. Temporary permits: A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in S.57, grant permits to he effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily:- (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purpose of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit; and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit: Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under S.46 or S.54 during the pendency of the applications : Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in the case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewal". The procedure under S.57 which is ruled out concerns the making available of an application for the issue of permit for inspection at the office of the Authority and the publication of the application or substance thereof in the prescribed manner for purpose of inviting representations within time fixed, against the grant of the permit concerned. There does not therefore seem to be any scope for the contention raised by the learned counsel that objections to the grant of temporary permits will have to be invited and overruled before temporary permits are at all issued under S.62. It is no doubt true that the permit as granted for the limited period is still of one of four categories referred in S.2(20) and is on that account controlled by the Sections of the Act dealing with the particular category concerned. So if it is a temporary stage carriage permit as here, S.47 and 48 may have to be conformed to. But this must be subject always to the overall considerations provided for under S.62. So if it is a temporary stage carriage permit as here, S.47 and 48 may have to be conformed to. But this must be subject always to the overall considerations provided for under S.62. Thus representations or objections relevant to the subject matter and from persons interested, within the meaning of S.47 and 48 may have to be considered before a Road Transport Authority exercises its jurisdiction in respect of an application for temporary permit under S.62. There is no warrant however to say that such representations or objections should be invited in connection with an application under S.62 and they should be all together dealt with. This is exactly what the learned counsel contends for. 6. In Kotah Transport Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authortiy, AIR 1954 Rajasthan 33 relied on by the learned counsel, the question was whether the Regional Transport Authority was exercising a quasi judicial and not a mere executive or administrative function when acting under S.62 and the court held: "It is not right to say that the action of the Regional Transport Authority is purely executive or administrative in issuing temporary permits under S.62. In our opinion the function under S.62 is a quasi judicial function and it has got to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the procedure laid down in the Act itself." and the learned Judges gave their reasons for arriving at the above conclusion as follows:- "The Regional Transport Authority has to consider representations, if any, of interested persons. Applications have got to be invited and the necessary conditions have to be satisfied before the authority can proceed to exercise its discretion under S.62. In considering the representations and in granting permits whether temporary or non temporary in accordance with the provisions of law, the authority has to act quasi judicially. The decision of the Regional Transport Authority affects the right of the permit-holders and the Authority has also to act in accordance with certain procedure laid down by the law." It is not clear that the passage lays down that representations from the existing permit-holders should be invited before the petition under S.62 is disposed off, but if it does so, I beg respectfully to dissent. Probably all that was meant was that under S.62 the Regional Transport Authority cannot fail to consider objections which are actually made before the disposal of the applications. Probably all that was meant was that under S.62 the Regional Transport Authority cannot fail to consider objections which are actually made before the disposal of the applications. That is to say the procedure to be adopted is quasi judicial to that extent but the decision is nevertheless merely executive or administrative and that was why perhaps no appeal is contemplated from the decision as finally made. 7. The Punjab case in AIR 1959 Punjab I related to the issue of a temporary public carrier's permit under a special provision in the Punjab Act empowering the issue. "(d) in any such circumstances as may in the opinion of such authority justify the grant of such permit". And the question was whether the clause left the power to issue permits under S.62 uncontrolled or unrestricted, and was on that account void. The learned Judges, in upholding the validity of the provision and the permit, said that S.62 of the Act did not provide for any new kind of permit which had not been provided for in the previous sections, and the power of issuing temporary public carrier's permits in question was controlled by the provisions of S.55 and 56. There was no question therefore of uncontrolled or unrestricted power even under S.62. But this hardly helps the petitioner's case. It follows therefore that there was no want of authority when the 1st respondent disposed of the application of the 2nd respondent for temporary permit on 12-2-1959 even as soon as it was filed. And it is noteworthy that the only kind of objection which the petitioner thought of raising against the 2nd respondent's application was the unfitness in fact of the road, but this was found against though by later enquiry. It would appear that the petitioner was after all concerned not so much with the road but with shutting out the 2nd respondent from competing with him - certainly not a commendable attitude. 8. The result is that there is no merit in the petition and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/- to the 1st respondent.