JUDGMENT N. Varadaraja Iyengar, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for rectification on account of fraud, of certain partition arrangements in a tarwad. The appeal is by the 18th defendant whose subsequent purchase of some of the items on basis of the partition has been ignored while granting the rectification by the court below. 2. The plaintiffs 1 to 8 and the defendants 1 to 11 represent a branch of the Polunnal Nair tarwad at Kottarakara in Travancore. This branch had Makkathayam properties covered by schedule 1 to the suit and also properties obtained in partition from the main tarwad under Ext. C dated 28-11-1103 and listed as items 1 to 26 of the schedule 2 to the plaint. These 2 sets of properties were partitioned among the members of the branch for the time being, respectively under Ext. B dated 27-5-1103 and Ext. D dated 14-11-1105. It is the rectification of the allotments in favour of the plaintiff's group under Exts. B and D partitions that formed the subject - matter of this suit. We are concerned in this appeal only with the rectification as regards Ext. D and that again to the extent it affects items 4 to 10 and 26 of the schedule 2 which had been subsequently purchased by the 18th defendant. It is the plaintiffs' case that item 26 of those is only an accession of item 4 and registered as such in the name of a prior karnavan of the tarwad, Parameswaran Pillai, and so had been continuously enjoyed by the tarwad. 3. There were 7 adults and 5 minors who were parties to Ext. D partition arrangement. The adults consisted of 3 sisters, Kunhikutty, Gouri and Janaki of whom the first two were issueless and Janaki's four children, namely the 1st defendant Narayanan Pillai, Karnavan of the branch, Parukutty the 2nd defendant, Kamalakshi the 5th defendant and Meenakshi the 6th defendant. The minors consisted of defendants 3 and 4, children of Parukutty, plaintiffs 1 and 2, children of Kamalakshi and the 7th defendant, the child of Meenakshi. It is the plaintiffs' case and has been so found by the court below that on the date of Ext. D, the 3rd plaintiff, Sadasivan Nair was a child in womb of their mother Kamalakshi. The plaintiffs 4 to 8 had then been neither conceived nor born. According to the plaintiffs, Ext. It is the plaintiffs' case and has been so found by the court below that on the date of Ext. D, the 3rd plaintiff, Sadasivan Nair was a child in womb of their mother Kamalakshi. The plaintiffs 4 to 8 had then been neither conceived nor born. According to the plaintiffs, Ext. D partition deed was void and ineffective as against the 5th defendant's group inclusive of the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and indeed against those of the 2nd and 6th defendants' group also, because it has been brought about by the 1st defendant in fraud of the others and in view only to his own self aggrandisement at the expense of the other cosharers. The plaintiffs laid their suit on 15-2-1123 when, it was claimed, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 had not passed three years after attaining majority. The 17th defendant was impleaded as the alienee from the 1st defendant under Ext. I dated 22-7-1117, of items 4 to 10 of the A portion of the II schedule which had fallen to his share under Ext. D. The 17th defendant had also obtained sale separately of item 26 under Ext. XVII dated 25-7-1117, from Kamalakshi, daughter of Parameswaran Pillai the prior karnavan abovesaid, on the assumption that that item belonged to her under Parameswaran Pillai's gift deed of 1106. But this document according to the plaintiffs was an attempt to make out an extenuous title by the 17th defendant who had obtained possession of item 26 along with item 4 under Ext. I itself. The 18th defendant was impleaded as transferee from the 17th defendant of all his rights in items 4 to 10 and 26 under Ext. III dated 22-2-1122. 4. Now, the properties allotted to the 1st defendant under Ext. D partition, viz., items 1 to 16 of the A list, measure on the whole 9 acres 53 cents of paddy field of which 7 acres 77 cents (items 4 to 10) were encumbered, and 2 acres 84 cents of garden lands, with all buildings, while all the rest of the sharers together got under it only 2 acres 42 cents of paddy filed and no garden land or house. It was no doubt true that the 1st defendant took upon himself the liability to pay all the debts, mortgage and otherwise. It appeared neverthless that the mortgage debt of Fs. It was no doubt true that the 1st defendant took upon himself the liability to pay all the debts, mortgage and otherwise. It appeared neverthless that the mortgage debt of Fs. 28,700 charged against items 4 to 10 was supported by consideration only to the extent of Fs. 10,525 and similarly certain of the unsecured debts of Fs. 8,417/ were non existent. But Even assuming that the total mortgage and other debts amounting to Fs. 37,117 3/4 as recited were subsisting and due to be paid, the court below found that the 1st defendant got too much over and above his share on the pretext of taking encumbered properties and discharging the debts. It appeared again that the 5th defendant's group which really represented an adult and 3 minors (inclusive of the 3rd plaintiff in the womb) was taken to consist of only 1 adult and 2 minors for purposes of Ext. D. And simultaneously therewith, the shares appertaining to but given up by Kunhikutty and Gouri were appropriated by the 1st defendant for his sole benefit, though subject to his maintaining them for their life-time. On these main considerations the court below was able to find that Ext. D partition deed was vitiated by the fraud of the 1st defendant so as to be totally unfair to the plaintiffs' group and so required rectification. The court below also found that Ext. 17 sale of item 26 in favour of the 17th defendant was incompetent for the reasons mentioned by the plaintiffs. The decree was accordingly passed for fresh partition of 4/11 shares of the items in the 2nd schedule in favour of the plaintiffs and unaffected by Ext. III sale deed of the 18th defendant of items 4 to 10 and 26 to the extent called for. 5. Mr. K. P. Abraham, learned counsel for the appellant sought to support the allotment in favour of the 1st defendant under Ext. D partition agreement on two grounds, firstly that Ext. C partition in the main tarwad must be deemed to have allocated items 4 to 10 mainly for purpose of payment off of the mortgage debt charged thereon and therefore the allocation of such properties and the encumbrances thereon to the 1st defendant could not be a matter for much complaint. But there is hardly any support for this contention either on the terms of Ext. C or otherwise. But there is hardly any support for this contention either on the terms of Ext. C or otherwise. The I schedule 1 to 3 items were those allotted under it in favour of this branch. The items 2 of these were no doubt described to be mortgaged items but the mortgage debt along with the unsecured debts allocated to the branch were all grouped together in List II of the debts. There is no question therefore of any particular set of items being earmarked for particular debt, mortgage or otherwise. Even assuming that learned counsel is correct in his inference, it could not necessarily mean that any rise in value of the properties subsequent to Ext. C and before Ext. D could be ignored for purpose of Ext. D. Learned counsel complained that the court below was wrong in having adopted the price of the properties prevailing in 1954 as in Ext. N, report of the commissioner, for finding that the equity of redemption over the mortgaged items 4 to 10 was of considerable value. But even otherwise it was clear that the 1st defendant got an unencumbered 1 acre 76 cents of paddy lands and 2 acres 84 cents of garden land and all the houses, while all the other 10 sharers got only 2 acres and 42 cents of paddy field. 6. Learned counsel next said that the two childless females must be deemed to have given up their shares in favour of the 1st defendant only, while getting him to provide for their maintenance for life from out of particular property allocated to him under Ext. D. But here also there is no support on the facts. For Ext. D is clear that Kunhikutty and Gouri disclaim their shares simpliciter and not to particular cosharers, much less to the 1st defendant. Even otherwise the law is well settled that surrender by a cosharer of his share in family properties can ennure only in favour of all the rest of the members. As observed in Mayne on Hindu Law, 11th Edition, page 486, para 383 : "A gift or renunciation of his interest by a coparcener in favour of one of several coparceners can be valid neither as a gift nor as a renunciation. As observed in Mayne on Hindu Law, 11th Edition, page 486, para 383 : "A gift or renunciation of his interest by a coparcener in favour of one of several coparceners can be valid neither as a gift nor as a renunciation. In Alluri Venkatapathi Raju v. Venkatanarasimha Raju, (1936) 63 IA 397, the Privy Council held that a coparcener's renunciation of his interest merely extinguishes his interest in the joint estate and its only effect is to reduce the number of the persons to whom shares will be allotted if and when a division of the estate takes place". The principle is the same in Marumakkathayam law. Learned counsel then referred to the bona fides of his client the 18th defendant in taking Ext. III. But Ext. III depends for its validity on Ext. I only and so far as Ext. I was concerned the learned Judge below found that it was not supported by consideration to full extent and there was also no necessity to sell the properties and finally there was no bona fides in the way the recitals of the consideration were made in it. But the real question before us is one of competency of the executant of Ext. I, for, when once Ext. D partition goes, the sale by an allottee thereunder becomes automatically ineffective as against the party entitled to have a re-allocation. Of course to the extent that the prior encumbrances have been cleared by the alienee, he would be subrogated thereto but beyond that his sale cannot avail. 7. Learned counsel finally said that the court below was not justified in granting 4/11 shares out of items 4 to 10 to the 5th defendant's group by way of rectification. According to him it is only to the extent of the child in the womb which had been ingnored namely 1/11 share that there could be a rectification if at all, and there could in any event be no reopening of Ext. D in regard to the 1/11th share pertaining to the 5th defendant adult who was a party to it. But this is to forget that under S.36 of the Nair Act, II of 1100 governing the parties, the allotment in favour of the 5th defendant and her minor children the plaintiffs 1 to 3 had necessarily to be one and entire and such total share was 4/11. 8. But this is to forget that under S.36 of the Nair Act, II of 1100 governing the parties, the allotment in favour of the 5th defendant and her minor children the plaintiffs 1 to 3 had necessarily to be one and entire and such total share was 4/11. 8. It follows that the decree as granted by the court below is perfectly right and there is no substance in this appeal. It is therefore dismissed with costs.