JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a Rule against 22 persons calling upon them to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt of Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The charge against them, as far as it can be gathered from the petition, filed in this Court, is that on the 14th of November, 1958, they forcibly entered upon the land in dispute in violation of an order of perpetual injunction restraining them from entering upon the land, in an ex parte decree passed by the 9th Subordinate judge, 24-Parganas, in Title Suit No 93 of 1957. That suit was instituted by the petitioner for khas possession in respect of the lands described in Schedule C of the plaint and for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering upon the land described in Schedule B of the plaint. The operative portion of the decree is as follows: "plaintiff's title to the suit land is declared and the plaintiff do get khas possession of C schedule land by ejecting defendants therefrom. The defendants be restrained permanently from interfering with the plaintiff's cultivation and possession in B Schedule land. Defendants are given 30 days' time from date to remove structures standing on the suit land. In default the plaintiff will get khas possession or dismantle the same in execution of their decree." 2. ON the 29th April, 1958 the defendants filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in that proceeding they filed an application "to stay execution of the decree pending the hearing of the application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. " Upon this application the court made two orders. By the first order dated the 7th of May, 1958, the court directed that stay would be granted only on the applicants' depositing the entire cost by 21-5-58. In default, the petition would stand rejected. On the 21st of May 1958, the Court passed the final order of stay and as there is some dispute between the parties with regard to the construction of this final order of stay I set out the whole of it. It is as follows: "order No. 43 dated 21-5-58. Applicant deposits Rs. 947. 19 np. as claim and cost as per Challan No. 2329 (V) dated 22-5-58. It is as follows: "order No. 43 dated 21-5-58. Applicant deposits Rs. 947. 19 np. as claim and cost as per Challan No. 2329 (V) dated 22-5-58. Execution of the decree is stayed till the disposal of the Misc. Case." Thereafter, according to the petitioner, all the opposite parties forcibly entered upon the disputed land with a view to harvesting the paddy which had been grown by the petitioner but the petitioner succeeded in resisting the opposite parties. It is further stated by the petitioner that between the early part of November 1958, and the 21st of December, 1959, the petitioner harvested the paddy crops grown on the B Schedule land from about 3/4ths of its area and that the paddy-crop grown on the remaining l/4th area still remained to be harvested when a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started against it. These statements made by the petitioner are challenged by the opposite parties who aver in their affidavit-in-opposition that they grew the last crop at their cost on their respective plots and that the allegations of force and violence were all false. In paragraph 26 of the petition the petitioner states that the paddy crops which were sought to be harvested by the Opposite Parties were grown on the land in B schedule of the plaint. This statement, however, is not specifically denied by the Opposite Parties who merely say in paragraph 16 of their affidavit-in-opposition that "they grew the last crop on their respective plots. "These "respective plots" can, therefore, be reasonably inferred to be the plots described in Schedule 'b' of the plaint as alleged by the petitioner. Reading paragraph 26 of the petition upon which this Rule was issued and paragraph 16 of the affidavit-in-opposition where the statement in paragraph 26 is sought to be denied, the conclusion seems to be reasonable that the apposite parties admit that they went upon the land of Schedule B with a view to harvesting the paddy which according to them was grown upon the land by them. Mr. Mr. Ghose appearing far the opposite parties also does not contend before us that the opposite parties did not enter upon the land of schedule B. This act of the opposite parties, in our opinion, constitutes a violation of the order of perpetual in junction incorporated in the ex parte decree dated the 8th of April, 1958. Mr. Ghose appearing for the opposite parties however raised certain points for our consideration. 3. THE first point raised by him was to the effect that the operation of the order of injunction incorporated in the ex parte decree was suspended or stayed by the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the 21st of May. I have already quoted that order in extenso and it does not appear from that order that the learned Subordinate Judge directed the operation of the order of injunction to be suspended during the pendency of the proceeding under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Ghose nevertheless contended that it was certainly the intention of the parties and the intention of the court to stay the operation of the entire decree during the pendency of the miscellaneous proceeding arising out of the application under Order IX, rule 13. We are, however, unable to accept this contention. The intention of the parties can be gathered only from the language used by them in their application and the intention of the court has to be gathered from the making of the order. Neither the one nor the other justifies the conclusion that the parties or the court ever intended to stay the operation of the order of injunction during the pendency of the miscellaneous case under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also to be noted that the opposite parties represented by Mr. Ghose do not state in their affidavit-in-opposition that they understood the order dated the 21st of May, 1958 to mean that it was an order of stay of operation of the order of injunction or that they were misled by any wrong advice given on this point. For these reasons I am unable to hold that the opposite parties were justified in entering upon the land of Schedule B on the 14th of November, 1958. For these reasons I am unable to hold that the opposite parties were justified in entering upon the land of Schedule B on the 14th of November, 1958. Their action in entering upon the land on that date constituted a violation of the order of injunction incorporated in the ex parte decree dated the 8th of April, 1958. 4. THE second point raised by Mr. Ghose is that the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of the offence committed by the opposite parties is excluded by section 3 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act XXXII of 1952 ). That section is in the following terms: "no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code." Mr. Ghose's contention is that the acts alleged to have been done by the opposite parties constitute an offence of trespass and are punishable under section 447 of the Indian Penal Code and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these acts, Dr. Sen Gupta appearing on behalf of the petitioner, however, placed before us a decision of the Supreme Court in the case Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras (1) (1952 S. C. A. 312) where the Supreme Court pointed out that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 2 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926 was confined only to cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate court as punishable as contempt under the specific provisions o3 the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other descriptions for which punishment has been provided in the Penal Code. Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code contains various sections under which a contempt of the lawful authority of the court is made punishable and section 480 of Criminal Procedure Code provides that when any offence as is described in sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of a civil, criminal or revenue court, the court may cause the offender too be detained in custody and may take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to a fine. The decision of the Supreme Court is under the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926 and on comparison of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926 and those of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 it appears to me that the language of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the latter Act is exactly the same as that of subsection (3) of section 2 of the former. For these reasons I hold that under section 3 (2) of the Contempt of Courts act of 1952 the jurisdiction of this Court is excluded only in cases which come under the different sections of Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code relating to contempt of the lawful authority of the Court. The second point raised by Mr. Ghose is therefore of no substance. 5. THE third point raised by Mr. Ghose is that the proceeding for contempt is of quasi-criminal nature and therefore if there is any reasonable doubt about the offence alleged to have been committed by the contemnors, the contemnors are entitled to the benefit of that doubt. Reliance has been placed for this proposition upon a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of State v. Dasarath Jha, (2) (A. I. R. 1951 Pat. 443 ). Assuming that this principle is correct, I find that there is no ground for holding that there is any reasonable doubt as to the nature of the acts done by the opposite parties. The distinction between a civil contempt and a criminal contempt has been considered in various cases and one of such cases is to be found in the decision of this court in the case of Dulal Chandra v. Sukumar (3) (62 C. W. N. 595) where it has been pointed out that if the contempt consists in mere failure to comply with or carry out an order of court made for the benefit of a private party it is civil contempt but if the contempt consists in setting the authority of the courts at naught and has had a tendency to invade the efficacy of the machinery maintained by the State for the administration of justice, it is a public wrong and consequently criminal in nature. Judged by this test, the acts committed by the opposite parties fall within the latter description and it is in the nature of a criminal contempt but, as I have said, there is no room for any reasonable doubt as to the nature of the acts done by the contemnors in this case. There was an order of injunction restraining them from entering upon the land of schedule B and in violation of that order they entered upon the land on the 14th of November 1958. I would, therefore, hold that all the opposite parties are guilty of contempt and are therefore punishable under section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 but a distinction has to be made on the question of sentence between the opposite parties who are represented by Mr. Ghose and those who are not represented by him The opposite parties who are not represented by Mr. Ghose are opposite parties Nos. 1, 4 and 14. From the affidavits it appears that opposite parties Nos. 1 and 4 were on a previous occasion convicted of contempt in T. S. No. 55 of 1944 and sentenced to imprisonment for six months but it appears that that sentence had no deterrent effect so far as they are concerned. There was an appeal against the order passed by the executing court in that case and in dismissing that appeal their Lordships Das Gupta, J. as he then was, and Guha, J. made the following observations:- "as we read the decree, the perpetual injunction restraining him from entering upon the land of the plaintiff implies that he had no possession of the land and that by the terms of the decree he was restrained from being on the land as also from entering into the land from outside. " 6. THE decree passed in the present case has precisely the same effect and in spite of the dismissal of the appeal against the order of the executing court in the earlier case opposite parties nos. 1 and 14 have again deliberately flouted the order of injunction passed in the present case. I would accordingly impose upon the opposite parties nos. 1 and 14 the maximum sentence of six months' simple imprisonment. With regard to the remaining opposite parties who are represented by Mr. 1 and 14 have again deliberately flouted the order of injunction passed in the present case. I would accordingly impose upon the opposite parties nos. 1 and 14 the maximum sentence of six months' simple imprisonment. With regard to the remaining opposite parties who are represented by Mr. Ghose and also opposite party No. 4 who is not represented before us at all, we are inclined to take a more lenient view because it is likely that they were led by opposite parties nos. 1 and 14. For the reasons given above 1 would make this Rule absolute and direct that opposite parties Nos. 1 and 14 be sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and that all the remaining opposite parties do pay a fine of Rs. 50/- each, in default suffer simple imprisonment for three weeks each. Opposite parties Nos. 1 and 14 have not appeared before us although the notices of the Rule have been served personally upon them. We accordingly direct that the District Magistrate of 24-Parganas do issue warrants of arrest against opposite parties nos. 1 and 14 named Rajani Mridha. son of late Chandi Charan Mridha, resident of Mouza Amtoli, P. S. Sandeskhali District 24-Parganas, and Rishibar Mondal, son of Darparayan Mondal, resident of mouza Kalidaspur (Chhoto Mollakhali) P. S. Sandeskhali, District 24-Parganas and send them to simple imprisonment for a period of six months The fines may be realised according to law.