JUDGMENT G. Kumara Pillai, J. 1. This is an appeal against an order of acquittal made by the Special First Class Magistrate of Cannanore in S.T.C. No. 512 of 1958 on his file. 2. The respondent, the accused in the said case, was conducting a textile business known as Ananda Textiles in the building K. K. 525 at Kakad within the Cannanore Municipality, and in connection with this business he was also carrying on dyeing operations in that building. Alleging that he was carrying on the dyeing operations in 1957-58 without obtaining the licence, which it was necessary for him to take out under section 249 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 5 of 1920, and clause (g) of Schedule V thereto and the Notification dated 1st February 1956 published by the Cannanore Municipal Council under the said section, the Municipal Health Officer, Cannanore, prosecuted him under section 313 of the said Act. The accused pleaded not guilty. His contention before the magistrate was two-fold, namely, (1) that under section 249 and the Notification published by the Cannanore Municipal Council referred to above licence was required for dyeing only if it was being conducted in a "factory '' and, as there was no evidence in the case that the concern he was conducting was a " factory " within the meaning of that term as defined in the Factories Act (Central Act 63 of 1948), he was not bound to take out a licence ; and (2) that even if his concern was held to be a " factory " he was not bound to take out a licence as the Madras Government had by G.O.No.26669-49-8-E1 dated 29th June 1949 exempted all factories engaged in dyeing in yarn or cloth where no mechanical or electrical power was being used from taking out the licences required by section 24 and Schedule V. Both these contentions found favour with the learned Magistrate and has, therefore, acquitted the accused. The Municipal Health Officer his, therefore, filed this appeal. 3. There are six clauses in section 249 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, and of these, clause (1) done is material to the present case. That clause reads is follows : " 249. The Municipal Health Officer his, therefore, filed this appeal. 3. There are six clauses in section 249 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, and of these, clause (1) done is material to the present case. That clause reads is follows : " 249. (1) The council may publish a notification in the district gazette and by beat of drum that no place within municipal limits or at a distance within three miles of such limits shall be used for any one or more of the purposes specified in schedule V without the licence of the executive authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein : Provided that no such notification shall take effect (a) until sixty days from the date of publication, and (b) except with the previous sanction of the State Government in any area outside the municipal limits", (underlining ours). Schedule V bears the heading : , "Purposes for which premises may not be used without a licence under section 249" and clause (g) of that Schedule runs : "(g) making soap, dyeing, boiling or pressing oil, burning bricks, tiles, pottery or lime." It will be seen from the above that there is no mention of the word 'factory' either in section 249 (1) or in clause (g) of Schedule V. The power which has been granted to the municipal council by section 249 (1) is to prohibit the use of any place within the municipal limits or within three miles thereof for any of the purposes mentioned in Schedule V and not to prohibit the use of any factory within the municipal limits or within three miles thereof for such purposes. Likewise, the word used in the heading or title of Schedule V is premises and not factory or factories. It is, therefore, clear that the Legislature has not placed any restrictions or limitations on the powers conferred on the municipal councils by section 249 so as to make such powers exercisable only in relation to factories. 4. Likewise, the word used in the heading or title of Schedule V is premises and not factory or factories. It is, therefore, clear that the Legislature has not placed any restrictions or limitations on the powers conferred on the municipal councils by section 249 so as to make such powers exercisable only in relation to factories. 4. The respondent's counsel contended before us that, even if the municipal council has the wide power under section 249 to prohibit the use of any place within the municipal limits or within three miles thereof for ay of the purposes mentioned in Schedule V, the actual prohibition of the use has to be made by a notification published by the municipal council, and that as the notification of 1st February 1956, under which the prosecution claims the prohibition has been made in this case, prohibits dyeing in factories or for weaving factories without a licence, the prosecution cannot succeed without proving that the accused was conducting the dyeing in a factory or for a factory within the meaning of that term as defined in the Factories Act. The prohibition was first made by the Cannanore Municipal Council by a notification, dated 4th June 1948, and the notification of 1st February 1956 relied upon by the prosecution and referred to above is only a later notification making certain changes and modifications in the first notification. Clause 2 of paragraph 1 of the notification of 1st February 1956 reads : " Under section 249 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920, as amended the Municipal Council, Cannanore, hereby notifies for the information of the public that in super-session of the previous notifications that no place within the municipal limits or within a radius of three miles of the municipal limits shall be used for any one or more of the purposes specified in Schedule V of the Act from 1948-1949 without a licence from the executive authority or the Municipal Health Officer and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein. " The fees for the licences are prescribed in the schedule attached to this notification, and items 32 to 35 relate to dyeing. Item 32 prescribes a fee of Rs. 25 per year for " dyeing as special industry "; item 33 prescribes Rs. " The fees for the licences are prescribed in the schedule attached to this notification, and items 32 to 35 relate to dyeing. Item 32 prescribes a fee of Rs. 25 per year for " dyeing as special industry "; item 33 prescribes Rs. 20 per year for "dyeing for weaving factories" with handlooms of five or less; item 34 prescribes a fee of Rs.35 per year for " dyeing for weaving factories " with handlooms of more than five but less than fifty ; and item 35 prescribes a fee of Rs. 50 per year for "dyeing for weaving factories" with handlooms of fifty and above. The prosecution case is that the accused was conducting dyeing for the Ananda Textiles and that he was bound to take out a licence under clause 2 of paragraph 1 of the notification dated 1st February 1956 and pay the licensing fee mentioned in item 34 of the schedule. To prove that he was liable to pay the fee as per item 34 of the schedule the prosecution relies upon the evidence of P.W. 1, the Sanitary Inspector of the municipality, who says that the accused was doing the dyeing business for the Ananda Textiles in which he was working twenty handlooms. P.W. 1 was not cross-examined on this part of his evidence, and his evidence on this point was not disputed before us also. Therefore, our finding on the question of fact involved in this case is that the accused was conducting the dyeing in the premises mentioned in the complaint for his business, Ananda Textiles, in which he was operating twenty handlooms. 5. Now, the prohibition under clause 2 of paragraph 1 of the notification dated 1st February 1956 is not of the use of a factory within the municipal limits for dyeing without licence but is the prohibition of the use of any place within the municipal limits for such purposes. The fee payable for the licence would depend upon the question as to which of the items, items 32 to 35, would apply to the accused. The prosecution has no case that the dyeing was being conducted as a special industry. Therefore item 32 will not apply to the accused. The specific case of the prosecution is that item 34 applies, as the Ananda Textiles for which the dyeing was being conducted had twenty handlooms. The prosecution has no case that the dyeing was being conducted as a special industry. Therefore item 32 will not apply to the accused. The specific case of the prosecution is that item 34 applies, as the Ananda Textiles for which the dyeing was being conducted had twenty handlooms. According to the respondent's learned counsel, even if the Ananda Textiles was working twenty handlooms item 34 cannot be held to apply to the accused so long as the prosecution has no evidence to prove that the Ananda Textiles was a 'factory' within the meaning of that term as defined in the Factories Act. He lays emphasis on the word ' factories' in the description of the item " dyeing for weaving factories " and contends that it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the concern for which the dyeing was being conducted was a " factory " as that term is defined in the Factories Act. 6. In his cross-examination P.W. 1 was asked whether the Ananda Textiles was a factory within the meaning of that term as defined in the Factories Act, and he said that he did not know. The prosecution has no other evidence. Therefore, it is contended by the respondent's counsel that the prosecution has failed to prove that the Ananda Textiles was a factory and consequently failed to prove also the accused's liability to pay the licence fee as per item 34 of the schedule to the notification. The dictionary meaning of the word ' factory ' is ' manufactory' or ' workshop ', and it cannot be gainsaid that a weaving concern working twenty handlooms would come within the meaning of that word. But the Factories Act has given an artificial definition to the term "factory". The dictionary meaning of the word ' factory ' is ' manufactory' or ' workshop ', and it cannot be gainsaid that a weaving concern working twenty handlooms would come within the meaning of that word. But the Factories Act has given an artificial definition to the term "factory". It is defined in the Factories Act as follows : "(m) "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof” (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (XXXV of 1952) or a railway running shed. " The Factories Act was passed on the 23rd September 1948, and it was enacted for the purpose of consolidating and amending the law regulating labour in factories. The Cannanore municipal council's notification under the Madras District Municipalities Act was first published on 4th June 1948, long before the Factories Act was enacted. It cannot, therefore, be that the word "factory" was used in that notification with reference to the definition of that term in the Factories Act. Further, the purposes of the two Acts are also wholly different, and an artificial definition for a term given in one Act for the purpose of that Act cannot be taken as governing or limiting the natural and ordinary meaning of the same term used in an earlier enactment made, or notification issued, for an entirely different purpose. We hold that the word ' factories ' in items 33 to 35 of the schedule to the notification, dated 1st February 1956 means not factories as defined in the Factories Act but only manufactories or workshops. 7. We hold that the word ' factories ' in items 33 to 35 of the schedule to the notification, dated 1st February 1956 means not factories as defined in the Factories Act but only manufactories or workshops. 7. It would follow that the accused was liable to pay licence fee under item 34 of the schedule to the notification, dated 1st February 1956 and that as he was conducting the dyeing without paying that fee and taking out the necessary licence he is guilty of an offence punishable under section 313 of the Act. 8. But it is contended that the notification of 1st February 1956 itself is illegal as the Madras Government had by G.O. No. 26669-49-8-E1, dated 29th June 1949 exempted all factories engaged in dyeing yarn or cloth where no mechanical or electrical power is used from taking out the licences required by section 249 and Schedule V of the Madras District Municipalities Act. This contention also has been upheld by the Magistrate. The G.O., however, shows that what was exempted by it was only the levy of licensing fee under section 193 of the Madras District Boards Act, 14 of 1920 and not the levy of licensing fee under section 249 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 5 of 1920. The present case is not, therefore, governed at all by the G.O. 9. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal made by the learned Magistrate and convict the accused under section 313 of the Madras District Municipalities Act and order him to pay a fine of Rs. 25. In default of payment of that fine he will undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Under the District Municipalities Act, by his failure to pay the licensing fee and take out a licence, the accused has also become liable to pay a penalty of 50 per cent, of the licensing fee over and above the normal fee, and under clause (9) of section 321 of the Act when a person is convicted for an offence in respect of the failure to obtain a licence the Magistrate has, in addition to the fine which may be imposed for the conviction, to recover summarily and pay over to the municipal council the amount of the fee due to it. The Magistrate will, therefore, recover from the accused not only the fine to which we have sentenced the accused but also the amount of Rs. 52.50 claimed by the municipality as due from the accused on account of the licensing fee and penalty.