S. N. Sahi v. Vishwanath Lal — 1959 DIGILAW 67 (PAT)

Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This case involves the interpretation of Sec.18(1) of The Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, (Act 45 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as "the Act". 2. The sole question for determination is, Does the word "employer" in Section 18(1) of the Act include the manager? 3. The circumstances leading up to the instant case are these: This Bihar Journals Limited, Patna, is a newspaper establishment, registered as a company under the Indian Companies Act, and, it carries on the business of conducting and publishing two daily newspapers from Patna -- "The Searchlight" in English, and, "The Pradip" in Hindi. The petitioner is its Manager, and as such, supervises and directs the work of his fellow employees including that of the proof-readers, who are employed under the Bihar Journals Ltd. 4. The opposite party is the General Secretary of the Bihar Working Journalists Union, a registered Trade Union of the Working Journalists in the State of Bihar, having is office at Patna. 5. The opposite party on 9-6-1956 filed a complaint under Sec.18(1) of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Patna Sadar, against the petitioner, for contravention of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act, alleging that the proof-readers, employed under the Bihar Journals Limited have been made to work for about 192 hours per four consecutive weeks, commencing from 27-3-1956, in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 6(1) of the Act, which provide a maximum of 144 hours of work during any period of four consecutive weeks, exclusive of the time for meals. It was further alleged that the petitioner, as manager and chief executive officer of the newspaper establishment, was an "employer" within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, he was criminally liable for breach of Sec. 6(1) of the Act. 6. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, on 2-8-1957. summoned the petitioner, under Sec.18(1) of the Act, and, sent the case for disposal to Mr. S. N. Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, First Class, Patna, where the matter is now pending. 7. The petitioner has, therefore, moved this Court in revision and asked for quashing the criminal proceeding against him. 8. The argument presented by Mr. summoned the petitioner, under Sec.18(1) of the Act, and, sent the case for disposal to Mr. S. N. Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, First Class, Patna, where the matter is now pending. 7. The petitioner has, therefore, moved this Court in revision and asked for quashing the criminal proceeding against him. 8. The argument presented by Mr. A.N. Sahay, in support of the rule, was that the petitioner, being the Manager of the Bihar Journals Ltd., was also one of its employees, and, therefore, he could not be considered either an "employer", or, a person included within the word "employer", within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Act, and, consequently, he way not liable under Sec.18(1) of the Act. He further contended that simply because the petitioner held the post of the Manager, and, had in that capacity the power of superintendence and control over the proof-readers, he cannot be considered to be an employer vis-a-vis the proof-readers even, because both the petitioner and the proofreaders were co-employees or fellow-workers under the same master, or employer, namely, the Bihar Journals Ltd., and, as such, he cannot be legally prosecuted under Sec.18(1) of the Act for the act or omission of his employer, the Bihar Journals Ltd., in that, there was no vicarious liability on the petitioner for the same. 9. In reply it was argued by Mr. Padmanand Jha, who opposed the rule, that the word "employer" includes the Manager also, and, therefore, the petitioner being admittedly the manager of the Bihar Journals Ltd., and having control and superintendence over the proof-readers, was an "employer" within the meaning of Sec.18(1) of the Act, and, as such he was liable under it. 10. It would be useful at this stage to read Sec.2 (c), (d), (f) and (g); Section 6 (1) and Sec.18 (1) of the Act, which are in these terms:- "2. Definitions. 10. It would be useful at this stage to read Sec.2 (c), (d), (f) and (g); Section 6 (1) and Sec.18 (1) of the Act, which are in these terms:- "2. Definitions. -- In this Act, unless the contest otherwise requires, X X X X X (c) "newspaper employee" means any working journalist, and includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment; (d) newspaper establishment means an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or Syndicate; x x x x x (f) working journalist means a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and who is employed as such in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment, and includes an editor, a leader writer, news-editor, sub-editor, feature writer, copy-tester, reporter, correspondent, cartoonist, news-photographer and proof-reader, but does not include any such person who - (i) is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, or (ii) being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, either by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature; (g) all words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act". X X X X X "6. Hours of work: (1) Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, no working journalist shall be required or allowed to work in any newspaper establishment for more than one hundred and forty-four hours during any period of four consecutive weeks, exclusive of the time for meals". X X X X X 18. Penalty: (1) If any employer contravenes the provisions of Sec. 6. he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees. x x x x x 11. In the present case, the simplest way to decide the question at issue is to construe correctly Sec.18(1) of the Act under which this case has arisen. 12. The cardinal rule of interpretation of a statute is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. x x x x x 11. In the present case, the simplest way to decide the question at issue is to construe correctly Sec.18(1) of the Act under which this case has arisen. 12. The cardinal rule of interpretation of a statute is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. It is only when such a construction leads to an obvious absurdity, which the Legislature cannot be supposed to have intended, that the Court in interpreting the section may introduce words to give effect to what it conceives to be the true intention of the Legislature. It is not, however, any and every inconvenience that justifies adoption of this extreme rule of construction: Nana Lal V/s. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 172 : 1950 SCR 391 . 13. It is also useful to bear in mind what Lord Chancellor in Henrietta Muir Edwards V/s. Attorney General of Canada, AIR 1930 PC 120, said: "In coming to a determination as to the meaning N of a particular word in a particular Act of Parliament it is permissible to consider two points, viz : (i) The external evidence derived from extraneous circumstances such as previous legislation and decided cases; (ii) Internal evidence derived from the Act itself. 14. It is equally well established principle of construction that what is said, and not what is supposed to be intended, is to be construed. As observed by the Lord Chancellor, in AIR 1930 PC 120 (supra), in construing an Act the question is not what may be supposed to have been intended, but what has been said. 15. Where the meaning of the word of a section of a statute is plain, it is not the duty of the Court to busy itself with supposed intentions. The Court cannot put into an Act words which are not expressed and which cannot reasonably be implied on any recognised principle of construction. That would be a work of Legislature, not of construction and outside the province of the Court. 16. Bearing the above well known canons of construction, let us now construe Sec.18(1) of the Act. In construing this section, it is our duty to enter into the mind of the framers of the Act and look at the whole matter as they must have looked at it. 16. Bearing the above well known canons of construction, let us now construe Sec.18(1) of the Act. In construing this section, it is our duty to enter into the mind of the framers of the Act and look at the whole matter as they must have looked at it. It would be useful, therefore, to know the scheme of the Act. 17. In order to understand the true nature and scope of an Act, it is necessary, however, to ascertain, what the evils were which were intended to be redressed by it The Act is, as its long title shows, an Act to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishment, and, in the very forefront of the Act the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is, by Sec.3, made applicable to working journalists with certain modification in connection with the application of Sec.25F of that Act. The rest of the provisions contained in Chapter II concern themselves with the payment of gratuity, hours of work and leave & fixation of wages of the working journalists. The regulation of the conditions of service is thus the main object which is sought to be achieved by the Act. Chapter III of the Act, by Sections 14 and 15, applies the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and, the Employees Provident Funds Act. 1952 to all the employees of the newspaper establishments wherein twenty or more newspaper employees are employed, and covers working journalists as well as other employees in the employ of the newspaper establishments. The miscellaneous provisions contained in Chapter IV are designed merely to implement or to carry out the provisions of the main part of the Act and they do not make any difference so far as the effect and operation of the Act is concerned. Sec.18, under Chapter IV is a penal section, and, it provides the penally for the employer for contravention of Sec. 6 of the Act. If his is the true nature of the Act, it is obvious that the enactment of this measure is for the amelioration of the conditions of the workmen in the newspaper industry: Express Newspapers Ltd. V/s. Union or India, AIR 1958 SC 578 . 18. If his is the true nature of the Act, it is obvious that the enactment of this measure is for the amelioration of the conditions of the workmen in the newspaper industry: Express Newspapers Ltd. V/s. Union or India, AIR 1958 SC 578 . 18. From the definition of a "newspaper employee" in Sec.2(c), it is, however, clear that it is wider in its connotation, because it means and includes any working journalist and, also includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment; but the definition of a Working journalist", in Sec.2(f) is narrower, in that, it does not include every newspaper employee, and, also any such person, even coming within the definition of a "working journalist", if (i) he is employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity, or, (ii) being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, either by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions of a managerial nature. Prom Sections 2(c) and 2(f), it follows, therefore, that the petitioner is a newspaper employee, but not a working journalist. 19. The contention of Mr. Jha, that because the petitioner, being the manager, has supervisory and administrative capacity, as admitted by him, he must be considered to be an "employer" of the proof-readers, who work under his supervision and control is not valid. If a master employs a servant and authorises him to employ a number of persons to do a particular job, the employees thus appointed by the servant would become equally with the employer, servants of the master. The question as to whose employee a particular person was has to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In the present case, the direction and control of the petitioner was entirely vested in the Bihar Journals Ltd., through its manager or other superior officer. The question as to whose employee a particular person was has to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In the present case, the direction and control of the petitioner was entirely vested in the Bihar Journals Ltd., through its manager or other superior officer. The fact that the petitioner had powers of full control Over the day-to-day working of the proof-readers of the newspaper establishment in question cannot possibly convert the petitioner from a "newspaper employee" to it the position of an "employer" which is only the Bihar Journals Ltd. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner is an employee, and not an employer in the Bihar Journals Ltd: Shivanandan Sharma V/s. Punjab National Bank, Ltd., (S) AIR 1955 SC 404 : (1955) 1 SCR 1427 . 20. The contention of Mr. Sahay, therefore, that the petitioner, like the proof-readers, is also an employee of the Bihar Journals Ltd., and, that the petitioner and the proof-readers both must accordingly be treated as co-employees of this newspaper establishment, and the petitioner cannot be considered to be an employer of the proof-readers, must be accepted as correct. 21. The crucial question, however, is, whether the petitioner can be considered to be an "employer" within the meaning of Sec.18(1)? 22. The word "employer" has not been defined anywhere in it he Act; but Section 2(g) of the Act, quoted earlier, provides that "all words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act". In order to find out the meaning of the word "employer" used in Section 18(1) of the Act, therefore, we have to turn to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 23. The word "employer" has been defined in Sec.2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thus: "2. In order to find out the meaning of the word "employer" used in Section 18(1) of the Act, therefore, we have to turn to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 23. The word "employer" has been defined in Sec.2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thus: "2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, X X X X X (g) employer means - (i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department; (ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief executive officer of that authority." X X X X X 24. The above definition of the word "employer", however, obviously, cannot apply to the present case. The newspaper industry here, namely, The Bihar Journals Ltd., is neither carried on by or under the authority of the Central or the State Government or on behalf of a local authority; Here, it is a private newspaper establishment registered as a company under the Indian Companies Act. 25. I do not think it would be correct to hold that although the newspaper establishment in question is not carried on by any of the three authorities mentioned above, still by a process of legal fiction, as the petitioner, is the Chief Executive Officer, or, being the manager, the head of the establishment, should be considered as "employer" within the meaning of that Act. The legal fiction, as observed by Lord Blackburn, in Arthur Hill V/s. The East and West India Dock Company, (1884) 9 A C 448 at p. 458, no doubt, may be extended only so far as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act and no further; but here I think that to give to the word "employer" the sense, which the learned Counsel for the opposite party contends for, would be to go far beyond the purposes of the Act, and, to work a cruel hardship upon persons in the position of the present petitioner. The fixation of the hours of work for working journalists under Sec. 6 naturally rests with the newspaper establishment, and, not with the manager or any other similar officer. The fixation of the hours of work for working journalists under Sec. 6 naturally rests with the newspaper establishment, and, not with the manager or any other similar officer. The manager is only to enforce the hours of work and for this very reason it is apparent the Act made the employer, namely, the newspaper establishment itself liable to be criminally prosecuted under Section 18(1) of the Act for violation of Sec. 6 of the Act. The purpose of the Act, therefore, is achieved, and most effectively effectuated without extending the legal fiction. 26. The definition of the word "employer", therefore, as given in Sec.2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not, in my opinion, furnish the key to the meaning of the word "employer" used in Sec.18(1) of the Act. 27. The riddle, therefore, is not solved either with reference to the Act or to the Industrial Disputes Act. In the absence, therefore, of a definition of the word "employer" in the Act itself and due to the non-application of the definition of "employer" in the Industrial Disputes Act to the present case, the only course left is to construe the word "employer", used in Sec.18(1) of the Act, by giving it its ordinary and natural meaning. 28. The Dictionary meaning of the word "employer", according to Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary, Volume II, is "one who employs; one who uses or engages the services of other persons for pay", and, according to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1954 Edition, also it means: "that which engages or occupies". In the present case, there can be no doubt that the only employer which is the common employer of both the petitioner and the proof-readers, is the newspaper establishment, namely, The Bihar Journals Ltd. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the word "employer", used in Section 18 (1) of the Act, cannot but mean the Bihar Journals Ltd., only and, it cannot, and, does not include or mean also the manager in the instant case. 29. The word "employer" has been used also in several other, sections of the Act. To begin with, it has been used in Sec.17 of the Act. Sec.17 provides a mode of recovery of any money due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions of the Act. 29. The word "employer" has been used also in several other, sections of the Act. To begin with, it has been used in Sec.17 of the Act. Sec.17 provides a mode of recovery of any money due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions of the Act. As the marginal note shows, the section deals with the recovery of money due from an employer. Sec.17 applies to all newspaper employees including a manager also. If the interpretation sought to be put on the word "employer" in Sec.18(1) of the Act by the opposite party as meaning the manager be accepted, then a manager also can be made liable for the employees claim contemplated by Sec.17; and, in such a case, the manager would then be liable even for his own money due. This will make Sec.17 unworkable and its construction absurd. 30. The word "employer" has been used, as mentioned above, in other sections of the Act also, for example, in Sections 4, 5(1), 8(2), 12, 13(2) and 16(2). Nowhere in the Act, it has been said, either expressly or impliedly, that the term "employer" would mean or include the manager. How unworkable would be the provisions of the Act and how absurd would be the construction of the word "employer" if it is supposed to include the manager, can well be demonstrated from some of the aforesaid sections also. For instance, under Sec. 4 or Section 5 if the manager is treated to be included in the word "employer", as contended for by the opposite party, then the manager will become personally liable to pay the wages or the compensation, or gratuity, as the case may be, to the working journalist, and, the employer can well escape-scotfree. Such could never have been intended by the Parliament. The purpose of the Act in such a case will be defeated. The employer, namely, the newspaper establishment, has been brought by the Act in direct touch with its employees and made directly and solely liable for the benefits, rights, wages, or the like, of the working journalists or its other employees. 31. The purpose of the Act in such a case will be defeated. The employer, namely, the newspaper establishment, has been brought by the Act in direct touch with its employees and made directly and solely liable for the benefits, rights, wages, or the like, of the working journalists or its other employees. 31. The rule of construction is well settled that it is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of the Act, unless there is anything to indicate the contrary, although the presumption that the same words are used in the same meaning is, however, very slight, and it is proper, if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act. The presumption is not of much weight also because the same word may be used in different senses not only in the same statute, but also even in the same section: Shamrao Vishnu V/s. Dist. Magistrate, Thana, 1956 SCR 644 : (S) AIR 1957 SC 23 . 32. Here, however, on an examination of the above mentioned provisions of the Act in their context, it will be seen that there is no sufficient reason nor, there is any indication to the contrary in the Act, to construe the word employer* in Sec.18(1) as meaning or including a manager, and, the same word used in the other sections of the Act as not meaning and including a manager. 33. In my opinion, to construe the word employer in Sec.18(1) as meaning also a manager would be to stretch the word used by the Legislature to fill in cans or omissions in the provisions of the Act, which ti is certainly not the duty of the Court, although no doubt it is its duty to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. It is elementary that the primary duty of a Court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find that intention. It is elementary that the primary duty of a Court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find that intention. The spirit of the law, therefore, may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the section of the Act, but here by interpreting the word "employer" as meaning the newspaper establishment, and as not including the manager, the spirit of the Act is given effect to, and its purpose is accomplished. 34. If, therefore, the word employer used in Sec.18(1) is read literally, that is, by giving to it its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning, it does not lead to any hardship to anybody, nor does it lead to absurdity; whereas if the construction, contended for by the opposite party, be accepted it will obviously lead to absurdity. In such a case, the manager will be visited with punishment for no fault of his; and, he would be made vicariously liable for the act of his employer. This could never have been the intention of the framers of the Act. 35. It is well settled that a penal section in an enactment must be strictly construed and the Court is not concerned so much with what might possibly have been in" ended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed. Even if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. In the absence of any indication in the Act and any express words to show that a manager was intended to be included in the word "employer" in Sec.18(1), it must be held that it means only the newspaper establishment, which is the owner and proprietor of the newspaper and the employer of the proof-readers. 36. If the Legislature would have intended to include also the Manager or any newspaper employee employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, it would have been a very simple thing for the Legislature to have said so. 36. If the Legislature would have intended to include also the Manager or any newspaper employee employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, it would have been a very simple thing for the Legislature to have said so. The fact that the framer of the Act, if that was his intention, has entirely failed to use language adequate for the purpose he intended to attain, as contended by the opposite party, it is not for me to speculate as to what was in the mind of the framer of this statute. But, on looking at the plain language of Section 18(1) of the Act, I have no manner of doubt that the word "employer" used in Sec.18(1) of the Act does not include the "manager". Then, is there anything in the context or anything in the object of the Legislature which requires that although the word "employer" would not so properly include the manager, yet in this particular case, it should extend and include the manager? I cannot see that there is. The contention that the word "Employer" includes the manager because in order to carry out the object of the Act. it would be necessary to say that the word "employer" did include the manager, in my opinion, is devoid of merit. That object is certainly not avowed upon the face of the Act. Whether any of those who prompt-ed the Act had or had not such an idea in their minds I cannot tell; but the framers of the Act have not brought it forward, or nut it in such words as to lead the Legislature to think that they were doing it. If the word "employer" would have been defined in the Act by saying that it means and includes a manager or any newspaper employee in a managerial or administrative capacity, it would have made the matter plain. At all events, they have not said that in distinct words if they did mean it. In my opinion, there is nothing in the object of the Act here which would require that we should so read Sec.18(1) of the Act. 37. The contention of Mr. At all events, they have not said that in distinct words if they did mean it. In my opinion, there is nothing in the object of the Act here which would require that we should so read Sec.18(1) of the Act. 37. The contention of Mr. Jha that the word manager should be read as included in the word "employer", used in Sec.18(1) of the Act, although the Act itself does not say so in express terms, if accepted would obviously mean giving the word "employer" an artificial definition. It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition, but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended : Hari-prasad V/s. A. D. Divelkar, (S) AIR 1957 SC 121 . 38. In the present case, the language of Sec.18(1) and the ordinary and natural meaning of the word "employer" in Sec.18(1) of the Act does not, in my judgment, lead to any manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, which can authorise the Court to introduce words to give effect to what Mr. Jha conceives to be the true intention of the legislature. The word "employer", even if construed literally in its natural and ordinary meaning, would make the section workable and would not in any way affect its intent and purpose. There is internal evidence here in the Act itself as will appear from the sections of the Act, referred to before, and, its object, that the Parliament deliberately used the word only "employer" and did not say that it would mean and include the manager or other similar officer. 39. I think, therefore, that here there is internal evidence derived from the Act itself, as is clear from the sequel of the Act, that the word "employer" used in Sec.18(1) of the Act cannot mean and include the manager. 39. I think, therefore, that here there is internal evidence derived from the Act itself, as is clear from the sequel of the Act, that the word "employer" used in Sec.18(1) of the Act cannot mean and include the manager. My conclusion, looking at the Act, is that the word "employer" here is so used as to show that it does not include a manager, and, that there is no object or intension of the statute which indicates that it is requisite to extend the word "employer" to a sense, which probably those who used it in legislation were not thinking of it at all. 40. There is another internal evidence in the Act itself, which, in my opinion, also furnishes a useful test in determining the meaning of the word "employer" in Sec.18(1) of the Act, and, supports the above conclusion of mine. Under Sec.18(1) of the Act, the "employer" who contravenes the provisions of Section 6 of the Act is liable to be punished only with fine, and not with any imprisonment, obviously because the "employer" under the Act being the newspaper establishment could not be visited with the sentence of imprisonment. 41. The nature of punishment provided by the Act- therefore, does also indicate the intention of the Legislature as to whether the newspaper establishment, which is the employer, is liable or its manager is also liable. It is true that this does not mean that wherever the punishment provided is fine, the person liable would be a company or a body corporate; but it is certainly correct to say that whenever the intention of the Legislature is that the company or a body corporate should be criminally liable, the punishment provided for cannot but be fine, and not imprisonment. In this connection, the observation of Lord Blackburn, in Pharmaceutical Society V/s. London and Provincial Supply Association, Ltd., (1880) 5 A. C. 857, is very apposite. In this connection, the observation of Lord Blackburn, in Pharmaceutical Society V/s. London and Provincial Supply Association, Ltd., (1880) 5 A. C. 857, is very apposite. Lord Blackburn, in his learned address to the noble Lords on the question as to whether the word "person" in the statute, under consideration before the noble Lords, does include a "corporation" at pages 869 and 870, said: "I quite agree that a corporation cannot, in one sense, commit a crime -- a corporation cannot be imprisoned if imprisonment be the sentence for crime; a corporation cannot be hanged or put to death if that be the punishment for the crime; and so, in those senses a corporation cannot commit a crime. But a corporation may be fined, and a corporation may pay damages; and, therefore, I must totally dissent, notwithstanding what Lord Justice Bramwell said, or is reported to have said, upon, the supposition that a body corporate or a corporation that incorporated itself for the purpose of publishing a newspaper could not be tried and fined, or an action for damages brought against it for a libel; or that a corporation which commits a nuisance could not be convicted of the nuisance or the like." 42. On a reference to other Acts also, this conclusion of mine is re-inforced. 43. I am conscious that it is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act and, therefore, the meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. But here what I want to shew, with reference to other Acts, is that whenever the Legislature has intended that not the Company or the establishment should be liable, but its manager or other similar officer, it has said so in express terms, and, whenever the Company or the establishment or the like has been made punishable for any offence the sentence is only fine. 44. Under the Companies Act 1956 (I of 1956), where the company is also made punishable, the nature of punishment to be inflicted on It is only fine, but where not the company itself but its officers are intended to be punished, the sentence provided is not only fine but imprisonment also, for instance, Section 218 of the Companies Act. 44. Under the Companies Act 1956 (I of 1956), where the company is also made punishable, the nature of punishment to be inflicted on It is only fine, but where not the company itself but its officers are intended to be punished, the sentence provided is not only fine but imprisonment also, for instance, Section 218 of the Companies Act. It provides inter alia that if there is any contravention of Sec.215 or Sec.217 of the Companies Act. "the company, and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees;". It will, therefore, be seen that as under Sec.218 of the Companies Act, the company was also made liable for the offence contemplated by Sec.218, a sentence of only fine was provided for. If, however, we look to Sec. 63 of the same Act, it will be found that there the sentence of imprisonment is also provided. Sec. 63 provides for criminal liability for mis-statements in prospectus. It provides that every person who authorised the issue of the prospectus shall be punishable with Imprisonment, or with fine, or with both. The company under Sec. 63 of the Companies Act is not liable, but only the person who authorised the issue of the prospectus is liable, and, therefore, the punishment provided is not only fine, but also imprisonment. 45. Similarly, under the Factories Act, 1948 (Act LXIII of 1948), it will be found that Section 92 of that Act provides for general penalty for offences. It lays clown that if in, or in respect of any factory there is any contravention of any of the provisions of that Act or of any rule made thereunder, or any order in writing given thereunder, the occupier and manager of the Factory shall each be guilty of an offence and punishable with imprisonment or with fine, or with both. 46. Mr. Jha, in this connection, relied on Sections 26(2), 31(1) and 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in order to shew that an "employer" under that Act, although it is an industry, is also punishable with imprisonment. 47. The argument of Mr. 46. Mr. Jha, in this connection, relied on Sections 26(2), 31(1) and 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in order to shew that an "employer" under that Act, although it is an industry, is also punishable with imprisonment. 47. The argument of Mr. Jha is obviously fallacious: firstly, because the word "employer" in that Act means the person specified in it, and not the "industry" itself, which has also been defined in Sec.2(j) of that Act; secondly, when a company or an "industry", as defined in the Act, is likely to contravene any provision of the Act or any rule made thereunder the punishment provided is only fine, see Sec.31(2); and, thirdly, when an offence by any company is likely to be committed, every director, manager, secretary, agent, or other officer or person concerned with the management thereof as guilty : See Sec. 32. For these reasons, the contention of Mr. Jha is not valid. 48. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which has specifically by Sec.3 of the Act been made applicable to it, however, it will be found that the word "employer" has specifically been defined to mean the head of the department of Central or State Governments or the chief executive officer of the local authority, and, as such Sections 26(2) and 31(1) provide that any employer who contravenes the provisions of the sections mentioned therein shall be punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with both. Sec.32, of the Industrial Disputes Act, provides for offences by companies, etc., and, therefore it lays down "where a person committing an offence under the Act is a company, or other body corporate, or an association of persons (whether incorporated or not), every director, manager, secretary, agent or other officer or person concerned with the management thereof shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or consent, be deemed to be guilty of such offence." Sec.31 (2) of that Act also provides that "whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if no other penalty is elsewhere provided by or under this Act for such contravention, be punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees". Under the present Act, there is no provision, express or even implied, similar to Sec.32 of the Industrial Disputes Act so as to make even the Manager liable for contravention of Sec. 6(1) of the Act. 49. Mr. Sahay prayed in aid of his contention the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court, Benerji, J., in V. L. Chandi V/s. Banarsilal Bharatia, 1954 BLJR 273. In that case the Electric Supply Co: Ltd., was not summoned, but its managing director and the Resident Engineer, who also was the Manager, were summoned to take their trial for an offence under Sec. 42 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. His Lordship held that under Sec. 42 of the Indian Electricity Act, the licensee alone is liable, and, a company is a legal entity and a breach of statute is an offence which can be visited upon the company itself, and, therefore, the order summoning the Managing Director and the Resident Engineer of the Electric Supply company was held to be illegal, and it was quashed. 50. There is no doubt that a company is a legal entity, and, as pointed out in R. V/s. Tyler and International Commercial Co., (1891) 2 QB 588 at p. 592 by Bowen, L. J. : "Where a duty is imposed upon a company in such a way that a breach of the duty amounts to a disobedience to the law, then, if there is nothing in the statute other expresssly or implied to the contrary, a breach of the statute is an offence which can he visited upon the company." The above observation of Bowen L. J., was relied upon by a Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court in Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Co. Ltd. V/s. Emperor, ILR 11 Rang 162: (AIR 1933 Rang 70). 51. A converse case came up for consideration before the House of Lords in (1880) 5 AC 857, (supra). The statue under consideration by their Lordships did not use the word "Corporation", but it used the word "person" only, and, the question was whether the word "person" does include a "Corporation". It was observed that whether the word "person" in a statute can be treated as including a "corporation" must depend on a consideration of the object of the statute, and, of the enactments passed with a view to carry that object into effect. It was observed that whether the word "person" in a statute can be treated as including a "corporation" must depend on a consideration of the object of the statute, and, of the enactments passed with a view to carry that object into effect. Their Lordships proceeded to examine the statute and found it was passed to protect the public against the sale by incompetent persons of poisonous drugs, and, therefore, under the circumstances of that case, the word "person" in the statute did not include a "corporation" so as to make a company liable to the penalty. In this connection, the principle laid down by the junior Counsel for the Respondents in that case, which was accepted as substantially right by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Selborne), was: "that if a statute provides that no person shall do a particular act except on a particular condition, it is, prima facie, natural and reasonable (unless there be something in the context, or in the manifest object of the statute, or in the nature of the subject-matter, to exclude that construction) to understand the Legislature as intending such persons, as by the use of proper means, may be able to fulfil the condition; and not those who, though called person in law, have no capacity to do so at any time, by any means, or under any circumstances, whatsoever." 52. In the present case, the word used is not "person", but "employer". Who the "employer" under the Act is, and who is contemplated thereby, can be answered only with reference to the Act itself. It is obvious that the employer meant, for the reasons already indicated was the newspaper establishment, for whose working journalists and other employees this Act was enacted. It has not to be forgotten that in its, popular sense and in ordinary use, the word "employer" does not extend so far as to include any of its employees, however highly placed he may be. As observed by the Lord Chancellor, in the just mentioned case of the House of Lords, "Statutes, like other documents, are constantly conceived according to the popular use of language ........." 53. As observed by the Lord Chancellor, in the just mentioned case of the House of Lords, "Statutes, like other documents, are constantly conceived according to the popular use of language ........." 53. I do not see myself how it is possible to suppose, in the absence of express words to that effect, that the Legislature contemplated that anyone of the "newspaper employees" should be considered to be an employer within the meaning of Sec.18(1) of the Act. 54. Mr. Jha in this connection referred to the definition of the word "manager" in the Companies Act. The "manager" has been defined in Sec.2(24) of the Companies Act in the following terms: "2. Definitions. -- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- X X X X X (24) manager means an individual (not being the managing agent) who, subject to the superintendence, control and direction of the Board of Directors, has the management of the whole, or substantially the whole, of the affairs of a company, and includes a director or any other person occupying the position of a manager, by whatever name called, and whether under a contract of service or not;" 55. In the first place, in view of Sec.2(g) of the Act under consideration, it is not permissible to look to the Companies Act for the definition of the word employer" in the Act. In the second place, the above definition also does not solve the question under consideration. Even under this definition, the manager is subject to the superintendence and control of the Board of Directors, although he has the management of the whole or substantially the whole of the affairs of a company. From the definition of newspaper establishment in Sec.2(d) of the Act it will appear that it "means an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or syndicate". From this definition, it is manifest that the petitioner could not be considered to be an employer under or in the newspaper establishment, namely, the Bihar Journals Ltd. 56. Mr. From this definition, it is manifest that the petitioner could not be considered to be an employer under or in the newspaper establishment, namely, the Bihar Journals Ltd. 56. Mr. Jha then strongly urged that Sections 14 and 15 of the Act have made the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Act No. XX of 1946) and the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 (Act XIX of 1952) applicable to newspaper employees, and, therefore, the definition of the word "employer" contained in those two Acts will also apply here, and, as such the word "employer" in Section 18(1) of the Act should be construed in the light of its definition in these two Acts and given the same meaning. Ho, therefore, relied on Sections 2(d)(iii) and 2(e) (ii) of Act XX of 1946 read with Sec.2(k)(iv), (m) and (n) of the Factories Act, 1948 (Act LXIII of 1948), and on Sec.2(e) of Act XIX of 1952. The above sections of the three Acts, relied upon by Mr. Jha, are to the following effect: Act No. XX of 1946 : The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. "2. Interpretation -- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, X X X X X (d) employer means the owner of an industrial establishment to which this Act for the time being applies, and includes - X X X X X (iii) in any other industrial establishment, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the industrial establishment; (e) industrial establishment means - X X X X X (ii) a Factory as defined in Clause (j) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1934, or X X X X X Act LXIII of 1948 : The Factories Act, 1948. "2. "2. Interpretation-- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, X X X X X (k) Manufacturing process means any process -- X X X X X (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; X X X X X (m) factory means any premises including the precincts thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on; or (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being earned on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,-- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (XXXV of 1952), or a railway, running shed; (n) occupier of a factory means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a managing agent, such agent shall be deemed to be the occupier of the factory; x x x x x" Act XIX of 1952 : The Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952. "2. Definition -- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-- X X X X X (e) employer means - (i) in relation to an establishment which is a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory, including the agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier and where a person has been named as a manager of the factory under Clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948, the person so named; and (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of, the establishment, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, such manager, managing director or managing agent"; 57. Mr. Jha further argued that the petitioner, being a manager, would come within the definition of the word employer as given in Act XIX of 1952, quoted above, and. Mr. Jha further argued that the petitioner, being a manager, would come within the definition of the word employer as given in Act XIX of 1952, quoted above, and. therefore, by virtue of Sec.14-A(1) of that Act, he will be liable under Sec.18(1) of the present Act. 58. Sec.14A(1) of Act XIX of 1952 is to the following effect; "14A. Offences by companies -- (1) If the person committing an offence under this Act or the scheme made thereunder is a company every person, who ab the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. * * * * *" The above argument of Mr. Jha based on the aforesaid two Acts, which, no doubt, apply by virtue of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act to newspaper employees also, is not valid, and, as such it cannot be accepted as correct for the reasons given hereinafter. 59. The first reason is that, to accept the definition of "employer" in those two Acts would obviously be a breach of Sec.2(g) of the present Act. Section 2(g) in express terms provides that all words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act. Nowhere the Act provides that if any word is not defined in this Act, and, is also not covered by the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it should have the same meaning as assigned to it in the two Acts referred to in and applied by Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. 60. The second reason is that these two Acts have been made applicable to the newspaper employees under the present Act. to give them mure benefits. 60. The second reason is that these two Acts have been made applicable to the newspaper employees under the present Act. to give them mure benefits. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act cannot be read as making even the definition sections of those two Acts applicable to the definition of the words feed in the present Act. If that would have been the intention of the Parliament, it could have said so in express terms in Sec.2(g) of the Act itself wherein there is a reference to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, only. Sec.2(g) of the Act specifically mentions only the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not these two Acts which are referred to in and applied to the present Act by Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. The deliberate omission of these two Acts in Sec.2(g) of the present Act also clearly goes to shew that the provisions of these two Acts so far as they confer advantages and benefits on newspaper employees under certain circumstances have only been made applicable in order to give additional benefits to them, over and above those conferred on them by the Act itself. 61. For these reasons, in my opinion, the definition of and the meaning given to the word "employer" in the two Acts, referred to in Sections 14 and 15 of the present Act, will not govern the word "employer" used in Sec.18(1) of the Act. 62. The above conclusion of mine gets strong corroboration from the decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturi and Sons (Private) Ltd. V/s. N. Salivateswaran, AIR 1958 SC 507 . In that case, the petitioner, a company, was the proprietor of a daily newspaper fulled "The Hindu". The respondent was a journalist and used to supply news to the "Hindu" on payment of fixed monthly honorarium. Me made an application under Sec.17 of the present Act for payment of a certain sum of money due to him from the newspaper establishment. The contention of the employee was that it a claim is made by the employee and denied by the employer, the merits of the claim together with the other issues that may arise between the parties have to be considered under the section. The contention of the employee was that it a claim is made by the employee and denied by the employer, the merits of the claim together with the other issues that may arise between the parties have to be considered under the section. In this connection, it was argued that as under Sec.3(1) of the Act the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917, had been made applicable, and, as Sec.11(3) of that Act conferred on every Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the maters specified in Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (3) of Sec.11 of that Act, the enquiry contemplated by Sec.17 of the present Act should include within its compass the examination of the merits of the employees claim against his employer and a decision on it. This contention, on the analogy of the Industrial Disputes Act, was rejected by their Lordships, and, His Lordship P. B. Gajendragadkar. J., who pronounced the unanimous opinion of the Court, at p. 510 said: "It is true that Sec.3, Sub-section (1) of the Act provides for the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to or in relation to working journalists subject to Sub-section (2); but this provision is in substance intended to make working journalists workmen within the meaning of the main Industrial Disputes Act. This section cannot be read as conferring on the State Government or the specified authority mentioned under Sec.17 power to enforce attendance of witnesses, exmine them on oath, issue commission or pass orders in respect of the discovery and inspection such as can be passed by the boards, Courts or tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act. If is obvious that the relevant provisions of Sec.11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which confer the said powers on the conciliation officers boards. Courts and tribunals cannot be made applicable to the State Government or the specified authority mentioned under Sec.17 merely by virtue of Section 3(1) of the Act." His Lordship further observed: "It is well known that, whenever the legislature wants to confer upon any specified authority powers of a civil Court in the matter of holding enquiries, specific provision is made in that behalf. If the legislature had intended that the enquiry authorised under Sec.17 should include within its compass the examination of the merits of the employees claim against his employer and a decision on it, the legislature would undoubtedly have made an appropriation provision conferring on the State Government or the specified authority the relevant powers essential for the purpose of effectively holding such an enquiry. The fact that the legislature has enacted Sec.11 in regard to the Wage Board but has not made any corresponding provision in regard to the State Government or the specified authority under Sec.17 lends strong corroboration to the view that the enquiry contemplated by Sec.17 is a summary enquiry of a very limited nature and its scope is confined to the investigation of the narrow point as to what amount is actually due to be paid to the employee under the decree, award, or other valid order obtained by the employee after establishing his claim in that behalf." 63. For the reasons given above, therefore, in the present case also, because by Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, the two Acts referred to therein have been applied to the present Act, they cannot be rend as meaning that the word "employer" should be under-stood in the same sense and construed in the same way and should bear the same meaning as the word "employer" does in these two Acts. The argument of Mr. Jha based On these two Acts, therefore, must be overruled. 64. A question similar to the one which has arisen now came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Karam Chand Thapar V/s. State of Bihar, ILR 37 Pat 726: ( AIR 1958 Pat 378 ). Their Lordships were considering in that case the Mines Act, 1952 (Act XXXV of 1952) and the Indian Mines Act, 1923 (Act IV of 1923), which had been repealed by Section 88 of the 1952 Act. 65. Along with others, all the Directors of Bhowra-Kankance Collieries Ltd., were also prosecuted for an offence under that Act in the just mentioned case. 65a. The criminal prosecution of the Directors of the Colliery was also quashed on the ground that under Section 76 of the new 1952 Act a prosecution may be instituted against "any one of the directors thereof", and not against more than one Director. 65a. The criminal prosecution of the Directors of the Colliery was also quashed on the ground that under Section 76 of the new 1952 Act a prosecution may be instituted against "any one of the directors thereof", and not against more than one Director. In this connection his Lordship, Ramaswami C. J., observed, that "If Parliament had intended that all the Directors should be prosecuted we should expect different language to have been used in Section 76 of the Mines Act". His Lordship, thereafter, referred to other statuses in order to show that such an intention is always expressed by Parliament. 66. It will appear from the other statutes referred to therein that wherever the intention of the Parliament has been to make a company or corporation or a body corporate liable for an offence under the relevant Act, it has in express terms provided that where the person guilty of an offence under that particular Act is a company or Corporation or a body corporate, every director or officer, or manager, or secretary, or other similar officer of the company or corporation, or the body corporate, if, of course, the offence has been committed with his knowledge and consent shall be liable: for example, Sec.15 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (Act 19 of 1923); Sec.15 (2) of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948 (Act 29 of 1918); Section 8(5) of the English Official Secrets Act, 1920; Sec.14 of the Drugs (Control) Act, 1950 (Act 26 of 1950), like Sec.218 and Sec.232 of the Companies Act, 1956, or Sec.32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or, sec. 14-A of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, already referred to. 67. Here also, if the Parliament had intended that the Manager or other similar officer of the newspaper establishment should also be prosecuted for contravention of Sec. 6 of the Act, different language was expected to have been used in Sec.18(1) of the Act. 14-A of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, already referred to. 67. Here also, if the Parliament had intended that the Manager or other similar officer of the newspaper establishment should also be prosecuted for contravention of Sec. 6 of the Act, different language was expected to have been used in Sec.18(1) of the Act. I do not see why Sec.18(1) of the Act be so widely construed, in the absence of any indication anywhere in the Act to the contrary, so as to include the manager of the newspaper establishment also and thus to rope in all its employees, who are excluded from the definition of "working journalist" in Sec.2(f) of the Act, but are included in the definition of "newspaper employee in Sec.2(c) of the Act, simply because such a person is employed in a managerial or administrative or supervisory capacity and has control and superintendence over proof-readers also. In my opinion, to put such a construction on the word "employer" used in Section 18(1) of the Act would be to do violence to the language used in Sec.18(1) of the Act and to negative the object of the Act, and, it will fail to accomplish its purpose. In such a case, the employer, namely, the newspaper establishment may with impunity violate the provisions of the Act, which impose liability on the employer, and take the defence, in case of its prosecution, that it is not liable, but its manager is liable, because he is directly responsible for compliance of the provisions of the Act. In such a case, the working journalists will be driven from pillar to post, and, their interest will be jeopardised. The mischief which the Act was intended to prevent instead of being prevented a very wide door would be opened to the evils which the Act was intended to guard against and thus expose the working journalists to the risk of payment of their wages or the like being delayed or even denied. Such could never have been in contemplation or the intention of the legislature. 68. In the absence, of express declaration in Sec.18(1) of the Act that the word "employer" shall include and extend also to a manager, I think it is clear from the sequel of the Act that a manager cannot be freaked as included in the word "employer". Such could never have been in contemplation or the intention of the legislature. 68. In the absence, of express declaration in Sec.18(1) of the Act that the word "employer" shall include and extend also to a manager, I think it is clear from the sequel of the Act that a manager cannot be freaked as included in the word "employer". I can only look at the language which the Legislature has employed in enacting Sec.18. The class manager or other similar officer has deliberately been omitted from Sec.18(1) of the Act, or as a matter of fact from the Aet itself, wherever the word "employer" has been used in it, and, therefore, it is not possible to fasten the liability of the employer under Sec.18(1) of the Act upon the Manager with regard to an offence under that section of the Act. 69. Looked at from every conceivable point of view, and, considered from all possible angles, therefore, my concluded opinion is that the manager is completely out of Sec.18(1) of the Act; and, therefore, the criminal liability of the newspaper management under Sec.18(1) of the Act cannot be visited on its manager, and, he cannot be made liable to the penalty under Sec.18 (1). The employer, the Bihar Journals Ltd., may be liable, because qui facit per alium facit per se. 70. For the aforesaid reasons, which I have attempted to give, I would accept the contention of Mr. Sahay as correct, and accordingly hold that the word "employer" in Sec.18(1) of the Act does not include and mean its manager, and, therefore, the petitioner, being the manager of the newspaper establishment, of which the proprietor and owner is the Bihar Journals Ltd., which alone is the "employer", and, of which the petitioner is an employee, cannot be legally prosecuted under Sec.18(1) of the Act. The question posed by me, therefore, must be answered in the negative. 71. In the result, the rule is made absolute, the order dated 2-8-1947, of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate summoning the petitioner to take his trial under Sec.18(1) of the Act is set aside, and, the criminal proceeding pending against him is quashed. 72. This order, however, will be no bar to the opposite party filing a fresh complaint against the Bihar Journals Ltd., under Sec.18(1) of the Act, it there is otherwise no legal bar to his doing so.